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Abstract
To overcome poverty, strengthening human development is crucial. However, today 250 million chil-
dren younger than 5 years in low-income and middle-income countries are likely not to attain their
full development potential. To overcome the obstacles to optimal human development, this disserta-
tion examines the effect of determinants on the child, parent, school, or country level that determine
child development.
The first essay questions the robustness of parental preferences as the main determinants of the height
gap between children in India and sub-Saharan Africa as Jayachandran & Pande (2017) [J+P] claim.
In this replication and extension, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of J+P’s model considering more
recent data, weights, and additional controls: macro-determinants such as female education, house-
hold prosperity, open defecation, and the consumption of animal sourced foods. We show that the
birth order gradient is shallower and can only explain a small share of the height difference using data
from around 2015 or weights. The additional macro-determinants contribute to explaining the height
gap.
The second essay poses the question if timing and duration of the use of fortified foods in school
lunches determine child development. This essay presents the results of a follow-up study to a
randomized controlled trial of a nutrition intervention that provides double-fortified salt [DFS] to
government schools in Bihar. We find that children who receive DFS for almost 4 years have
higher hemoglobin levels. Children with DFS exposure only in early childhood have also increased
hemoglobin levels and reduced likelihood of suffering from moderate or severe anemia than children
who only receive DFS briefly for 4 months in later childhood. The results show that a public nutrition
intervention can determine child health outcomes.
The third essay investigates how market returns to investments and parentsâ perception thereof inter-
acted with child endowments determine parental investments in children in India. Though research
has examined the effects and causes of son preference in India widely, studies fail to cleanly identify
the underlying reasons for lower parental investments in daughters. Our lab-in-the-field experiment
reveals that parents react to different market settings: parents invest almost 10 percent less of the ini-
tial endowment in their children under competition. Further, parentsâ investments decrease by more
than a quarter of the initial endowment once their own child competes against a boy. Market returns
determine parental investments in children and so child development.
Zusammenfassung
Um Armut zu bekämpfen, muss die menschliche Entwicklung gestärkt werden. Allerdings werden
heute 250 Millionen Kinder unter 5 Jahren in Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen
wahrscheinlich nicht ihr volles Entwicklungspotenzial erreichen. Um Hindernisse für eine optimale
menschliche Entwicklung zu beseitigen, untersucht diese Dissertation die Wirkung von Determinan-
ten kindlicher Entwicklung auf der Ebene des Kindes, der Eltern, der Schule oder des Landes.
Der erste Aufsatz stellt die Robustheit der elterlichen Präferenzen als Hauptdeterminanten der Größe-
nunterschiede zwischen Kindern in Indien und Subsahara-Afrika in Frage, wie Jayachandran & Pande
(2017) [J+P] behaupten. In dieser Replikation und Erweiterung führen wir eine Sensitivitätsanalyse
des Modells von J+P. Wir verwenden aktuellere Daten, Gewichte und zusätzliche Kontrollvariablen
von Makro-Determinanten wie weibliche Bildung, Haushaltswohlstand, Defäkation unter freiem Him-
mel und der Konsum von Nahrungsmitteln tierischer Herkunft. Unter Verwendung von Daten um das
Jahr 2015 und Gewichtung ist der Gradient der Geburtenreihenfolge flacher und der Höhenunter-
schieds weniger durch elterlichen Präferenzen erklärbar. Die Makro-Determinanten tragen zur Erk-
lärung des Größenunterschieds bei.
Der zweite Aufsatz stellt die Frage, ob Zeitpunkt und Dauer der Verwendung von angereicherten
Lebensmitteln in der Schulspeisung die kindliche Entwicklung bestimmen. Dieser Aufsatz präsen-
tiert Ergebnisse einer Folgestudie zu einer randomisierten kontrollierten Studie einer Ernährungsin-
tervention, die doppelt angereichertes Salz [DFS] für staatliche Schulen in Bihar bereitstellt. Unsere
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kinder, die mindestens 3 Jahre lang in der frühen Kindheit DFS erhalten
haben, höhere Hämoglobinwerte aufweisen. Kinder, die nur in der frühen Kindheit mit DFS versorgt
wurden, haben zudem eine geringere Wahrscheinlichkeit, an moderater oder schwerer Anämie zu lei-
den, als Kinder, die nur kurzzeitig für 4 Monate in der späteren Kindheit DFS erhalten. Eine staatliche
Ernährungsintervention scheint bestimmend für Kindergesundheit zu sein.
Der dritte Aufsatz untersucht, wie Marktrenditen für Investitionen und die Wahrnehmung der Eltern
derer Investitionen in Kinder in Indien bestimmen. Obwohl die Forschung die Auswirkungen und Ur-
sachen der Sohn-Präferenz in Indien umfassend untersucht hat, sind die zugrundeliegenden Ursachen
für geringere elterliche Investitionen in Töchter nicht klar identifiziert. Unser Lab-in-the-Field Exper-
iment zeigt, dass Eltern auf Marktbedingungen reagieren: Eltern investieren unter Wettbewerb fast 10
Prozent weniger des Startkapitals in ihre Kinder. Außerdem sinken die Investitionen der Eltern um
mehr als ein Viertel des Startkapitals, sobald ihr Kind gegen einen Jungen antritt. Marktrenditen
bestimmen die elterlichen Investitionen in Kinder und damit die kindliche Entwicklung.
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1 | Introduction
1 Context for Investigating Determinants of Child Develop-
ment in India
Around 600 million people in the world live in extreme income poverty, on less than $1.90 a
day (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2019). When using a different poverty
measure such as the Multidimensional Poverty Index even more people live in extreme poverty,
1.3 billion (UNDP, 2019). As this is an unacceptably high number for the global community,
the first of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations demands to "end poverty
in all its forms everywhere" by 2030 (General Assembly resolution, 2015).
To overcome poverty, strengthening human development is crucial (UNDP, 2019). However,
today 250 million children younger than 5 years in low-income and middle-income countries
are likely not to attain their full potential, i.e. competencies to make accomplishments in aca-
demic, behavioral, socio-emotional, and economic areas (M. M. Black et al., 2017).
Whether children reach their developmental potential is to a large degree determined before
their birth (Currie & Almond, 2011; Deaton, 2003). Parental resources such as maternal ed-
ucation, maternal health, and income or community resources like sanitation or safety affect
brain development, nutritional status, and health in early childhood (M. M. Black et al., 2017).
Growth failure due to malnutrition below primary-school age is associated with lower school-
ing, lower test performance, lower household per capita expenditure, and a higher probability
of living in poverty as an adult (Alderman et al., 2006; Hoddinott et al., 2013). As deprivations
during childhood carry through to adulthood, poverty is transmitted from one generation to an-
other.
Children are a good target group to stop the vicious cycle because they have not yet completed
their human development. Interventions in childhood or early adolescence allow to catch up to
prior foregone development to a certain degree (Jee et al., 2014).
India is an interesting study region for enhancing child development in an adverse setting be-
1
cause India is home to about 18.69 percent of children between 0 and 14 years of age in the
world, 366 million (World Bank, 2019). At the same time, 21.2 percent of India’s population
lives under extreme income poverty with less than $ 1.90 a day (UNDP, 2019). To learn how to
overcome the transmission of poverty by strengthening human development, India is an ideal
setting.
The description of the intergenerational transmission of poverty already shows that the determi-
nants of child development root in multiple disciplines. To do justice to this multidisciplinary
research area, I want to relate the examined determinants of child development in this disserta-
tion to the disciplines of economics, public policy, and public health. For this, I introduce three
seminal models to capture the essence of the multidisciplinary approaches and match the three
essays in this dissertation with these conceptual models. In this way, I want to show how this
dissertation contributes to progress in each discipline.
2 Conceptual Models for Determinants of Child Health and
Development
To find remedies for intergenerational poverty, it is helpful to consult existing conceptual models
on the formation of child development because determinants, causes, and influencing factors are
spread across multiple levels and dimensions linked to several disciplines, such as economics,
public policy, and public health. To do justice to the interdisciplinary character of the research
on this topic, I introduce three seminal conceptual models: the intergenerational transmission
theory by Becker & Tomes (1979) and Becker & Tomes (1986), the "Framework of Causes
of Malnutrition and Death" by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
[UNICEF] (1990), and the"Framework for actions to achieve optimal fetal and child nutrition
and development" by R. E. Black et al. (2013). After a brief summary of each model and a
brief comparison, I show which pathways in these conceptual models are captured in the three
different essays of my dissertation. I focus on the used dependent and independent variables.
2
2.1 An Economics Conceptual Model: Theory of the Transmission of
Earnings, Assets, and Consumption from Parents to Descendants
In the model of the transmission of earnings, assets, and consumption from parents to descen-
dants by Becker & Tomes (1979) and Becker & Tomes (1986) the focus lies on the parents’
utility function that derives from own parental consumption and wealth of children in the future
period. We consider the income of children in the future as the measured outcome of child
development. Parents face a maximization problem in which they have to choose the optimal
investments in the human capital development of children subject to family income constraints.
All parents independent of their financial present income can contribute to the production of
wealth of children by investing in their human capital development giving up their own con-
sumption. We consider the demand function for the income of children by Becker & Tomes
(1979) to learn about what factors matter for child wealth in the future. We use the equation
even though it is a simplification of reality because it does not account for the quantity of chil-
dren, only the overall wealth of all children in the family.
It+1 = αwt+1(1− h+ f)ēt + βtIt + ahwt+1et + αwt+1vt+1 + αwt+1ut+1 (1.1)
with
It+1 wealth of children in future t+ 1
α fraction of family income spent on children
wt+1 real income per unit of capital to children in t+ 1
(1− h+ f)ēt cultural or social environment
et parental endowment
h constant fraction of et inherited by children
ēt average endowment in generation t
f rate of growth of ēt
βt parents’ propensity to invest in children
It wealth of children at time t
3
vt+1 exogenous component in the endowment of children
ut+1 market returns to child capital
The demand function reveals that the income of children in the future It+1, a measured out-
come of child development, depends on factors related to the parents, family, or the child itself.
These are the share of income spent on children α , the income returns to developed capital
of children wt+1, the parental endowment et, the fraction of inherited endowment of parents h,
parents’ propensity to invest in children βt, the wealth of children at time t, and idiosyncratic
shocks vt+1. The demand function also depends on factors beyond the family. These apply for
whole communities or societies: the cultural or social environment (1 − h + f)ēt, the average
endowment in generation t ēt, the rate of growth of the average endowment f , covariate shocks
vt+1, and the market returns to investments ut+1 shaped by the current market situation. Becker
& Tomes (1979) extend the model and also include further factors like economic growth, taxes,
or subsidies.
2.2 A Public Policy Conceptual Model: UNICEF (1990) Framework of
Causes of Malnutrition and Death
Moving from the economists’ perspective to the political arena, we introduce the "UNICEF
(1990) Framework of Causes of Malnutrition and Death" as the second seminal conceptual
model (Figure 1.1). This conceptual model reflects the multisectoral nature of child survival,
growth, and development, especially the nutritional status. Its goal is to bring all possible causes
together to allow an exchange between different professions. It is explicitly not predictive.
The framework considers three levels of causes that generate the manifestations: immediate,
underlying, and basic causes. Immediate causes are the health status and dietary intake of the
child. These are rooted in the underlying causes that represent unmet basic needs of children
and women and belong to one of the following three groups: household food security, care for
children and women, or health services and healthy environment.
Underlying causes are triggered by basic causes that include multiple levels. The first level
consists of potential resources of production of a community or society. In the second level, the
political and ideological superstructure and the economic structure are introduced that restrict
the potential resources. This is reflected in the third level, in the real allocation of human, eco-
nomic, and organizational resources as well as control. The ability to use the available potential
4
Figure 1.1: UNICEF (1990) Conceptual Model of Causes of Malnutrition and Death
Source: UNICEF (1990)
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is moderated by information, education, or communication of households. This channels the
real allocation to the underlying causes.
The model has also been adapted and modified (see for example the adaptation by van den Bold
et al. (2013) in the appendix).
2.3 A Public Health Conceptual Model: Framework for Actions to Achieve
Optimal Fetal and Child Nutrition and Development
We turn now from the policy perspective to a public health framework that aims at informing
about viable intervention options. We consider the "Framework for actions to achieve optimal
fetal and child nutrition and development" by R. E. Black et al. (2013) (Figure 1.2).
It differs from the conceptual model introduced before because instead of looking at causes of
Figure 1.2: Framework for Actions to Achieve Optimal Fetal and Child Nutrition and Develop-
ment
Source: R. E. Black et al. (2013)
undernutrition it displays pathways to reach optimal fetal and child development. The possible
benefits during the life course of this are displayed at the top of the diagram.
Optimal development builds on "dietary, behavioural, and health determinants" (R. E. Black et
al., 2013). They are affected by underlying causes of dietary determinants, behavioral determi-
nants, and health determinants.
6
Causes of the dietary determinants are related to food security, causes of the behavioral deter-
minants to caregiving resources, and causes of health determinants to environmental conditions
regarding health.
These causes in turn rely on a broader context base that includes knowledge and evidence,
politics and governance, leadership, capacity, and the financial resources, and also the overall
social, economic, political, and environmental context on a national and global level.
Further, this framework points out possible pathways to intervene in all three levels of the
model. Interventions listed in "building an enabling environment" aim to improve the context
base for the causes of the determinants (R. E. Black et al., 2013). Nutrition sensitive programs
and approaches focus on the underlying causes of the development determinants whereas nutri-
tion specific interventions and programs target the development determinants.
2.4 Comparison of the Conceptual Models
After the brief introduction, I want to highlight the key differences and similarities of the intro-
duced conceptual models in Table 1.1. The three conceptual models derive from different disci-
plines and have distinct goals. The economic conceptual model by Becker & Tomes (1979) and
Becker & Tomes (1986) aims at predicting the transmission of earnings, assets, and consump-
tion from parents to descendants. The "UNICEF (1990) Framework of Causes of Malnutrition
and Death" is explicitly not predictive. Its goal is to facilitate an exchange between different
professions that are related to child development. The"Framework for actions to achieve opti-
mal fetal and child nutrition and development" by R. E. Black et al. (2013) intends to inform
about viable intervention options.
The style, outcomes, and input factors considered in the conceptual models are quite similar
in the models by UNICEF (1990) and R. E. Black et al. (2013). Both represent multi-level
frameworks. The outcome for both models is explicitly child development that includes the
nutritional status. Both identify basic or a base that influences causes that affect either deter-
minants or immediate causes of the outcome. Basic causes in the UNICEF (1990) framework
and the base of causes by R. E. Black et al. (2013) include the broader economic, human, orga-
nizational, political, ideological, social, and environmental context, knowledge, and resources.
Causes of the determinants in the framework by R. E. Black et al. (2013) look at the same as-
pects as the UNICEF (1990) framework: food security, care for children and women, as well as
health services and hygienic environment. The basic causes in the UNICEF (1990) framework
7
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are defined more broadly because it only considers dietary intake and health status compared
to the framework by R. E. Black et al. (2013). In this model dietary intake is included but also
behavioral determinants like parenting and health determinants such as the low burden of infec-
tious diseases.
The theoretical model by Becker & Tomes (1979) and Becker & Tomes (1986) follows a dif-
ferent approach. It considers the wealth of children in the future as the outcome in the demand
function for the income of children. The input factors are not hierarchical. It considers the
wealth of children in terms of monetary income though we interpret wealth here as develop-
ment. Unlike the two other frameworks, Becker & Tomes (1979) and Becker & Tomes (1986)
explicitly consider two time periods and include how parental beliefs about the future could
affect present behavior.
The demand function depends on parameters that focus on the context like economic growth,
market returns to child capital, exogenous components in the endowment of children, real in-
come per unit of capital to children in the future, the cultural or social environment, or the
average endowment in a generation. This is similar to the basic or base of causes in the two
multi-level frameworks. Parameters like parental endowments, the fraction of family income
spent on children, or parents’ propensity to invest in children captures the underlying causes or
causes of dietary and behavioral determinants such as food security via household income or
care for children. The theoretical model also uses child endowments like the wealth of the child
at present and inherited endowments of parents that are represented as health status, a basic
cause, in the UNICEF (1990) framework.
Even though the three presented seminal models pursue different goals, derive from different
disciplines, and have a different style, they roughly fit together regarding the considered links
for child development.
2.5 Contextualizing the Dissertation
This a good starting point to examine the considered determinants in the three essays of this
dissertation in the light of the conceptual models. I create an overview table by listing the
matching concepts in the model with the dependent and independent variables of each essay in
Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2: Contextualizing the Essays Given Three Seminal Conceptual Models
Essay Variable Becker & Tomes(1979, 1986) UNICEF (1990) Black et al. (2013)
Dependent:
1 Child height
Wealth of children in
the future
Manifestation
Optimal child nutrition
and development
Independent:
Parental
preference
Cultural or social envi-
ronment
Basic causes
(political and ideologi-
cal superstructure)
Base of causes
(social context)
Female
education
Parental endowment;
average endowment in
parent generation
Basic causes
(education)
Base of causes
(knowledge and evidence)
Economic
growth
Economic growth Basic causes
(economic resources)
Base of causes
(economic context)
Anti-open
defecation
campaigns
Cultural or social envi-
ronment
Basic causes
(information, educa-
tion, communication
Base of causes
(knowledge and evidence)
Nutrition
transition
Income spent on chil-
dren
Basic causes
(economic resources)
Base of causes
(economic context)
Dependent:
2
Child health,
cognition,
school outcomes
Wealth of children in
the future
Manifestation
Optimal child nutrition
and development
Independent:
Timing and
Duration of
DFS Supply
Covariate shocks;
subsidies
Basic causes
(organisational
resources)
Cause of dietary determi-
nants
(food security)
Dependent:
3 Child Investment
Parents’ propensity to
invest in children
Underlying causes
(care for children)
Cause of behavioral deter-
minants
(caregiving resources on
the maternal and house-
hold level)
Independent:
Competitive
labor market
Market returns to child
capital;
exogenous components
in the endowment of
children
Basic causes
(economic structure)
Base of causes
(economic context)
Source: Own elaboration.
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2.5.1 Essay 1
The first essay examines the sensitivity of parental preferences as the main determinants of the
height gap between children in India and sub-Sahara Africa [SSA]. One robustness check is the
inclusion of recent macro-determinants. The focus lies on parental preferences for the eldest
son or generally sons in India and macro-determinants like female literacy, economic growth,
anti-open defecation campaigns, and the nutrition transition that have developed differently in
India compared to SSA. We examine how these determinants influence the height of children
below 5 years of age.
In the perspective of the model of the transmission of earnings, assets, and consumption from
parents to descendants by Becker & Tomes (1979) and Becker & Tomes (1986) the outcome
variable of interest is child wealth in the future. The explanatory variables parental preferences
and anti-open defecation campaigns can be counted to the cultural or social environment. Eco-
nomic growth has been examined by Becker & Tomes (1979) as a potential determinant for
future child wealth. The explanatory variable female literacy is reflected in the parental endow-
ment but also in the average endowment in the parent generation. Another macro-determinant,
the nutrition transition, represents an increase in the real income spent on children. The nutrition
transition is a change in the dietary pattern of the population. It is accompanied by decreasing
prices for staple foods. Via the income effect of decreasing prices parents purchasing power in-
creases and they can afford to buy more calories with a fixed nominal income spent on children.
When we use the UNICEF (1990) framework to contextualize this essay, we find that most ex-
planatory variables fall into the level of basic causes. Parental preferences belong to the political
and ideological superstructure. Economic growth and the nutrition transition as a change in the
availability and access of foods count to the economic resources. Female literacy and anti-open
defecation campaigns change the information, education, or communication of how resources
and control of these are used by the households. This moderates how the basic causes affect
the underlying causes. The explanatory variables determine the underlying causes that in turn
affect immediate causes and so the manifestation of interest, the height of children.
In the framework of R. E. Black et al. (2013) most of the explanatory variables of the gap
of child height between India and SSA count to the base of causes of the development deter-
minants. Parental preferences belong to the social context, economic growth and the nutri-
tion transition to the economic context, female literacy, and anti-open defecation campaigns to
knowledge. So the explanatory variables determine the underlying causes of the development
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determinants that shape the optimal child nutrition and development. Parental preferences, fe-
male literacy, and economic growth affect food security, feeding and caregiving resources, and
access to health services, all three domains of the underlying causes. The nutrition transition
influences only food security and the anti-open defecation campaigns the hygienic environment.
The considered outcome, the height of children, is represented by the optimum child nutrition
and development in the framework.
2.5.2 Essay 2
The second essay poses the question if timing and duration of the use of double-fortified salt
[DFS] in the school lunch determine child development. This essay presents the results of a
nutrition intervention that bridges a supply chain gap. Even though schools are obligated to
use iron and iodine fortified salt, DFS, in the Midday-Meal-Scheme [MDM], the Indian school
feeding program, by law, they do not adhere because DFS is not widely available in the market.
We start providing DFS to schools at different times and follow up with children leaving the
treatment schools to learn about the determining character of timing and duration of DFS usage
on children’s health, cognition, and school attainment.
In the perspective of the model of the transmission of earnings, assets, and consumption from
parents to descendants by Becker & Tomes (1979) and Becker & Tomes (1986) this nutrition
intervention represents either a covariate shock or a type of subsidy because children receive
investments in their human capital development apart from their parents. The considered out-
comes, children’s health, cognition, and school attainment, are represented as child wealth in
this model.
When we consider the UNICEF (1990) framework, our intervention targets basic causes be-
cause we add to the organizational resources by working as a supplier of DFS to schools. This
has an impact on the underlying causes because the care for children is increased. This affects
the immediate cause of dietary intake and so manifests in child development.
Using the framework by R. E. Black et al. (2013), we have to refine the type of our intervention.
Our intervention has the character of a nutrition sensitive program because it improves food se-
curity, i.e. the economic access of schools to the fortified product. By strengthening the access
to foods, a cause of the dietary determinants, we contribute to children’s intake of nutrient rich
foods, a dietary determinant to improve children’s health, cognition, and school attainment. The
outcomes reflect the goal in the framework: optimal child nutrition and development.
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2.5.3 Essay 3
The third essay investigates how market returns to investment and parents’ perception thereof
interacted with child endowments determine parental investments in children. The outcome is
here not child development but one step before: the provision of investments used for building
up child development.
The logic of this paper follows the theory of the transmission of earnings, assets, and con-
sumption from parents to descendants by Becker & Tomes (1979) and Becker & Tomes (1986)
closely. The link between this essay and the model is explained in more detail in the essay itself.
The design used in the essay artificially changes the market situation. In this ways, we cleanly
identify how these changes affect parents’ propensity to invest in their children. The considered
child endowments like gender and ability are captured by the exogenous components in the
endowment of children in the demand function for child wealth in the future. The endowment
might moderate the parental propensity to invest.
In terms of the UNICEF (1990) framework, this study manipulates a basic cause, the economic
structure, because it changes the market returns to investment for parents. The market structure
affects the human and economic resources and control within the basic causes. These influence
the underlying cause of care for children, parental investment in this essay.
In the light of the framework by R. E. Black et al. (2013), a change in the market returns to
investment is reflected in the economic context of the base for the causes of child determinants.
This directly affects the caregiving resources of a household, a behavioral determinant, that
represents the outcome of interest of the essay in this framework.
2.5.4 Conclusion of Contextualization
The contextualization reveals how this dissertation adds to the broad field of determinants of
child development across disciplines. We provide further evidence for the Public Health com-
munity by showing how the base of causes (Essay 1) or causes of dietary determinants (Essay
2) influence optimal child nutrition and development following the framework by R. E. Black
et al. (2013). Essay 3 looks at how the base of causes affects causes of behavioral determinants.
Considering the UNICEF (1990) framework all essays look at the effect of basic causes. How-
ever, the first two essays consider the manifestations of child development as outcomes while
the outcome of the third essay belongs to underlying causes.
In the light of the theory of the transmission of earnings, assets, and consumption from parents
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to descendants by Becker & Tomes (1979) and Becker & Tomes (1986) the first two essays deal
with the generation of wealth of children in the future as the outcome. They look at different ex-
planatory variables: essay 1 at the cultural or social environment, parental endowment, average
endowment in parent generation, economic growth, as well as income spent on children, and
essay 2 at covariate shocks or subsidies. The third essay examines the effect of market returns
to capital and exogenous components in the endowments of children on parents’ propensity to
invest in children.
The explored determinants as well as the considered outcomes have relevance for economics,
public policy, and public health.
3 Summary of the Essays
The contextualization has already provided a brief introduction to the three essays of the dis-
sertation. In the following, I summarize the essays about determinants of child development in
India in more detail.
3.1 Essay 1
The first essay is co-authored by Professor Stephan Klasen and reassesses a puzzle in science:
the "Asian Enigma". It describes the contradiction of greater progress in indicators like gross
domestic product [GDP], food supply, education, and health services and remaining higher child
malnutrition in South Asia [SA] compared to SSA (Smith et al., 2003; Ramalingaswami et al.,
1996; Klasen, 2008; Headey et al., 2012).
The literature offers a broad range of possible determinants for this puzzle like women’s status,
sanitation, urbanization, agricultural development, or measurement errors due to genetic differ-
ences in growth potential (Smith, 2003; Headey et al., 2012; Klasen, 2008; de Haen et al., 2011;
Spears, 2018). Jayachandran & Pande (2017) make the case for another possible determinant:
parental eldest son preference. The study by Jayachandran & Pande (2017), henceforth J+P, has
been quite influential and triggered more research concentrating on cultural preferences of birth
order and gender shaping health outcomes for children.
The wide use of cultural preference for sons as a determinant for health outcomes of children
demand a sensitivity analysis. Providing future researchers insights into the sensitivity of J+Ps
models constitutes the main contribution of this essay. After the publication of the study by J+P,
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data for about 10 years later has become available. During that time four major trends emerged
that could impact child health outcomes between India and SSA largely: greater female educa-
tion, further economic growth, anti-open defecation campaigns, and the nutrition transition.
As a starting point for our sensitivity analysis, the same methodology by J+P is used but with
more recent data from around 2015 considering a similar SSA sample. The data derive from
the Demographic and Health Surveys [DHS], either directly from the platform in the case of
the India samples or from the IPUMS Demographic and Health Surveys [IDHS] project for
the SSA sample. Further, we use different methodology but similar data used by J+P from
around 2005. At first, we only adjust the methodology by weighting the data to make it nation-
ally representative. We show that the birth order effect can only explain a small share of the
difference in height between African and Indian children when using either more recent data
or weighting. Moreover, we bring in new determinants of the height gap that have developed
differently over time. Still using weights, we examine to what extent the consequences of the
macro-determinants - female education, household prosperity, open defecation, and the con-
sumption of animal proteins - can account for the height difference. We find that the emerging
macro-determinants are drivers of the difference in height between African and Indian children
and so help to explain the "Asian Enigma".
3.2 Essay 2
The second essay is joint work with Abhijeet Kumar, Santosh Kumar, and Sebastian Vollmer.
We conduct a follow-up study to the RCT by Krämer et al. (2020) that supplies DFS to schools.
This mimics the implementation of a directive by the Indian Ministry of Women and Child
Development that postulates all government run schools to use DFS in the MDM (Ministry of
Human Resource Development, 2015). However, this policy is hardly implemented due to a
lack in supply of DFS. Facilitating the availability of DFS at schools, we want to investigate
the impact of this policy on child health, cognition, and school outcomes in the long run. By
examining whether timing and duration of a nutrition sensitive intervention determine child de-
velopment we complement the literature about long-term treatments and food fortification in
school programs.
Examining the consequences of long-term treatments is in accordance with the recent article by
Bouguen et al. (2018) who call for looking beyond short-term treatment effects of randomized
controlled trials [RCT]. Like Chhabra et al. (2019) we are interested in the policy-relevant ef-
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fects of a program but we focus on only one cohort and long-term treatment with an immediate
follow-up.
Further, pure DFS has been used as a treatment in the MDM at a large scale only by Krämer et
al. (2020) before. They assess the effect of DFS over a period of 1 year at government-funded
schools in two blocks of the district Jehanabad in Bihar. The RCT covers 54 randomly selected
treatment schools that receive the DFS and 53 control schools that use iodized salt. The as-
sessed outcomes are the change in hemoglobin levels, educational achievements, and cognitive
ability of 2,000 children.
By using data collected after almost 4 years of treatment, we examine the effect of DFS use
for four different exposure groups and so come close to possible real-world implementations:
children who receive DFS in their MDM since third or fifth grade and continued receiving it or
stopped at the end of fifth grade. Thus, this essay contributes to the literature by considering
the so far longest treatment period of DFS of a maximum treatment period of almost 4 years,
by examining different treatment periods and duration, and by investigating how a childhood
intervention (in third grade) unfolds in outcomes for young adolescents (in sixth grade).
For the data analysis, the RCT structure is exploited to measure the policy-relevant intention-to-
treat [ITT] effects. We use analysis of covariance [ANCOVA] estimation techniques to assess
the difference in means of the health, cognition, and education outcome variables of four dif-
ferent exposure groups of DFS.
Our results show that compared to a child group that is hardly exposed to the DFS treatment in
the MDM, children who receive DFS for almost 4 years have on average a higher hemoglobin
level of 0.260 g/dL. Even treatment in only early childhood increases the hemoglobin level by
the same amount and reduces the likelihood of a child being moderate or severe anemic by 8.6
percentage points compared to the children who are only exposed to DFS for 4 months in later
childhood.
The results show that a public nutrition intervention - short-or-long-term - can determine child
health outcomes and so the overall development of children.
3.3 Essay 3
The third paper, co-authored by Sebastian Vollmer, investigates how a competitive labor mar-
ket and parents’ belief thereof in combination with child endowments determine parental in-
vestment in children in India. Though there is evidence available about how changes in the
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labor market influence investment decisions of parents, studies fail to cleanly identify the effect
because of the use of retrospective studies. The real-world setting does not allow to isolate
the effect of market returns to investment from other input factors like human capital returns
to investment or child endowment (Carranza, 2014; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982; Munshi &
Richard Rosenzweig, 2006; Heath & Mushfiq Mobarak, 2012; Jensen, 2010; Jensen & Miller,
2010)
Only Durante et al. (2015) offer a cleaner identification. They use a discrete-choice experiment
in a lab-like setting to examine how different economic situations shape the spending behavior
of consumers towards female or male children. However, they investigate investment behavior
in general in different market settings, not for the particular relationship of parental investment
in children.
Our study combines both approaches using a lab-in-the-field experiment with sixth grade stu-
dents and their parents in rural Bihar. In this way, we cleanly isolate one effect and capture the
particular real-world relationship. We use the strategy method to elicit the investment of parents
for two different market returns to investment: a non-competitive setting with a piece-rate pay-
ment scheme depending on the performance of the participants’ own child and a competitive
setting with a contest payment scheme depending on the absolute and relative performance of
the own child in a tournament against either a girl, a boy, or a child with unknown gender. We
use ordinary least squares [OLS] regressions with cluster robust standard errors to test hypothe-
ses about parents’ investment and beliefs derived from a conceptual framework.
Our lab-in-the-field experiment reveals that parents react to different market returns to invest-
ment. We find that parents invest about 10 percent less of the initial endowment in their children
when exposed to market returns that are based on a competition with others. Parents’ belief
about the probability of their own child winning against a competitor has a positive association
with investing in their children. Though the effect magnitude does not outweigh the decrease
in investment due to competition. Irrespective of the gender of the own child, parents invest
less in the tournament setting when their own child competes against a girl or a boy. Parents’
investments decrease by more than a quarter of the initial endowment once the competitor is a
boy.
We make contributions to two strains of literature. We add to the experimental literature with
evidence about the influence of competition on the investment behavior of participants in risky
settings. We also show how the gender dynamics of competitors matter for a third party that is
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not involved in the competition itself. Additionally, we contribute to the examination of input
factors of parental investment decision by isolating the effect of market returns to investment
and its interaction with child endowment in a lab-in-the-field experiment.
We conclude that market returns to investment and parents’ beliefs thereof determine child in-
vestments, the base for child development.
4 Outline
The rest of this dissertation about determinants of child development in India is organized as
follows: Chapter 2 presents the first essay about the sensitivity of parental preferences as de-
terminants of the gap of child height between India and SSA. In chapter 3, the second essay is
presented. It investigates the effect of timing and duration of a nutrition intervention on chil-
dren’s health, cognition, and school outcomes. The third essay follows in chapter 4. It cleanly
identifies how competitive markets and parents’ beliefs thereof determine investments in chil-
dren. The Appendix contains chapters for each essay with further information regarding data
collection, data analysis, results, or robustness checks.
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2 | Essay 1: "Why are Indian Children So Short? The
Role of Birth Order and Son Preference" - Repli-
cation and Extension
Abstract.1 Using data from about 2005, Jayachandran & Pande (2017), henceforth J+P, argue
that most of the difference in height between African and Indian children is due to the worse
treatment of higher birth order children, particularly girls. In this replication and extension,
we conduct a sensitivity analysis of J+P’s model considering more recent data, weights, and
macro-determinants s additional controls. We show that the birth order effect can only explain
a small share using data from around 2015. When weighing the 2005 Indian data used by
J+P to make them nationally representative, the birth order effect can also only explain a small
share of the height difference. In both of these analyses, the Indian birth order gradient is
much shallower than in J+P’s results. We then investigate the robustness of J+P’s model to the
inclusion of female education, household prosperity, open defecation, and the consumption of
animal sourced foods. We find that these factors matter and contribute to explaining the height
gap between African and Indian children. We discuss other potential reasons for the height
difference.
1This paper is co-authored by Stephan Klasen.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s scientists examine the "Asian Enigma", the contradiction of greater progress in
indicators like gross domestic product [GDP], food supply, education, and health services and
remaining higher child malnutrition in South Asia [SA] compared to sub-Saharan Africa [SSA]
(Smith et al., 2003; Ramalingaswami et al., 1996; Klasen, 2008). Headey et al. (2012) see the
"Asian Enigma" as a particular puzzle for India because despite a dramatic increase in GDP
between 1998/99 and 2005/6 child stunting and underweight of women hardly declines.
Smith et al. (2003) conclude that women’s status, sanitation, and urbanization contribute to ex-
plaining this puzzle. Spears (2018) finds that difference between India and SSA in sanitation
with the background of different population densities of open defecation can account for the
height difference. He uses a demographic projection of the average height of Indian children
given the exposure to sanitation like in SSA.
A cross-country comparison Klasen (2008) finds that the high rates of stunting in SA can be
partially explained by the used child growth reference standard. The used standard might not
fit with the actual growth pattern of SA children because in the study by the World Health Or-
ganization [WHO] to establish a worldwide reference standard Indian children are smaller than
the sample average (WHO Multicentre Growth Reference Study Group, 2006). Indian children
could be smaller due to genetic differences in growth potential or delayed impacts of past un-
dernutrition of their mothers (Klasen, 2008; Prendergast & Humphrey, 2014). So, the level of
stunting in South Asia could be overestimated.
More recently Jayachandran & Pande (2017), henceforth J+P, have added to this discussion by
showing that Indian children are shorter than their peers in SSA due to parental preferences
regarding birth order and gender. The favoritism of eldest sons determines the height of chil-
dren because these preferences shape fertility behavior, family size, and investment decisions
in child health. Eldest son preference especially in Hindu families is triggered by religious,
cultural, and economic reasons. The study by J+P has been quite influential and triggered more
research concentrating on cultural preferences of birth order and gender shaping health out-
comes for children.
Yet, authors like Spears et al. (2019) challenge that Indian parents decrease the health invest-
ments necessary for growth into higher birth order children and so cause the height gap between
African and Indian children because of eldest son preference. Our objective is to guide future
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research on the appropriate inclusion of measures of the health investment in the form of el-
dest son preference when analyzing resource allocation of parents to children. We conduct a
sensitivity analysis of J+P’s model by considering a more recent time period. J+P focus on
data collected between 2004 and 2010. Since then, however, four major macro-determinants
emerged that could impact child health outcomes largely: greater female education, further
economic development, anti-open defecation campaigns, and the nutrition transition. We want
to test whether J+P’s eldest son preference hypothesis is robust to the inclusion of these changes.
For this, the results by J+P are replicated using data from around 2015 in the first step while
considering a similar SSA sample. The data derive from the Demographic and Health Survey
[DHS], either directly from the platform in the case of the India samples or from the IPUMS
Demographic and Health Surveys [IDHS] project for the SSA sample. We show that the birth
order effect can only explain a small share of the difference in height between African and In-
dian children. Further, we weigh the 2005 Indian data used by J+P to make them nationally
representative. We stay with the data from the original sample but adapt the methodology. Birth
order effects can now only explain a small share of the height difference in this time period.
Moreover, we extend the replication by assessing whether J+P’s hypothesis still holds when
including female education, household prosperity, open defecation, and the consumption of an-
imal proteins. The four emerging macro-determinants are important drivers of child height.
Thus, this study contributes to the literature by conducting a sensitivity analysis of the hypoth-
esis of eldest son preference as the driver of the "Asian Enigma".
This paper is structured as follows: the next section will provide a brief overview of evidence
for the eldest son hypotheses as well as the effect of the recent macro-determinants. Section
three looks at the data and the empirical strategy whereas section four presents the results for
the replication using data of around 2015. In section five the original time period is reassessed
weighing the data to become nationally representative. Section six is dedicated to the results of
the extension of the replication by adding the four emerging macro-determinants. Section seven
discusses the results and section eight concludes.
2 Background and Literature Review
To explain the discrepancy between good progress in development indicators but worse child
health outcomes in India compared to SSA, the literature offers a broad range of possible con-
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tributing factors like women’s status, sanitation, urbanization, agricultural development, or mea-
surement errors due to genetic differences in growth potential (Smith, 2003; Headey et al., 2012;
Klasen, 2008; de Haen et al., 2011; Spears, 2018). J+P make the case for another possible de-
terminant: parental eldest son preference.
2.1 Son Preference in India
Social, economic, and cultural reasons shape this preference (Arnold et al., 1998; Jayachan-
dran, 2015). Socially, many families, particular in North India have a patrilineal descent where
only sons are accepted hers (Arnold et al., 1998; M. D. Gupta, 1987a; Pande, 2003). Sons have
economic utility because they can participate in agricultural production, earn wages, guarantee
dowry payments, and represent security for the parents during sickness and old age (Arnold et
al., 1998; Rosenblum, 2017; Jayachandran, 2015). For Hindu families, sons also play a key role
for religious functions like post-death rituals (Arnold et al., 1998; Jayachandran, 2015).
This son preference affects the fertility behavior of parents. Couples are likely to adopt a dif-
ferential stopping behavior and continue reproduction until attaining a certain sex composition
of children, i.e. the desired number of sons (Clark, 2000; Jensen, 2003; Rosenblum, 2013).
Consequently, the differential stopping behavior leads to a high proportion of sons in a family
when sons are born early or a low proportion when sons are born later (Clark, 2000).
By determining the number of siblings, son preference also influences the allocation of re-
sources in the households indirectly because in larger families children have to share limited
resources with more siblings (Anukriti et al., 2016). This indirect channel and the direct fa-
voritism of sons contribute to a discrimination against daughters in education (Jensen, 2003),
nutrition (Anukriti et al., 2016; Jayachandran & National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009;
Behrman, 1988b), and health (Anukriti et al., 2016; Arnold et al., 1998; Bharadwaj & Lak-
dawala, 2013; V. Gupta et al., 2016; Oster, 2009; Pande, 2003; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982;
Asfaw et al., 2010).
Budget constraints of parents seem to worsen discrimination. Asfaw et al. (2010) show that
when parents have no other means but have to borrow, sell assets, or receive help from friends,
boys are more likely to be hospitalized than girls. Behrman (1988b) finds a bias in food alloca-
tion towards sons in Indian families during lean seasons. Older children independent of gender
are also favored during lean seasons (Behrman, 1988a). Harris-Fry et al. (2017) conclude in
their review that female household members aged 15 and older receive less food during severe
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or unexpected food insecurity.
Based on the literature formulate their J+P’s hypotheses: the birth order gradient, i.e. declining
parental investment, for children and especially girls should be more pronounced in India due to
eldest son preference. Recently Spears et al. (2019) have reassessed the eldest son hypotheses
by J+P. They focus on the contradictory findings by Coffey & Spears (2019) who report that
later birth order children are more likely to survive early-life using the same DHS data. Spears
et al. (2019) conclude that correlations between the number of siblings and household well-
being differ between India and the same SSA countries selected by J+P. The omitted variable
bias driven by the number of siblings constitutes the birth order effects. The robustness checks
conducted by JP, i.e. considering a sample with completed fertility or mother fixed effect, are
misleading due to the given data structure of the DHS data set according to Spears et al. (2019).
These authors also show that alone recoding of birth order puts the results under doubt, i.e. they
exclude children without siblings in their analysis or look at last and second-last born children
only. They find that last-born children in India are better off than their African counterparts. In
our replication study, we bring in another perspective by considering a later period in time and
the national representativeness of the data. Another novel aspect is testing the robustness of the
hypothesis considering macro-determinants that might influence the height gap between India
and SSA.
2.2 Emerging Macro-Determinants Affecting Child Health
Menon et al. (2018) examine the differences in stunting prevalence between low and high bur-
den districts using population-weighted regressions and regression-based decomposition. We
want to have a closer look at four of the five most important determinants of the difference
(education, children’s adequate diet, assets, and open defecation) that might weaken the effect
of eldest son preference of Indian parents on child height. Three of the listed determinants have
also been identified as key drivers for child height in SA: greater material well-being, increased
female education, and improved sanitation (Headey et al., 2016).
The first we want to consider is female education. It is linked to lower fertility, lower child mor-
tality, and higher quality care for children (Klasen, 2016). In India, the access to public schools
has widely improved and so the gender gap in overall school enrollment and completion has
almost disappeared, whereas in SSA primary, secondary, and tertiary education gender gaps
persist (Klasen, 2016; Sahoo & Klasen, 2018). This might be an advantage for India because
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greater female education allows for higher quality care and/or decreased family sizes that would
increase available resources of parents to invest in their children.
Changes in income via economic development are one of the major macro-determinants that
widened between India and SSA between 2004 and 2018 even more (Figure 2.1). Within India
analysis show that economic growth is significantly correlated with stunting prevalence, stunt-
ing, and body mass index [BMI] (Headey et al., 2011; Bhagowalia et al., 2012; Klasen, 2008).
Higher per capita income increases the budget of households and so the available resources of
parents for investing in their children.
Figure 2.1: GDP for India and Sub-Saharan Africa
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Other macro-determinants in the past years like campaigns against open defecation and the
nutrition transition might also play a key role in the difference of health outcomes of Indian
children and their SSA peers.
Spears (2018) shows that open defecation in India is a major contributing factor for the height
gap between Indian and SSA children. Open defecation is such a major determinant of child
health because it increases the disease environment for children via fecal-oral transmission
(Larsen et al., 2017; Clasen et al., 2014). Diseases causing diarrhea or transmission of helminths
impair child health and so the growth of children (Spears et al., 2013; Hammer & Spears,
2016). This is particularly the case for densely populated regions where the externalities of
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open defecation have a larger impact on child health outcomes (Hathi et al., 2017; Geruso &
Spears, 2018). Spears et al. (2013) find that differences in open defecation can explain the
differences in stunting between low-performing and high-performing Indian districts. In 2014
the Indian government has started the Swachh Bharat Mission to eliminate open defecation by
2019 (A. Gupta et al., 2019). The program includes public awareness campaigns and financial
benefits when building new latrines. This governmental impulse could have decreased open
defecation in India. While this government mission has increased toilet ownership, it has lim-
ited effects on the adoption of the use of these improved sanitation facilities (Clasen et al., 2014;
A. Gupta et al., 2019). Adding open defecation or more so the ownership of toilets is a crucial
macro-determinant that differs between India and SSA. The active awareness campaigns are
very unique. Though India has a particular outstanding level of open defecation, it is also prac-
ticed in SSA (Pickering et al., 2015; Abubakar, 2018). Abubakar (2018) show that at least 25.1
percent of the population in Nigeria practices open defecation.
The last macro-determinant, the nutrition transition, favors an increase in animal sourced foods
intake and so the trend away from underweight to obesity. The nutrition transition is defined
as the shift away from traditional diets based on staples towards increased consumption of
wheat, high protein and energy-dense food products, and temperate vegetable and fruits (Pin-
gali, 2007). In this more westernized diet, the intake of processed foods rich in sugar, salt, and
fat has particularly increased (Baker & Friel, 2014). Drivers of the diet change are economic
and income growth, urbanization, and globalization of agri-food systems (Pingali, 2007; Qaim,
2017). These factors increase the accessibility of non-traditional food products by relatively
decreasing costs for the consumer.
Shetty (2002) shows that the nutrition transition is associated with chronic non-communicable
diseases and Meenakshi (2016) finds that the diet quality, i.e. a low intake of vegetables, dairy,
and meat, is associated with malnutrition. Even though undernutrition related to macronutrients
is losing its importance, micronutrient deficiencies remain high. Overweight is increasing in
urban and rural areas over time with related non-communicable diseases. Meenakshi (2016)
claims that the Indian poor face greater challenges to increase diet quality and micronutrient
intake because the relative price of micronutrient-rich foods compared to cereals has increased
more quickly than for the rich. The trend of increasing weight is prevalent in both SA and
SSA; in SA the BMI of children and adolescents has accelerated particularly from 1975 to 2016
(Jaacks et al., 2015; Abarca-Gómez et al., 2017). This is striking as consumption of animal
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sourced foods, one element of the nutrition transition, during periods of growth are important to
cover nutrient requirements for optimal attainment of height (C. Neumann et al., 2002; Murphy
& Allen, 2003; C. G. Neumann et al., 2003; Iannotti et al., 2017). Children are less likely to
be stunted when consuming animal sourced foods (Dror & Allen, 2011; Headey et al., 2018;
Krebs et al., 2011). Thus, the nutrition transition might affect the reliability of anthropometric
measures as indicators of nutritional status because it increases the macronutrient intake and so
weight but not micronutrient intake in the same way (de Haen et al., 2011). In an extreme case,
children could be obese and stunted at the same time. So, the nutrition transition will challenge
the identification of undernourished children and so might weaken the effect of eldest son pref-
erence. These four emerging macro-determinants call for a reassessment of the Indian Enigma
because of their huge impact on the health outcomes of children.
3 Data and Methodology
To compare the results of J+P, the employed sample, cleaning procedures and analyses follow
their paper closely.
3.1 Sample Description
The data sets for India are all four available DHS waves including the latest National Family and
Health Survey [NFHS] 4 that had been conducted in 2015/2016 (ICF, 2004). Unlike the previ-
ous three waves of the NFHS data, the sampling procedures are readjusted to collect data that is
representative on the district level, not only state level. The latest round also includes union ter-
ritories like Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and
Diu, Lakshadweep, and Puducherry. Therefore, the sample size has increased largely leading to
more precise measures. If we compare the shares of each Indian state in of NFHS 3 to NFHS 4
like in Table 2.1, states like Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh take
up an at least one percent larger share of observations and states like Andhra Pradesh, Delhi,
Goa, Kerala, Maharashtra, Manipur, Nagaland, or West Bengal bring in fewer observations
(with at least a one percent difference). States like Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh
with a higher sex ratio gain additional weight whereas states with low sex ratios such as Andhra
Pradesh, Goa, Kerala, Manipur, Nagaland, and West Bengal lose weight. The sex ratio is de-
fined as low if the ratio of boys and girls under five years of age is smaller than the median ratio
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using Indian census data of 2011. The sample differences of the NFHS 3 and NFHS 4 lead to di-
verging outcomes as shown in the next section. This difference hinders the direct comparability
of the two samples and so conclusions from a replication study as we would like to undertake.
This is why we adjust these samples by the suggested mother sample weights of DHS to make
the samples representative on the population level and overcome possible sampling procedure
differences. The different results of the original study and the results of the weighted data from
2004 to 2010 will be presented and discussed in the appendix. We will use the weighted data for
both time periods when we extend the replication with the four emerging macro-determinants.
For the sample of SSA, surveys are chosen that have been conducted four years previous to and
up to two years after the Indian survey in 2015/6, i.e. from 2011 to 2017. This is a similar time
period of seven years as the original sample by J+P. The included countries are all available data
sets on IPUMS DHS in the given time period for all the countries that had been included in the
study by J+P: 13 countries are represented in both samples with each one survey. Due to lack of
data, seven countries are only included in the sample from 2004 to 2010. Among these are five
countries that do not fulfill the inclusion criteria of the original sample: a higher GDP per capita
than half of India’s GDP per capita in the respective survey year. Only two excluded countries,
Sao Tome and Principe and Swaziland, would have met the criteria. Further, the samples differ
in the number of surveys included for five countries. Following 25 surveys are used for the
new sample: Cameroon 2011, Congo Democratic Republic 2013-14, Ethiopia 2011, Ethiopia
2016, Ghana 2014, Guinea 2012, India 2015-16, Kenya 2014, Lesotho 2014, Malawi 2016,
Mali 2012, Namibia 2013, Niger 2012, Nigeria 2013, Rwanda 2014, Senegal 2010-11, Senegal
2012-13, Senegal 2012-13, Senegal 2015, Senegal 2016, Senegal 2017, Tanzania 2015, Uganda
2011, Uganda 2016, Zambia 2013, and Zimbabwe 2015. The data is downloaded from IPUMS
DHS that harmonizes the different surveys (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019). Table 2.2 provides
an overview of the different SSA samples used in the original and the replication study. In
the following, the sample of SSA will be referred to as African. To ensure comparability the
African surveys are weighted by the suggested mother sample weights of DHS or IDHS. The
weights of the countries that have conducted n surveys, i.e. more than one survey, in one of the
given time periods will be adjusted to 1/n times. Robustness checks will be conducted to ensure
that this procedure is not distorting the results.
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Table 2.2: Sample Comparison
Original (2004-2010) Replication (2011-2017)
Cameroon 2004 2011
Congo Democratic Republic 2007 2013-14
Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) 2005
Chad 2004
Ethiopia 2005 2011 & 2016
Ghana 2008 2014
Guinea 2005 2012
Kenya 2008-9 2014
Lesotho 2004 & 2009 2014
Liberia 2007
Madagascar 2003
Malawi 2004 2016
Mali 2006 2012
Namibia 2006 2013
Niger 2006 2012
Nigeria 2008 2013
Rwanda 2005 2014
Sao Tome and Principe 2008-9
Senegal 2005 2010-11 & 2012-13 & 2015 & 2016 & 2017
Sierra Leone 2008
Swaziland 2006-7
Tanzania 2004 & 2010 2015
Uganda 2006 2011 & 2016
Zambia 2007 2013
Zimbabwe 2005-6 2015
Total 27 24
Source: Own calculations based on J+P
29
3.2 Estimation Strategy
Not only the data is supposed to be as similar to the original study as possible but also the
methodology. We have used the published do-files from J+P for cleaning and analysis for both
data sets: the one for around 2005 and the other one for around 2015. The estimation strategies
stay unchanged for the next section that focuses on the same methods but more recent data. The
first three pair of regression output tables use the following estimation equation from J+P:
HFAimc = α1Ic + α2Ic × 2ndChildimc + α3c × 3rd+ Childimc
+β12ndChildimc + β23rd+ Childimc + γXimc + εimc
(2.1)
HFA represents the outcome variables, mostly the standardized height-for-age score [HFA z-
score]. It is a measure of the deviation to a reference standard of height at a given age. A
standard deviation of smaller than -2 is judged as impaired growth, stunting. Other consid-
ered outcomes in Table 2.5 and 2.6 are wasting measured as standardized weight-for-age scores
[WFA z-score], hemoglobin level in the blood adjusted by altitude, and death. Table 2.7 and 2.8
consider child health inputs as outcomes, whereas in Table 2.9 and 2.10 HFA z-score and WFA
z-scores are considered. The outcome variable has index i, m, and c standing for the i-th child
born to mother m in country c. Ic represents the indicator for Indian children; the coefficient
α1 measures the India gap for first-born children, the omitted birth order category. α2 and α3
represent the gap for second-born children and third-and-higher birth order children in India.
β1 and β2 for second-born children and third-and-higher birth order children show the gap to
first-born children in general. X represents a changing number of control variables on the child,
mother, or primary sampling unit [PSU] level to overcome endogeneity concerns. Due to the
sampling procedure of DHS that includes families that have or have not completed their fertility
and only collects anthropometric data for children below five years of age, family size cannot
be controlled for so that birth order could also capture the effects of high-fertility families (Jay-
achandran & Pande, 2017). One strategy of J+P to address endogeneity is the use of covariates
like PSU fixed effects, maternal literacy, maternal age, child age, and interactions with an India
dummy.2 Each table pair in the result sections will give details about all used variables. In all
regressions, standard errors are clustered at the mother level and child age dummy variables
2J+P in the original paper provide a more detailed discussion on endogeneity issues that will not be repeated
here.
30
(in months) are included to allow for nonlinear patterns of z-scores and age. In the extension
section, we add the macro-determinants, that are interacted or not with the India dummy, to X .
The last table pair is estimated with an extended estimation equation from J+P:
Yimc = α1Ic + δ1Ic ×Girl + δ2Ic ×Girl × 2ndChildimc + δ2Ic ×Girl × 3rd+ Childimc
+β12ndChildimc + β23rd+ Childimc
+β3Girl × 2ndChildimc + β4Girl × 3rd+ Childimc + β5Girlimc
+α2Ic × 2ndChildimc + α3Ic × 3rd+ Childimc + γXimc + εimc
(2.2)
Apart from the already defined vectors, a variable indicating the gender of the child enters the
equation. This includes the interaction of Girl with India δ1, with Indian second-born children
δ2, with Indian third-and-higher born children δ3, with first-born children β3, with second-born
children β4, with third-and-higher born children β5. In the extension part, we include the macro-
determinants with or without interaction with the India dummy into X .
3.3 Measures of the Four Macro-Determinants
In the following, we will explain the measures of the four macro-determinants . We use the
partially imputed measure for literacy that J+P use in their set of control variables but only keep
values that are either 0 or 1. It is a dummy variable that turns to one when the mother can at
least read part of a sentence in the literacy test or it is imputed based on the country-specific
literacy rate given the mother’s completed number of school years.
To measure the influence of economic well-being of households on child health outcomes, we
use wealth quantiles constructed based on a wealth index on the household level as additional
control variables. The available DHS data does not provide any information regarding income or
expenditure but allows to calculate a wealth index. We prepare the wealth index for each sample
guided by the DHS procedures (Rutstein, n.d.). As the wealth index should be comparable
across the two periods of time and include only information that had been asked for in all
the surveys, only 34 dummy variables are used for the factor analysis. In the appendix, we
present summary statistics for the included factors, the wealth index score, and wealth quantiles
separately for India and the selected African countries.
For open defecation, we use again the same measure as in J+P. Practicing open defecation is
measured as a dummy that turns to one if the household does not have a toilet facility. This
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should capture the essence of the Swacch Bharat Mission that has increased toilet ownership.
However, this measure does not account for the adoption of the use of toilets or population
density or open defecation practices within the village that might be a better measure to capture
the negative externality of open defecation on child health (Spears, 2018).
For the nutrition transition, we use two dummy variables that turn to one when the child has
been fed (a) eggs and/or meat or (b) dairy products the previous day. However, we substituted
this information to whether the child has been fed in the past seven days if the information for
the previous day is not available. This might potentially create bias as this is the case for five
surveys conducted in Africa between 2004 and 2010.
This all should allow making the results of the original work and the replication most compara-
ble. We compare the results of around 2005 to the results of around 2015 in the next section.
4 Replication Results (2011-2017) vs (2004-2010): Unweighted
In this section, we will compare the results by J+P with the methodologically replicated results
of the more recent time period. We display figure and table pairs, the first being the original
results and the following the replicated ones. Throughout the replication and extension, we
focus on the India-Africa health outcome gap. 3
4.1 Summary Statistics
The two subsamples for the time period around 2005 (2004 to 2010) and around 2015 (2011 to
2017) differ mainly in their sample size (Table 2.3 and 2.4): the main sample of children for
India increases from 42,069 to 230,220 and for Africa from 126,066 to 168,490. The number
of PSUs is greater in the later time period. India takes the lead this time with 28,215 PSUs
compared to Africa with only 12,684 PSUs.
Considering the summary statistics of the previous time period and now, mother characteristics
have generally improved. Mother’s age at birth in years and mother’s desire for more chil-
dren have increased compared to the earlier time period. The number of born children by each
mother and completion of fertility have slightly declined. Mother’s desired fertility has de-
creased in India, whereas it has increased in Africa. Average mother’s heights are unchanged.
3J+P also conduct a within India analysis looking at different son preference proxies. We leave the results out
in the main text but display the replication results in the appendix.
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Mother’s literacy has improved from 58 percent to 67 percent in the Indian subsample but de-
creased from 49 percent to 48 percent in the African subsample. The gap between Africa and
India has widened. Prenatal and postnatal health inputs like maternal iron supplementation, to-
tal tetanus shots, delivery at health facilities, postnatal checks within two months, and average
pooled inputs have increased overall. The number of prenatal visits has gone up in India, too,
but not in Africa. The average value in India is now surpassing the one in Africa in the percent-
age of deliveries at health facilities with 76 percent compared to 58 percent and average pooled
inputs with 46 percent compared to 40 percent. The number of nonresident among children
has slightly decreased for Africa but stagnated for India. The number of adult females in the
household has increased overall with Africa surpassing India in the more recent time period.
The log GDP per capita in a child’s birth year has increased over time with the log GDP of 8.51
in India exceeding the log GDP in Africa of 7.75 in the time period around 2015.
Child characteristics have also changed except the gender distribution. Children in the India
sample are slightly younger on average and African children older comparing the time period
around 2005 to around 2015. The birth order of the sampled children is lower than previously.
HFA z-scores, stunting, WFA z-scores, hemoglobin levels, and death incidents of children have
improved. 4 The average HFA z-score in India increases from -1.51 to -1.26 standard deviations
and the one in Africa from -1.35 to -1.11 standard deviations. The gap between the Indian and
African subsample has widened for children taking iron pills and the number of total vaccina-
tions. In both India has higher reported values in the later time period, unlike Africa where
numbers have decreased. The birth spacing in months has increased over time. Incidences of
diarrhea are unchanged. Open defecation has decreased for both countries over time, though
Africa has a greater reduction from 32 percent to 35 percent. In India, 46 percent of households
in the sample of around 2005 and 44 percent around 2015 defecated in the open. Open defeca-
tion has not decreased more in Indian than in Africa.
Not only the per capita GDP in the child’s birth year has increased but also the correlation be-
tween GDP and the HAZ z-score has become stronger for India comparing the original time
4The rate of diseased children has become more similar over time between India and Africa suggesting that
Indian parents do not practice sex-selective abortion widely or to a larger degree than African parents. We examine
the survival rate of all ever born children reported by the mother and whether the survival rate differs by birth order,
gender, and country in the appendix. In general, we find that survival increases from earlier to later surveys and is
higher in India. However, the survival rates do only differ up to 3 percent. The similarity between the India and
Africa sample in the survival rate reduces the likelihood of more sex-selective abortion within India because we
would expect a greater survival rate in particular for Indian girls. The ones who did not get aborted are wanted by
the parents. This is not the case.
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period to the more recent one in Figure 2.2. However, the changes in the sampling strategy
of the Indian sample might lead to an overestimation of the strength of the correlation. Even
though India improved more than Africa in income per capita, education, and health inputs (ex-
cept open defecation), India’s stunting rate is not falling faster. The Indian Enigma seems to be
still at play.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics (2004-2010)
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.75 26.96 Child’s age (months) 30.20 28.27
[5.23] [6.86] [16.90] [17.06]
Mother’s total children born 2.74 3.88 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.82] [2.54] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.47 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.62 3.74
[0.96] [1.47] [1.80] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.51 -1.35
[0.47] [0.46] [1.81] [1.94]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.40 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.49] [0.48]
Mother is literate 0.58 0.49 Child’s WFA z-score -1.53 -0.88
[0.49] [0.50] [1.33] [1.42]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.28 10.15
[0.06] [0.07] [1.57] [1.68]
Mother took iron supplements 0.69 0.62 Child is deceased 0.05 0.07
[0.46] [0.49] [0.22] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.87 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.06 0.11
[0.94] [1.20] [0.23] [0.32]
Total prenatal visits 4.04 3.85 Child’s total vaccinations 6.61 6.24
[3.48] [3.07] [2.80] [3.12]
Delivery at health facility 0.45 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 36.16 38.69
[0.50] [0.50] [20.32] [20.63]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.09 0.30 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.29] [0.46] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.33 0.38 Open defecation 0.46 0.32
[0.28] [0.30] [0.50] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.10 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.04] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.85 1.60 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[1.09] [1.06]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.78 7.36
[0.10] [0.65]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. The following variables are summarized at the mother level: total children born, mother’s desired fertility, wants more children,
mother completed her fertility, mother is literate, and mother’s height. Total prenatal visits, mother took iron supplements, total tetanus shots,
postnatal check within two months are also, in effect, summarized at the mother level because they are only available for the most recent birth.
Variables summarized at the child level include: mother’s age at birth, birth spacing (the birth interval between a child and his or her older
sibling), delivery at health facility, average pooled inputs, all child variables (first ten variables in the second column), diarrhea in last two
weeks, open defecation, percent nonresident among children, number of adult females in the household, and log GDP per capita in child’s
birth year.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics (2011-2017)
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 25.12 27.23 Child’s age (months) 30.14 28.90
[4.96] [6.71] [16.92] [17.02]
Mother’s total children born 2.38 3.81 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.49] [2.48] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.42 4.73 Child’s birth order 2.26 3.70
[0.99] [1.41] [1.47] [2.42]
Mother wants more children 0.41 0.71 Child’s HFA z-score -1.26 -1.11
[0.47] [0.44] [1.82] [1.73]
Mother completed her fertility 0.61 0.28 Child is stunted 0.35 0.29
[0.49] [0.45] [0.48] [0.45]
Mother is literate 0.67 0.48 Child’s WFA z-score -1.43 -0.86
[0.47] [0.50] [1.30] [1.31]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.60 10.33
[0.06] [0.06] [1.51] [1.63]
Mother took iron supplements 0.77 0.76 Child is deceased 0.04 0.05
[0.42] [0.43] [0.20] [0.22]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.91 1.42 Child taking iron pills 0.23 0.07
[0.78] [1.09] [0.42] [0.25]
Total prenatal visits 4.19 3.77 Child’s total vaccinations 7.30 4.92
[3.86] [2.92] [2.70] [3.55]
Delivery at health facility 0.76 0.58 Birth spacing (months) 37.26 38.83
[0.43] [0.49] [21.45] [20.79]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.36 0.49 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.48] [0.50] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.46 0.40 Open defecation 0.44 0.25
[0.25] [0.29] [0.50] [0.43]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.09 Number of PSUs 28,215 12,684
[0.04] [0.00]
Number of adult females in household 1.91 1.94 Main sample of children 230,220 168,490
[1.03] [1.66]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 8.51 7.75
[0.08] [0.68]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. The following variables are summarized at the mother level: total children born, mother’s desired fertility, wants more children,
mother completed her fertility, mother is literate, and mother’s height. Total prenatal visits, mother took iron supplements, total tetanus shots,
postnatal check within two months are also, in effect, summarized at the mother level because they are only available for the most recent birth.
Variables summarized at the child level include: mother’s age at birth, birth spacing (the birth interval between a child and his or her older
sibling), delivery at health facility, average pooled inputs, all child variables (first ten variables in the second column), diarrhea in last two
weeks, open defecation, percent nonresident among children, number of adult females in the household, and log GDP per capita in child’s
birth year.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Figure 2.2: Child Height versus National GDP (2004-2010) vs (2011-2017): Unweighted
Replication (2004-2010)
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Notes: The light and dark circles represent sub-Saharan African countries and Indian states, respectively. The averages are calculated over all
children less than 60 months old. The lines represent the best linear fit for each sample.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from Penn World Table 9.0 (Robert C. Feenstra, 2016), Penn World Table 9.1 (Robert C. Feenstra,
2019), and the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States (Reserve Bank of India, 2019)
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4.2 India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Re-
lated Outcomes
In the table pair Table 2.5 and 2.6, the pattern of HFA z-score is now analyzed using regressions.
In the time period around 2015 (Table 2.6 column 1) we find that pooling all children Indians
are on average 0.11 standard deviations shorter than Africans. This result is significant on the 1
percent significance level. The magnitude of the height difference to African children is larger
using the new data compared to the original results by J+P. Children in India seem to be worse
off compared to African children in recent years than before.
Next, we want to examine the differences in height based on the birth order. For this we want
to assess the average HFA z-scores of Indian and African children per time graphically in a first
step. In Figure 2.3, we assess the average child HFA z-scores for India and Africa by birth or-
der. We observe that the Indian deficit does not only affect children of second-and-higher birth
order anymore but also firstborns. Additionally, the gap between Indian and African children
has widened for second birth order children but declined for third-and-higher birth order chil-
dren. From 2011 to 2017 all children in India independent of their birth order are shorter than
in Africa.
Starting with column 2 in the presented table pair, we use the introduced estimation strategy of
equation (1) that disaggregates the results by birth order. Unlike for the period around 2005,
the Indian height disadvantage affects all Indian children independent of their birth order in
the time period around 2015. A first-born child in India is on average 0.02 standard deviations
shorter than its African peer. This height disadvantage compared to African children (sum of
main effect and interaction term) is even stronger for second-born Indian children with -0.11
and third-born ones with -0.27. All coefficients are statistically significant at least on the 5 per-
cent significance level. The birth order gradient is less steep in India in the more recent time
period than before.
Column 3 adds now PSU fixed effects and control variables interacted with India like child’s
age dummies, mother’s literacy, and mother’s age at birth (linear and quadratic). This represents
the main specification that is used also for column 6 following as well as for the next table pair
in the following subsection. The effect magnitude for Indian children decreases with unchanged
significance in the time period around 2005 and 2015. In the more recent sample, however, the
addition of control variables increases the effect size and significance for second-and-higher
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birth order children in general. Column 4 uses the same specification as in column 3 but a sam-
ple that has already completed fertility and dummies for family size proxied by the observed
number of children and interacted with India. 5 The subsample includes all children whose
mother has likely completed fertility. This is why the sample reduces to roughly 40 percent
in the earlier time period and about less than 50 percent in the more recent time period. The
coefficients are not significant anymore in the time period around 2015 and also the effect sizes
change.
In column 5, another robustness check of the results is conducted by using mother fixed effects
and so a within-family comparison that keeps family size constant. The sample only includes
families with at least two children in one family. The sample sizes are reduced to 83,228 for
the time period around 2005 and to 189,520 observations for the time period around 2015. All
birth order gradients remain statistically significant but are larger in magnitude apart from the
coefficient for third-or-higher born children that reduces in size. A key finding for J+P is that
“the birth order gradient in child height is twice as large in India as in Africa". Reassessing this
finding with data from around 2015 the birth order gradient is not as large in India as before.
Columns 6 to 9 focus on other health outcomes that are also likely to be affected by birth or-
der driven parental investment decisions. In column 6 the outcome variable is the incidence of
stunting in children, a lower HFA z-score than 2 standard deviations above or below the mean.
Indian second-born children perform 2 percentage points and Indian third-or-higher born chil-
dren 3 percentage points lower than their African counterparts. The Indian birth order gradient
is very shallow as the magnitudes of second-and-higher birth order children are quite similar in
the time period around 2015. At least for stunting the additional gap in stunting for Indian and
African children has halved for higher-birth order children.
Column 7 considers the WFA z-scores. The steep birth order gradient for India for the pe-
riod around 2005 has flattened in the time period around 2015. For example, Indian second-
born children weigh now 0.09 standard deviations less compared to 0.15 standard deviations in
the earlier sample. The effect sizes and birth order gradients for hemoglobin levels have also
changed over time. In the time period around 2005, we see a steep birth order gradient for
India. In contrast, around 2015 only the second-born Indian children have a statistically signif-
icant effect on hemoglobin levels that is smaller in magnitude than in the time period before.
The outcomes for infant mortality in column 9 do not longer change for the Indian birth order
5We follow J+P in their classification for completed fertility: Women have completed their fertility if they
“stated they do not want any more children or [if they] have been sterilized”.
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Table 2.5: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010)
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.083 0.092
[0.011] [0.018]
India × 2nd child -0.144 -0.161 -0.110 -0.243 0.051 -0.147 -0.094 0.003
[0.025] [0.027] [0.063] [0.048] [0.007] [0.020] [0.030] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.377 -0.228 -0.194 -0.436 0.064 -0.199 -0.158 0.002
[0.024] [0.032] [0.092] [0.085] [0.009] [0.024] [0.036] [0.004]
2nd child 0.024 -0.011 -0.096 -0.167 0.009 0.010 -0.010 -0.014
[0.015] [0.017] [0.053] [0.027] [0.004] [0.012] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.065 -0.117 -0.168 -0.334 0.036 -0.063 -0.038 -0.011
[0.013] [0.019] [0.074] [0.044] [0.005] [0.014] [0.025] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 0.375 -0.877 10.149 0.072
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Africa mean -0.023
India mean 0.078
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,135 168,135 167,765 66,574 83,243 167,765 167,765 88,893 199,514
Table 2.6: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2011-2017)
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.107 -0.019
[0.006] [0.010]
India × 2nd child -0.105 -0.073 -0.059 -0.168 0.024 -0.087 -0.039 -0.002
[0.014] [0.015] [0.055] [0.028] [0.004] [0.011] [0.018] [0.002]
India × 3rd+ child -0.271 -0.112 -0.082 -0.326 0.028 -0.129 -0.013 -0.000
[0.013] [0.018] [0.076] [0.049] [0.005] [0.014] [0.020] [0.002]
2nd child 0.007 -0.049 -0.092 -0.178 0.011 -0.014 -0.026 -0.009
[0.012] [0.013] [0.053] [0.021] [0.004] [0.010] [0.016] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.104 -0.155 -0.129 -0.314 0.043 -0.082 -0.114 -0.009
[0.010] [0.014] [0.072] [0.033] [0.004] [0.011] [0.018] [0.002]
Africa mean of outcome -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 0.289 -0.858 10.332 0.049
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Africa mean -0.018
India mean 0.015
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 398,710 398,710 397,702 176,665 189,520 397,702 397,702 300,933 410,460
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. HFA z-score is the child’s height-for-age z-score, Stunted is defined as
having an HFA z-score 2, WFA z-score is the child’s weight-for-age z-score, and Hb level is the child’s hemoglobin level; 2nd child is an
indicator for children whose birth order is 2; 3rd+ child is an indicator for children whose birth order is 3 or higher. Child age dummies are
included in all columns. In columns 3- 4 and 6-9, the main effect India is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. In column 5, the main effect India is
absorbed by mother fixed effects. Columns 3-4 and 6-9 include PSU fixed effects, a linear and a quadratic variable for mother’s age at birth,
mother’s literacy, and mother’s literacy, maternal age, and child age dummies interacted with India. In columns 3 and 5-9, the sample is
restricted to PSUs with at least two children aged 1-59 months. In column 4, the sample is restricted to children whose mothers report that
they do not want to have more children, are sterilized, or are infecund. Column 4 includes total fertility dummies, top-coded at 6 children, and
total fertility dummies interacted with India. In column 8, Hb level is defined for children 6 months or older and is not available for six
surveys. In column 9, the sample consists of ever-born children aged 13-59 months.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Figure 2.3: Child Height in India and Africa, by Child’s Birth Order (2004-2010) vs (2011-
2017): Unweighted
Replication (2004-2010)
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Notes: The figure depicts the mean child height-for-age z-scores for sub-Saharan Africa and India, by the birth order of the child. The mean is
calculated over all children less than 60 months old.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (ICF, 2004) and IPUMS DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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gradient from positive in the time period around 2005 to negative in the time period around
2015. A preferential treatment regarding birth order is not visible. Overall, the steep birth order
gradient found in the study by J+P is much shallower in the new considered sample. A partic-
ular preference for Indian first-borns in form of a positive birth order effect is not detectable
anymore. This puts a particular first-birth order preference of Indian parents into question.
4.3 Child Health Inputs
The next table pair, Table 2.7 and 2.8, focuses on the link between birth order gradients and
prenatal and postnatal investments in child health.6 Considering the prenatal inputs, India has
on average a higher outcome for the time period around 2005 (Table 2.7) than for the time period
around 2015 (Table 2.8). India surpasses Africa in all outcomes in the time period around 2015
and in all but delivery at the health facility in the time period around 2005. In the later time
period, the birth order gradient is not as clear for India anymore: in the case of mother’s tetanus
shots, the effect size is larger for third-or-higher born children than for second-born children.
In the case of delivery at the health facility, second-born children are even more likely to be
delivered at a health facility than their African counterparts; third-or-higher birth order children
in India are negatively associated with delivery at a health facility again.
Turning to postnatal inputs, the African subsamples have higher outcomes in postnatal checks
within two months, while the Indian subsamples show higher rates of child vaccinations overall.
In the later considered period, India surpasses the African mean of children taking iron pills.
In the time period around 2005, there are no differential birth order gradients for postnatal
checkups and iron pill consumption of children. However, around 2015 there are significant
effects of third-born Indian children. For postnatal checks, they are even positive for third-
or-later-born children. Around 2005 a clear birth order gradient for Indian children is visible
considering vaccinations. Around 2015 there is no birth order gradient detectable anymore for
Indian children because all effects are insignificant.
Column 8 looks at average total inputs. This measure is composed of the seven prior health put
indicators. The indicators with original multiple values (total prenatal visits, total tetanus shots,
and total vaccines) are transformed into dummy variables that turn on if the measure of the
original variable has a value larger than the sample median. In the earlier period, the birth order
gradient in India is quite steep compared to around 2015 when only the third-or-higher-born
6The estimation strategy follows the one for Table 2.5 and 2.6 column 3.
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children in India have a significant effect. Its magnitude is smaller than the prior effect size.
The child health inputs do not show a clear birth order preference of Indian parents but rather
an increase of child health investments in India in the recent years that benefited all children
independent of their birth order.
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Table 2.7: Child Health Inputs (2004-2010)
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.525 -0.031 -0.019 -0.040 -0.008 -0.008 -0.204 -0.011
[0.052] [0.008] [0.018] [0.006] [0.013] [0.005] [0.039] [0.003]
India × 3rd+ child -1.011 -0.072 -0.036 -0.092 0.015 -0.010 -0.462 -0.033
[0.060] [0.009] [0.021] [0.008] [0.014] [0.006] [0.051] [0.004]
2nd child -0.182 -0.014 -0.111 -0.088 0.004 -0.004 -0.097 -0.044
[0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004] [0.010] [0.004] [0.025] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.432 -0.031 -0.207 -0.133 -0.023 -0.014 -0.207 -0.071
[0.033] [0.005] [0.014] [0.004] [0.011] [0.005] [0.030] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.847 0.622 1.415 0.472 0.302 0.113 6.245 0.380
India mean of outcome 4.041 0.689 1.872 0.450 0.090 0.055 6.607 0.334
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,364 117,707 117,219 167,405 35,902 91,964 122,922 167,752
Table 2.8: Child Health Inputs (2011-2017)
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.208 -0.016 0.085 0.008 0.006 -0.002 0.035 -0.003
[0.030] [0.004] [0.011] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.045] [0.002]
India × 3rd+ child -0.418 -0.031 0.115 -0.007 0.016 -0.011 -0.030 -0.009
[0.035] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.054] [0.002]
2nd child -0.231 -0.012 -0.178 -0.082 -0.017 -0.002 -0.173 -0.041
[0.023] [0.004] [0.010] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.043] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.466 -0.025 -0.253 -0.136 -0.032 -0.001 -0.310 -0.066
[0.026] [0.004] [0.011] [0.003] [0.005] [0.002] [0.051] [0.002]
Africa mean of outcome 3.767 0.760 1.423 0.582 0.490 0.068 4.920 0.405
India mean of outcome 4.193 0.771 1.908 0.760 0.358 0.230 7.298 0.463
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 287,302 282,486 281,157 397,406 272,650 374,185 215,976 397,636
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Control variables included are child age dummies, mother’s literacy,
maternal age, PSU fixed effects, and child age dummies, mother’s literacy, and maternal age interacted with India. The main effect India is
absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Total prenatal visits, mother took iron supplements, mother’s total tetanus shots, and postnatal check within 2
months are only available for the youngest living child in the family; postnatal check within 2 months is collected in only 13 African surveys
in Table 2.7. Delivery at health facility, child taking iron pills, and total vaccinations are available for all births in the past five years; child
taking iron pills is collected in only ten African surveys; total vaccinations uses children ages 13-59 months, as the recommended age for
some is up to 1 year. In column 8, the average across four prenatal and three postnatal inputs is used to create the outcome. The dummies are
(i) total prenatal visits > 3; (ii) mother took iron supplements; (iii) mother’s total tetanus shots > 2; (iv) child was delivered at a health
facility; (v) child is taking iron pills; (vi) total vaccinations > 8; (vii) child had postnatal check within two months of birth.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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4.4 Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 examine whether children’s birth order gradient can be traced back to par-
ent’s eldest son preference. We use the second equation introduced in section 3 that considers
gender-specific gradients. The regression should test in particular the two predictions made by
J+P:
PREDICTION 1: Relative to African counterparts, both boys and girls in India will
exhibit a steeper birth order gradient.
PREDICTION 2: The India-Africa height gap will be more pronounced among girls.
Prediction 1 could be observed because preferring the eldest son over all other sons would cause
a steep birth order gradient for boys directly. For girls eldest son preference would lead to a
steeper birth order gradient because parents would concentrate spending their resources on her
older brother. Girls are also more likely to live in larger families with more siblings to compete
for resources against because parents will only stop reproduction when having at least one son.
The second prediction derives from two reasons. If elder sons are preferred to any other siblings,
on average all sons would be receiving more investments than the average daughter. Further,
the desire of bearing a son in Indian mothers is higher than in African mothers who only have
given birth to girls before (Jayachandran & Pande, 2017). So families will exceed their planned
family size and so lack adequate resources for their children with a given budget.
Columns 1 to 4 examine prediction 1 whereas columns 5 to 8 investigate prediction 2. In the
first specification in column 1 only age dummies and interactions with Girl and India are used
as control variables. In the earlier period (Table 2.9), there is a steep birth order gradient for
girls and boys in India. However, the interactions of India, higher birth orders, and girl dummy
are both statistically insignificant, though negative in sign. Eldest daughters have a negative
association with height, unlike eldest sons. The eldest sons are 0.15 standard deviations taller
in India than in Africa around 2005 but only 0.03 standard deviations taller around 2015. For
boys, the birth order gradient in India is shallower in the more recent period than in the earlier
one.
In column 2 additional covariates are added and in column 3 mother fixed effects are used that
change only the magnitude of the birth order gradient for sons but not the significance. For the
later period in column 2, the triple interaction of India, higher birth order, and girl dummy turns
significant. In the later time period in column 3 the birth order gradient for girls turns around
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reducing the effect of being later born. However, the effects are not statistically significant.
Column 4 with the same specification as column 2 considers now weight as an outcome. The
birth order gradient for boys and girls is again visible and significant for sons in both tables.
Only in the later time period around 2015 Indian higher birth order daughters have a significant
association with weight. Overall, the birth order gradient for sons has become shallower for
columns 2 to 4 overtime. Unlike for girls whose birth order gradient has become steeper in
column 2 and column 4.
Now we turn to prediction 2 looking at gender bias in India. Column 5 has similar controls
like column 1, column 6 like column 2, and column 7 like column 3. Column 8 looks at WFA
z-score just like column 4. In the time period around 2005, the India dummy in column 5
is insignificant and small in magnitude and the interaction of India and Girls is negative and
significant in columns 5 to 8. In the later time period, Indian daughters are still shorter and
weigh less than their African peers but the magnitude is reduced compared to the time period
around 2005. However, column 5 in the later time period diverges from the results in the
earlier one: Indian sons are 0.07 standard deviations shorter on the 1 percent significant level.
The average mother fixed effects in column 6 have different signs than in column 3: We have a
negative and rather stable mean for Indian mother fixed effects but a positive average for African
mother fixed effects which increases over time. Without adjusting for birth order children born
to Indian mothers are less tall than those born to African mothers in general.
Overall the birth order gradient for boys has become much shallower over time raising doubts
on eldest son preference. The situation for higher birth order girls seems to have worsened for
height and weight outcomes. The results on son preference show that on average sons in India
are disadvantaged compared to their African counterparts.
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Table 2.9: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010)
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India 0.148 -0.011
[0.026] [0.014]
India × Girl -0.112 -0.143 -0.147 -0.098 -0.116
[0.036] [0.020] [0.019] [0.032] [0.014]
India × 2nd child -0.107 -0.153 -0.228 -0.122
[0.036] [0.040] [0.069] [0.030]
India × 3rd+ child -0.352 -0.222 -0.414 -0.176
[0.033] [0.047] [0.097] [0.035]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.077 -0.045 -0.024 -0.047
[0.053] [0.057] [0.101] [0.042]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.051 -0.048 -0.030 -0.063
[0.047] [0.067] [0.092] [0.049]
2nd child 0.023 -0.005 -0.202 0.006
[0.022] [0.026] [0.041] [0.019]
3rd+ child -0.057 -0.113 -0.355 -0.069
[0.019] [0.029] [0.052] [0.021]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Africa mean -0.031 0.028
India mean 0.102 -0.092
Observations 168,135 165,623 83,243 165,623 168,135 167,765 83,243 167,765
Table 2.10: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2011-2017)
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India 0.028 -0.068
[0.014] [0.008]
India × Girl -0.091 -0.076 -0.072 -0.055 -0.044
[0.020] [0.011] [0.010] [0.018] [0.008]
India × 2nd child -0.100 -0.043 -0.181 -0.062
[0.021] [0.023] [0.040] [0.017]
India × 3rd+ child -0.271 -0.066 -0.349 -0.090
[0.019] [0.027] [0.056] [0.020]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.011 -0.057 0.029 -0.048
[0.030] [0.033] [0.057] [0.025]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.002 -0.094 0.054 -0.074
[0.026] [0.038] [0.053] [0.028]
2nd child 0.023 -0.049 -0.156 -0.010
[0.017] [0.019] [0.031] [0.015]
3rd+ child -0.067 -0.144 -0.286 -0.074
[0.014] [0.021] [0.039] [0.016]
Africa mean of outcome -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 -0.858 -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 -0.858
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Africa mean -0.039 0.100
India mean 0.034 -0.086
Observations 398,710 390,071 189,520 390,071 398,710 397,702 189,520 397,702
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Child age dummies are included in all regressions. Columns 2, 4, 6,
and 8 additionally include mother’s literacy, maternal age, and PSU fixed effects. In columns 2 and 4, child age dummies, maternal age, and
mother’s literacy are interacted with Girl, India, and India × Girl and PSU fixed effects are interacted with Girl. In columns 3 and 7, the main
effect India is absorbed by mother fixed effects. In columns 2 and 4, the main effects India and India × Girl are absorbed by PSU fixed effects
and their interactions with Girl. In columns 6 and 8, the main effect of India is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. The main effect of Girl is
included in all regressions but not shown. In columns 1-3, coefficients for 2nd child and 3rd+ child, 2nd child × Girl, and 3rd+ child × Girl
are included in the regression but not shown.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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4.5 Impact on Average Height - Accounting exercise
Just like J+P we turn now from an examination of the inequality across children to two back-
of-the-envelope calculations. We assess to what degree the birth order gradient in general and
the birth order gradient driven by eldest son preference explain the average height gap between
India and Africa. J+P generate two gradient proxies.
The first is the average height gap between first-borns and children with birth order two or
higher that is weighted by the observed country-specific or region-specific birth order distribu-
tion (Table 2.11 and 2.12 column 2). The second gradient proxy is defined as the regression
coefficient of a linear birth order variable (with the highest value three for third or higher birth
order children) when estimating height for each country or region separately (column 3). Age
dummies as well as GDP per capita in the child’s birth year are included as control variables.
The second approach comes closest to the presented regression tables, however, it implies lin-
earity unlike the first approach.
Comparing the two different time periods, we find that the magnitude for India in column 1 has
increased and the magnitude of the gradient proxy in column 2 has slightly increased over time.
The magnitude of the gradient proxy in column 3 has halved in the later compared to the earlier
time period but is not significant around 2015.
The estimates are then used to calculate the share explained by birth order gradient in general
and by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference in Table 2.13 and 2.14. 7
The height gap, the explained amount of the height gap by the birth order gradient and by the
birth order gradient driven via son preference have decreased in both accounting exercises. In
the earlier period (Table 2.13), the birth order gradient accounts for 67 percent of the height gap
but in the later time period only for 33 percent. The birth order gradient rooted in eldest son
preference also loses its explanatory power over time from 33 percent to 19 percent. A similar
decrease is visible in Accounting Exercise 2, however, the proxy estimated in the later time
period column 3 is not significant.
The accounting exercises emphasize our finding that the eldest son preference hypothesis is not
as clearly visible as in the period around 2005. This is why we first want to reassess whether
the differing sampling strategy of NFHS 3 to NFHS 4 might play a role in the diverging out-
comes. Thus, we weigh the data as described in section 3 to make data sets representative on
the national and world level.
7J+P provide a more detailed explanation of the calculation exercise.
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Table 2.11: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2004-2010)
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.162
[0.017]
Gradient proxy 0.412 0.704
[0.069] [0.131]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.331 -0.234
Africa -0.066 -0.037
Kerala & Northeast -0.229 -0.155
Rest of India -0.358 -0.257
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,135 126,066 126,066
Table 2.12: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2011-2017)
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.186
[0.015]
Gradient proxy 0.431 0.375
[0.123] [0.187]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.251 -0.192
Africa -0.107 -0.070
Kerala & Northeast -0.182 -0.142
Rest of India -0.264 -0.203
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 398,710 168,490 168,490
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. In column (1), the sample consists of children aged 5 or less in NFHS-3
and 27 African countries for table 2.13 and in NFHS-4 and 24 African countries for Table 2.14. In columns (2)-(3), the sample is restricted to
African countries. In column (2), Gradient proxy is defined as the weighted average of the height gap between second borns and first borns
and the height gap between third- and higher-borns and first borns. In column (3), Gradient proxy is defined as the regression coefficient that
is obtained by regressing, separately by country-wave, HFA z-scores on a linear birth order variable that is top-coded at 3+. All columns
include child age dummies and log GDP per capita in the birth year.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table 2.13: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010)
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.265 -0.197
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.109 -0.139
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 67 % 86 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.129 -0.102
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.053 -0.072
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 33% 44%
Table 2.14: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2010-2017)
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.144 -0.122
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.062 -0.046
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 33 % 25 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.082 -0.061
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.035 -0.023
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 19% 12%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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5 Replication Results (2004-2010): Weighted
In this section, we will focus on new methodology but the same sample of J+P 2004 to 2010.
We compare the results for the time period of 2004 to 2010 that are weighted by the suggested
DHS mother sample weight for India for the regression analysis. Weighing matters and the im-
portance of birth order diminishes. We also show the regression results weighing both India and
Africa in the appendix. When using summary statistics in this section we adjust both the Indian
and African sample to mother sampling weights and the number of surveys included.8 We con-
centrate on reporting the most important results here; all other results of the new methodology
using the data of the original time period around 2005 are only shown in the appendix.
5.1 Summary Statistics
Even when we only consider the time period of 2004 to 2010, the values of the selected sum-
mary statistics for India and Africa differ in the unweighted sample (Table 2.15) to the weighted
sample (Table 2.16). After weighing and adjusting mother’s age at birth, mother’s literacy,
mother’s total prenatal visits, child’s HFA z-score, child’s WFA z-score, child’s hemoglobin
level, child’s number of vaccinations, and birth spacing have decreased in the Indian sample.
For the number of prenatal visits, India is not surpassing Africa as in the unweighted data and
for mother’s literacy, and child’s hemoglobin level India has now only a 0.01 larger value than
the African sample. In the Indian sample values for mother’s total children born, child’s birth
order, and open defecation are higher in the weighted than in the unweighted sample. The
increase is particularly dramatic for open defecation: in the unweighted sample 46 percent of
children live in households without any sanitation facility; in the weighted sample this is the
case for 63 percent. For the African sample, only child’s total vaccination and birth spacing are
0.01 units lower than in the unweighted sample. Adjusting the sample with weights draws a
less rosy picture of India in 2004 to 2010.
8You can find the only India weighted data in the appendix for the summary statistics and the figures in this
chapter.
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Table 2.15: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Unweighted
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.75 26.96 Child’s age (months) 30.20 28.27
[5.23] [6.86] [16.90] [17.06]
Mother’s total children born 2.74 3.88 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.82] [2.54] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.47 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.62 3.74
[0.96] [1.47] [1.80] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.51 -1.35
[0.47] [0.46] [1.81] [1.94]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.40 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.49] [0.48]
Mother is literate 0.58 0.49 Child’s WFA z-score -1.53 -0.88
[0.49] [0.50] [1.33] [1.42]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.28 10.15
[0.06] [0.07] [1.57] [1.68]
Mother took iron supplements 0.69 0.62 Child is deceased 0.05 0.07
[0.46] [0.49] [0.22] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.87 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.06 0.11
[0.94] [1.20] [0.23] [0.32]
Total prenatal visits 4.04 3.85 Child’s total vaccinations 6.61 6.24
[3.48] [3.07] [2.80] [3.12]
Delivery at health facility 0.45 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 36.16 38.69
[0.50] [0.50] [20.32] [20.63]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.09 0.30 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.29] [0.46] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.33 0.38 Open defecation 0.46 0.32
[0.28] [0.30] [0.50] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.10 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.04] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.85 1.60 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[1.09] [1.06]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.78 7.36 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[0.10] [0.65]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.3 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table 2.16: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Weighted
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.25 26.95 Child’s age (months) 30.18 28.26
[5.19] [6.85] [17.01] [17.05]
Mother’s total children born 2.87 3.90 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.91] [2.55] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.45 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.74 3.75
[0.89] [1.46] [1.88] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.67 -1.36
[0.47] [0.46] [1.80] [1.96]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.45 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.50] [0.49]
Mother is literate 0.49 0.48 Child’s WFA z-score -1.70 -0.89
[0.50] [0.50] [1.30] [1.44]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.10 10.11
[0.06] [0.07] [1.56] [1.70]
Mother took iron supplements 0.66 0.62 Child is deceased 0.06 0.07
[0.47] [0.49] [0.23] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.86 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.05 0.13
[0.95] [1.21] [0.21] [0.34]
Total prenatal visits 3.49 3.87 Child’s total vaccinations 6.42 6.14
[3.32] [3.28] [2.75] [3.17]
Delivery at health facility 0.39 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 35.43 38.43
[0.49] [0.50] [19.42] [20.43]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.08 0.32 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.28] [0.47] [0.29] [0.37]
Average pooled inputs 0.30 0.38 Open defecation 0.63 0.32
[0.27] [0.31] [0.48] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.09 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.03] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.89 1.59 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[1.11] [1.05]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.77 7.35 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[0.10] [0.67]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.3 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
5.2 Summary of Results for India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient
and Gender for Child Health and Related Outcomes
The pattern of HFA z-score is now analyzed using regressions to be able to compare the dif-
ferences in the unweighted sample (Table 2.17) and the weighted sample (Table 2.18). The
weighted and unweighted results in column 1 are the same. Children in India seem worse off
compared to African children.
If we examine the differences in height based on the birth order (weighing also the Africa
sample), we see in Figure 2.4 that the Indian deficit does not only affect children of second-and-
higher birth order but also firstborns in the weighted data. Additionally, the gap between Indian
and African children is wider for second birth and higher birth order children in the weighted
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sample. In the weighted sample first-born African children are not as tall as their second-born
siblings but shorter. Weighing the data reveals that all children in India, not even the eldest
child, independent of their birth order are shorter than in Africa.
When disaggregating the regression results by birth order, we find that the Indian height disad-
vantage affects all Indian children independent of their birth order. Even a firstborn in India is
on average 0.09 standard deviations shorter than its African peer, not 0.09 standard deviations
taller than in the unweighted model (Table 2.17). This height disadvantage is even stronger for
second-born Indian children with -0.11 and third-born ones with -0.36 in the weighted model.
All coefficients are statistically significant on the 1 percent significance level. However, the
birth order gradient is less steep in India in the weighted model compared to the unweighted
one.
Similarly, the main specification in column 3 shows a slightly more muted birth order gradient
for India in the weighted sample compared to the unweighted one.
Column 4 hardly changes when weighing the data whereas the Indian birth order gradient in-
creases in the model with mother fixed effects in column 5.
Columns 6 to 9 focus on other health outcomes that are also likely to be affected by birth order
driven parental investment decisions. The birth order gradient is more muted in the likelihood
of stunting and WFA z-scores, is slightly increased for hemoglobin, and is absent for deceased
as an outcome.
Overall, the steep birth order gradient found in the study by J+P is usually shallower in the
weighted sample. A particular preference for Indian first-borns in form of a positive birth order
effect is not detectable. This puts a particular first-birth order preference of Indian parents into
question, even for the time period around 2005.
Further, changes for child health inputs when weighing the data do not follow a clear pattern
but introduce only slight changes in magnitude.9
Moreover, we also reassess the two predictions that hypothesize differential effects for girls and
boys.10 We find that the India dummy is always negative for the weighted data and Indian girls
are generally worse of than their African peers. The birth order effect of second birth order chil-
dren reduces in magnitude and the one of third-or-higher born children increases. The general
Indian birth order changes for the specification of completed fertility and mother fixed effects
just like for the displayed table pair.
9The results are displayed in the appendix.
10The regression results can be found in the appendix.
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Table 2.17: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Unweighted
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.083 0.092
[0.011] [0.018]
India × 2nd child -0.144 -0.161 -0.110 -0.243 0.051 -0.147 -0.094 0.003
[0.025] [0.027] [0.063] [0.048] [0.007] [0.020] [0.030] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.377 -0.228 -0.194 -0.436 0.064 -0.199 -0.158 0.002
[0.024] [0.032] [0.092] [0.085] [0.009] [0.024] [0.036] [0.004]
2nd child 0.024 -0.011 -0.096 -0.167 0.009 0.010 -0.010 -0.014
[0.015] [0.017] [0.053] [0.027] [0.004] [0.012] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.065 -0.117 -0.168 -0.334 0.036 -0.063 -0.038 -0.011
[0.013] [0.019] [0.074] [0.044] [0.005] [0.014] [0.025] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 0.375 -0.877 10.149 0.072
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Africa mean -0.023
India mean 0.078
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,135 168,135 167,765 66,574 83,243 167,765 167,765 88,893 199,514
Table 2.18: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Weighted India
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.083 -0.086
[0.011] [0.021]
India × 2nd child -0.108 -0.138 -0.110 -0.275 0.047 -0.136 -0.094 -0.005
[0.029] [0.032] [0.068] [0.057] [0.009] [0.024] [0.035] [0.005]
India × 3rd+ child -0.360 -0.203 -0.197 -0.471 0.059 -0.190 -0.163 -0.005
[0.029] [0.039] [0.102] [0.102] [0.011] [0.029] [0.042] [0.006]
2nd child 0.024 -0.011 -0.096 -0.167 0.009 0.010 -0.010 -0.014
[0.015] [0.017] [0.053] [0.027] [0.004] [0.012] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.065 -0.117 -0.168 -0.334 0.036 -0.063 -0.038 -0.011
[0.013] [0.019] [0.074] [0.044] [0.005] [0.014] [0.025] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 0.375 -0.877 10.149 0.072
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Africa mean 0.014
India mean -0.041
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,135 168,135 167,765 66,574 83,243 167,765 167,765 88,893 199,514
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004)
and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Figure 2.4: Child Height in India and Africa, by Child’s Birth Order (2004-2010): Unweighted
vs Weighted
Replication (2004-2010): Unweighted
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Replication (2004-2010): Weighted
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Notes: The figure depicts the mean child height-for-age z-scores for sub-Saharan Africa and India, by the birth order of the child. The mean is
calculated over all children less than 60 months old. Please consider the notes in Figure 2.3 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (ICF, 2004) and IPUMS DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Considering the back-of-the-envelope calculations, we find that the birth order gradient can ex-
plain the height gap between African and Indian children less. The explained share reduces
by at least 35 percentage points in each of the two accounting exercises compared to the un-
weighted data. The birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference can explain even less in
the weighted data, between 11 and 14 percent.
6 Extension Macro-Determinants (2011-2017) vs (2004-2010):
Weighted
In the replication part of this paper, we first have used the same methodology but more recent
data and then different methodology but the same time period around 2015. We bring now
both together, new methodology and more recent data. Apart from weighting, we expose J+P’s
specification to additional covariates. We examine the sensitivity of the gap between Indian
and African children using four emerging macro-determinants: mother’s education, economic
growth, anti-open defecation campaigns, and the nutrition transition. 11
As data of food consumption is only available for the last born child of each family, the sample
is reduced by half in the later time period and almost by two-thirds in the earlier time period.
12 We weigh all the samples to be nationally representative. Countries with multiple surveys in
the periods are weighted so that each survey receives the weight of 1/n for n surveys. 13
6.1 Summary Statistics
We want to briefly describe the means of the considered macro-determinants for the time period
around 2005 (Table 2.19) and around 2015 (Table 2.20).
Literacy increases for both India and Africa though India has the largest growth in literacy just
as we hypothesized.
Noteworthy is the wealth distribution that mirrors the larger economic growth in India: 23 per-
cent of the Indian households in our sample in the period around 2005 and 12 percent in the
11In the appendix we look at different average inputs like consumption of meat and eggs by gender and birth
order to get a first idea about whether these inputs are distributed differently.
12This is why we also estimate the regressions with all macro-determinants but the nutrition transition for greater
power. The results are in the appendix and similar to the ones shown in the main body of this text.
13We also analyze the time period around 2005 and 2015 using weights but without macro-determinants in the
appendix.
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later time period are in the poorest quantile whereas African households are represented with
23 percent and 43 percent, respectively. Looking at the richest quantile we find that 27 percent
of the Indian households in our sample in the earlier time period and 29 percent in the later
time period are in the richest quantile whereas African households are only represented with 16
percent and 4 percent, respectively. The wealth gap has widened between India and Africa over
time. More African households are in the poorest and second poorest wealth quantile and less
in the third, fourth poorest, and richest wealth quantile than Indian ones in the more recent time
period.
Open defecation has overall decreased: 63 percent of Indian households in the time period
around 2005 and 47 percent in the time period around 2015 have no sanitation facilities; African
households have decreased open defecation from 32 percent to 23 percent.
The gap in consumption of animal products has decreased over time: In the time period around
2005, 12 percent of the Indian children and 43 percent of the African children have consumed
meat or eggs in the past 7 days. In the later period, 14 percent and 30 percent have eaten meat
or egg, respectively. More children consume dairy products. The consumption increases from
11 to 13 percent and in Africa from 16 to 20 percent over time. Possible explanations of the
diverging meat and egg consumption of the African sample could be measurement errors. In the
survey for the period around 2005, we also include measures about the consumption of animal
products in the past 24 hours for the Africa sample when measures for the consumption in the
past 7 days are not available. This might increase the likelihood of consumption. However, this
trend might also reflect the gap in economic growth leading to decreasing purchasing power of
rather expensive animal sourced foods for the African population compared to India.
Considering the presence of the four macro-determinants, we observe mixed evidence. The in-
creased level of maternal literacy mirrors the greater improvements in female education in India
than in Africa. In the period between 2004 and 2017 India has grown much faster than Africa.
This is reflected in the wealth of the households in our sample. Indian households are repre-
sented more in higher wealth quantiles. The dramatic improvement in India in open defecation
could reflect the increased awareness and construction of sanitation facilities. Nevertheless, the
decrease in open defecation in India is not large enough to catch up with Africa. Children’s
consumption of animal sourced foods has increased in India but not clearly in Africa. We want
to assess now in the next section how these macro-determinants are related to the height gap
between African and Indian children. Is the eldest son preference specification by J+P sensitive
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to the addition of the selected macro-determinants?
Table 2.19: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Weighted Macro-Determinants
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother is literate 0.49 0.48 Open defecation 0.63 0.32
[0.50] [0.50] [0.48] [0.47]
Poorest wealth quantile 0.23 0.23 Meat or eggs consumed 0.12 0.43
[0.42] [0.42] [0.33] [0.50]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.09 0.24 Dairy products consumed 0.11 0.16
[0.28] [0.43] [0.31] [0.37]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.20 0.20 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.40] [0.40]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.21 0.18 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[0.41] [0.38]
Richest wealth quantile 0.27 0.16
[0.45] [0.36]
Table 2.20: Summary Statistics (2011-2017): Weighted Macro-Determinants
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother is literate 0.68 0.55 Open defecation 0.47 0.23
[0.47] [0.50] [0.50] [0.42]
Poorest wealth quantile 0.12 0.43 Meat or eggs consumed 0.14 0.30
[0.32] [0.49] [0.35] [0.46]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.19 0.23 Dairy products consumed 0.13 0.20
[0.39] [0.42] [0.34] [0.40]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.19 0.15 Number of PSUs 28,215 12,684
[0.39] [0.36]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.22 0.14 Main sample of children 230,220 168,490
[0.41] [0.35]
Richest wealth quantile 0.29 0.04
[0.45] [0.21]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. The following variable is summarized at the mother level: mother is literate. Meat or eggs consumed and dairy products consumed
are also, in effect, summarized at the mother level because they are only available for the most recent birth. Variables summarized at the child
level include: open defecation and the wealth quantiles.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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6.2 Summary of Regression Results Using Macro-Determinants
We present now regression results including the identified macro-determinants to explain the
height gap between Indian and African children. We also reassess the two main predictions of
J+P and the accounting exercises.
6.2.1 India and Birth Order as Determinants
We consider the table pair - Table 2.21 and Table 2.22 - for an in-depth description of regression
results. The India dummy is significant and negative in column 1 and column 2 in the time
period around 2005 (Table 2.21) and around 2015 (Table 2.22). The magnitude is larger in the
later time period than in the earlier time period. The effect size is also greater than the weighted
model without the macro-determinants but smaller than the weighted models with only three
macro-determinants excluding animal sourced foods.
The Indian birth order gradient is shallower in the later period in time because the magnitude of
the effects decreases for all outcomes.
6.2.2 Emerging Macro-Determinants
The literacy dummy interacted with India is significant for the HFA z-scores without controls
and for WFA z-scores for both time periods. Literacy of mothers in India benefits children addi-
tionally in the later time period in the HFA z-scores main specification, stunting, and likelihood
to decease. The interaction term is positively associated with improved health outcomes (except
for the fertility sample in the earlier time period). The magnitude of the interaction of India and
literacy increases for the models of HFA z-score without controls over time.
The literacy dummy is significant for all outcomes in both time periods. Literacy is positively
correlated with improved health outcomes as expected (apart from deceased in the later time
period). The magnitude of the dummy literacy increases for the first three columns for the HFA
z-scores but decreases for all other outcomes.
The wealth quantiles are positively associated with improved health outcomes for all but de-
ceased for which evidence is mixed. In general, richer households are associated with healthier
children because the effect sizes usually increase from the second poorest wealth quantile over
the third and fourth poorest quantile to the richest wealth quantile. The richest wealth quantile
has a significant and positive relationship with improved health outcomes but deceased. All
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wealth quantiles do not have a significant association with deceased overall. The fourth and
third poorest wealth quantiles have a significant and positive relationship with all improved
health outcomes but hemoglobin in the time period around 2005. The second poorest wealth
quantile does not seem to differ too much from the poorest wealth quantile, the reference cat-
egory, because significant effects can only be found for one specification for HFA z-score and
WFA z-scores in the earlier time period. Around 2015 the second poorest wealth quantile has
more significant correlations with health outcomes (three of the four HFA z-score specifica-
tions, stunting, and WFA z-scores). There is not a clear time trend.
Open defecation interacted with India has negative associations with improved health outcomes
(apart from hemoglobin outcomes in the time period around 2005 and the third specification of
HFA z-scores as well as deceased in the later time period). The coefficients in the first speci-
fication for HFA z-scores are significant in both time periods. The coefficient for the outcome
WFA z-scores, the second specification of HFA z-scores and deceased have significant effects
for the later time period. A clear time trend is not detectable.
Open defecation alone has the expected negative relationship for stunting, weight-for-age z-
scores, and hemoglobin in both time periods as well as for deceased in the later time period.
Only in the main specification for HFA z-scores open defecation has the expected sign. This
shows the importance of adding PSU fixed effects that include characteristics of each PSU like
population density and disease environment that moderate the negative externality of open defe-
cation on child health. The dummy is significant for the first specification of HFA z-scores in
both tables and the second specification in the later time period. These effects vanish once in-
cluding PSU fixed effects. Further, around 2005 we find significant effects for WFA z-scores.
The consumption of animal products should be positively associated with improved health out-
comes. We consider two different outcomes: the consumption of dairy products as well as of
meat and egg together. We look at the interactions with the India dummy, too. The interaction
of meat and egg consumption with India is only significant for hemoglobin outcomes in the ear-
lier time period. In general, the interaction is correlated with improved health outcomes. Only
in the later period, this relationship is not positive in two specifications for the HFA z-scores.
Meat and egg consumption in India provides in most cases an additional benefit for children.
The dummy meat and egg consumption has the expected positive association with health out-
comes. It is significant for specifications in columns 1 to 3 for HFA z-scores, WFA z-scores,
and stunting in both tables.
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The interaction of dairy products and India does not show any significant effects (apart from
diseased in the time period around 2015). The small effect sizes and the changes in signs imply
that consumption of dairy products in India is not creating additional benefits for the health
outcomes of children.
The consumption of dairy products has significant positive associations with improved health
outcomes for HFA z-scores (apart from the specification of the fertility sample), stunting, WFA
z-scores, and deceased in both time periods. Hemoglobin has the expected sign and significance
only in the earlier time period.
From our assessment of emerging macro-determinants of the height gap between children in In-
dia and Africa we draw the following conclusions. Literacy plays a key role in health outcomes.
There is a gap between India and Africa. For India, the interaction term helps to improve health
outcomes even further. Wealth plays a key role in the improvement of health outcomes apart
from death. In the models without controlling for PSU fixed effects, the effects for open defe-
cation for India and Africa seem to be quite distinct. Defecating in the open in India damages
health outcomes additionally. There does not seem to be a particular difference for Africa and
India for the consumption of animal sourced products because most of the coefficients of the
interaction terms with India are not significant and vary in signs. The consumption of animal
sourced foods improves health outcomes overall. The macro-determinants are jointly significant
in models but deceased in the earlier time period. Adding the macro-determinants increases the
general height gap of children between India and Africa.
6.2.3 Reassessment of the Main Predictions and Accounting Exercise
When examining the two predictions deriving from eldest son preference, we have similar find-
ings. Additionally, we observe negative -though over time- decreasing effects of girls in India
on child health outcomes relative to their African peers. Interactions of girl, India, and birth or-
der are positive in the time period around 2005 when adding the macro-determinants. However,
these signs turn negative in the later time period.
We again perform the two back-of-the-envelope calculations. This time we additionally control
for the macro-determinants. In the time period around 2005, the explained share by the birth
order gradient is even lower than for the weighted sample: between 18 and 9 percent. There
is also a reduction for the later time period, however, the accounting exercise fails. Due to
weighting the data the average first-born child in Africa is taller than the second-born child, so
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Table 2.21: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Weighted Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India -0.158 -0.142
[0.036] [0.057]
India × 2nd child -0.117 -0.179 -0.732 0.051 -0.184 -0.085 0.003
[0.052] [0.060] [0.605] [0.015] [0.043] [0.072] [0.002]
India × 3rd+ child -0.170 -0.222 -1.374 0.065 -0.161 -0.121 0.006
[0.048] [0.070] [0.775] [0.018] [0.050] [0.083] [0.003]
2nd child 0.092 0.052 1.500 -0.005 0.079 0.046 0.002
[0.033] [0.039] [0.351] [0.009] [0.028] [0.055] [0.001]
3rd+ child 0.055 -0.048 2.426 0.014 -0.003 0.033 0.002
[0.028] [0.044] [0.531] [0.010] [0.031] [0.062] [0.001]
India ×Mother’s literacy 0.157 0.154 0.081 -0.026 -0.025 0.094 0.001 0.003
[0.034] [0.043] [0.052] [0.084] [0.014] [0.037] [0.061] [0.002]
Mother’s literacy 0.100 0.082 0.082 0.151 -0.023 0.123 0.098 -0.003
[0.019] [0.023] [0.031] [0.061] [0.007] [0.021] [0.045] [0.001]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.077 0.017 0.018 -0.016 -0.012 0.061 0.027 -0.001
[0.025] [0.030] [0.036] [0.062] [0.009] [0.025] [0.044] [0.001]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.229 0.184 0.140 0.175 -0.030 0.110 0.014 -0.001
[0.025] [0.029] [0.038] [0.064] [0.010] [0.026] [0.046] [0.001]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.363 0.314 0.188 0.295 -0.057 0.217 0.066 -0.000
[0.025] [0.029] [0.043] [0.071] [0.011] [0.030] [0.052] [0.001]
Richest wealth quantile 0.690 0.672 0.401 0.570 -0.107 0.413 0.264 0.001
[0.028] [0.034] [0.056] [0.092] [0.014] [0.039] [0.070] [0.002]
India × Open defecation -0.205 -0.073 -0.116 -0.019 0.038 -0.086 0.009 0.002
[0.035] [0.044] [0.068] [0.106] [0.018] [0.048] [0.077] [0.003]
Open defecation 0.050 0.004 -0.061 0.002 0.009 -0.060 -0.076 -0.002
[0.021] [0.025] [0.038] [0.074] [0.009] [0.027] [0.053] [0.002]
India ×Meat or eggs consumed 0.059 0.068 0.092 0.167 -0.027 0.026 0.158 0.000
[0.037] [0.048] [0.060] [0.095] [0.017] [0.044] [0.066] [0.002]
Meat or eggs consumed 0.199 0.204 0.134 0.094 -0.029 0.120 0.031 -0.000
[0.020] [0.024] [0.030] [0.061] [0.007] [0.020] [0.039] [0.001]
India × Dairy products consumed 0.048 -0.020 -0.058 0.165 -0.005 0.058 -0.075 0.001
[0.044] [0.056] [0.067] [0.108] [0.018] [0.048] [0.072] [0.002]
Dairy products consumed 0.101 0.126 0.126 -0.025 -0.030 0.080 0.135 -0.002
[0.025] [0.030] [0.038] [0.078] [0.009] [0.027] [0.047] [0.001]
Africa mean of outcome -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 0.381 -0.889 10.107 0.074
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No
p-Value of joint significance test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.437
Observations 64,785 64,785 63,635 24,638 63,635 63,635 28,297 47,835
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations. Source:
Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table 2.22: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2011-2017): Weighted Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India -0.309 -0.202
[0.021] [0.040]
India × 2nd child -0.076 -0.098 0.231 0.023 -0.059 -0.104 0.001
[0.037] [0.044] [0.781] [0.010] [0.032] [0.051] [0.001]
India × 3rd+ child -0.166 -0.187 -0.128 0.040 -0.123 -0.030 0.002
[0.034] [0.051] [0.900] [0.012] [0.037] [0.057] [0.001]
2nd child 0.068 0.033 0.604 -0.006 0.035 0.064 -0.002
[0.029] [0.035] [0.638] [0.008] [0.025] [0.044] [0.001]
3rd+ child 0.077 0.012 1.183 0.000 0.003 -0.022 -0.002
[0.024] [0.039] [0.716] [0.009] [0.028] [0.048] [0.001]
India ×Mother’s literacy 0.102 0.073 0.082 0.052 -0.024 0.087 0.041 -0.002
[0.021] [0.029] [0.038] [0.081] [0.009] [0.027] [0.042] [0.001]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.122 0.167 0.104 0.119 -0.018 0.085 0.083 0.002
[0.014] [0.020] [0.028] [0.068] [0.007] [0.021] [0.034] [0.001]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.096 0.086 0.051 0.132 -0.013 0.052 0.048 0.000
[0.016] [0.021] [0.026] [0.052] [0.006] [0.019] [0.030] [0.001]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.225 0.217 0.113 0.183 -0.023 0.109 0.119 0.001
[0.016] [0.022] [0.031] [0.060] [0.007] [0.022] [0.034] [0.001]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.410 0.400 0.270 0.326 -0.065 0.223 0.168 0.001
[0.017] [0.023] [0.036] [0.069] [0.009] [0.026] [0.039] [0.001]
Richest wealth quantile 0.655 0.690 0.461 0.522 -0.100 0.416 0.269 0.001
[0.019] [0.028] [0.047] [0.085] [0.011] [0.032] [0.047] [0.001]
India × Open defecation -0.180 -0.151 0.010 -0.147 0.008 -0.086 -0.013 -0.002
[0.023] [0.032] [0.048] [0.099] [0.011] [0.035] [0.054] [0.001]
Open defecation 0.084 0.122 -0.030 0.134 0.005 -0.003 -0.056 0.001
[0.017] [0.023] [0.035] [0.083] [0.008] [0.027] [0.045] [0.001]
India ×Meat or eggs consumed 0.009 -0.059 0.011 -0.069 -0.018 0.031 0.074 -0.000
[0.025] [0.037] [0.047] [0.093] [0.011] [0.033] [0.046] [0.001]
Meat or eggs consumed 0.183 0.187 0.134 0.123 -0.027 0.089 0.002 0.000
[0.015] [0.022] [0.027] [0.067] [0.007] [0.019] [0.031] [0.001]
India × Dairy products consumed -0.050 -0.058 0.037 0.128 -0.000 0.006 0.006 0.003
[0.026] [0.038] [0.046] [0.093] [0.011] [0.034] [0.046] [0.001]
Dairy products consumed 0.209 0.174 0.095 0.105 -0.016 0.095 -0.018 -0.002
[0.017] [0.024] [0.030] [0.074] [0.007] [0.022] [0.035] [0.001]
Africa mean of outcome -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 0.311 -0.838 10.439 0.050
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No
p-Value of joint significance test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029
Observations 145,957 145,957 139,245 43,381 139,245 139,245 84,690 75,570
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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the calculated gradient proxies for Africa are also negative just like in India. A negative proxy
implies differences in height depending on the birth order favoring firstborns.
When we add up the coefficients of the macro-determinants for the accounting exercise, we
find that the macro-determinants contribute to the explanation of the height gap between In-
dian and African children.14 To conclude, the results of this extension show that the emerging
macro-determinants are drivers of child height, especially female literacy, economic growth,
and the nutrition transition. Birth order and son preference are sensitive to the addition of the
macro-determinants and so have less explanatory power in the extension.
7 Discussion
The results of this replication and extension study show that J+P’s eldest son preference is sen-
sitive to specification. Using weights or more recent data the birth order gradient is less steep.
When interpreting the results we should have certain limitations in mind.
The presented evidence is overall descriptive, not causal evidence. We want to support our ev-
idence with checks of our methodology and sample. To lend our results more credibility, we
are planning to conduct placebo tests to check our methodology by using other outcomes that
are not related to child development where we expect not to detect an effect. If we found an
“effect”, we would have to question the validity of our identification strategy (Jones, 2009). To
ensure that our results are not driven by the selection of our sample of countries, we are planning
to conduct Monte Carlo simulations to assess how a different African sample would influence
our results just like Spears (2018). We will also conduct similar Monte Carlo simulations for
different weighing options of the data.
The used data considers families that have or have not yet completed their fertility. So, the
health outcomes of the children might not yet reveal the parents’ birth order or gender prefer-
ences completely. They might only practice discriminatory behavior with completed fertility.
We are also not controlling for the number of siblings that seems to be a crucial omitted variable
when assessing child survival (Spears et al., 2019). We are not integrating this omitted variable
because we want to focus on other methodological aspects. However, we are planning to con-
duct an additional robustness check including the omitted variable of the number of siblings as
14The accounting exercises can be found in the appendix. The simple extension of the back-of-the-envelope
calculations allows us to report whether the macro-determinants provide additional explanatory power, however,
the reported magnitude of the simple calculations are not meaningful.
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a next step.
The measures used for our analysis might have errors due to the data collection in different
settings or the use of different survey questions in the case of the nutrition indicators we are
using. Another concern is that we make the implicit assumption that the growth potential of
Indian and African children based on gens or health endowments of parents is not distinct. We
use the WHO standards to calculate the HFA z-scores and WFA z-scores. We are also only
using the information of whether a household defecates in the open as a measure. This does not
account for the disease environment or the externality of open defecation behavior of neighbors
or residents in the same PSU (Spears, 2018).
Macro-determinants help to explain children’s health outcomes but alone they do not bridge
the difference between Indian and African children. The puzzle of the "Asian Enigma" has
not been solved completely in our study because in regressions with only the emerging macro-
determinants the India dummy is still significant. However, other researchers, in particular,
Spears (2018) offers a rather convincing explanation: the disease environment caused by the
externality of open defecation. We only included a dummy in our study about the ownership of
toilets but not about the behavior of neighboring households. The externality is captured in our
study by the PSU fixed effects. The decomposition analysis of drivers of child stunting in South
Asia by Headey et al. (2016) also provides more potential factors that might be important to
consider. Other emerging macro-determinants that we do not focus on but might also be driving
the health outcomes is the level of urbanization.
Our results should be interpreted keeping in mind the descriptive character of our study, the
specific sample, the potential measurement errors in the data, and the selected determinants of
the "Asian Enigma" in this study.
8 Conclusion
The results of this replication and extension study have several important implications for the
cross-country assessment of health outcomes.
In our extension, we use emerging macro-determinants in the past ten years that evolved dif-
ferently in India and Africa: mother’s education, household prosperity, open defecation, and
consumption of animal sourced foods. We find that the birth order gradient is not robust to
the inclusion of these macro-determinants. The explanatory power of birth order gradients is
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reduced.
When testing the sensitivity of the eldest son preference hypothesis by J+P, we find that parental
preferences seem to explain the "Asian Enigma" less in recent years or the weight-adjusted pre-
vious years. For this, we use first the same methodology but more recent data from around
2015 and then adjusted methodology and the data from the original time period. In both of
these analyses, the eldest son preference or differences between the birth order of the children
are not the key to explaining the differences in height for Indian and African children.
Using weights, we are not even able to conduct the same back-of-the-envelope calculations as
J+P for the time period around 2015 because it is based on the assumption that the birth order
gradient is absent in Africa. This is not the case. Birth order gradients exist even beyond India
and might be rooted more in gens or health endowments like mothers’ height than of culture fa-
voring a certain gender and birth order. Future research should work on the separation between
health endowments and health investments like cultural birth order effects keeping the changing
macro-determinants in mind.
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3 | Essay 2: Long-Term Evidence of a Cluster Ran-
domized Controlled Trial: Double Fortified Salt
Usage for Health and Human Capital Acquisition
of School Children in Rural Bihar
Abstract.1 To what degree timing and duration of exposure to a long-term nutrition intervention
matter for child development is hardly considered in research. We provide evidence by examin-
ing the effectiveness of a follow-up to a randomized controlled trial delivering iron and iodine
fortified salt for the school feeding program of 107 randomly selected governmental schools
in Bihar, India. Using panel data of about 1,000 school children, we analyze the difference in
means of the health, cognition, and education outcomes for four different exposure groups vary-
ing in onset and duration. Our results show on average higher hemoglobin levels for children
who receive fortified salt at least in early childhood. Early childhood exposure matters espe-
cially because the likelihood of suffering from moderate and severe anemia in early adolescence
is 8.6 percentage points lower compared to children who are hardly exposed to fortiï¬edsalt.
1This is joint work with Abhijeet Kumar, Santosh Kumar, and Sebastian Vollmer.
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1 Introduction
Many existing nutrition interventions evaluate the short-term effects on child health. The fo-
cus lies more on “if” exposure to a nutrition treatment matters for child health but less to what
degree timing and duration of exposure to a long-term nutrition intervention improve child de-
velopment.
This is why we strive to answer the following research question: Does timing and duration
of the use of salt fortified with iron and iodine called double-fortified salt [DFS] in the Indian
school lunch determine child development?
For this, we examine the effectiveness of a follow-up to a randomized controlled trial that is
inspired by a directive issued by the Indian Ministry of Women and Child Development that
postulates all government run schools to use DFS in the Midday-Meal-Scheme [MDM], the
Indian school feeding program to improve children’s diets (Ministry of Human Resource De-
velopment, 2015). Increasing the iron intake improves the development potential of children
because 15 to 90 percent of Indian school children between 5 and 15 years of age are anemic
and half of this stems from iron deficiency due to iron-poor diets (Allen et al., 2006; Alvarez-
Uria et al., 2014). However, DFS is hardly available on the market, so schools cannot purchase
and use it (Krämer et al., 2020). Therefore, we established a supply chain of DFS for up to 107
governmental schools in two blocks of the district Jehanabad in the state of Bihar, India. Half
of the 107 randomly selected primary and middle schools are chosen by chance to receive DFS
starting in 2015 or 2017. Within each school, we randomly choose on average 20 students in
second grade in 2014.
To capture the effect of onset and duration of this nutrition intervention, we follow up with
the selected children even after they change to another governmental led middle school [MS].
So the sample has been enlarged by 16 untreated middle schools after the maximum treatment
period of 4 years. Due to the variation in the start and the end of the treatment, we examine the
intention-to-treat [ITT] effect of DFS use for four different exposure groups: a) children who
receive DFS from third grade in 2015 onward, b) children who receive DFS from fifth grade in
2017 onward, c) children who receive DFS from third grad in 2015 to the end of fifth grade in
2018, and d) children who are hardly exposed. The longest treatment period is about four years,
48 months (from August 2015 to July 2019).
This paper contributes to the literature by considering the so far longest treatment period of DFS
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in the MDM -a maximum treatment period of about 4 years-, by examining different treatment
periods and duration, and by investigating how a childhood intervention (in third grade) unfolds
in outcomes for young adolescents (in sixth grade).
Examining the consequences of long-term treatment is in accordance with the recent article by
Bouguen et al. (2018) who call for looking beyond short-term treatment effects of RCTs. How-
ever, our study does not focus on the long-term impacts of short-term treatment, i.e. a short
duration of treatment and a long duration between treatment end and follow-up. We rather con-
sider the cumulative effect of treatment and whether an earlier or later onset determines child
health, cognition, and education outcomes. Like Chhabra et al. (2019) we are interested in the
policy-relevant effects of a program. These “full” effects of a program are distinct from “pro-
duction function” effects that are early measurable outcomes of a program according to Glewwe
& Muralidharan (2016). Nevertheless, our study differs also from the study by Chhabra et al.
(2019) because we do not examine differential program effects on later and early cohorts but
we follow only one cohort over a long period of treatment time.
Further, we add to research about food fortification in school lunches for improved child nutri-
tion by examining the effectiveness of four treatment periods within one study. We extend the
study by Krämer et al. (2020) who assess the short-term effects of an intervention in the MDM
after 1 year of DFS supplementation by providing evidence about how four different treatment
periods varying in onset and duration of DFS exposure affect child development. Thus, we
provide novel insights into the effectiveness of DFS in the MDM for possible implementation
options.
The last contribution is linked to the long treatment duration that starts in one life stage but ends
in another. The exposure to DFS starts in childhood when children are on average 8 years of
age in third grade. Our measures collected after the treatment period of maximum of 4 years
capture health and other human development outcomes of children with an average age of 11
years in sixth grade. This age group is in early adolescence. Thus, our study provides evidence
of how exposure to DFS in one life stage, childhood, can affect another life phase, adolescence.
In general, the unique duration and variation of the treatment contribute to the understanding of
exposure effects of nutrition interventions.
As we build on the RCT supplying DFS for the Indian MDM by Krämer et al. (2020), we work
with a panel data set of about 1,000 children after the treatment period of maximum of 4 years.
The data collection includes a household survey, cognitive ability tests, health assessments,
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observations at the school level, administrative records of attendance as well as interviews of
headmasters and school cooks.
For the data analysis, we measure the effectiveness of the introduced policy using ANCOVA
estimation techniques corrected for attrition to assess the difference in means of the health, cog-
nition, and education outcomes of the four exposure groups.
Our results show that compared to a child group that is hardly exposed to DFS in the MDM,
children who receive DFS at least in early childhood (from third to fifth grade) have on aver-
age a higher hemoglobin level of 0.260 g/dL. Exposure in early childhood alone reduces the
likelihood of a child being moderate or severe anemic by 8.6 percentage points compared to
the children who are only exposed to DFS for 4 months in later childhood. Nevertheless, the
exposure of about 4 years starting in early childhood in the third grade does not seem to suffice
to improve cognitive ability or education outcomes in early adolescence in sixth grade.
The results have high policy relevance as they show the potential of fortified foods in school
feeding programs to increase the health of adolescents without crowding out other interventions.
The results highlight that early childhood exposure is long-lasting and so could benefit children
even when schools are closed.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a more detailed description of the
background and the literature. Section 3 describes the exposure groups, data collection, and
measures of the panel data. In section 4 we propose our estimation strategy and discuss pos-
sible internal validity threats with a focus on attrition. We present the results in section 5 and
discuss these in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background and Literature Review
As our study focuses on the supply of DFS for use in the MDM at government schools, we
provide a brief overview of the characteristics of the Indian school feeding program and the
state of iron deficiency in India in the appendix. Here we only focus on the coverage of DFS
interventions in the MDM in the scientific literature.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining a long-term nutrition intervention
of DFS in a public distribution channel, by focusing on the effect of a childhood intervention for
outcomes in early adolescents, and by considering different exposure periods within one study.
Pure DFS has been used as a treatment in the MDM at a large scale only by Krämer et al. (2020)
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before. They assess the effect of DFS in the MDM over a period of 1 year at government-funded
schools in two blocks of the district Jehanabad in Bihar, India. The RCT covers 54 randomly
selected treatment schools that receive the DFS and 53 control schools that use iodized salt.
The assessed outcomes are hemoglobin levels, cognitive ability, and educational achievements
of 2,000 children in second grade at baseline. Krämer et al. (2020) conclude that the inclusion
of DFS reduces the prevalence of any form of anemia by 20 percent. Treated children with
higher school attendance more than 80 to 90 percent have even larger improvements in anemia
and test scores.
Other rigorous studies using the same DFS formula in India focus on another public channel:
the Public Distribution System [PDS]. A. Banerjee et al. (2013) find that only 13 percent of
customers at the PDS shops and 33 percent of customers at private shops choose to buy subsi-
dized DFS instead of conventional salt. The consumption of DFS declines after 2 to 3 years of
the roll-out: only 10 percent of customers consume subsidized DFS. The provision of DFS free
of costs to randomly selected households is examined by A. Banerjee et al. (2018). They find
that despite the free delivery only 61 to 75 percent of households use the DFS. Nevertheless,
the availability of DFS in shops or free delivery of DFS for a period of about 2 years benefits
adolescents. Their hemoglobin levels increase slightly and the fraction of anemia of this age
group decreases.
Further, some studies with school level treatment use multiple fortified salts for meals and find
increases in hemoglobin levels and even in memory and attention for children between the age
of 5 and 18 (Sivakumar et al., 2001; Kumar & Rajagopalan, 2007; Vinodkumar & Rajagopalan,
2009). However, the sample sizes are smaller than the one by Krämer et al. (2020) and the
treatment period is 1 year, less than in A. Banerjee et al. (2018). The MDM is also used to pro-
vide other micronutrients or fortified rice in India like the study by Berry, Mehta, et al. (2020)
in which the impact of the usage of a micronutrient mix to fortify the MDM in Odisha, India,
is assessed. The authors do not find any effects on hemoglobin levels, child health, and sub-
sequently human capital measures of cognitive or learning outcomes. Other studies using DFS
find effects on hemoglobin levels, too (Radhika et al., 2011; Osei et al., 2010; Pinkaew et al.,
2013). However, the sample sizes and exposure periods do not surpass the studies introduced at
the beginning of this subsection.
Despite the evidence that longer-term iron supplementation has positive effects on the cognitive
performance of children older than 2 years of age and adolescents, iron nutrient interventions
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targeting early adolescents in India are rare (Bryan et al., 2004). Exceptions are the evaluations
of India’s Adolescent Girls’ Anaemia Control Programme or a study conducted by Deshmukh
et al. (2008) that fails due to lack of compliance in taking iron supplements. More recently
Berry, Mehta, et al. (2020) examine the usage of the MDM to provide iron folic acid [IFA] sup-
plementation for adolescents. They provide evidence on the supplementation of IFA in Odisha,
India, for primary school children who attend the first to the fifth grade, but not the sixth grade
like in our study. They find that the IFA program has significant large effects for moderately
anemic students in schools that are distributing tablets more recently compared to schools that
run out of tablets.
Our study adds to the existing literature by looking at the until now longest treatment period
of DFS in the MDM of up to 4 years, the effect of different exposure periods of DFS in one
study, and how a childhood intervention starting in third grade unfolds in outcomes for young
adolescents in the sixth grade.
3 Study Design and Data
In this section, we want to provide an overview of the study site and sample selection, the data
collection methods, and the used measures. For the interested reader in the underlying causal
pathway of the intervention, we recommend the study by Krämer et al. (2020) or the appendix.
3.1 Study Site and Sample Selection
For this study, Bihar is a suitable site because it is one of the poorest states in India. 34 percent
of its population lived below the poverty line in 2012 with the second-largest share of India’s
poor (World Bank, 2016). It also ranks low in the Indian Health Index (NITI Aayog, n.d.).
Anemia is also widespread 58.3 percent of women (age 15 to 49) are affected and 99.2 percent
of girls (age 10 to 19) in 2015/2016 (George & Ray, 2016). Jehanabad is chosen as the district
in which the study is implemented. This district performs slightly better than Bihar on average
regarding the share of anemic children below the age of 5 (61.5 percent of the district popula-
tion) and anemic women in reproductive age (56.7 percent) (George et al., 2017).
We select our sample schools and children in the following way: Out of all 228 government-
funded schools in two blocks (Kako and Modanganj) 54 schools are randomly selected to re-
ceive DFS since 2015 (See table in the appendix.). Among these are 31 primary schools [PS]
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that teach children from first to fifth grade and 23 middle schools [MS] that children can attend
from first to at least eighth grade. The other 53 randomly selected schools (32 PS and 21 MS)
are the schools that receive DFS since 2017. The different types of schools are not stratified. In
this way, we create variation in the starting point of the DFS exposure.
Our target group is school children between 7 and 9 years of age because this age group has
large potential to be affected in their cognitive abilities because of a particular developmental
phase of the frontal lobes during this time (Thatcher, 1991). Thus, we select on average 20
children from second grade (April 2014 to March 2015) of each school. The sample of children
with an average age of 6 years adds up to initially 2,000 (Krämer et al., 2020). As the MDM
is prepared decentralized at own school kitchens and distributed directly to the children in this
district, all school children when eating at school consume the DFS.
Apart from this random selection, we also include schools for the third data collection wave
in a purposive way. We do this because 31 schools in our baseline sample are PS that only
teach children until fifth grade. Thus, in April 2018 children attending a PS have to change
to a MS to join the next highest grade, sixth grade. These schools are either a MS within or
outside of our sample. The schools excluded in our sample could be either other governmental
MS or private schools. In the data collection after the treatment period of maximum of 4 years
children attend 20 PS and 23 MS which receive DFS since 2015 (referred to hereafter as early
childhood) as well as 21 PS and 21 MS which receive DFS since 2017 (referred to hereafter as
later childhood). To minimize attrition, we follow children who transition to 16 governmental
schools that we subsequently include in the sample. Figure 3.1 visualizes the DFS delivery to
the schools over time indicating the start of the supply and the wave of the data collection.
Due to the inclusion of both PS and MS in our sample, we have the chance to examine the
effect of a long or short exposure duration. Children in fifth grade have to choose another
school to continue their education. In Figure 3.2 we simplify the decision to either choosing to
attend a school in our original sample (Group Always and Group Late) or not (Group Early and
Group Hardly). In this way we have the advantage to observe the effect of DFS on four distinct
exposure groups:
• Group Always contains all children who attend a school with the early start of DFS supply
until fifth grade and any school (Early or Late) in our original sample after fifth grade.
They receive DFS beyond fifth grade and so have the longest (48 months) and earliest
exposure of the four groups.
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Figure 3.1: DFS Supply to Schools over Time
Time School Sample
Data collection wave I (11/2014-01/2015) School Early School Late Other School
No DFS No DFS
DFS start in early childhood (08/2015) DFS No DFS
Data collection wave II (08-10/2016) DFS No DFS
DFS start in later childhood (12/2017) DFS DFS
Data collection wave III (01-07/2019) No DFSDFS DFS
Notes: School Early indicates a start of the DFS supply in 2015 and school Late in 2017. Source: Own data.
• Group Early includes all children who attend a school with the early start of DFS supply
until fifth grade and no school in our original sample after fifth grade. They receive DFS
only until fifth grade and so have a short (32 months from August 2015 to March 2018)
and early exposure to DFS (no exposure in the past 12 months August 2018 to July 2019).
• Group Late are all children who attend a school with the late start of DFS supply until
fifth grade and any school in our original sample after fifth grade. They receive DFS
starting at the end of fifth grade and so have a short (20 months from December 2017 to
July 2019) and late exposure (exposure in the past 12 months August 2018 to July 2019).
• Group Hardly contains all children who attend a school with the late start of DFS supply
until fifth grade and no school in our original sample after fifth grade. They receive DFS
only briefly (4 months from December 2017 to March 2018) at the end of fifth grade and
so have a late and the shortest exposure to DFS (no exposure in the past 12 months August
2018 to July 2019).
As the parents and children are not informed about the schools’ supply with DFS, we are confi-
dent that the selection of the school after fifth grade is independent of the treatment status of the
schools and so does not introduce selection bias. However, child and household characteristics
might in general drive the selection of attending a certain type of school in any grade.
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Figure 3.2: Child Treatment over Time
Time School Sample
Data collection wave I (11/2014-01/2015) Treatment School Control School
No DFS No DFS
DFS start in early childhood (08/2015) DFS No DFS
Data collection wave II (08-10/2016) DFS No DFS
DFS start in later childhood (12/2017) DFS DFS
Start of sixth grade (04/2018) Original Sample
School
(Treatment or
Control)
No Sample School
(Other Governmental
and Private School
or Drop-out)
Original Sample
School
(Treatment or
Control)
No Sample School
(Other Governmental
and Private School
or Drop-out)
DFS No DFS DFS No DFS
Data collection wave III (01-07/2019) DFS No DFS DFS No DFS
Treatment exposure
(overall until 12/2019 /
past 12 months prior to wave III)
Group 1: Early and
late childhood
(53/12)
Group 2:
Only early childhood
(32/2)
Group 3:
Only late childhood
(25/12)
Group 4: Only briefly
in late childhood
(4/2)
Source: Own data.
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3.2 Data Collection
To assess whether timing and duration of DFS matters, we have received ethical clearance for
the intervention and the data collection by University Medical Center Göttingen and Georg
August University of Göttingen. The intervention and data collection are also supported by
the local administration, the Bihar Midday Meal Directorate and the local administration which
have granted us access to the schools for the data collection waves and the delivery of DFS. The
data collection waves follow the same procedure as described by Krämer et al. (2018). 2
3.3 Outcome and Covariate Measures
For the assessment of the effects of DFS on children’s health and human, we choose outcomes
and covariates that are measured as consistently as possible across all three data collection
waves. However, as we follow children over time, the cognitive ability tests are adjusted to be
in line with the actual ability of the children and provide enough variability in the data. The
focus in the following is to revise the chosen outcome variables by Krämer et al. (2018) briefly
and to emphasize the differences of the measures in the third data collection wave. Krämer et
al. (2018) provide a more detailed description.
3.3.1 Health Measures
The main health outcomes of interest are hemoglobin levels in g/dL, mild anemia status, mod-
erate anemia status, and severe anemia status.3 Depending on the hemoglobin level we classify
the anemia status of the children following the WHO (2011).4 As the age of the children varies
within and across surveys, we have to apply different thresholds (see Figure in appendix). This
adjustment is in particular necessary for the third data collection wave in which children are on
2However, there are some minor differences that we will mention in this footnote. Firstly, the duration of the
questionnaires in the third wave is longer for the household interviews (on average 40 minutes) and the cognition
and education tests (30 minutes). Secondly, in the last survey, an additional team plays a behavioral experiment
with children and their parents at the schools. It follows the team conducting the cognition tests and precedes
the medical staff. Thirdly, the third wave only includes MS for the headmaster, cook-cum-helper interviews,
observations, and recording of attendance. These are the schools which children should attend in sixth grade. They
are not permitted by law to stay at a PS after fifth grade.
3The hemoglobin levels are determined with the HemoCue® Hb 301 photometer (AB Leo Diagnostics, Helsin-
borg, Sweden) on-site because it only requires a drop of finger-prick blood for the test.
4Children between 5 and 11 years of age are considered severe anemic when their blood hemoglobin level is
lower than 8 g/dL, moderate anemic with a level between 8g/dl to 10.9 g/dL, and mild anemic with a level between
11 g/dL to 11.4 g/dL.
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average 11 years of age and 18 children are above 14 years of age.5 We also group moderate
and severe anemia status because for severe anemia there are only eleven observations at the
first data collection wave, one observation at the second wave, and three observations at the
third wave (see table in the appendix).6
3.3.2 Cognition Measures
To assess cognitive ability and in particular executive functioning, we use a cognitive ability in-
dex based on five tests: block design, forward digit-span, backward digit-span, Raven’s Colored
Progressive Matrices, and a Stroop test (see table in the appendix). To account for a general in-
crease in cognitive ability in the third data collection wave, we adjust or even employ new tests
like the fruit/vegetable Stroop by Röthlisberger et al. (2010).7 Based on the five tests we use a
principal component analysis to calculate a cognitive index. For the block design test and the
Stroop test, we use the extended or new measures. The index is normalized by subtracting the
baseline mean and dividing by the baseline standard deviation. The unit of the outcome is then
standard deviations from the mean in the first data collection wave.
3.3.3 Education Measures
For examining the reading and math skills the Annual Status of Education Report [ASER]
reading assessment tool and the ASER Math tool are used that are developed by the Indian
Non-Governmental Organization Pratham (ASER Centre, 2014). However, the conduction of
the test has been modified to accommodate the setting.8 The outcomes are normalized just like
the cognition index.
School attendance is recorded from the official record books of the schools. The focus lies in
5The thresholds for moderate and severe anemia remain the same for children between 12 and 14 years of age,
non-pregnant women aged 15 years and above, as well as men aged 15 years and above. Otherwise, the bounds for
mild anemia widen for children above 12 and women to 11.9 g/dL and men up to 12.9 g/dL. We adjust the anemia
status according to age and gender.
6That includes all children that have taken the hemoglobin test and are in one of the four exposure groups.
7Adjustments to the previous data collection waves affect Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices, Block Design,
and the Stroop test:The test matrices for the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices are changed to avoid learning
effects from previous rounds. For the block design we add two more pictures displaying a pattern in accordance to
which the children are asked to arrange red and white colored blocks (Malin, 1969). When block design is used as
an outcome in comparison with the previous surveys, the additional new patterns are censured. However, it remains
uncensored in the calculation of the final cognition index. We provide more details about the fruit/vegetable Stroop
in the appendix.
8At the first data collection wave the math exercises comprise of 13, in the second wave of 15, and in the third
wave of 16. The scoring remains the same across waves except with additional chances to gain points in the math
assessment due to the included exercises.
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particular on the past 12 months before the survey. The official records of many schools go only
back for 12 months or to the start of the school year. The first data collection wave includes
attendance data for the time between November 2013 and October 2014, the second wave for
the time between August 2015 and July 2016, and the third wave for the time between January
and December 2018. We calculate school attendance as the rate of the total number of days
present of a child and the total number of days school is open for each time period.
3.3.4 Covariate Measures
We follow roughly the covariate choice by Krämer et al. (2018) for the health, cognition, and ed-
ucation outcomes but bring in school level covariates for all outcomes. We provide an overview
table of the choice of our covariates in the appendix. For our empirical model, we use in partic-
ular the baseline data apart from three exceptions measured in the third data collection wave.
We add another variable to account for the activities of the weekly IFA supplementation [WIFS]
program. This governmental program provides once a week one IFA tablet containing 100 mg
elemental iron and 500 ug folic acid for each child attending the sixth to the twelfth grade of
government, government aided, or municipal schools (Ministry of Health & Family Welfare,
2016). The provision is administered by the schools. The WIFS program has been introduced
by India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in 2012 but only started again after the onset
of our intervention (2014) in Bihar in late 2017. Only four schools have started distributing the
tablets to children in 2018. In 2019 all but one school in our sample are actively participating
in the WIFS. As the provision of IFA supplements could potentially bias our estimates, we add
it as an additional control to the food intake covariates. IFA supplementation is measured as the
number of days between the date the school starts providing IFA tablets to the child’s grade and
the date on which the health measurements of the child have been collected.
The other exceptions relate to the construction of the exposure groups. Two of the groups
include children that only go to a private school or that have dropped out of school. Chil-
dren attending private schools might perform better in cognition and education tests because of
higher quality education. At private schools, more resources for more nutritious foods might
be provided. This could increase the micronutrient status of the children. So, children attend-
ing government schools might be - independent of the DFS treatment - worse off than children
attending private schools. Thus, we add a dummy of whether the child attends only a private
school after fifth grade. Children who drop out of school do not receive any kind of free food
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or any kind of cognitive stimulation or educational input. They might be in general worse of
than children attending government schools. Therefore, we also include a dummy for whether
the child dropped out of school after fifth grade.9 This rich set of control variables related to so-
cioeconomic, nutrition, health, and psychosocial interaction status ensures that other potential
drivers of our child development outcomes are accounted for.
4 Estimation Strategy
To assess how timing and duration of exposure to DFS in the MDM affect health, cognition,
and education outcomes of school children, we are discussing compliance, attrition, baseline
balance, and the empirical specification in the following.
4.1 Compliance
In our study, we might face an internal validity threat by partial compliance on the school or
the child level. Krämer et al. (2020) discuss potential compliance issues in more detail. We
want to mention additional possible channels for partial compliance. On the child level children
who are enrolled in a governmental school offering free lunch might not eat the MDM. At the
third data collection wave, this is only the case for four children in our sample according to
self-report by the tested children.
At school level, partial compliance might be a greater threat due to the switch of suppliers,
strikes of cooks and helpers, and the production of DFS in Northern Bihar. Due to the lack of
production, we had to switch the supplier for about 4 months in 2018. The interim supplier is
a less known and so less accepted brand by the schools. We cannot fully overcome the concern
that the treatment and control schools have not used another kind of salt during this time. The
MDM has also not taken place in January and most of February in 2019 due to a strike of cooks-
cum-helpers. In our study area, DFS has not been available and mostly unknown throughout
the study region. Even though DFS has been started to be sold in Patna, the capital of Bihar, in
early 2017, the production has been reduced or partly stopped due to low demand by our original
supplier. Since 2018 a Bihari company manufactures also DFS and has started to supply districts
in Northern Bihar. They have not spread the supply to Jehanabad district, though. So there is
little chance that the school children receive DFS apart from the MDM. As compliance might
9Children who leave our original selected schools earlier than fifth grade are also captured by these variables if
they continued this behavior during the third wave data collection.
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be impaired especially because of children’s attendance, we measure the ITT effects and not the
ATE.
4.2 Attrition
Another potential internal validity threat is attrition. In the following, we describe the causes
and extent of attrition in our sample.
4.2.1 Reasons for Sample Attrition
When collecting the data in the third wave, we face additional challenges that decrease the num-
ber of complete information of participants. The first challenge is the revisit after more than 2
years that increases the likelihood of reallocation of households.
The children’s life stage is also decisive because some parents might opt for private or boarding
schools after children have completed PS and are considered old enough to be away from the
family. The completion of PS increases the likelihood of the child to change the school.
Another challenge is insufficient or contradictory information: Even though we have conducted
the household interviews first, the available information about the attended school of the child
remains often ambiguous. In few cases, children are reported to go to two schools, a govern-
mental and a private school. Cases with missing or contradictory information of schools are
considered incomplete and so increase the attrition by large. In the appendix, we illustrate with
a flowchart at which stage children drop out of the health outcomes sample.
The different types of schools attended at baseline introduce differential attrition between the
four exposure groups because children who attend MS until fifth grade only have to decide on
their continuation of education if they want to attend private school, explicitly another school,
or want to drop out. Instead, the children at PS until fifth grade do not have a default option to
continue studying. For them a change to MS is mandatory. As there is no default for these chil-
dren, ambiguous information does not allow to determine the attended school after fifth grade
easily. Due to this, children going to PS until fifth grade are more likely to exit our analytical
sample.
Children who attend PS until fifth grade are also more likely to continue education at a govern-
mental or private school that is not in our original sample. Thus, they would mainly constitute
group Early and Hardly with no exposure to DFS in later childhood. The selection into schools
after fifth grade affects attrition. As our exposure groups are built on the attendance of certain
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Table 3.1: Correlation between Attrition and DFS Exposure Status
Sample Health Outcomes
Cognition and
Education Outcomes
Attendance Outcome
Group Always -0.105* -0.208** -0.218*
[0.043] [0.064] [0.088]
Group Early 0.022 -0.008 0.083
[0.057] [0.085] [0.119]
Group Late -0.074 -0.240*** -0.299***
[0.046] [0.064] [0.085]
P-value: Group Always = Early 0.006 0.003 0.003
P-value: Group Always = Late 0.319 0.383 0.167
P-value: Group Early = Late 0.049 0.001 0.000
Attrition rate
All 0.211 0.308 0.349
Group Always 0.167 0.252 0.291
Group Early 0.294 0.453 0.592
Group Late 0.198 0.220 0.210
Group Hardly 0.272 0.460 0.509
Observations 1477 1477 1477
Notes: Exposure group Hardly is used as reference category. Standard errors are clustered by PS-MS cluster and appear in brackets. *, **, ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The number of observations are all children we could group in one of the four
exposure groups without ambiguity.
Source: Own Data
schools, the exposure groups are correlated with the combination of PS and MS attended by the
children and so also associated with attrition. We argue that attrition depends on the school type
and not the treatment because Krämer et al. (2020) show that the small treatment effect of DFS
does not affect attrition for a shorter treatment period.
4.2.2 Extent of Sample Attrition
The attrition in our sample constitutes a challenge for the estimation of the exposure effects be-
cause it is high in frequency, differs between different exposure groups, and seems to be partly
driven by observable baseline characteristics.
The attrition rate from baseline to the point in time after a treatment exposure of maximum of
4 years is 21.1 percent for health outcomes, 30.8 percent for cognition outcomes, maths and
reading score, and 34.9 percent for the attendance outcome as Table 3.1 depicts.10 The attrition
varies between the different exposure groups. Considering the health outcomes as an example
the attrition varies between 16.7 percent in group Always to 29.4 percent in group Early (column
10In the appendix, we also depict the attrition rate considering different baselines.
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2). In general, groups Early and Hardly have larger attrition rates than groups Always and Late.
This holds also for cognition and education samples and the attendance outcome sample. There
are significant differences between the exposure groups related to attrition. For the health out-
come samples the difference between group Always and Hardly, Always and Early, and Early
and Late are statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. For the other outcome
samples there are statistically significant differences at least at the 10 percent significance level
between group Always and Early, Always and Hardly, Early and Late, and Late and Hardly.
This pattern reveals that attrition seems to be different in group Early and Hardly that transition
out of the school with DFS supply due to school change compared to group Always and Late
that mainly remain at schools with DFS supply. Overall, attrition of participants is correlated
with the exposure group and so threatens internal validity.
In the appendix we examine differences in observable characteristics between the children in
our analysis sample and those who dropped out and between drop-outs across the different
exposure groups considering different baseline samples. We find statistically significant differ-
ences between the comparison groups. Thus, attrition is likely to bias our outcome estimates.
As the exposure groups are correlated with attrition via the type of attended schools, we cannot
exclude the possibility of differential or selective attrition. To correct for this selection bias,
we use parametric and non-parametric attrition correction approaches. As a parametric attri-
tion correction approach, we employ inverse probability weighting. We estimate the attrition
weights with baseline characteristics and exposure group. As a non-parametric attrition cor-
rection approach, we use Lee bounds (Lee, 2009). These bounds create worst-case scenarios
assuming that participants who select into the sample because of the treatment rank at the top
or the bottom of the outcome distribution (Tauchmann, 2014). The group with less attrition
is trimmed either from above or below. We report tightened Lee bounds in the text that use
the baseline outcome and either quartiles, terciles, or dummies representing the group below or
above the median of the outcome for more precise estimates. We report additional details and
classical Lee bounds in the appendix.
4.3 Pre-Intervention Balance
Another interval validity threat is the pre-intervention imbalance of observable characteristics
between the exposure groups. The random selection of schools into receiving DFS in early
childhood for group Always and Early or in later childhood for group Late and Hardly at the
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beginning of the intervention should ensure that there are no systematic differences between
these groups. However, as a change in schools is likely to be based on the child and household
characteristics, that influences in which exposure group participating children fall into after the
treatment period of maximum 4 years, differences at baseline between the four exposure groups
are likely. When comparing baseline characteristics of the four exposure groups, our suspicion
is confirmed: There are statistically significant differences between groups. We illustrate this by
Table 3.2 which shows mean baseline outcomes and statistically significant differences between
exposure groups for hemoglobin, any anemia, moderate or severe anemia, and reading score.
We show extended baseline tables for covariates and other baselines in the appendix.
Due to the imbalance of the baseline means we control for the baseline characteristics that
might influence the outcome following the outlined selection of covariates in the subsection
about measures.
Table 3.2: Baseline Summary Statistics for Health Outcomes Sample (Balance Check) at Wave
III Using Wave I Data as Baseline
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Obser-
vations
Group
Al-
ways
Early Late Hardly
Always-
Early
Always-
Late
Always-
Hardly
Early-
Late
Early-
Hardly
Late-
Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 1,165 11.401 11.458 11.586 11.709 0.654 0.037 0.001 0.330 0.059 0.198
[1.107] [1.091] [1.177] [1.058]
Any anemia 1,165 0.501 0.493 0.430 0.373 0.887 0.033 0.002 0.271 0.052 0.161
Mild anemia 1,165 0.208 0.204 0.184 0.155 0.907 0.289 0.135 0.559 0.268 0.427
Moderate/severe anemia 1,165 0.293 0.289 0.246 0.218 0.943 0.157 0.024 0.451 0.210 0.400
Cognitive test outcomes
Cognitive score index 1,135
-
0.034
0.099
-
0.071
0.013 0.365 0.740 0.730 0.280 0.622 0.569
[1.009] [0.950] [0.976] [1.012]
Education outcomes
Math score 1,138 4.506 5.101 4.920 4.848 0.372 0.427 0.527 0.797 0.724 0.902
[3.841] [3.657] [3.679] [3.675]
Reading score 1,138 0.815 1.058 0.949 0.937 0.099 0.273 0.441 0.498 0.525 0.945
[1.118] [1.205] [1.166] [1.089]
School attendance 1,112 0.781 0.817 0.801 0.819 0.124 0.363 0.116 0.395 0.921 0.361
[0.172] [0.138] [0.157] [0.139]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report baseline means by intervention arm for child in the study analysis. Columns 6-11 report p-values from tests on the
equality of means for each variable.
Source: Own Data.
4.4 Empirical Specification
As already pointed out we will focus on estimating the ITT and not the ATE because of incom-
plete compliance on the child and school level. For the data analysis, we estimate the difference
83
in means of the outcome variables of the four different exposure groups using analysis of co-
variance [ANCOVA]. It includes lagged baseline characteristics. We condition on the baseline
level of outcomes because of two reasons: improving statistical power and controlling for base-
line imbalance of the exposure groups (McKenzie, 2012). Our main estimation specification is
the following:
Yis1 = α + β1Alwayss + β2Earlys + β3Lates + γ0Yis0
+γ1Xis0 + γ2Ws0 + γ3Xis1 + µs + εis
(3.1)
where Yis1 represents the previously explained outcomes: hemoglobin level, anemia status, the
cognitive ability index, reading scores, math scores, and school attendance. For the outcome
anemia status, linear probability models are estimated. i is used as a subscript indicating obser-
vations for child i and s for all combinations of PS and MS s. All standard errors are clustered
at the school level, i.e. the PS-MS clusters. The subscript 1 indicates the time after the treatment
period of maximum of 4 years.
α constitutes the intercept. Alwayss, Earlys, and Lates are dummy variables that turn to one
when the PS-MS cluster is assigned to the respective group, it is zero otherwise. β1, β2, and β3
represent the ITT estimators.The focus lies on the children who have observations for all three
data collection waves. Yis0 is the outcome of interest at baseline. To increase precision and to
overcome baseline imbalance, we introduce control variables on the child level with the vector
Xis0 and PS-MS cluster Ws0 at baseline. We also include control variables that we measure in
the same data collection wave as the outcome Xis1. This vector includes fixed effects for the
test conductor of the child cognition and education tests, a private school dummy, a drop out
dummy, and the number of days between the beginning of the IFA distribution to the child’s
grade and the day on which the medical tests are conducted. µs and εis are independent and
identically distributed errors across clusters and children within clusters.
We present the outcomes for three different estimation strategies. The first contains no control
variables including the baseline outcome Yis0. The second model includes the baseline out-
come Yis0 as a control variable. The last specification and main specification uses all discussed
controls for the chosen outcome. To not only test whether there are statistically significant
differences between the exposure group Always, Early, as well as Late and Hardly, we also
conduct Wald tests of equality for differences between all other group combinations and report
the p-values.
As attrition is correlated with school type and so the exposure groups, we address this issue
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by reporting results in the text using inverse probability weighting based on attrition status and
tightened Lee-bounds for the treatment estimates.
To get to know more about how the exposure to DFS affects different groups, we conduct het-
erogeneous effects analysis using the same estimation strategy but using interaction terms or
splitting the sample considering the attendance levels measured as the average attendance level
in the fourth and sixth grade during the potential DFS exposure. For this, we plot marginal
effects of the treatment exposure by attendance levels or we split the sample by different atten-
dance levels (at least 60 %, 70 %, or 80 %) or by attendance terciles.
5 Results
We use the empirical specification to measure the effects of timing and duration of exposure
to DFS use in the MDM in child health, cognition, and education outcomes. We show results
for a maximum treatment period of about 4 years adjusted for attrition and multiple hypotheses
testing.
5.1 Health Outcomes
We find statistically significant differences between groups for hemoglobin for all three spec-
ifications comparing group Always to Hardly in Table 3.3 adjusting for attrition using IPW.
Compared to a child group that is hardly exposed to DFS in the MDM, children who receive
DFS for about 4 years have on average a higher hemoglobin level of 0.260 g/dL. For the spec-
ifications I and II, the comparison between group Late and Hardly also shows a significant
difference at the 10 percent significance level. However, this effect is no longer significant in
the main model (column 4). We also find a significant positive effect for group Early for specifi-
cation III. Receiving DFS in early childhood only increases on average the hemoglobin level by
0.260 g/dL compared to a group of children who is hardly exposed. This implies that exposure
during early childhood and not so much in later childhood is important for higher hemoglobin
levels.
We do not find statistically significant differences between groups for any form or mild ane-
mia. Nevertheless, we find a statistically significant difference between group Late and Hardly
in specifications I and II as well as for group Early and Hardly for specification III. There is
also a significant difference between group Always and Early for specification III. On average,
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receiving DFS in early childhood reduces the likelihood of a child being moderate or severe
anemic by 8.6 percentage points compared to children who receive DFS only briefly, less than 4
months. When we translate the significant effect into the prevalence of moderate/severe anemia,
we find a reduction of 33 percent.11 We suppose that we are not able to observe improvements
of moderate or severe anemia for group Always due to low power.
Regarding Lee bounds, we find no significant positive lower bounds for hemoglobin or negative
upper bounds for anemia status in Table 3.4 Panel A that shows tightened Lee bounds.12
As testing for four different outcomes increases the probability of false rejection of at least
one null hypothesis, we also correct standard errors for multiple hypothesis testing using the
Benjamini-Hochberg method as a robustness check in Table 3.5 (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995;
Benjamini et al., 2006). In the appendix, we report the sharpened q-values for further outcomes
of the main specification. The estimated significant coefficients hold and have even smaller
standard errors than in the main specification.
To examine the intensive margin of exposure to the treatment, we examine heterogeneous ef-
fects based on different attendance levels. However, the heterogeneity analysis is underpowered
due to the small sample size. Though the intuition that greater attendance increases the effect
sizes for health outcomes seems to hold, we hardly find statistically significant effects. To il-
lustrate this issue, we show a margins plot for the outcome hemoglobin at different attendance
levels in Figure 3.3. The 95 percent confidence intervals always include zero. Further evidence
for all other outcomes is provided in the appendix.
5.2 Cognition and Education Outcomes
Next, we want to examine whether health effects transform into effects on cognition and edu-
cation in Table 3.6.
5.2.1 Cognition Index Score
We start with describing the results for the cognition index. For specifications II and III, we find
a statistically significant difference between group Always and Hardly suggesting that children
who receive DFS for about 4 years have on average a 0.192 standard deviation lower score than
children who consume it only briefly in later childhood, all else equal.
11This is the ratio of the coefficient divided by the baseline mean of non-attrited children after the treatment
period of maximum 4 years: 8.6/26.
12We provide further details of the tightened and classical Lee bounds in the appendix.
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Figure 3.3: Marginal Affects for Hemoglobin by Level of Attendance
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Note: Own Data.
The lower Lee bound is negative and statistically significant but the upper bound is not signif-
icant and also positive in Table 3.4 Panel B. Here the bounds are tightened with the cognition
index split into terciles and the baseline outcome. We also conduct a robustness check of mul-
tiple hypotheses testing of all cognition related outcomes in the main specification in Table 3.5.
The corrected standard errors for multiple hypothesis testing for the cognition index is no longer
significant.
The unexpected sign might be driven by the adaptation of the tests to adjust to child develop-
ment or a lack of other inputs for developing cognitive ability. Single test outcomes for the main
specification do not show other statistically significant differences between groups (see tables in
the appendix). The decrease in the cognition index might be due to the adaptation of the tests to
adjust to the growing cognitive abilities of children over time. We have not tested the compara-
bility of adapted and original tests. For example, we measure inhibition with the fruit/vegetable
Stroop by Röthlisberger et al. (2010) instead of the Stroop like “Day- Night” test by Gerstadt et
al. (1994). We have not tested the comparability of the two tests. The adaptation of the Stroop
test might drive the difference in the performance of children in the cognitive index. Another
explanation of this finding could be that for the cognitive ability to increase at different ages
supplementary inputs apart from optimal nutrition are needed like psychosocial stimuli. The
reference group, group Hardly, might have an advantage because next to children who drop
out or go to another governmental school it also includes children who attend a private school
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after fifth grade. Assuming that the quality of psychosocial stimuli and other input factors for
the development of cognitive ability is greater for group Hardly, it would not be surprising that
children who only attend less equipped government schools perform lower (group Always).
Thus, the negative coefficient could be explained by the more cognitively developed exposure
group or the different measures used to adapt to later childhood.
5.2.2 Education Outcomes
We do not find statistically significant differences between any two groups for the math or the
reading score outcome. Ceiling effects could be the reason (Wang et al., 2008). We provide
graphical evidence for this in the appendix. For example, in the conducted reading test it is
relatively easy for children in sixth grade to score high so that the true extent of very well-
performing students cannot be determined. The highest level of assessment measures whether
children can read a story fluently. Nevertheless, we find a statistically significant difference in
school attendance for group Always and Hardly for specification II, between group Late and
Hardly as well as between group Early and Late for all specifications, and between group Al-
ways and Early for specification II and III. This is quite puzzling because school attendance
should not be directly affected by the treatment because children are not aware of the DFS us-
age, and children who do not eat the MDM regularly are not able to improve their health and,
indirectly their school attendance through the treatment.
Lee bounds for education outcomes comparing group Late and Hardly as well as for reading
score and attendance comparing group Always and Hardly have a significant and positive upper
bound. The lower bound is not significant and negative. The Lee bounds for the reading scores
are classical Lee bounds due to a lack in variation within the data. Correcting the standard er-
rors for multiple hypotheses testing for the three education outcomes in the main specification
in Table 3.5, there is no statistically significant difference in attendance between Group Late
and Hardly anymore. The significant finding is not robust.
The correlation of our exposure groups and the school types might explain the effect of the treat-
ment on attendance. First, in group Early and Hardly children exit our original selected schools
to change to another school where we only have access to a limited amount of administrative
records capturing their attendance. Second, children who attend PS until fifth grade are more
likely to attend a school that is not in their own but a neighboring village or town. This implies
that many children who could go to PS that is situated in their own village have to travel further
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to attend MS. The increased opportunity costs of traveling to reach further away schools might
lead to children attending school less.
Despite treatment effects on hemoglobin and moderate anemia after the treatment period of
maximum of 4 years, the results of treatment of about 4 years starting in early childhood does
not seem to suffice to improve cognitive ability or education outcomes in early adolescence in
sixth grade. We find an increase in hemoglobin for groups of children receiving DFS for about
4 years and in early childhood only. A reason for why exposure in early childhood appears to
be more beneficial is that the requirement of daily intake of iron increases by age but that the
intake of iron due to DFS does not increase at the same pace, i.e. depending on attended grade,
not child age. 13 DFS received in early childhood reduces the likelihood of moderate anemia in
early adolescence compared to children with low exposure. However, we do not see improve-
ments in cognition even after a duration of about 4 years. The considered outcome, a cognition
index, has even an unexpected negative sign. We argue that cognitive ability has additional
complementary factors that are essential to increase it. Thus, we conclude that supplementation
of DFS alone might not be sufficient to increase cognition in early adolescence. Attendance has
a positive association with different treatment groups though this effect might be traced back to
the different school types in the exposure groups than the treatment itself.
6 Discussion
Overall, our results show that the implementation of the government directive postulating the
use of DFS in the MDM has positive health outcomes. Our results have to be interpreted consid-
ering four limitations: partial compliance, attrition, age-adjusted measures, and school quality.
As already explained before, we can not exclude partial compliance on the school and in partic-
ular the child level. Krämer et al. (2020) show that attendance of children represents a mediating
factor. Children with higher attendance have larger treatment effects for health and cognition
outcomes. This is why our study again does not look at the ATE but the ITT. The focus lies
13Children aged 4 to 6 years require 8 mg of daily iron intake, children aged 7 to 9 years 10 mg, children aged
10 to 12 years 12 mg, and children aged 13 to 19 years 15 mg (WHO, 1959). One 450 kcal meal portion for
primary school children (first to fifth grade) should contain 4 g of DFS per meal, i.e. 3.5 mg of iron (Krämer et al.,
2020; Bihar Government, 2017). Upper primary school children (from sixth grade onward) should receive a larger
portion 700 kcal, so 6.222 g of DFS, i.e. 5.444 mg of iron (Bihar Government, 2017). Thus, the iron intake due to
DFS accounts for 43.75 percent of the required daily iron intake for children between age 4 and 6 years, 35 percent
for children between age 7 to 9 years, and 29.167 percent for children between age 10 and 12 years considering
the size of a meal for the first to the fifth grade. Considering the portion size at sixth grade, the iron intake due to
DFS accounts for 45.367 percent of the required daily iron intake for children between age 10 and 12.
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on the policy effectiveness of the intervention, not at the ATE that would have greater external
validity.
Another limitation of our study is attrition. We face additional challenges after the treatment
period of maximum of 4 years due to incomplete information. Attrition in our case threatens
internal validity because exposure groups and attrition are correlated. We also show that there
are significant differences between children within our analytical sample at the third data col-
lection wave and those who dropped out. There are also significant differences in observable
characteristics between the drop-outs of the different exposure groups.
However, we argue that the correlation between exposure groups and attrition is mainly driven
by the school types that are included in the different exposure groups. Children who attend PS
until fifth grade are more likely to leave the sample because additional information is needed
to determine the newly attended school. Children attending MS until fifth grade have a default
option that can be easily verified by checking attendance records. As the exposure groups are
correlated with attrition via the type of attended schools, we use parametric and non-parametric
attrition correction approaches.
Another limitation we want to draw attention to is the consistency of the cognition and edu-
cation tests. Our study is following a cohort of children from second to sixth grade. During
this time children are naturally developing greater cognitive ability and might also be exposed
to more education. As we tried to be as consistent as possible, we conducted the same tests
with only slight modifications for most tests. After the treatment period of maximum of 4 years
this leads to less variability of the outcomes, a ceiling effect. For example, in the reading test
hardly any participating child in sixth grade is not able to read single letters. For the outcome
considering the ability of inhibition control we adopt a new test. The Stroop like “Day-Night”
test by Gerstadt et al. (1994) used in the first two data collection waves to measure the abil-
ity of inhibition control is no longer appropriate for the new age group of the children in the
third data collection wave. That is why we use an adapted version of the fruit/vegetable Stroop
by Röthlisberger et al. (2010). We did not perform consistency checks or how performance in
one test should be translated best to scores in the other. Instead, we convert the scores of the
fruit/vegetable Stroop into points based on the outcome distribution. This might explain the
puzzling negative treatment effects for the cognition index.
Another limitation is the influence of school quality on our outcome measures. So far we use a
limited number of school characteristics at baseline as control variables like total school enroll-
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ment, number of children in the same grade as the child, distance to school, and student teacher
ratio at the school level. However, this does not seem to suffice to capture the effect of school
characteristics on our considered child development outcomes. The difference in education
quality between schools might also be the reason why children who attend government schools
that receive DFS during PS and MS score lower in the cognition index than those children who
hardly consume DFS. Among the children who do not consume DFS are children who go to
private schools where education quality is probably higher. We argue that education quality and
so psychosocial stimuli are essential for child development. Even in the presence of adequate
nutrition, the education quality could act as a constraint to child development.
These limitations - imperfect compliance, attrition, age-adapted measuring, and hardly con-
trolled school quality - should be kept in mind when interpreting our findings.
7 Conclusion
Using panel data of about 1,000 school children we examine the effectiveness of a government
directive. To model reality as close as possible we supply DFS to 107 randomly selected gov-
ernmental schools in two blocks of the district of Jehanabad in the state of Bihar. We contribute
to the literature by looking at one of the longest treatment periods of DFS in the MDM so far:
about 4 years. Due to variation in onset and duration of DFS exposure we can examine the
effectiveness of the salt across different exposure periods and observe how a childhood inter-
vention starting in third grade unfolds in outcomes for young adolescents in sixth grade.
Employing an ANCOVA approach corrected for attrition we show that assigned usage of DFS
during the preparation of the MDM increases the hemoglobin level by 0.260 g/dL for the chil-
dren who receive DFS at least in early childhood. Exposure in early childhood only reduces the
likelihood of a child being moderate or severe anemic by 8.6 percentage points compared to the
children who are only exposed to DFS for 4 months in later childhood. However, the improved
health outcomes do not transform into cognition or education gains.
The results have high policy relevance as they show the potential of fortified foods in school
feeding programs to increase the health of adolescents without crowding out other interventions.
The results highlight that early childhood exposure is long-lasting and so could benefit children
even when schools are closed.
We argue that optimal nutrition is only one important determinant for the development of cog-
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nitive ability and so school attainment. Another decisive factor is school quality that in our case
might constraint the effects of the nutrition intervention. Therefore, we recommend a more
holistic approach for future nutrition interventions at the school level. Apart from a treatment
arm with only DFS supply, it would be advisable to complement it with measures improving
the quality of education at schools.
Another interesting angle of our study is how an intervention in childhood unfolds in outcomes
for early adolescents. It would be interesting to learn about the effects of DFS for girls before
and after menarche that happens around early adolescents. We have not collected information
on this even though menstruation leads to a regular blood and so iron loss for girls. Investigating
the differential effects of the use of DFS for girls in this crucial life stage could show additional
beneficial effects of the DFS in the MDM.
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4 | Essay 3: Parental Beliefs and Investment Deci-
sions under Competition
Abstract.1 Though research has examined the effects and causes of son preference in India
widely, studies fail to cleanly identify the underlying reasons for lower parental investments in
daughters. We examine how believed market returns to investment in children - one possible
cause - affect parental investment decisions.
To isolate the effect of parents’ believed market returns to investment, we conduct a lab-in-the-
field experiment with sixth grade students and their parents in rural Bihar. We use the strategy
method to elicit the investment of parents for two different market returns to investment: a
non-competitive setting depending on the performance of the participants’ own child and a
competitive setting depending on the absolute and relative performance of the own child in a
tournament against either a girl, a boy, or a child with unknown gender.
Our lab-in-the-field experiment reveals that parents react to different market returns to invest-
ment. We find that parents invest almost 10 percent less of the initial endowment in their
children when exposed to a competitive market setting. Competing against a competitor with
known gender reduces the investment. Parents invest about 27 percent less of the initial endow-
ment into their children when competing against a boy compared to a non-competitive setting.
We contribute to the experimental literature with evidence about the influence of competition on
the investment behavior of participants in a competitive setting. We also show how the gender
dynamics of competitors matter for a third party that is not involved in the competition itself.
Additionally, we contribute to the examination of input factors of parental investment decision
by isolating the effect of market returns to investment and its interaction with child endowment
in a lab-in-the-field experiment.
1This paper is co-authored by Sebastian Vollmer.
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1 Introduction
A broad body of literature examines reasons and outcomes of daughter discrimination in India
in areas like education, nutrition, and health. Yet, most studies fail to cleanly identify the under-
lying reasons for lower parental investments in daughters. We examine one possible underlying
cause of parental differential investment in children - market returns to investment - with a lab-
in-the-field experiment that allows clear isolation of the effect. We want to investigate how
market returns to investment in combination with child endowments matter for parental invest-
ment decisions in their children.
To isolate the effect of parents’ believed market returns to investment, we conduct a lab-in-the-
field experiment with sixth grade students and their parents in rural Bihar. We keep income,
family size, human capital returns to investment, effort costs, and time of investment fixed and
vary the endowment of children and the market returns to investment. The within-subject-design
or using control variables take care of parental heterogeneity in altruism, risk aversion, beliefs,
and aspirations. We use the strategy method to elicit the investment of parents in two settings
proxying two different market returns to investment: a non-competitive setting with a piece-rate
payment scheme depending on the performance of the participants’ own child and a competitive
setting with a contest-like payment scheme depending on the absolute and relative performance
of the own child in a tournament against either a girl, a boy, or a child with unknown gender.
Beliefs about the probability of single events and probability distributions about multiple events
are elicited using visual aids. This elicitation method has been inspired by Delavande & Kohler
(2009) and Giné et al. (2009). We use ordinary least squares [OLS] regressions with cluster
robust standard errors to test hypotheses about parents’ beliefs and investments derived from a
conceptual framework.
In our first part of the analysis, we assess the belief formation of parents. We find that observ-
able characteristics of own children like gender matter more than their real ability when parents
form beliefs about the probability of their own child solving any one task of the game. How-
ever, when forming beliefs about how likely parents’ own child is to win against a competitor,
believed child ability matters. Parents believe that daughters have lower absolute and relative
ability than sons. When we make the gender of the competitor salient, parents believe it is less
likely for their own child to win.
In the second part of our analysis focusing on the parental investment decisions, we find that
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believed higher ability of children increases the investment of parents but does not matter more
under competition. Parents invest less in daughters in general and discount their ability in the
competitive setting. Regarding returns to market investment, we find that parents invest almost
10 percent of the initial endowment less in children when they are exposed to competition.
The influence of social preferences seems negligible. Parents’ belief about the probability of
their own child winning against a competitor has a positive association with investing in their
children. Though the effect magnitude does not outweigh the decrease in investment due to
competition. Irrespective of the gender of the own child, parents invest less in the tournament
setting when their own child competes against a girl or a boy. Parents’ investments decrease by
more than a quarter of the initial endowment once the competitor is a boy.
We make contributions to two strains of literature. We add to research on input factors of
parental investment by cleanly identifying the influence of variation of market returns to invest-
ment and its interaction with child endowment with the help of a lab-in-the-field experiment.
Further, we provide novel evidence about the influence of competition on the behavior of par-
ticipants: investments are lower in a competitive compared to a non-competitive risky setting.
We also show how the gender dynamics of competitors matter for a third party not involved in
the competition itself.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the two different strains of literature this
study connects. Section 3 derives the hypotheses from a conceptual framework of parents’ in-
vestment in children. Section 4 describes the experimental design including the methodology
for data collection and analysis. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 a brief discussion.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Background and Literature Review
The objective of the study is to show how competitively framed market returns to investment
evoke differential parental investments in children. We contribute to the literature on inputs
into parental investment in children because we identify the influence of variation of market
settings and its interaction with child endowment in a lab-in-the-field experiment. Further, we
provide novel evidence for the experimental literature on competition because we investigate
how a competitive setting shapes investment behavior and how gender dynamics influence the
decisions of a third party.
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Our study draws from two strains of literature: input factors of the parental investment function
in their children and experimental evidence about behavior under competition.
2.1 Input Factors in Parental Investment in Children
We start with reviewing input factors of parental investments in children. First, we describe the
identified inputs in the parental investment of the intergenerational mobility and transmission
theory of earnings, assets, and consumption by Becker & Tomes (1986, 1979). Then, we bring
in more recently discovered input factors omitted in this theory.
2.1.1 Becker’s Identified Inputs
Becker & Tomes (1979) consider the utility function of parents that derives from own consump-
tion and wealth of children in the future period subject to own parental income, the inherited
endowments of children, and expected endowed and market luck of children. All parents can
contribute to the production of children’s wealth by investing in their human capital develop-
ment giving up their own consumption.2 The optimal investment in a child depends amongst
others on income spent on children, the rates of return on investment in the child, the child
endowment, the market luck of the child, and the family size (Becker & Tomes, 1986, 1979).
Parents have to form beliefs about the endowment of children, the rates of return on invest-
ments in children, and the market luck because they are not fully observable at the time of the
investment decision. The authors assume that parents are perfectly informed about the human
capital production function. Parents are also supposed to be utility maximizers, altruistic, and
risk-neutral (Becker & Tomes, 1979) .
Input Factor Income Empirical and theoretical results show that parents with higher income
invest more and earlier in their children (Attanasio et al., 2017; Karagiannaki, 2017; Boneva
& Rauh, 2018). This leads to human capital differences between children of low-income and
high-income families.
In general, parents seem to be inequality averse, i.e. they aim at equal allocation of resources
between siblings (Ejrnaes & Portner, 2004; Behrman et al., 1982; Jurges, 2000; Del Bono et
al., 2012; Berry, Dizon-Ross, & Jagnani, 2020). Only income constraints force them to take
up selective strategies (Glick & Sahn, 2000; Majid, 2018; Ejrnaes & Portner, 2004; Lundberg,
2Low-income parents are restricted to human capital investment whereas high-income parents can choose to
also invest in non-human capital.
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2005; Behrman et al., 1982; Cardona, 2014; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982). Lack of income
or time does not allow parents to invest in their children equally (Ejrnaes & Portner, 2004;
Behrman et al., 1982). For instance, higher-income parents in India favor eldest sons less in
terms of school enrollment than lower-income families (Kaul, 2018).
Input Factor Family Size Family size also affects parental investment in each child. Aizer
& Cunha (2012) find that larger families increase the investment in higher endowed children
relative to their siblings. Kaul (2018) shows that larger Indian families invest less in all male
children but focus on the eldest son.
Input Factor Child Endowment Becker & Tomes (1979) assume that the expected endow-
ment of children depends on the characteristics of parents, family members, and culture of
family and society. The literature confirms that there is either reinforcing or compensating in-
vestment behavior of parents based on the endowment of their children (Yi et al., 2015; Ye & Yi,
2017; Johnson & Schoeni, 2011). As hinted at in the introduction, in India parents’ investment
decisions depend on the gender of their child. The preference for sons unfolds in areas like
education (Jensen, 2003; Kaul, 2018), nutrition (Anukriti et al., 2016; S. Banerjee et al., 2011;
Behrman, 1988c; Jayachandran & National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009), and health
(Anukriti et al., 2016; Arnold et al., 1998; Bharadwaj & Lakdawala, 2013; M. D. Gupta, 1987b;
Jayachandran & Pande, 2017; Oster, 2009; Pande, 2003; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982; Asfaw
et al., 2010).
Next to gender, age (Behrman, 1988c), birth order (Kim, 2020; Kaul, 2018), health status (Re-
strepo, 2016; Datar et al., 2010), statue (Majid, 2018), ability (Akresh et al., 2012; Behrman et
al., 1994; Berry, Dizon-Ross, & Jagnani, 2020; Aizer & Cunha, 2012), and school attainment
(Dizon-Ross, 2019) play a role in parents’ preferential treatment of children.
As the endowment of children is not completely observable, expectations are also formed based
on the culture. In the setting of our study, India, cultural son favoritism and especially the pref-
erence for the eldest son are practiced. The main reasons are patrilocality, old-age support by
eldest sons, dowry, patrilineality, religious rituals, safety and purity concerns, and persistence
of gender norms (Jayachandran, 2015; Kaul, 2018).
Child endowment also includes the ability of parents to deliver investments. Parents with low
capacity, lack in knowledge, or mental health issues are less able to provide investments for
human capital development (Carneiro et al., 2019; Attanasio et al., 2017).
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As not all types of child endowment are clearly observable, parents might have inaccurate be-
liefs about observable characteristics like child performance at school (Bergman, 2015; Datta Gupta
et al., 2016; Dizon-Ross, 2019). As parents rely on beliefs when making decisions regarding
the endowment of their child, their investment might not be optimal. 3
Input Factor Rates of Return to Investment In India rates of returns for daughters seem
to be constrained for parents because it is harder for them to capture them due to patrilocality
that forces daughters to leave their natal family and become part of the groom’s family. Daugh-
ters’ ability in terms of education is also valued less when the amount of dowry is determined
(Maertens & Chari, 2020; Rosenblum, 2017). As parents have to invest in their children before
the returns of investments in building human capital are revealed, parents have to rely on their
beliefs. The higher the anticipated returns the more parents invest (Cunha et al., 2013). As
parents invest according to their beliefs they influence cognitive, socio-emotional, health, and
school outcomes of children (Bhalotra et al., 2020; Attanasio et al., 2019; Cunha et al., 2013;
Boneva & Rauh, 2018). However, the beliefs are neither always accurate nor homogeneous
across caregivers and can lead to non-optimal investment decisions. An example of an inaccu-
rate belief in India is that parents believe that daughter’s education has lower returns for their
human capital formation as is the case (Emran et al., 2020).
Input Factor Market Luck Another input factor of parents’ investment decision is market
luck that is the key input in our study. Becker & Tomes (1979) define that "the market luck
of children, however, is determined by fluctuations in production possibilities and the prices of
goods and factors of production that are often revealed only after children have received their
education and much of their other training and entered the labor force [...]". We summarize
evidence about how features of the labor market influence parental investments in children.
Durante et al. (2015) examine how different economic situations shape the spending behavior of
consumers towards female or male children. The behavior seems to mirror evolutionary biology
because girls - who have greater reproductive value in poor economic conditions - are favored
in the scenarios of economic crisis. For their discrete-choice experiment, participants are first
introduced to one of three economic situations. Then they have to decide how to allocate certain
goods to either a female or male child when choosing the perspective of a parent.
3Ability of children seems to be rather hard to observe from outside. However, children also do not seem to
be able to observe their ability as they seem to have inaccurate beliefs as well (R. Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner,
2014; T. Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2012)
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Considering the labor market in India, girls face more challenges reducing the market returns
to investment. Overall, there is low female employment, fewer labor opportunities for women,
and boys are usually favored (Carranza, 2014; Jayachandran, 2015; Emran et al., 2020). How-
ever, labor market returns for investment in daughters and so investments can be increased by
female employment opportunities (Carranza, 2014; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982; Munshi &
Richard Rosenzweig, 2006; Heath & Mushfiq Mobarak, 2012; Jensen, 2010). One of the few
empirical studies on this topic by Jensen & Miller (2010) uses a market luck shock in form
of labor opportunities away from home combined with human capital returns to investment. It
shows that the child, usually a son, parents have invested in in order to make him stay with them
in their old age receives lower investments if labor opportunities away from home appear. Prox-
imity enables parents to have greater decision-making power of the earnings of this child. That
is why Jensen & Miller (2010) find only for girls a significant increase in school enrollment by
about 5 to 6 percentage points because parents assume that they will not be able to capture their
returns of investments anyways due to female exogamy upon marriage and thus invest more in
them for short-run higher family income.
As market luck is not observed but only anticipated, parental beliefs play again an important
role. The overall economic situation seems to shape aspirations that influence parents’ incen-
tives to make investments. In turn, aspirations matter for economic growth (Genicot & Ray,
2017). Attanasio & Kaufmann (2014) find that mothers’ expectations and risk perception of
labor market returns determine schooling decisions, in particular for girls. Most of the studies
examining the influence of market luck on the investment decisions of parents are retrospective
studies. The real-world setting does not allow to isolate the effect of market returns to invest-
ment from other input factors like human capital returns to investment or child endowment. The
presented study by Durante et al. (2015) uses a multiple-choice experiment in a lab-like setting.
They examine investment behavior in different market settings in general, not for the particular
relationship of parents and their children. Our study combines these approaches using a lab-
in-the-field experiment to have both the ability to isolate one effect and capturing the particular
real-world relationship.
2.1.2 Becker’s Assumptions
When creating the theoretical model Becker & Tomes (1986, 1979) make assumptions about
parental behavior that is decisive for investment in children. Parents are supposed to be per-
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fectly informed about the human capital production function. Empirically, this is not the case
and so misbelief leads to non-optimal allocations of investment (Bergman, 2015; Datta Gupta
et al., 2016; Carneiro et al., 2019; Attanasio & Kaufmann, 2017; Attanasio et al., 2019; Boneva
& Rauh, 2018; Dizon-Ross, 2019; Cunha et al., 2013; Bhalotra et al., 2020).
Another assumption is that parents are trying to maximize their utility. Becker et al. (2016)
support this claim with the "Rotten Parent Theorem": parents invest in the human capital ac-
quisition of children due to expectations of old-age support. Parents manipulate their children’s
preferences to ensure their old-age support. Berry, Dizon-Ross, & Jagnani (2020) lend empir-
ical support when investigating potential drivers of parents’ preference for investing in their
children. They conclude that parents have a slight preference for maximizing earnings.
Even though parents maximize their utility, Becker & Tomes (1979) also assume that parents
are altruistic. Field-experiments show that parental altruism becomes apparent in mothers’ and
fathers’ investment behaviors, though differently (Beaulieu & Bugental, 2008; Eswaran & Kot-
wal, 2004; Vyrastekova et al., 2014).
The last assumption is parents’ risk neutrality. It does not hold empirically. Risk aversion
might decrease or increase parental investment in children (Checchi et al., 2014; Sovero, 2018;
Tabetando, 2019). Sovero (2018) find that higher risk aversion of mothers is associated with
higher spending on their son’s school-related expenditure in Mexico. This triggers a gender gap
in investments between siblings that is increasing with greater maternal risk aversion. Higher
risk aversion of mothers’ is also linked to higher weight-for-age and body mass index-for-age
and overweight for boys. Further, Tabetando (2019) finds that overall parental risk aversion
is positively associated with spending on educational expenditure of children in Uganda. The
author shows that average risk aversion increases with wealth. However, when only considering
poor households parental risk aversion is negatively correlated with spending on the educational
expenditure for children.
2.2 Beyond Becker: Other Inputs
Recently other input factors for parental investment have emerged like the timing of the invest-
ment in early or late childhood (Cunha & Heckman, 2007; Caucutt & Lochner, 2012), effort
costs of providing investments (Bhalotra et al., 2020), and parental aspirations (Favara, 2017;
Ross, 2019; Beaman et al., 2012; Dercon & Singh, 2013; Serneels & Dercon, 2014).
Parents with higher aspirations for their children invest more in them. In India aspirations re-
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lated to education, marriage, and occupation are lower for girls than for boys (Dercon & Singh,
2013; Beaman et al., 2012). The lower aspirations transform into lower human capital develop-
ment of girls.
Using a lab-in-the-field experiment we keep certain assumptions and inputs constant and so
identify to what degree market luck, the labor market returns of parental investments in children,
matters. We keep the input factors of income, family size, human capital returns to investment,
effort costs, and time of investment fixed and vary the endowment of children and the market
luck. We control for parental heterogeneity in altruism, risk aversion, beliefs, and aspirations in
our study by either using a within-subject design or using covariates in the regression analysis.
We contribute to the literature on input factors of parental investment in children because we
investigate the influence of variation of market luck and its interaction with child endowment in
an ideal setting - a lab-in-the-field experiment.
2.3 Behavior under Competition
We define the market returns to investment as given by either a competitive or non-competitive
setting with different competitors. This is another novelty of our study: We describe the behav-
ior of participants exposed to a competitive setting in which they are not directly involved as
they are not playing the game but have to make investments in regard to it. The participants for
the elicitation of investment decisions are also unique: parents and their own children. We make
the non-competitive and competitive setting more salient to the participants by letting their own
children perform in a competitive or non-competitive game in line with the setting parents are
exposed to. This allows us to conclude how different gender pairs of competitors influence
the investment decisions of a third person. We now summarize research on how exposure to
competition changes investments before we look at evidence about children’s behavior under
competition that might shape parental beliefs.
2.3.1 Behavior under Competition in the Lab
In general the literature examines changes in behavior exposed either to different features of
competition, to non-competitive and competitive settings, or to the choice to participate in a
competitive game.
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Behavior under Competition The survey article by Dechenaux et al. (2015) concludes that
subjects deviate from the Nash equilibrium solution of tournaments because of non-monetary
utility from winning, errors of the subjects, judgemental bias like non-linear probability weight-
ing, or features of the experiment.
Features like the quantity and quality of competitors matter for the effort and performance of
subjects. When competitors are perceived as stronger, players face the "discouragement effect"
and perform less (Dechenaux et al., 2015; John, 2017). This affects in particular men.
Otherwise, Andreoni & Brownback (2017) find mixed evidence. They theoretically derive and
test in a lab experiment how different numbers of competitors in an auction affect exerted ef-
fort. When auction size increases, participants with low ability decrease their effort but ones
with high ability increase their effort. Smaller group sizes increase the uncertainty of the partic-
ipant in which percentile ranking of ability she falls in. Thus, in a larger group of competitors
participants with lower ability have to exercise more effort to win and ones with higher ability
can use less effort to maintain their position.
Other features of the game itself matter, too. When using noise parameters to obscure how effort
translates into outcomes, Cason et al. (2010) observe that risk-aversion and utility of winning
increase the deviation from theoretical optimal strategies in all contest types. Lower risk aver-
sion and higher utility of winning increase effort. The task used for the competition explains the
difference in the performance of female and male participants (Dreber et al., 2014; Shurchkov,
2012; Günther et al., 2010; De Paola & Gioia, 2016).
Behavior under Competition vs Non-Competition Comparing the behavior under competi-
tion (competitive payment scheme) and non-competition (piece-rate payment scheme) the liter-
ature shows that subjects exercise on average more effort when exposed to competition although
the variance of effort is larger (Eriksson et al., 2009; Bull et al., 1987). Self-selection into com-
petition, the higher ability of the participant, and the lower difficulty of the task decrease the
variance of performance in the competitive payment scheme (Eriksson et al., 2009; Vandegrift
& Brown, 2003). Strategic uncertainty regarding the unknown performance of the competi-
tor and greater complexity of the competitive payment function increase variance (Bull et al.,
1987).
The evidence for sharing behavior under competition is mixed. When Krawczyk & Le Lec
(2010) elicit the investment decisions in variations of the dictator game, they find that even in
competitive settings subjects share chances to win, though the shared amount is less. Further,
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the payment level seems to influence the beliefs of participants in a competitive game and in an
employer-employee dictator game (Butler, 2016; Heinz et al., 2016). In the latter, employers act
only gender neutral in case of competition but discriminate against female employees in case of
a piece-rate remuneration scheme.
Behavior Shaped by Willingness to Compete and Risk An increase in the competitive-
ness of an environment further increases the performance of men overall (Gneezy et al., 2003).
Women only increase their performance if they compete exclusively against other women.
Competitions are also linked to risk because they include uncertainty. Bull et al. (1987) explain
that competition increases uncertainty because (a) a more elaborate strategy is needed than just
maximizing behavior like in a piece-rate system and (b) strategic uncertainty related to the be-
havior of the competitor evolves. Higher risk exposure decreases giving in modified dictator
games or trust games (Brock et al., 2013; Cettolin et al., 2017).
As the competitive setting of our lab-in-the-field experiment is unique, we can only draw from
the evidence of modified dictator games, trust games, and different types of tournaments to infer
behavior changes induced by competition. In general subjects in a tournament exert on average
more effort. So, exposure to competition might increase investment due to non-monetary utility
from winning, errors of the subjects, judgemental bias like non-linear probability weighting,
higher payment levels, or features of the experiment.
Parents might invest less in competition when they believe competitors are stronger due to the
"discouragement effect". As competition increases risk, risk-averse parents might invest less.
Competition also reduces sharing that would point to lower parental investments in the compet-
itive setting.
There are mixed results about how participants react in a tournament to the number of com-
petitors, the gender of the competitor, or the type of tasks to be solved. Depending on the
endowment of the participant these factors increase or decrease effort. Another example is that
women only compete more against women, not against any competitor like men. Evidence of a
modified dictator game show that only in a competitive setting a third party would discriminate
less against women.
The mixed evidence does not yield clear predictions about investment behavior in a competitive
setting like ours.
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2.3.2 Children’s Behavior Under Competition
Now we look at how children or slightly older students react to competition. Parents might
consider the behavior of children under competition when making their investment decisions.
Under competition students with overconfidence about their own ability exercise less effort and
children with realistic beliefs or low-self confidence score less (Brownback, 2018; Bedard &
Fischer, 2019). Children’s willingness to compete is positively associated with parents’ aspira-
tion (Khadjavi & Nicklisch, 2018). Competitiveness decreases for girls around puberty when
they grow up in a patriarchal society (Andersen et al., 2012). Thus, for the age group of our
children (on average 11 years of age) other endowments than gender should matter more for
their performance.
Though the literature has started to investigate the influence of competition on the behavior of
participants, we can make novel contributions by looking at the effects of competition on in-
vestments in a unique competitive setting and how the gender dynamics of competitors matter
for a third party not involved in the competition itself.
3 Conceptual Framework
When we create our conceptual framework we can neglect the input family size, human cap-
ital returns to investment, effort costs, and time of investment because they are fixed in our
experimental set-up. All parents receive the same kind of information and the same income
endowment. So, they do not differ in available income and their degree of knowledge about
the games as well as the optimal outcome maximizing strategy. In our experiment, we vary
the endowment of children and the market luck. The competitive and non-competitive settings
in our lab-in-the-field experiment constitute different market returns to investment, the overall
market luck. As certain assumptions and inputs are parent-specific like altruism, risk aver-
sion, or parental aspirations, we measure these possible heterogeneous factors to control for
them. When comparing the competitive and the non-competitive setting we are even able to
use a within-subject design that would take care of specific parent characteristics. To derive our
hypotheses, we consider the following models explained below.
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3.1 Investment under Non-Competition
In the first step, we consider a non-competitive setting in which participants have to choose
how to split their endowment into investments of a certain and another uncertain outcome. The
uncertain outcome is the payout of a setting without competition. The outcome of the non-
competitive setting is based on the realization of the real ability of the participant’s own child.
We assume that parents know the real ability distribution of their child but are exposed to risk
regarding the realization when eliciting the real ability only once.
We use the subscript NC to indicate that the employed function applies for the case of non-
competition. Parents are assumed to maximize utility U : a greater payout in the game increases
utility. The utility derives from the realized payout πNC (with πNC ≥ 0 ) and social preferences
or errors sNC .4
UNC = U(πNC , sNC) (4.1)
Participants might make a decision considering not only the optimal strategy to maximize out-
come but also social norms, personal values, or feelings (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). They might
also like to appear fair and so not reveal their real investment decisions (Andreoni & Bernheim,
2009). In terms of social preferences, we focus on inputs or assumptions of parental investment
in children: altruism, risk aversion, and aspirations.
In the investment game, the payout depends on the initial endowment e , the invested amount in
the child account I , the amount remaining in the parental account e− I , and the real ability of
the child to solve tasks a. The subscript i is an indicator for own child.
πNC(e, I, a) (4.2)
Though the parent might know about the real ability distribution of their child, they cannot be
sure what ability the child displays in only one game. Parents have to use their beliefs about the
real ability p. This is why p and not a enters the expected payout equation:
E[πNC ] = πNC(e, I, p) (4.3)
4We assume that economic incentives and social preferences are separable though this assumption has been
contested Faravelli & Stanca (2014).
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We assume that parents rely on more child endowments apart from ability when forming their
beliefs. Parents might use observable characteristics of the own child g like gender. The belief
is based on uncertainty, so we also include social preferences sp because parents might have
different degrees of risk aversion that shape their beliefs.
p(a, g, sp) (4.4)
We assume that p does only indicate values of possible realized abilities p ∈ [0; 6] . It is the sum
of the expected ability E[a], the gender of the child g, and the product of these factors g×E[a].
p(a, g, sp) = α1E[a] + α2g + α3g × E[a] + α4sp (4.5)
We derive our first set of hypotheses from this:
Hypothesis Belief 1a: Greater ability of own child a increases parental belief in the own
child to solve more tasks p.
Hypothesis Belief 2a: When the own child is a girl (boy) g, parents believe that their
child solves less (more) tasks p.
The social preferences and errors sNC do not depend on the invested amount in the child account
I . We want to illustrate this by assuming that the utility function is a weighted sum of πNC and
sNC with strictly positive weights β1, β2 ≥ 0:
UNC = β1πNC + β2sNC (4.6)
The payout function of the non-competitive setting in this paper is defined as follows:
πNC = aI + (e− I) where e = 100
I ∈ [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100]
a ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
(4.7)
The parental invested amount in the child account I is multiplied by the real ability of the own
child, the number of solved tasks a. In the played game children can solve up to six tasks.
We endow the parents initially with Indian Rupee [INR] 100; they are only allowed to invest
zero or multiple of INR 10 in the child account. Figure 4.1 shows the underlying decision tree.
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However, the expected payout function of the non-competitive setting deviates:
Figure 4.1: Simplified Decision Tree for Non-Competition
Piece-rate
Child Account
aI
a tasks solved
I
Parent Account
e− I
constant return: 1
e− I
E[πNC ] = pI + (e− I) where e = 100
I ∈ [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100]
p ∈ [0; 6]
(4.8)
Each parent sets a piece-rate amount based on the belief of how many tasks the child solves p
before making their investment and determining I .
Given this payment scheme and assuming parents derive their utility only by increasing their
income (adopting pure rational behavior), they would invest in their own child account when
the expected utility of the payout is larger than keeping the amount in their own account:
E[U(πNC(I, p, e))] ≥ U(e)
pI + (e− I) ≥ e
p ≥ 1
(4.9)
Once the child would have an expected ability p of 1 or greater, parents increase their util-
ity when investing only in the child account. We show this in Table 4.1 for the case p ∈
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] and e = 100. However, the believed ability and realized ability might differ
p 6= a because the beliefs are also based on the gender g of the own child that might increase or
discount believed ability and so investment. We assume that daughters’ abilities are reduced by
this in particular. This motivates our first hypothesis for investment decisions we want to test
empirically:
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Table 4.1: Payout Table for Non-Competition
Believed
Ability p
Investment in
child account I
pI
Investment in
parent account
(e− I)
Expected Payout
E[πNC ]
Investment
Strategy
0 0 0 ×0 = 0 100-0=100 100 Parent
1 all rational 100 Both
2 100 2 ×100 = 200 100-100=0 200 Child
3 100 3 ×100 = 300 100-100=0 300 Child
4 100 4 ×100 = 400 100-100=0 400 Child
5 100 5 ×100 = 500 100-100=0 500 Child
6 100 6 ×100 = 600 100-100=0 600 Child
Note: The table is based on the assumption of a pure utility maximizing individual with the utility function UNC = β1πNC
with β1 = 1. The payout function is defined as E[πNC ] = pI + (e − I) where e = 100, p ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], and I
∈ [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100].
Hypothesis Investment 1a: Greater believed ability of own child p increases parental
investment in the child account I .
Hypothesis Investment 2a: When the own child is a girl (boy) g, parents invest less
(more) in the child account I .
Otherwise, social preferences might matter for the investment decision:
E[U(πNC(I, p, e), sNC)] ≥ U(πNC(0, p, e), sNC)
β1[pI + (e− I)] + β2sNC ≥ β1e+ β2sNC
β1pI ≥ β1I + β2[sNC − sNC ]
p ≥ 1 + β2[sNC − sNC ]
β1I
p ≥ 1
(4.10)
When we use a within-subject-design [sNC − sNC ] = 0 , the magnitude of the term β2[sNC−sNC ]β1I
is zero and so we have the same results as in a case without social preferences.
In our lab-in-the-field experiment parents have to maximize their expected utility choosing in-
vestment I into the child account subject to a budget constraint I ≤ e. They are exposed to
uncertainty regarding the realization of the child’s ability in a single game and so have to use
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the believed ability p when making a decision. We receive the following results for optimal
investments of I∗NC in a within-subject-design:
max
I
E[UNC ] = max
I
U(E[πNC ], sNC) =
max
I
β1pI + β1(e− I) + β2sNC
s.t. I ≤ e
(4.11)
First order condition (FOCNC):
∂L
∂I
= β1p− β1 − λ = 0
λ ≥ 0, I ≤ e and λ(I − e) = 0
(4.12)
L represents the Lagrangian of the maximization problem, λ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier
indicating the shadow price of the constrain I ≤ e. The optimal investment depends on the
expected ability p and the weight β1 of the payout πNC . We use the derived optimal investment
I∗NC to learn how optimal investments under a non-competitive setting compare to a competitive
one I∗C .
3.2 Investment under Competition
Just like in the non-competitive setting, parents have to choose how to split their endowment
into investments of a certain and an uncertain outcome in the competitive setting. The utility
function is similar to the one under non-competition building on the realized payout πC (with
πC ≥ 0) and social preferences or errors sC . We use the subscript C to indicate that the
functions are used for the case of the competitive setting.
UC = U(πC , sC) (4.13)
The social preferences at the core of our study are the inputs or assumptions of parental in-
vestment in children: altruism, risk aversion, and aspirations. Compared to a non-competitive
setting, parents face greater risk. They do not know about the revealed ability of their own child
but also the ability of the potential competitor. An additional risk is involved because the differ-
ence in the ability between the own child and the competitor is unknown. Further, the parents
might gain non-monetary utility from winning or have a different willingness to compete for
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themselves or their children. These factors could increase their spending on the child account
(Dechenaux et al., 2015). The errors of participants when making decisions could also increase
because a more elaborate strategy is needed than just maximizing behavior like in a piece-rate
system (Bull et al., 1987). Thus, in a competitive setting the weight or the types of social pref-
erences at play increase.
In the competitive setting the expected payout depends on the initial endowment e , the invested
amount in the child account I , the remaining amount in the parental account e− I , the believed
ability of the child to solve tasks p, and the parental belief about the probability that the own
child solves more tasks than the competitor, i.e. wins the competition w.
E[πC ] = πC(e, I, p, w) (4.14)
Winning depends on the difference between the real ability of own child a and competitor b to
solve tasks. However, the realized ability of the competing child in one game is uncertain, so
the parents have to use their expectations about the real ability of the competing child to assess
whether their own child or the competitor is more likely to solve more tasks.
We assume that parents consider also other endowments of children apart from ability when
forming their beliefs. Parents might feel that performance under competition might vary by
other child endowments. They might use observable characteristics of the own child g and the
competitor h like gender. The literature review in the previous chapter indicates that gender
could but might not determine performance in a tournament compared to a piece-rate sched-
ule. Playing against a certain competitor might also shape the performance of the children. For
example, Dechenaux et al. (2015) find that the "discouragement effect" decreases the effort of
players in a game. This effect evolves when players are heterogeneous to a large degree. In
our sample playing against another gender might increase the heterogeneity of the players and
so discourage parents from investing in the child account and children to invest effort. There-
fore, we assume that not just the gender of the own child and the competitor matter but also
the combination in the competitive case. We will use gender to capture how observable charac-
teristics could influence the beliefs of parents. As described in the literature review, parents in
India value the educational achievements of their sons more than their daughters. This valuation
might influence their formation of expectations.
We also include social preferences sw of parents because of possible different reactions to com-
petition depending on the degree of risk aversion or competitiveness.
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w(a, b, g, h, sw) (4.15)
We assume that w is linear and does only indicate positive probabilities: w ∈ [0; 1] . Apart from
considering gender having possible effects on the performance under competition, we also treat
gender as a discount factor for ability again.
w(a, b, g, h, sw) = α5E[a] + α6g + α7g × E[a] + α8E[b] + α9h+ α10h× E[b] + α11g × h+ α8sw
(4.16)
We derive additional hypotheses from this:
Hypothesis Belief 1b: Greater ability of own child a increases parental belief in the own
child to win against a competitor w.
Hypothesis Belief 2b: When the own child is a girl (boy) g, parents believe in a lower
(higher) probability to win against a competitor w.
Hypothesis Belief 1c: Lower believed ability of the competitor b increases parental belief
in the own child to win against a competitor w.
Hypothesis Belief 2c: When the competitor child is a girl (boy) h, parents believe in a
higher (lower) probability of their own child to win w compared to a competing child
with unknown gender.
The social preferences and errors do not depend on the invested amount in the child account I
but whether the setting is competitive or not. Under competition social preferences sC like risk
aversion and competitiveness gain greater emphasis.
To illustrate parental investment decisions, we assume that the expected utility function is a
weighted sum of E[πC ] and sC with strictly positive weights β1, β2 ≥ 0, just like in the case for
non-competition.
E[UC ] = β1E[πC ] + β2sC (4.17)
The payout function is a function of nested decisions (Figure 4.2). First parents have to decide
whether to contribute to the child account or the parent account. In this way, they define the
piece-rate amount for every task the child solves like in the non-competitive setting. However, if
parents decide to invest in the child account, they face an uncertain outcome with the probability
w. When the real ability of the own child is greater than the competitor’s ability (a > b), then
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the parent receives the invested amount multiplied by the real ability of the own child a and by
the factor two. When the real ability of the own child is lower than or equal to the competitor’s
ability (a ≤ b), then the parent receives nothing from the child account because the invested
amount is multiplied by the real ability of the own child a and by the factor zero.
Figure 4.2: Simplified Decision Tree for Competition
Tounament
Child Account
2aI
a > b
0
a ≤ b
I
Parent Account
e− I
constant return: 1
e− I
We can formalize the decision tree for the expected payment scheme. As the real ability of the
own child a is not known to the parents they have to use their beliefs p. Thus, the expected
payout is represented as follows:
E[πC(e, I, p, w)] = w[2pI + (e− I)] + (1− w)[0pI + (e− I)]
where e = 100
I ∈ [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100]
p ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
(4.18)
In the played game children can solve up to six tasks. We endow the parents initially with INR
100; they are only allowed to invest zero or multiple of INR 10 in the child account, just like in
the non-competition game.
Given this competitive payment scheme and assuming parents derive their utility only by in-
creasing their investment neglecting social preferences, they should invest in their own child
account when the expected utility of the payout is larger than keeping the amount in their own
account:
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E[U(πC(e, I, p, w))] ≥ U(e)
w[2pI + (e− I)] + (1− w)[0pI + (e− I)] ≥ e
w2pI + (e− I) ≥ e
wp ≥ 1/2
p ≥ 1
2w
(4.19)
Once the child’s believed ability is 1
2w
or greater, parents increase their utility when they invest
only in the child account. w is the believed probability that the own child solves more tasks than
a competitor. The greater the believed ability of the own child to win against a competitor w the
lower the believed ability of the child p has to be for the parent to invest in the child account.
Hypothesis Investment 3: Higher believed probability of the own child to win against
a competitor w increases parental investment in the child account I ( for competitive
games).
To provide an example of the competitive payment scheme (Table 4.2), we assume that the
believed chance of winning is w = 1/2, p = a, and e = 100. As the believed ability of the own
child p(a, g, sp) depends again on the ability and gender of the own child, we adapt the first two
hypotheses related to investment for the non-competitive game:
Hypothesis Investment 1b: Greater believed ability of own child p increases parental
investment in the child account I .
Hypothesis Investment 2b: When the own child is a girl (boy) g, parents invest less
(more) in the child account I .
However, also social preferences might matter for the investment decision:
E[U(πC(e, I, p, w), sC)] ≥ U(πC(e, 0, p, w), sC)
β1[w2pI + (e− I)] + β2sC ≥ β1e+ β2sC
2β1[pIw] ≥ β1I + β2[sC − sC ]
p ≥ 1
2w
+
β2[sC − sC ]
2β1Iw
p ≥ 1
2w
(4.20)
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Table 4.2: Payout Table for Competition
Believed
Ability p
Investment in
child account I
pI
Investment in
parent account
(e− I)
Expected Payout
E[πC ]
Investment
Strategy
0 0 0×0 = 0 100-0=100 100 Parent
1 all rational 100 Both
2 100 2 ×100 = 200 100-100=0 200 Child
3 100 3 ×100 = 300 100-100=0 300 Child
4 100 4 ×100 = 400 100-100=0 400 Child
5 100 5 ×100 = 500 100-100=0 500 Child
6 100 6 ×100 = 600 100-100=0 600 Child
Note: The table is based on the assumption of a pure utility maximizing individual with the utility function UC = β1 × πC with β1 = 1. The
payout function is defined as πC(e, I, p, w) = w× [2pI + (e− I)] + (1−w)[0× pI + (e− I)] where e = 100, p ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], I
∈ [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100], and w=1/2.
In the case of a within-subject design, the term [sC − sC ] cancels and social preferences can be
ignored although social preferences are still in the probability to win w.
In our lab-in-the-field experiment, the parents have to maximize their expected utility by choos-
ing investment I:
max
I
E[UC ] = max
I
E[U(πC , sC)] =
max
I
β1w2pI + β1w(e− I) + β1(1− w)0pI + β1(1− w)(e− I) + β2sC =
max
I
β12wpI + β1(e− I) + β2sC
s.t. I ≤ e
(4.21)
First order condition (FOCC):
∂L
∂I
= β12wp− β1 − λ = 0
λ ≥ 0, I ≤ e and λ(I − e) = 0
(4.22)
L represents the Lagrangian of the maximization problem, λ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier
indicating the shadow price of the constrain I ≤ e. The optimal investment depends on the
believed ability p, the believed probability to win w and the weight β1 of the payout πC . We use
the derived optimal investment I∗C under competition to compare it to the optimal investment
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under a non-competitive setting I∗NC .
3.3 Differential Investment between Non-Competition and Competition
Introducing the first-order conditions for the non-competitive and competitive setting reveals
why we believe parents might invest differently. We take the difference of the two first-order
conditions to find the divergent terms that could explain the difference between these two situ-
ations:
∆FOC = FOCNC − FOCC =
[β12wp]− [β1p] =
β1p(2w − 1)
(4.23)
The difference between the two first-order conditions shows that the believed probability to win
w matters for making the investment decisions. When w = 1/2 or p = 0, there would not be
a difference in the optimal amount invested in the child account I∗. As β1 ≥ 0, p ∈ [0; 6], and
w[0; 1], the optimal amount invested in the child account is larger in competition than in non-
competition when w > 1/2. When w < 1/2 parents should invest more in the non-competitive
than in the competitive setting.
Further, the believed ability of the own child p is decisive for differential effects in the two
settings. If the believed ability is p = 0, there is no difference between the settings. The greater
p the larger the difference between the competitive and non-competitive setting because p is a
multiplicative factor. Thus, we come to the key hypothesis of our study:
Hypothesis Investment 4: Parents’ investments in the child account depend on the mar-
ket returns to investment: Parents invest differently when exposed to a competitive or a
non-competitive payment scheme (∆FOC 6= 0 when p 6= 0 and w 6= 1/2).
We could look at the differences of the first-order condition also in a reduced form replacing
first p(a, g, sp) and then w(a, b, g, h, sw) with its function:
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∆FOC = FOCNC − FOCC =
β1p(2w − 1) =
β1(α1E[a] + α2g + α3g × E[a] + α4sp)(2w − 1) =
β1(α1E[a] + α2g + α3g × E[a] + α4sp)(2(α5E[a] + α6g + α7g × E[a] + α8E[b]+
α9h+ α10h× E[b] + α11g × h+ α8sw)− 1)
(4.24)
This reduced form shows that social preferences sp and sw might matter for investment. Apart
from the gender of the own child g, the gender of the competitor h or its interaction with the
gender of own child g matter for parental investment decisions, too. This motivates our last set
of hypotheses:
Hypothesis Investment 5: Social preferences like competitiveness and risk-seeking in-
crease parental investments in the child account I more in a competitive than in a non-
competitive market returns setting.
Hypothesis Investment 6: Lower believed ability of the competitor hb increases parental
investment in the own child I .
Hypothesis Investment 7: When the competitor child is a girl (boy) h, parents invest
more (less) in the child account I compared to a competing child with unknown gender.
This conceptual framework and the derived hypotheses guide the empirical specification in the
next part.
4 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our goal is to identify how market luck affects parental investment decisions in children. We
use a lab-in-the-field experiment to expose parents to two different settings reflecting different
market returns of their invested amount in their children in the short run.
We use a within-subject design to measure the difference of parental investment exposed to
competition or not and interactions with child endowments represented by ability and gender.
To assess whether beliefs and investments are influenced not only by the gender of the own child
but also of the competing child, we employ a between-subjects-design. Each parent participates
with only one of her children and plays only one round of the competitive game against either
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Figure 4.3: Experimental Sequence
Stage Parents Children
I Ability elicitation/Games Ability elicitation/Games:
Round 1: competition or not
Round 2: competition or not
II
Elicitation investment strategies:
Round 1: competition or not
Round 2: competition or not
III
Belief elicitation (own child /
competitor):
Belief about single events
Belief about probability
distribution of multiple events
Belief elicitation (oneself /
competitor):
Belief about single events
Belief about probability
distribution of multiple events
IV Brief survey capturing covariates
V
Payout for incentivized investment
strategy
Payout for performance in game
Source: Own data.
another child with unknown gender, a girl, or a boy.
We recruited roughly 400 parents with one child enrolled in the sixth grade in government led
middle schools in rural Bihar, India. The selection from the same grade allows us to keep
another child endowment, age, roughly constant because children of a certain age group usually
attend a particular grade. We choose our sample from the randomly selected children of the
cluster randomized controlled trial by Krämer et al. (2020) from January to March 2019.
4.1 Experimental Procedures
The lab-in-the-field experiment has been conducted as one session with multiple stages. Figure
4.3 presents the experimental sequence visually.
For the behavioral experiment, a preceding household survey team has invited the parents to a
behavioral game at the child’s school a few days or up to a week before the session. We have
visited all schools where we have conducted the experiment at least one to five days before and
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told the children about the upcoming experiment. On the day of the experiment, children are
asked to bring their parents from the village or fellow children and their parents if they have not
attended school on this day. We conduct the experiment at two separate locations for parents
and children. In this way, children and parents cannot observe each other but get a sense of how
their decisions are interdependent.
After the arrival of parents and children pairs, we verify the identity to include only matching
pairs of one parent and one child. Only one parent and one child of each family are allowed to
participate. We group parents in groups of on average three participants. Children have larger
groups of on average 12 children. The game is facilitated orally as some of the participants are
illiterate. The results for the workshop are recorded on paper and for the short parental survey
using tablets. We start with describing the sequence of the session for parents and then move to
the session for children. A more detailed session protocol is provided upon request.
4.1.1 Experimental Sequence for Parents
In each group of the parents, one facilitator explains the instructions to the whole group. How-
ever, we facilitate the game in such a way that the answers of each participant are unknown to
the other participants in the same group.
We first introduce the parents to the game the children will play: Raven’s Colored Progressive
Matrices. This game is supposed to be perceived as gender-neutral by the children and the
parents. After explaining how to solve one of these tasks, each parent is asked to solve six of
them.
Elicitation of Investment Strategy After this, we try to capture parents’ investment strate-
gies for two different market returns to investment: tournament and a piece-rate scheme. We
randomize the order of the settings on the facilitator level. Thus, learning or order effects should
not affect one setting more than the other. We also determine the type of competitor for each
group randomly. Parents do not know the real competitor of their children. They only know
that the competitor is either a child, girl, or boy of their own children’s grade that is also taking
part in the behavioral experiment.
In the first round, the facilitators explain the functioning of one of the market settings to the
participants and check their understanding using visual aids including a payout schedule. After
this parents are endowed with play money resembling the Indian currency to make the decision
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more salient. Parents are asked to decide on how much of their endowment they want to invest
in their own account represented as a white envelope and a child account represented by a pink
envelope. Parents can invest amounts of zero to INR 100 in steps of INR 10 of play money.
Parents are asked to reveal their strategy for all possible seven outcomes of the game played
with their child. They have to make seven decisions.
Each parent in the group makes the decision individually. As she puts the play money into an
envelope other participants should not be able to observe it. This is meant to reduce social-
desirability bias because the pressure of the parent to make socially acceptable decisions is
reduced due to secrecy.
After all participants of one group have revealed their investment strategies a second round is
conducted covering the other market setting that has not been played before. The outcomes
depend on the solved tasks by their own children.
Belief Elicitation In the next stage, we elicit parents’ beliefs about the probability of single
events and probability distributions of multiple events. As probability is a difficult concept that
some of our participants without any formal education might not be able to understand, we
use beans as the representation of chances. The facilitators explain how the participants can
display their beliefs using beans. We provide visual aids for the explanation. The facilitator
gives examples and checks the understanding of the participant before the beliefs about the
probability of single events are recorded. To ensure secrecy parents receive two matchboxes,
one with the stock of chances - ten beans - and one in which parents have to put their chances
for each asked event. After each parent has provided their beliefs one after the other for single
events, we proceed similarly for the elicitation of the probability distributions of multiple events.
Beliefs are related to the absolute and relative ability of their own child and the competing child
regarding the played game.
Survey and Payout Thereafter, facilitators conduct a small survey with each participant in-
dividually regarding their preferences, aspirations, and other aspects related to the behavioral
experiment.
By the end of this session, children should also have completed playing the game. Depending
on the elicited ability of the child and the randomized choice of the competitive or piece-rate
payment scheme, we select the corresponding investment strategy of the parent for the payout.
To this, a random payout is added in order to blur the child’s performance. We also provide a
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minimum payout of INR 100 for all parents who participate until the end in cases the final pay-
out is lower than INR 100. The maximum amount received is INR 1300. The median payout is
INR 265. The average daily income of the district lies at about INR 300.
At the end of the interview, each parent is informed in privacy about their payout and receives
a debriefing stressing that the payout is based mainly on luck. We do not reveal the children’s
real performance to anyone, including the parents. We take up these measures to ensure that
disappointed parents who receive a lower payout than expected would blame their children.
Further, we emphasize that the performance of the child is kept confidential and has no adverse
consequences for the child’s school or later life.
Thereafter, we offer the parents to either receive their whole payout in cash or to buy subsidized
products with it. This is the end of the parental session.
4.1.2 Experimental Sequence for Children
At the same time, the children participate in their own session in a separate location. The
experimental sequence for children follows a similar pattern as the session for the parents.
In stage one, the children take two times a shortened version of the Raven’s Colored Progressive
Matrices test in the group setting. The facilitator uses visual aids to explain the test and checks
the children’s understanding. Then, children are introduced to one of the two different schemes
to win a certain amount of caramel bars: a piece-rate payment scheme or a competitive payment
scheme. The number of solved tasks determines the payout for children and the payout for
parents.
The order of the game or the competitor is randomly selected. Parent and child face the same
competing child: a child with unknown gender, a girl, or a boy. Children do not know the real
competitor their performance is compared to in the competitive game. They only know the
group of children, i.e. one of the other participating children in the game. All participating
children are usually from the same grade of the same school. Before the first round of the game,
the facilitator checks the understanding of the child that more solved tasks increase the amount
of paid caramel bars in case of the piece-rate payment scheme or a victory in the tournament.
After completion of the first round, the second round is conducted immediately afterward. The
procedures are the same.
In the next stage, the facilitators conduct the belief elicitation with beans in the same way as
for parents. The only difference is that children are asked about the probability of one event or
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the probability distribution of multiple events about their own and the competitor’s absolute and
relative ability regarding the played game.
In the last stage, each child receives their in-kind payout. The final paid amount of caramel
bars consists of the randomly selected round of the game, the number of solved tasks, and
random addition of caramel bars to blur the real performance of the child. The facilitators
give the children the caramel bars in an envelope to maintain secrecy about their performance.
Throughout and after the game we do not share the child’s performance with anyone. We also
do not tell the children that their parents bet on their performance in the game. We do this to
encounter possible sources of psychological pressure for the child.
4.2 Key Measures and Understanding
Now, we want to describe our key measures of investment and belief and show how we ensure
the validity of the measures.
4.2.1 Investment
Measuring Investment Decisions We use two different payment scheme settings and the
strategy method to elicit parents’ investment in children. The design of the investment choices
is closely linked to van Winden et al. (2011) and Hopfensitz & Van Winden (2008) who present
their decision problems not in the form of binary choice but a choice to allocate different
amounts. Just like them, we ask the participants to choose how to allocate their endowment.
They can choose between the parent account for a safe outcome or the child account for a risky
one. The return of the safe outcome is always the chosen amount. The return from the risky
account depends on the experimental condition. We have two conditions: a piece-rate or a com-
petitive payment scheme.
Instead of a one-shot game, we use a variant of the strategy method (Selten, 1967). We ask the
subjects in an incentive-compatible way how much they would like to allocate to the child ac-
count dependent on how much tasks their own child solves. We ask the subjects to indicate their
investment for all seven possibilities for solving these tasks. To make every parental investment
decision incentive compatible, every decision is potentially relevant for determining the actual
payout. The performance of the child and random choice of the experimental condition selects
one of the made decisions. According to this decision, we calculate the payout. This way of
using the strategy method has been used for eliciting contributions in public good games (Fis-
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chbacher et al., 2012, 2001; Martinsson et al., 2014; Mullett et al., 2020), trust games (Falk &
Zehnder, 2013), hybrid public good games (Di Cagno et al., 2016), measuring the influence of
emotions and punishment (Jordan et al., 2016), modified investment games (Güth et al., 2014),
or to elicit complete or partial strategies (Brandts & Charness, 2011). The strategy method
is also a more economical data-collection process because instead of just only one data point,
information about a whole strategy is collected (Brandts & Charness, 2011).
Understanding of Investment Decisions For the competitive and non-competitive settings,
the facilitators explain each parent the procedure, provide examples, and familiarize them with
a payout table that parents can use when deciding about their investment. After this, the facil-
itators ask the parents one question about what is the final return given a certain ability level
of their own child and the amount invested in the child account. In the case of a competitive
setting, the facilitator brings in an additional condition for the test questions whether the child
wins against the competitor. As a participant plays two rounds of the investment game with
two different settings, the participant answers two questions. She can make up to two right
or two wrong answers. If the participant has not given the right answer at first, the facilitator
explains the participant the game again and asks again about the answer. So, we have also the
answer option: correct at the second trial. Figure 4.4 shows that 34.54 percent of parents an-
Figure 4.4: Relative Frequency of Correct Answers of Test Questions for Investment Game
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swer correctly right away in both rounds and 18.66 percent answer once right and once right
on the second trial. Further, 20.61 percent of participants only answer correctly in both rounds
at the second trial. A lower number of participants answer one question wrong but another
right (18.66 percent) or right at the second trial (9.75 percent). No one in the sample has given
two wrong answers. This shows that participants widely understand the investment game. Our
measure seems to be a valid indicator of investment decisions of the participants.
4.2.2 Beliefs
Measuring Believed Probabilities We use two different ways to elicit participants’ beliefs
with visual aids. To get to know about the perceived likelihood of single events, we follow
Delavande & Kohler (2009) in procedure and text quite closely. Similarly, we ask respondents
to express the likelihood that an event is realized by choosing up to ten beans and put them
into an event box. As the elicitation is within a session, we try to create more secrecy for the
decision and use boxes and not an open plate for the indication of probability.
We use two test questions to assess the understanding. The first comes from Delavande &
Kohler (2009) but is adapted to the context, i.e. "Pick the number of beans that reflects how
likely you think it is that you will win if we play a game of Ludo after this interview". The
second question tries to make the correspondent aware of the difference between frequency and
probability. We ask them to indicate "how likely you think it is that it will rain today". We then
ask them about the probability that their own child or a competitor solves any one task in the
game and about the likelihood that their own child solves more tasks than a competitor.
To elicit the probability distribution of a number of events we adapt the elicitation method
of Giné et al. (2009) who provide ten stones to participants and a sheet of paper with boxes
indicating different time periods of the year. They instruct the respondent to put the stones in the
different boxes depending on the perceived likelihood that the monsoon will start in the period
indicated by the respective box. Instead, we provide seven boxes indicating the possibility of
their own child or a competitor to solve none or all six tasks during the played game. We
also use ten beans again as indicators of the likelihood of an event happening. Before this, we
conduct an understanding check asking them about the likelihood of winning up to six games
of Ludo.
We interpret the number of selected beans in the boxes indicating events as implied subjective
probabilities ranging between 0 and 1. Each bean indicates a probability of 0.1, 10 percent.
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We are positive that our visually aided elicitation of subjective beliefs is a valid measure of the
real beliefs of the participants because we adapt previously validated methods (Delavande et al.,
2011) and we check the understanding of the participants with test questions that give us more
confidence in their understanding.
Checking the Understanding of Beliefs about a Single Event For the belief elicitation re-
garding the probability of single events, the facilitators ask two check questions. The considered
events are winning one game of Ludo and rain today. When the participant decides to use zero
or ten beans to indicate the probability, the facilitators prompt the participants by asking whether
they are sure about the selected number of beans. We assume that choosing zero or ten beans
indicates that the participants have not understood the concept of probability. After prompting
the participants they have the chance to change their decision. In our sample 71.43 percent of
Figure 4.5: Relative Frequency of Prompts and Changes for Test Questions for Believed Prob-
ability of an Event
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the participants do not choose zero or ten beans, thus, the facilitators do not give them a prompt
(Figure 4.5). About a quarter of the participants (24.09 percent) is prompted once but does not
change the decision. We see this as an indication that the participant has taken the decision de-
liberately. A smaller amount of participants (1.12 percent) receives one prompt and changes the
allocation of beans after this. A small number of participants (3.36 percent) seems to have not
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grasped the idea of probability: they are prompted twice and do not change their allocation of
beans. We exclude this group in our analysis sample because a lack of understanding threatens
the validity of our results.
Checking the Understanding of Belief Distributions about Multiple Events For check-
ing the elicitation of the probability distribution of a series of events, we ask the participant to
distribute ten beans across the likelihood of winning zero to six games of Ludo when playing
six games, one after the other. The facilitators instruct the participants to put the number of
beans they would like to allocate for winning zero games, one game, etc., one by one into the
respective boxes. After the facilitators have asked the participants for all possible numbers of
winning a game, the facilitators show the participants how they have chosen to put their beans
and whether they want to make changes to the distribution. When participants have spent all
beans before the facilitator finishes asking the participant about all possible winning outcomes
of Ludo, the facilitators prompt the participants. The facilitator asks whether the participant
wants to reallocate beans to increase the likelihood of winning more games. However, the fa-
cilitator does not encourage the participant to spend all ten beans. We qualify using not all ten
beans as a sign of lack of understanding. This is why we exclude these participants in our main
sample. This is the case for 3.55 percent of our sample (Figure 4.6).
Overall, we exclude participants from our main sample who do not answer one single check
question for the investment game correctly or do receive two prompts during the belief elicita-
tion for the probability of one event, or do not use ten beans in the example belief distribution.
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Figure 4.6: Relative Frequency of Using Ten Beans for Believed Distribution of a Series of
Events
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4.3 Empirical Specification
The empirical specification is based on the conceptual framework and additional considerations
based on the data collection methodology.
4.3.1 Belief Outcomes
For the six hypotheses regarding parents’ beliefs, we use two different specifications. One to
learn about how believed ability of the own child is formed and another to assess the probability
of their own child to solve more tasks than a competitor.
pi = γ1ai + γ2gi + γ3gi × ai + γ4si + γ7Ri + γ8Xi + εi (4.25)
The outcome pi measures parents’ believed probability that their own child is able to solve any
one task in the game. The values range from 0 to 1. The subscript i is the indicator for parent i.
ai is the measured number of tasks the own child solved in the non-competition game. gi is the
gender of the own child and enters the equation also as interaction with ai. Social preferences si,
here only risk aversion, are also included. We also bring in possible reference points about the
difficulty of the game that parents might use to base their beliefs on: the vector Ri. It includes
another input factor of child endowment, parental ability, and aspirations of the parents for their
children. The parental endowment is measured as the number of correctly solved tasks of the
participating parent. Parental aspirations are represented by the aspired number of completed
years of education by the parents for their child.
The vector Xi is also not included in the conceptual framework. It represents facilitator fixed
effects. We use an error term εi and cluster the standard errors at the school level. We use OLS
regressions for the estimation.
For the second model regarding beliefs, we look at determinants that contribute to the develop-
ment of the beliefs about the likelihood to win. We use the following estimation equation:
wi = γ1ai + γ2bi + γ3gi + γ4hi + γ5ai × gi + γ6bi × hi + γ7gi × hi+
γ8si + γ9Ri + γ10Xi + εi
(4.26)
The outcome is the believed probability wi of the own child to win against a competitor . It is
a ratio between 0 and 1. Following our conceptual framework, it is determined by the believed
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ability of the own child ai that we measure here as the parental belief about the probability of
the number of solved tasks in the non-competitive game. It is a probability between 0 and 1.
bi is the parental expectation about the performance of the competitor. As a measure, we use
here the parental belief about the probability of the competitor to solve any one task. It is a
probability between 0 and 1.
gi is a dummy turning to one if the own child is a daughter. The reference category is a son. hi
reveals the gender of the competitor. This vector contains two dummies indicating whether the
competitor is a girl or a boy. The omitted category is another child with unknown gender. This
will hint at whether parents take observable characteristics of the competitor into account when
forming their beliefs. We also include an interaction term to learn how the combination of the
gender of own child and competitor matter for the belief gi × hi. We also include interactions
of gender and ability for the own child ai × gi and the competitor bi × hi.
Social preferences si are also included: risk aversion and competitiveness for oneself and one’s
child. The subscript i and parameters Ri, Xi, and εi follow the estimation equation for the
outcome pi We again cluster the standard errors at the school level and use OLS regressions for
the estimation.
4.3.2 Investment Outcome
We want to examine the first five hypotheses regarding parental investment using the following
estimation equation.
Iit = γ1ait + γ2gi × ait + γ3gi + γ4cit + γ5cit × wi + γ6si + γ7cit × si+
γ8ri + γ9Xit + εit
(4.27)
Iit is the outcome variable, the amount of INR a parent invests in the child account. As we elicit
the parental investment with the strategy method, we ask them 14 times. Thus, the subscript t
indicates the number of the subsequent rounds. Unlike in the conceptual model, we are right
away replacing the believed ability of children to solve a certain number of tasks p with its
components: a and g . ait is the known real ability of the child. It is the named number of
solved tasks in the strategy method. gi is the gender of the own child and enters the equation
as a dummy and an interaction with ait. cit is a dummy variable that turns to one if the played
game is competitive. We consider the interaction of competition and the parental belief about
the probability that the own child solves more tasks than the competitor cit×wi. The probability
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is a ratio between 0 and 1. The parameter is independent of the solved task by the own child.
As social preference might be at play we include the vector si and an interaction of it with
competition cit × si for possible differential effects for competition and non-competition in the
estimation equation. The preferences are assumed to stay constant across the elicitation period.
We consider altruism and risk aversion derived from Becker’s assumption for parental invest-
ment in children. We include parental aspirations as additional inputs for parental investment.
We also add competitiveness for oneself and for children to account for possible influences on
behavior due to the competitive setting.
We also include parental endowment ri , i.e. the number of correctly solved tasks of the partic-
ipating parent. Further, we include the vector Xit that contains variables related to the imple-
mentation of the experiment: facilitator fixed effects and time fixed effects of the taken decision.
εit constitutes the error term.
We use clustered standard errors at the parent level because parental observations are not inde-
pendent when made by the same parent. We run the regressions with OLS and check the results
with a random effects model with standard error clustered at the school level and a random
effects mixed model clustering at school level and facilitator level. To make full use of the in-
formation gathered by the strategy method we use a similar estimation strategy as Fischbacher
& Gachter (2010) and use every measured investment decision as one observation. As the be-
lief about the probability of the own child to win against a competitor is conditional on parents’
exposure to the competitive setting, we only include the interaction term of competition and
belief. However, as this probability could be interpreted as the relative ability that could poten-
tially also be a measure of child ability, we conduct robustness checks in the appendix where
we include the main effect next to the interaction.
4.3.3 Reduced Form Regression for Investment Outcome
In the last step, we want to run a reduced form equation replacing the endogenous factor wit
in the introduced estimation equation of the investment outcome with the additional exogenous
factors used to estimate wi: ait, bi , gi, hi, ait × gi, bi × hi,gi × hi.
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Iit = γ1ait + γ2gi × ait + γ3gi + γ4cit+
δ1cit × ait +2 cit × bi + δ3cit × gi + δ4cit × hi+
δ5cit × ait × gi + δ6cit × bi × hi + δ7cit × gi × hi+
+γ6si + γ7cit × si + γ8ri + γ9Xit + εit
(4.28)
The own child ability variable is now again the number of solved tasks ait parents are exposed
to when revealing their investment strategy. All variables with the parameter γ are using the
same measures as in the model for estimating the investment outcome before. The parameters
with δ in front are the same measures used for the belief estimation apart from ait.
We do not include the following variables in the regression to account for all main effects of
the interaction because these variables are only specified in the competitive setting. We exclude
them because they are not part of the conceptual model. Further, the value of these variables
is conditional on the competitive setting. For a robustness check, we include the main effects.
However, all of them are omitted as their value is zero when the setting is non-competitive. This
is the case for the following variables and interactions: Competitor : child, Competitor : girl,
Competitor : boy, Competitor : child × Competitorbelievedability, Competitor : girl ×
Competitorbelievedability, Competitor : boy × Competitorbelievedability, Daughter −
Child, Daughter −Girl, Daughter −Boy, Son− Child, Son−Girl, and Son−Boy.
5 Experimental Results
After explaining the underlying methodology of the analysis, we now show our empirical re-
sults.
5.1 Sample Characteristics: Summary Statistics
We start by describing the characteristics of our sample in Table 4.3. The described game has
266 participants for whom we have complete information on the invested amounts, beliefs, and
the competing child. The sample includes only participants who have passed our understanding
checks. Parents invest on average INR 56.61 in the non-competitive setting and INR 53.93 in
the competitive setting.
Parents believe that their own child is able to solve any one task with a probability of 56.8
percent and to win against a competitor of 56.9 percent. However, when we measure the real
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
Observations Mean Standard deviation
Parental Investment
No competition: Average investment by parents
(in INR)
266 56.606 17.299
Competition: Average investment by parents (in
INR)
266 53.926 15.883
Parental beliefs about ability
Believed: Probability own child solves any one
task
266 0.568 0.237
Believed: Probability own child solves more
tasks than competitor 266 0.569 0.235
Measured ability
Measured: Probability own child solves any one
task
266 0.520 0.121
Measured: Probability own child solves more
tasks than competitor 266 0.222 0.266
No competition: Number of solved tasks by
own child
266 3.173 1.549
Competition: Number of solved tasks by own
child
263 3.297 1.626
Number of solved tasks by parent 266 3.639 1.243
Parent characteristics
Participant: Mother 266 0.782
Expected completed education of own child (in
years) 265 12.045 1.313
Altruistic (0 to 10) 262 5.317 2.290
Willingness to take risks (0 to 10) 257 5.451 2.590
Competitive for oneself 250 0.720
Competitive for own child 260 0.500
Child characteristics
Daughter 266 0.549
Competitor: child 266 0.346
Competitor: girl 266 0.312
Competitor: boy 266 0.342
Game: Own child vs competitor
Daughter - Child 263 0.194
Daughter - Girl 263 0.167
Daughter - Boy 263 0.183
Son - Child 263 0.167
Son - Child 263 0.133
Son - Child 263 0.156
Source: Own Data.
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ability of their own children we find lower probabilities: Children are able to solve any one
task with a probability of 52.0 percent and to win against a competitor of 22.2 percent. The
stochastic likelihood of winning against a competitor is roughly 42.9 percent, i.e. of all 49
possible combinations of scored matrices the own child could win in 21 combinations. Thus,
the average observed likelihood is lower than the stochastic likelihood. This might be likely due
to the small sample size that does not allow to converge to the stochastic likelihood. Children
solve on average 3.17 tasks under the piece-rate payment scheme and 3.29 under the competitive
payment scheme. Parents solve on average 3.64 tasks. This shows that even though the task has
been conceptualized for children below the age of 10, the task is challenging for children and
parents alike.
In the lab-in-the-field experiment, 78.2 percent of participants are mothers. On average parents
aspire their own child to complete 12.04 years of education. This means they expect their
children to complete school right before transitioning to higher education. On a scale from
zero to ten participants see themselves on average on a level of 5.32 of altruism and of 5.45 of
willingness to take risk. On average 72 percent are willing to enter a competition but only 50
percent are willing to let their child compete.
Our sample of children has slightly more girls than boys: 54.9 percent are girls. In our sample,
34.6 percent of children compete against another child with unknown gender, 31.2 percent
against another girl , and 34.2 percent against another boy. The relative frequency of conducted
combinations of own child gender and competitors ranges from 19.4 percent of games between
daughter and child to 13.3 percent of games between son and child.
5.2 Formation of Parental Belief
One decisive factor for parental investment is parents’ believed ability of own child p or the
probability to win against a competitor w. We want to examine in this section how accurate
parental beliefs are and whether the identified input factors in the conceptual framework matter
for belief formation.
5.2.1 Descriptive Assessment of Accuracy of Beliefs
Recent literature shows that parents’ belief about their child’s performance at school is often
inaccurate (Bergman, 2015; Datta Gupta et al., 2016; Dizon-Ross, 2019). Thus, we check
whether this applies also in our case. We examine the difference between believed and measured
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results. We first consider the relative frequency of believed and measured probability of solving
any one task in Figure 4.7. Most frequently parents believe their child solves any one task with a
Figure 4.7: Histogram of Relative Frequency of Probability of Solving Any One Task by Gender
of Own Child Comparing Believed and Measured Values
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probability of almost 50 percent independent of gender. In reality, the most frequent probability
for all children to solve any one task lies at 30 or 50 percent. The highest frequency measured
for girls is a likelihood of 30 percent to solve any one task and for boys it is 80 percent.
Further, we examine graphically the differences between believed and measured probability of
the own child to win against a competitor in Figure 4.8. Parents most frequently believe that
their child has a chance of 50 percent to win. This also holds when the competitor is a child with
unknown gender or a boy. When the competitor is a girl the most frequent believed probability
of winning drops to 40 percent. When we look at the measured probability of winning against
a competitor, we find a rather bleak picture. The most frequent probability for all, female, or
male competitors is zero. Only when competing against another child the highest frequency of
the probabilities to win is 20 percent.
In Table 4.4 we examine whether statistical tests of difference of means also capture our findings
of the graphical assessment. Due to the small sample size and possible non-normal data, we
also show the results for the Mann-Whitney rank-sum test or Wilcoxon signed-rank test. We
examine the differences in believed and measured probability of solving any one task in the
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Figure 4.8: Histogram of Relative Frequency of Probability of Own Child Winning against a
Competitor with Different Gender Comparing Believed and Measured Values
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Table 4.4: Mean Comparison of Believed and Measured Values
Observations Believed
mean [sd]
Measured
mean [sd]
t-test
p-value
Wilcoxon
p-value
Sign test
p-value
Probability of solving any one task
Own child 266 0.568 0.529 0.069 0.050 0.059
[0.237] [0.258]
Child 92 0.592 0.504 0.000 0.001 0.006
[0.220] [0.091]
Girl 83 0.551 0.521 0.265 0.438 0.826
[0.213] [0.107]
Boy 91 0.626 0.534 0.002 0.008 0.208
[0.228] [0.154]
Probability own child wins against
Child 92 0.585 0.423 0.000 0.000 0.005
[0.229] [0.295]
Girl 83 0.528 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.251] [0.205]
Boy 92 0.585 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.230] [0.128]
Notes: All tests are two-tailed. The abbreviation sd stands for standard deviation.
Source: Own Data.
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first panel in Table 4.4 and of the own child to win against different competitors in the second
panel.5
Believed and measured probability of the own child to solve any one task is only significant
at the 10 percent significance level. The difference is rather small, less than 4 percent. Parents
have inaccurate beliefs about the ability of a child with unknown gender and boys. They believe
that they perform better than they do. The inaccuracies amount to a difference of slightly less
than 9 percent. This is more than for the own child. Parents’ beliefs about the ability of girls
are accurate, believed and measured mean are not significantly different from zero. So, overall
parents overestimate the performance for own children and competitors apart from competing
girls.
In the lower panel of the table, we look at parental beliefs about the probability of their own
child winning against a competitor. Believed and measured values are all statistically significant
from zero. Parents overestimate the probability to win of their own child. They believe children
have the lowest chance to win when playing against a girl, though the difference is only 5.7
percent.
5.2.2 Assessment of Parental Belief by Child and Competitor Endowment
The previous subsection already hinted at the influence of observable characteristics on the for-
mation of parental beliefs about the ability of children. Now, we want to examine more closely
how the gender of the own child, the gender of the competing child, and a combination of these
matter for belief formation.
We first assess whether the means regarding belief are significantly differently between parents
with a daughter or a son. As the number of observations is reduced to as low as 37 observations
in one group, we not only run t-tests but also Wilcoxon rank-sum tests in Table 4.5. We assess
the probability of solving any one task of the own child and the competitors, the own child
winning against a competitor, and the probability of the own child to solve a certain amount
of tasks. The only statistically significant difference at the 5 percent significance level is the
probability of solving any one task of own child. Parents with a son believe that his average
likelihood to solve any one task is 60.2 percent. Parents with a daughter believe that the proba-
bility to solve any one task is on average 54.0 percent, more than 6 percent less than for sons.
The gender of the own child seems to matter for the belief formation of the parents.
5In the appendix, we also compare believed and measured probability of different numbers of solved tasks by
the competitor.
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Table 4.5: Mean Comparison of Beliefs by Gender of Own Child
Daughter Son p-Values
Observations Mean [sd] Observations mean [sd] t-test Wilcoxon
Probability of solving any one task
Own child 146 0.540 120 0.602 0.036 0.035
[0.239] [0.232]
Child 50 0.602 42 0.581 0.650 0.529
[0.213] [0.230]
Girl 46 0.585 37 0.508 0.104 0.094
[0.218] [0.202]
Boy 50 0.618 41 0.637 0.702 0.825
[0.235] [0.222]
Probability own child wins against
Child 50 0.550 42 0.626 0.112 0.150
[0.243] [0.206]
Girl 46 0.526 37 0.530 0.948 0.923
[0.246] [0.260]
Boy 51 0.547 41 0.632 0.079 0.085
[0.250] [0.194]
Probability own child solves certain amount of tasks
0 146 0.085 120 0.102 0.198 0.157
[0.103] [0.108]
1 146 0.135 120 0.134 0.955 0.861
[0.106] [0.114]
2 146 0.147 120 0.141 0.621 0.571
[0.094] [0.094]
3 146 0.168 120 0.174 0.728 0.344
[0.134] [0.130]
4 146 0.165 120 0.168 0.813 0.832
[0.107] [0.117]
5 146 0.147 120 0.125 0.119 0.183
[0.122] [0.098]
6 146 0.153 120 0.156 0.903 0.751
[0.158] [0.163]
Notes: The abbreviation sd stands for standard deviation.
Source: Own Data.
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Next we consider the gender of the competitor (Table 4.6). We again run t-tests and Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests to assess whether the beliefs about solving any one task or a certain amount of
tasks or the own child to win against a certain competitor differ. Only the difference between
girls and boys for the belief in solving any one task is statistically significant on the 5 percent
significance level. Further, we only find statistically significant differences at the 5 percent level
for a child with unknown gender and girl for the probability of solving three tasks.
We have seen that the gender of own child and the gender of the competing child evoke different
parental beliefs. In the next step, we assess whether the combination of the gender of own child
and the competing child matter for belief. Figure 4.9 shows box plots for the probability of
winning of the own child against a certain competitor. It shows all six possible combinations.
Whether the own child is a daughter or a son the median probability to win lies at 60 percent for
Figure 4.9: Box Plots on Probability to Win by Own Child by Gender Combinations
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Probability of Winning in Percent
Son-Boy
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Son-Child
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Source: Own Data.
Probability of Winning by Own Child by
Gender Combinations
competing against a child with unknown gender or at 50 percent for competing against a girl.
The median probability to win lies at 50 percent for the combination daughter vs boy, but at 60
percent for son vs boy. The interquartile ranges are largest for the combination daughter vs boy.
The interquartile ranges for the combinations with daughter include lower probabilities to win
than with sons.
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5.2.3 Predictors of Believed Own Child Ability
After our descriptive assessment of the effects of gender on parental beliefs, we assess now our
first derived hypotheses from the conceptual framework considering predictors of the believed
ability of the own child p in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Regression Results for Belief of Own Child Solving Any One Task
Believed Probability of Own Child Solving Any One Task
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own child real ability -0.008 -0.016 -0.019
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015]
Daughter -0.061* -0.092 -0.107
[0.027] [0.066] [0.065]
Daughter × Own child real ability 0.008 0.011
[0.019] [0.018]
Expected completed education
(in years) -0.001
[0.010]
Parent real ability 0.028*
[0.011]
Willingness to take risks -0.001
[0.007]
Mean Outcome 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.568
Controls No No No Yes
Observations 266 266 266 257
Subjects 266 266 266 257
Notes: Standard errors appear in brackets and are clustered by parent. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Source: Own Data.
The table shows four OLS regressions with the outcome believed probability of own child solv-
ing any one task.
Hypothesis Belief 1a On average parents believe that their own children have a probability of
56.8 percent to solve any one task. As shown in the assessment of graphics and tests, the real
ability of the child does not influence the belief. The coefficient is negative, small in magnitude,
and not significant across the presented models.
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Hypothesis Belief 2a Other observable endowments of the child seem to matter more in the
belief formation. When the own child is a girl, parents believe that on average a daughter is
6.1 percentage points less likely to solve any one task than a son (in column 2), ceteris paribus.
Though the magnitude increases when adding covariates, the effect is no longer significant.
The interaction of daughter and own child real ability is not significant and rather small in
magnitude.
Parent Endowment as Significant Predictor When adding reference points to the model in
column 4 such as parental ability and aspirations, we only find that parental real ability has
a positive and significant association with the believed probability of the parent’s own child to
solve any one task. For every additional task the parent is able to solve, the parental belief about
the own child to solve any one task increases on average by 2.8 percentage points, all else equal.
In the next subsection, we assess the possible influence of observable endowments of children
like gender on belief formation, this time related to the probability to win.
5.2.4 Predictors of Believed Probability to Win
We are testing the four left hypotheses regarding the parental belief formation derived from the
conceptual framework using the second specified equation model for beliefs. Table 4.8 includes
six different models. The first column focuses on endowments of the own child, the second on
endowments of the competitor, the third on the believed ability of own child and competitor,
and the fourth column on the gender of the own child, the competitor, and the combination of
both. The second last model brings all predictors together and the last model includes control
variables that have been specified in the empirical specification section.
Hypothesis Belief 1b We want to assess the hypothesis if greater believed ability of the own
child increases parental belief in the own child to win against a competitor. The believed ability
of own child is significant at least at the 5 percent significance level for all models in which it
is included. The magnitude is largest in column one. Considering the main model in column 6,
the believed likelihood to win increases by 2.89 percentage points when the believed ability of
the own child to solve any one task increases by 10 percentage points. This provides support to
our hypothesis.
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Table 4.8: Regression Results Parental Belief about Probability of Own Child to Win
Believed Probability of Own Child to Win
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own child believed ability 0.384*** 0.233** 0.260** 0.289**
[0.090] [0.067] [0.089] [0.103]
Daughter 0.028 -0.073* -0.038 -0.033
[0.078] [0.032] [0.070] [0.077]
Daughter × Own child believed ability -0.107 -0.047 -0.094
[0.133] [0.121] [0.116]
Competitor believed ability 0.179 0.281** 0.064 -0.095
[0.109] [0.080] [0.121] [0.102]
Competitor: girl -0.253*
-
0.233***
-
0.403***
-
0.528***
[0.100] [0.059] [0.103] [0.097]
Competitor: boy -0.136
-
0.274***
-0.263*
-
0.414***
[0.113] [0.075] [0.106] [0.107]
Competitor: girl × Competitor believed ability 0.369* 0.439** 0.472**
[0.167] [0.158] [0.151]
Competitor: boy × Competitor believed ability 0.217 0.237 0.288*
[0.156] [0.148] [0.133]
Daughter-Girl 0.222** 0.147** 0.233***
[0.071] [0.052] [0.056]
Daughter-Boy 0.283** 0.128 0.266**
[0.081] [0.063] [0.082]
Son-Girl 0.149** 0.101** 0.140**
[0.050] [0.034] [0.045]
Son-Boy 0.281** 0.121 0.205**
[0.082] [0.061] [0.073]
Mean Outcome 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569
Controls No No No No No Yes
Observations 266 266 266 263 263 239
Subjects 266 266 266 263 263 239
Notes: Standard errors appear in brackets and are clustered by parent. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Source: Own Data.
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Hypothesis Belief 1c Next, we want to assess whether lower believed ability of the competitor
increases parental belief in the own child to win against a competitor. Surprisingly the sign
of the coefficient for competitors’ believed ability is positive. However, the magnitude and
significance decrease when adding covariates. In the main model, the sign turns negative. The
association of believed ability of a competitor and probability to win of the own child does not
follow a clear pattern and so does not clearly support our hypothesis.
Hypothesis Belief 2b and 2c The last two hypotheses regarding parental belief formation
assess the role of gender of the own child and the competitor. The dummy Daughter is only
significant in models without own child believed ability. The coefficient is mostly negative,
particularly in the main model. It is significant on the 10 percent significance level in column 4
suggesting that parents with a daughter compared to those with a son believe that their own child
is 7.3 percent less likely to win against a competitor. The interaction of the dummy Daughter
with the believed ability of own child represents a discount factor for girls. It is negative in sign
but not significant.
Overall, we find that gender of the own child matters for the believed probability of the own
child to win. Playing with a daughter has a negative association with belief in winning. The
interaction of gender with the believed ability works as a discount factor for girls.
The last hypothesis regarding beliefs relates to the gender of the competitor. We claim when
the competing child is a girl (boy), parents believe in a higher (lower) probability of their own
child winning against a competitor compared to a competitor with unobserved gender. In our
regression analysis, we include two dummy variables indicating that the competitor is a girl or a
boy. The competitor with unknown gender is the reference category. Both dummies are largest
in magnitude and significant on the 1 percent significance level for the main model in column
6. When the competitor is a girl compared to a child with unknown gender, parents believe that
their child is on average 52.8 percentage points less likely to win, ceteris paribus. In the case of
a boy as a competitor, the believed likelihood decreases by 41.4 percentage points.
That the magnitude for competing girls is largest is surprising in the context of India because
parents value cognitive ability as revealed in our test less in girls than in boys. We would as-
sume that parents would perceive boys to be a bigger threat than girls. Otherwise, our sample
might be decisive for this parental belief. Higher performing sons are usually sent to private
schools and so the average ability of sons at governmental schools could be lower than the av-
erage ability of girls. High-performing girls remain at governmental schools and so might raise
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the average performance of girls relative to the remaining boys. Parents might be aware of this
and so see girls as a bigger threat and form the belief that their own child is less likely to win
against a competing girl. However, this awareness might not influence parental beliefs in the
likelihood of their own girl child to win in general because of the lower valuation of cognitive
ability of girls.
The interaction of competitors’ gender and ability are also significant in the main model. If
parents believe that a competing girl is 10 percentage points more likely to solve any one task
compared to a child of unknown gender, then the parental belief of their own child winning
increases by 4.72 percentage points on average, ceteris paribus. In the case of a boy competitor,
the increase is 2.88 percentage points.
We are also assessing the combinations of the gender of own child and the gender of the com-
petitor. We include a dummy for each combination except for son vs child that is our reference
category. The results for daughter vs child is omitted due to collinearity. All interactions are
positive in sign and significant at least at the 5 percent significance level in column 4 and col-
umn 6. Parents playing the game daughter vs girl compared to the game son vs child believe
that their own child is 23.3 percentage points more likely to win. When they play the game
daughter vs boy the chance increases even more by 26.6 percentage points. The increase in
ability is lower for the games son vs girl and son vs boy.
Parents believe that their own child is less likely to win if the competitor is a girl or a boy com-
pared to a child with unknown gender. However, the believed ability of girls and boys discounts
this because it has a positive association with the probability of winning. Looking at the com-
binations we observe the expected positive association of belief with the combination with son
and girls and boy competitor. Though the magnitude is larger for competing against the same
gender of the own child. For daughters, we see also positive effects, unlike our expectation. The
magnitudes are even larger than for boys and largest for the case where daughters are competing
against boys. We can only partly support our hypothesis because we find negative associations
with probability to win with competitors of known gender and positive associations with own
child and competing girl or boy.
To conclude, our empirical results show that the real ability of the own child and having a daugh-
ter are negatively associated with the belief about solving any one task though the findings are
not statistically significant in the main model. Having a daughter has also a negative association
with the believed probability to win. The believed ability of own child has a significant and
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positive association with the probability to win. The last two hypotheses regarding the competi-
tor find mixed evidence. Competitor’s believed ability does not have a clear association. For
competing boys we find a negative association with belief to win but also for girls compared to
children with unknown gender. We also find for both genders in the combination of own child
and competitor a positive association. For the belief formation of parents, it seems to make a
difference whether they know the gender of the competitor but not so much the gender itself.
5.3 Parental Investment Decisions under Competition
In this section, we come to the derived hypotheses for investment decisions of parents.
5.3.1 Are Parents Purely Utility Maximizing?
One assumption in the theoretical models of the intergenerational mobility and transmission of
earnings, assets, and consumption by Becker & Tomes (1986, 1979) is that parents are aiming
at maximizing their utility. In the conceptual framework, we observe that social preferences
matter not so much as a part of the utility function itself. Their influence on the belief formation
of p or w seems more important. If we assume parents to only consider their expected payout
for generating utility, the introduced payment schemes discourage parents to invest any money
in case the child solves no task and encourages them to invest the whole endowment in case
the child solves more than one task (if the probability to win is more than w = 1/2 in the
competitive game). When we look at the trend of investment over increasing numbers of solved
tasks, we can detect a pattern though less sharp as predicted (Figure 4.10). On average parents
invest more than INR 30 when the child solves no task. The investment is increasing. The
investments seem to be usually higher for a non-competitive setting than for a competitive one.
From this observation, we conclude that it is important to include social preferences in our
estimation strategy because the investment behavior can not be explained alone by a payout
maximizing strategy.
5.3.2 Do Parents Invest Less in Competitive Games?
This already introduces our main objective of this study: the influence of market luck in form
of a competitive or non-competitive setting on parental investment decisions in their children.
Considering the described trend in Figure 4.10 or the box plots of average parental investment
by setting in Figure 4.11, we find that parents at the median invest less in their children when
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Figure 4.10: Average Invested Amount over Number of Solved Tasks by Competition
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
A
ve
ra
ge
 A
m
ou
nt
 In
ve
st
ed
 in
C
hi
ld
 A
cc
ou
nt
 in
 IN
R
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Solved Tasks
Mean 95% CI
No competition No competition
Competition Competition
Source: Own Data.
Parental Investments by Solved Tasks and Competition
exposed to competition. As we have elicited parental investment decisions with the strategy
method we can have a closer look at the investment for each possible number of solved tasks
like in Figure 4.12. The interquartile range is very similar for all possible solved tasks but
Figure 4.11: Box Plots of Parental Investment in the Child Account by Competition
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Figure 4.12: Box Plots of Parental Investment in the Child Account over Solved Tasks by
Competition
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three and five solved tasks. In these two cases, the interquartile range includes higher invested
amounts for the non-competitive scenario compared to the competitive one. The median in-
creases or remains the same with an increasing number of solved tasks. The median is also very
similar for all possible solved tasks but solving nothing or three tasks. The median has a higher
value in the non-competitive setting.
Next, we want to confirm our hunch that parents invest less in their children when exposed
to competition by conducting t-tests of equality of means. As the assumption of normality is
violated, we also report results of non-parametric tests like Mann-Whitney rank-sum test or
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Table 4.9). We find significant differences at the 5 percent level for
all tests for solving three or five tasks. There is also a statistically significant difference between
investments considering average spending. The overall mean investment is lower under com-
petition. Standard deviations are usually smaller in the competitive setting until the possibility
of the child to solve four tasks. Then the pattern changes and the standard deviation becomes
smaller for the non-competitive setting.
We have just examined the investment decisions of parents based on the number of solved tasks
of children by competition. Now we turn to another key independent variable, the believed
probability of the own child to win against a competitor (Figure 4.13). When we look at box
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Table 4.9: Comparison of the Investments by Child Ability and Competition
Number of
Solved Tasks
Observations No Competition
mean [sd]
Competition
mean [sd]
t-test
p-value
Wilcoxon
p-value
Sign test
p-value
0 266 38.346 35.338 0.114 0.131 0.162
[28.196] [25.860]
1 266 48.233 45.489 0.152 0.073 0.066
[27.463] [25.858]
2 266 52.180 49.962 0.249 0.337 0.741
[25.854] [22.629]
3 266 58.421 54.135 0.022 0.011 0.014
[25.279] [24.189]
4 266 59.586 59.436 0.935 0.897 0.946
[24.942] [23.425]
5 266 67.256 62.970 0.019 0.026 0.101
[24.067] [25.782]
6 266 72.218 70.150 0.253 0.347 0.783
[26.206] [26.249]
Mean 266 56.606 53.926 0.015 0.041 0.029
[17.299] [15.883]
Notes: All tests are two-tailed. The abbreviation sd stands for standard deviation.
Source: Own Data.
Figure 4.13: Average Invested Amount over Number of Solved Tasks by Competition
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plots of parental investments in the child account by this key variable, we see that the median
investment rises with increasing belief in the ability to win. The median parent who believes
that the own child is 10 or 20 percent likely to win against a competitor invests INR 40. The
median of parents who believe in a probability between 30 to 80 percent lies at INR 50. The
median of parents with even higher believed probabilities is INR 60. The range of the me-
dian spending by believed probability to win contains a rather narrow bracket: INR 40 to INR
60. Our descriptive analysis shows that parents’ investments are sensitive to market luck: they
invest less under competition. Even parents who are sure that their own child wins against a
competitor invest INR 60 (of possible INR 100) at the median.
5.3.3 Test of Hypotheses Investment 1 to 5
With the prior introduced empirical specification for the structural form regression equation, we
estimate the effects of exposure to a competitive setting compared to a non-competitive one on
investment in children (Table 4.10). The outcome is the invested amount in INR in the child
account. We run the first eight models with OLS, the ninth with random effects, and the tenth
with a random effects mixed model. Column 8 is the main model of our analysis, columns 9
and 10 serve as robustness checks.
The first seven columns include 3724 observations of 266 subjects. When we introduce covari-
ates, the number of observations reduces to 3374 observations and 241 subjects. The average
amount invested under non-competition is INR 56.61. Priorly displayed graphs show that par-
ents invest between INR 0 and INR 100 with partly investments at the extreme. However, the
interquartile range of the overall mean of investments covers INR 30 to INR 80 for both settings.
We report the outcomes in INR and interpret them partly as a percent of the initial endowment
to put the magnitude of the coefficients into perspective. We consider the endowment of the
own children in general in the first three columns. Then we focus on competition and how child
endowment, believed probability to win, and other covariates influence the overall spending
behavior of parents. We present the findings for the first lot of hypotheses regarding investment
(Hypotheses Investment 1a, 2a, 2b, 3, 4, 5) in the following.
Hypothesis Investment 1a Our findings support the hypothesis that greater ability of the own
child increases parental investment in the child account. The effect is rather stable and always
significant at the 1 percent level. For example, in column 8 parents invest on average INR 4.82
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more in the child account when their child is able to solve one task more, ceteris paribus. That
corresponds to 5 percent of the initial endowment. Our findings lend support to hypothesis 1a.
Hypothesis Investment 2a Now we consider the influence of the gender of own child for the
investment decisions. Playing a game with a daughter has a negative association with investment
in all columns but column 2. The gender of the child does not discount the real ability of
daughters. The effects are not statistically significant and small in magnitude, each not more
than INR 1 in our main model.
Hypothesis Investment 4 We turn now to our key independent variable to analyze whether
market luck affects parental investment decisions in children. The result of column 4 reflects
the conducted mean tests from before: Exposure to competition is associated with a decrease
in investment in the child account by on average INR 2.68, ceteris paribus. This holds on the
10 percent significance level. When we add child endowments (real ability, gender of the own
child, and their interaction) or the interaction of competition and the believed probability to
win, the coefficient remains significant. It increases in size in column 6. For our main model in
column 8 that includes all covariates, the magnitude is even larger. However, the effect is only
significant in the random effects mixed model although the magnitude is stable in columns 8 to
10. On average parents invest INR 9.27 less in the child account when they are exposed to a
competitive setting that is 9 percent of their initial endowment.
Hypothesis Investment 3 The third hypothesis we consider is whether a higher believed prob-
ability of the own child to win against a competitor increases parental investment in the child
account. Our results in columns 6 to 10 show that the effect is positive and at least significant
at the 10 percent significance level. The magnitude is rather stable. According to column 8,
parents invest on average INR 1.23 more in the child account when the parental belief regarding
the probability of their own child to win against a competitor increases by 10 percentage points.
That corresponds to 1 percent of the initial endowment. We check the robustness of this find-
ing by adding also the main effect in the regression in the appendix. We find that the effect of
parents’ belief in the relative ability of their child, the probability to win against a competitor,
is positive just as the interaction with competition. The effect size of the interaction term is
reduced by half and is no longer significant.
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Hypothesis Investment 5 The fifth hypothesis claims that social preferences increase parental
investments in the child account more in a competitive than in a non-competitive setting. Al-
though interactions of competition with risk-seeking and competitiveness do have a positive
sign in the regression analysis, only the interaction of competition and competitiveness for
oneself is significant on the 10 percent significance level in column 10. We conduct joint sig-
nificance tests of either all included social preferences, only for the non-competitive, or only
for the competitive setting. All tests are not significant rejecting our fifth hypothesis that the
included social preferences matter significantly for the investment decision.
5.4 Reduced Form Regression - Bringing Investment and Beliefs together
We are now bringing the two equations of parental investment and belief formation together
to estimate the results for a reduced form as specified in the methods section. Column 1 of
Table 4.11 shows the results with the endogenous variable probability to win, the other columns
are the reduced form equation. When we replace child ability to win with the parameters that
generate this belief, we do this step-wise: column 2 considers own child endowments in the
competitive setting, column 3 competitor’s endowments, column 4 the gender combinations of
own child and competitor, and column 5 to 8 include all exogenous parameters of the child
ability to win against a competitor w. All parameters are interacted with competition. Our
previous observations for child endowment hold.
Reassessment of Hypothesis Investment 4 The dummy competition remains negative but is
smaller in magnitude and no more significant compared to the structural model. Parents still
invest less in competition though the evidence is less striking.
Hypothesis Investment 6 We have slight evidence for our sixth hypothesis that believed
lower ability of the competitor increases parental investment in the own child. The interac-
tion of competition and competitor’s believed ability is negative in sign and small in magnitude.
It is not significant.
Hypothesis Investment 1b Our findings still support the hypothesis that greater ability of the
own child increases parental investment in the child account for non-competition. However,
there is no additional ability effect when exposed to competition because the interaction term is
not significant and small in magnitude, though it is positive.
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Table 4.11: Reduced Form Regression Results for Parental Investment in Child Account
Parent Investment in INR Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS RE RE Mixed
Child ability 4.981*** 4.762*** 4.981*** 4.981*** 4.762*** 4.562*** 4.552*** 4.552***
[0.446] [0.566] [0.446] [0.446] [0.567] [0.595] [0.656] [0.400]
Daughter -0.579 -2.250 -1.013 -1.421 -2.159 -1.967 -1.882 -2.460
[2.482] [3.098] [2.459] [2.828] [3.106] [3.131] [3.364] [2.383]
Daughter × Child ability 0.554 0.894 0.554 0.617 0.894 1.121 1.118 1.118*
[0.593] [0.738] [0.593] [0.592] [0.739] [0.775] [0.743] [0.540]
Competition -6.014 -4.158 2.476 -2.700 -0.130 -4.232 -2.419 -0.113
[3.056] [2.498] [6.239] [2.712] [6.419] [7.421] [5.941] [4.711]
Competition × Child ability to win 12.348**
[4.188]
Competition × Child ability 0.438 0.438 0.513 0.507 0.507
[0.593] [0.594] [0.637] [0.717] [0.563]
Competition × Daughter 2.340
[3.242]
Competition × Daughter × Child ability -0.680 -0.554 -0.650 -0.645 -0.644
[0.780] [0.786] [0.839] [0.879] [0.766]
Competition × Competitor believed ability -9.130 -9.411 -7.040 -8.890 -9.148
[9.401] [9.274] [10.534] [8.062] [6.077]
Competition × Competitor: girl × Competitor believed ability 14.634 11.967 10.093 21.304 27.827***
[11.562] [11.617] [12.767] [12.212] [8.429]
Competition × Competitor: boy × Competitor believed ability 23.194 23.163 23.849 20.509 25.563***
[12.561] [12.534] [12.748] [11.200] [7.671]
Competition × Competitor: girl -10.720 -18.526** -14.909
-
19.820**
-
24.001**
[6.913] [6.764] [8.551] [6.302] [7.602]
Competition × Competitor: boy -17.784* -30.201***
-
26.779**
-
35.937***
-
40.161***
[8.113] [8.428] [9.904] [8.656] [11.213]
Competition × Daughter-Child 2.903 4.362 4.144 3.916 4.076
[3.452] [4.082] [4.106] [3.774] [3.350]
Competition × Daughter-Girl 0.510 13.358** 10.654 6.966 7.567
[3.682] [4.236] [5.615] [8.455] [6.888]
Competition × Daughter-Boy -2.850 14.346* 11.720 23.788* 25.245*
[3.767] [5.939] [7.802] [9.447] [10.698]
Competition × Son-Girl -0.526 10.684*** 9.307* 7.377 7.782
[3.297] [2.819] [4.502] [6.260] [6.397]
Competition × Son-Boy 0.025 15.463** 14.062* 24.539** 26.115*
[3.723] [5.437] [7.091] [7.514] [10.423]
Mean Outcome No-Competition 56.606 56.606 56.606 56.606 56.606 56.606 56.606 56.606
Joint significance: competition 0.010 0.169 0.079 0.173 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.000
Joint significance: social preferences 0.954 0.903 0.536
Joint significance: social preferences no-competition 0.947 0.939 0.756
Joint significance: social preferences competition 0.784 0.789 0.347
Controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3724 3724 3724 3703 3703 3353 3353 3353
Subjects 266 266 266 266 266 241 241 241
Notes: Standard errors appear in brackets and are clustered by parent. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Due to collinearity following variables and interactions are omitted: Competition×Daughter in column 5 to 8 and
Competition× Competitor : child× Competitorbelievedability and Competition× Competitor : child in column 3 and 5 to 8.
Following variables are not displayed: Competitorbelievedability in column 3 and 5 to 8. Source: Own Data.
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Hypothesis Investment 2b We stated in the second hypothesis that parents with a daughter
invest less in the child account during competition. The interaction of competition and daugh-
ter is positive but not significant in column 2. Then the effect is omitted due to collinearity.
The triple interaction of competition, daughter, and believed ability is a discounting factor for
daughter’s ability. It is also not significant and rather small in magnitude. The combinations
of daughter and type of competitor interacted with competition are only significant for a girl
competitor in column 5 or a boy competitor in column 5,7, and 8 at least at the 10 percent
significance level. The reference group is no competition. The coefficient is positive just like
the one for sons and its competitors in the models with other covariates, not in column 4. The
combinations of own son vs girl or boy have a similar magnitude like for daughters vs girl or
boy. For own sons, we find significant effects for column 5 to 8 for competing against a boy
and in column 5 and 6 for competing against a girl. Overall, the weak daughter discriminating
tendencies for investments persist also in the competitive setting.
Hypothesis Investment 7 The last hypothesis looks at the gender of the competing child.
Compared to the non-competitive setting, parents invest less in their child’s account when the
competitor is a girl and even less when the competitor is a boy. The effect for girls is significant
for column 5 and the alternative specifications of our main model (columns 7 and 8). The effect
for boys is significant at least on the 5 percent significance level throughout. When the own
child competes against boys, parents invest on average INR 26.78 less in the child account (in
our main model), all else equal. The reduction represents more than a quarter of the possible
initial investment.
Compared to non-competition the coefficient of the believed ability of competing girls has a
greater positive association with investment. The magnitude is larger for competing boys in the
OLS models but similar in the alternative random effects specifications. The effects are both
significant in the random effects mixed model. However, the magnitude is rather small: A 10
percentage point increase in the belief of the ability of a competing boy is associated with an
increased investment of INR 2.38 on average, ceteris paribus (column 5). This corresponds to
roughly 2 percent of the initial endowment.
When we consider the child combinations of own child and competitor interacted with compe-
tition, we see that parents invest more in the child account when the gender of the competitor is
known. The investments are larger for boy competitors than for girl competitors. These effects
do not outweigh the strong effects of the interaction of competition and the gender of the com-
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petitor. When we consider our main model (column 6) playing with a son against a girl has a
combined effect of a lower investment of INR 5.6 (-14.91+9.31= -5.6) and against a boy of INR
12.72 less (-26.78+14.06= -12.72) compared to a non-competitive setting. These findings are
puzzling considering the results about the believed ability to win where parents’ belief in their
child to win is lower for competing girls than boys with competing child with unknown gender
as the reference category. A possible explanation might be that parents follow heuristics, i.e.
boys perform better than girls, than their own critical thinking about the ability of the children
in the selected class when making the investment decision. We conclude that when the com-
petitor child is either a girl and even more if it is a boy, parents invest less in the child account
compared to non-competition.
We conclude that child endowments like ability and gender are decisive for parental investment
in children. The general effect of ability is strengthened under competition. Parents invest less
in daughters in general and discount their ability in the competitive setting. Considering market
luck, we find that parents invest in children almost 10 percent of the initial endowment less
when exposed to a competitive setting. Though their belief in their own child’s ability to win
increases investment, it can not outweigh the negative effect of the competitive setting itself.
Social preferences seem negligible. In the future, we will conduct robustness checks to exam-
ine whether the results still hold when social preferences are omitted. When making the gender
of the competing child salient, parents invest less in the child account. For competing boys, the
magnitude of the effect is largest that is irrespective of the gender of the own child. Competing
against boys reduces the investments by large, more than a quarter of the initial investment.
6 Discussion
Our results have to be interpreted with caution keeping certain assumptions in mind. In the
following, we critically reflect on the made assumptions and future extensions of this study.
Our study relies on the elicitation of valid and reliable measures. However, as we are dealing
with subjects with less education and likely lower cognitive ability, the measures might be bi-
ased. Less able subjects make random choices out of mistakes (Andersson et al., 2016). We
have not validated our measures to learn about the importance of cognitive ability and education
for making decisions. Nevertheless, the careful selection of our elicitation tools and understand-
ing checks make us confident that participants have not made random choices.
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In our experimental setting, we have not asked the parents separately whether they want to in-
vest at all in the child account and how much they would like to invest. Due to this, we are
unable to distinguish whether investing INR 0 reflects extreme risk aversion to any uncertain
setting or the exposure to the setting itself. However, we capture risk aversion as a control vari-
able. This is why we are confident that our investment measure is not biased.
In the study, we have measured risk aversion but not ambiguity aversion. We assume that the
participants have an accurate expectation of the potential of the competitors in the competition
game. However, this assumption might not hold and participants have not perceived the compe-
tition game as only risky but also ambiguous because they have not had an expectation about the
competitors’ potential. As risk and ambiguity are distinct concepts and we are not controlling
for ambiguity in our model, ambiguity might be driving the effect of the different investments in
the non-competitive and the competitive game (Eisenberger & Weber, 1995; Venkatraman et al.,
2006). Nonetheless, we argue that the exposure to a familiar setting like the child’s classmates
makes ambiguity less of a concern because parents have been exposed to the ability distribution
within the grade before. The ability distribution should not be ambiguous for the parents.
In our study, we also assume that participants’ personality trades and emotions do not influence
their investment behavior despite evidence of recent studies (Hajimoladarvish, 2018; Gambetti
& Giusberti, 2019; Hopfensitz & Van Winden, 2008). As we have tried to maintain a similar
atmosphere and setting in all sessions, there should not be any systematic differences in our
experimental setting triggering emotions. To compare the competitive and non-competitive set-
ting we use a within-subject design. In the case of constant emotions of parents within one
session, the effects should be negligible.
When selecting our sample, we try to keep another child endowment, age, constant. We con-
trol for the age of children by only choosing participants of the same grade. However, the age
bracket of children within one grade might vary because school enrollment, though mandatory
for primary schools, is not enforced in India. There might be older children who have started
school later in their childhood or younger children who are exceptionally intelligent who have
moved to a higher grade with on average older classmates. This might affect parents’ behavior
because in the case of an older child than the average child in the grade they might believe that
the endowment age is an advantage for the child to win the game because of her greater expe-
rience in her previous life. Otherwise, parents might believe that older children in the grade of
more younger children might have lower ability as the others because this might be the reason
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why the child is in the grade with on average younger classmates. Considering the case of
younger than average children in the grade parents might have opposing beliefs. Parents could
believe that their child is exceptionally intelligent and thus more likely to win in a competition
or that the child is less able to compete against more experienced fellow students. Nevertheless,
these concerns are all linked to the parents’ knowledge about the exact age of their children.
We are not sure how likely it is that parents actually know about their child’s exact age. In our
survey, we also ask the parents about the birth date of their child and not many are able to give
a prompt answer. Many parents do not attach importance to the age of their own child. Even if
there are age differences, parents’ belief is less likely to be influenced by it. We are planning to
control for the age of children as an extension of our analysis.
When setting up our experiment, we endow parents all with the same amount to create equal
budget constraints when making investment decisions. However, the amount parents could win
in the game is likely to have a relatively higher value to parents from a poor household. This
and the attitude towards making investments deriving from socialization at a certain household
wealth level might alter social preferences and attitudes towards child endowments. For exam-
ple, parents from wealthier households could be more risk-loving and so invest more in their
child independent of child endowments due to the less relative importance of the possible in-
come to be gained. Thus, our results might not apply to wealthier population groups. To get
better insights into how decisive household wealth is for parental behavior, we will conduct a
sub-sample analysis of households with different wealth levels.
In the analysis, we consider the gender combinations of own child and competitor but we do
not look at the gender of the parent, a possible decisive parent endowment. Mothers and fathers
might invest differently depending on the gender of their own child. The same gender might
create the feeling of an in-group or greater connection. It might lead to parents behaving more
competitively. We are planning to extend our analysis by including the gender of the parents as
a possible factor that affects the investment decisions.
Another extension of our analysis we have in mind is to test our investment results employing
a two-limit Tobit model because the dependent variable is doubly censored: the lowest possible
investment is zero and the highest possible investment is the amount of the endowment. How-
ever, there is no accumulation of observations at the limits of the range of the outcome variable,
so another check with the Tobit model is unlikely to bring about contradictory evidence.
Some of our underlying assumptions are critical for the interpretation of our results such as the
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absence of differential effects of parental cognitive ability, severe risk aversion, ambiguity aver-
sion, and emotions. We are planning to extend our analysis by examining how a child’s age, the
parent’s gender, and the censored variable investment affect our derived results.
7 Conclusion
Our lab-in-the-field experiment reveals that parents react to different market returns to invest-
ment. By holding other input factors of the investment function constant like income, family
size, human capital returns to investment, effort costs, and time of investment, we find that
parents invest almost 10 percent less of the initial endowment in their children when exposed
to market returns that are based on competition. Competing against a competitor with known
gender reduces the investment. The effect is largest for the competition against boys: Parents
invest about 27 percent less compared to a non-competitive setting. Parents’ belief about the
probability of their own child winning against a competitor has a positive association with in-
vesting in their child. Yet, the effect magnitude does not outweigh the decrease in investment
due to competition. In general playing with a daughter is associated with lower investment. In
the competitive setting, parents discount their daughters’ ability additionally. Higher ability of
children increases the investment decisions of parents in general. We only have week evidence
that social preferences matter in the competitive setting when conducting joint significant tests
of all interactions with a dummy indicating the competitive setting.
Further, we investigate the belief formation of parents. We find that the observable character-
istics of own children like gender matter more than their real ability when parents form beliefs
about the probability of their own child solving any one task of the game. However, when
forming beliefs about how likely a parent’s own child is to win against a competitor, believed
child ability matters. Parents believe that daughters have lower absolute and relative ability than
sons. When we make the gender of the competitor salient, parents believe it is less likely for
their own child to win.
Our results provide additional evidence for distinct strains of literature. We provide evidence
about the influence of competition on the behavior of participants: compared to a non-competitive
setting participants invest less in a competitive setting. We also show how the gender dynam-
ics of competitors matter for a third party that is not involved in the competition itself. When
gender is salient, the investments are reduced. Additionally, we contribute to the examination
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of inputs factors of parental investment decisions. We use a rather novel research design, a
lab-in-the-field experiment, to cleanly identify the influence of variation of market returns to
investment and its interaction with child endowments.
Our results show that parents are sensitive to the market returns to investment when investing in
the human capital of their children. Potential policy implications of these findings are that if par-
ents are fully informed about the market returns of their investment in children, they are likely
to act upon it. Creating favorable market settings increases parental investment. A competitive
setting of the market returns does not seem to be such a favorable option because parents reduce
their investments in children. The reduction is particularly high when the competitor is a boy
irrespective of the gender of the own child.
Future research could investigate further if other features or different degrees of competitiveness
of labor market returns to investment apart from competition matter for parental investment. It
would also be interesting to assess in a real-world setting how well parents are actually informed
about labor market returns and how much they use this knowledge when investing in the human
capital development of their children.
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Figure A.1: Conceptual Framework Depicting Causes of Malnutrition and Links between
Women’s Empowerment and Nutrition
Source: van den Bold et al. (2013) based on adaptation from Smith et al. (2003) and UNICEF
(1990)
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B | Essay 1
1 Results (2004-2010) by J+P and Replicated Results (2004-
2010): Same Methodology and Data from the Same Time
Period
1.1 Summary Statistics
Table B.1: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Original
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.75 26.96 Child’s age (months) 30.20 28.27
[5.23] [6.86] [16.90] [17.06]
Mother’s total children born 2.74 3.88 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.82] [2.54] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.47 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.62 3.74
[0.96] [1.47] [1.80] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.51 -1.35
[0.47] [0.46] [1.81] [1.94]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.40 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.49] [0.48]
Mother is literate 0.58 0.50 Child’s WFA z-score -1.53 -0.88
[0.49] [0.50] [1.33] [1.42]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.28 10.15
[0.06] [0.07] [1.57] [1.68]
Mother took iron supplements 0.69 0.62 Child is deceased 0.05 0.07
[0.46] [0.48] [0.22] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.87 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.06 0.11
[0.94] [1.20] [0.23] [0.32]
Total prenatal visits 4.04 3.85 Child’s total vaccinations 6.61 6.24
[3.48] [3.07] [2.80] [3.12]
Delivery at health facility 0.45 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 36.16 38.69
[0.50] [0.50] [20.32] [20.63]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.09 0.30 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.29] [0.46] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.33 0.38 Open defecation 0.46 0.32
[0.28] [0.30] [0.50] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.10 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.04] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.85 1.60 Main sample of children 42,069 126,039
[1.09] [1.06]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.78 7.36
[0.10] [0.65]
Source: J+P
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Unweighted
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.75 26.96 Child’s age (months) 30.20 28.27
[5.23] [6.86] [16.90] [17.06]
Mother’s total children born 2.74 3.88 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.82] [2.54] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.47 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.62 3.74
[0.96] [1.47] [1.80] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.51 -1.35
[0.47] [0.46] [1.81] [1.94]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.40 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.49] [0.48]
Mother is literate 0.58 0.49 Child’s WFA z-score -1.53 -0.88
[0.49] [0.50] [1.33] [1.42]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.28 10.15
[0.06] [0.07] [1.57] [1.68]
Mother took iron supplements 0.69 0.62 Child is deceased 0.05 0.07
[0.46] [0.49] [0.22] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.87 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.06 0.11
[0.94] [1.20] [0.23] [0.32]
Total prenatal visits 4.04 3.85 Child’s total vaccinations 6.61 6.24
[3.48] [3.07] [2.80] [3.12]
Delivery at health facility 0.45 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 36.16 38.69
[0.50] [0.50] [20.32] [20.63]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.09 0.30 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.29] [0.46] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.33 0.38 Open defecation 0.46 0.32
[0.28] [0.30] [0.50] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.10 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.04] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.85 1.60 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[1.09] [1.06]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.78 7.36
[0.10] [0.65]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.3 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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1.2 India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Re-
lated Outcomes
Table B.3: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Original
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.082 0.092
[0.011] [0.018]
India × 2nd child -0.144 -0.161 -0.110 -0.243 0.051 -0.146 -0.094 0.003
[0.025] [0.027] [0.063] [0.048] [0.007] [0.020] [0.030] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.377 -0.227 -0.193 -0.436 0.064 -0.198 -0.159 0.002
[0.024] [0.032] [0.092] [0.085] [0.009] [0.024] [0.036] [0.004]
2nd child 0.023 -0.011 -0.097 -0.167 0.009 0.009 -0.011 -0.014
[0.015] [0.017] [0.053] [0.027] [0.004] [0.012] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.066 -0.118 -0.169 -0.334 0.036 -0.063 -0.037 -0.011
[0.013] [0.019] [0.074] [0.044] [0.005] [0.014] [0.025] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 0.375 -0.877 10.150 0.071
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,108 168,108 167,737 66,566 83,228 167,737 167,737 88,838 199,514
Source: J+P
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Table B.4: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Unweighted
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.083 0.092
[0.011] [0.018]
India × 2nd child -0.144 -0.161 -0.110 -0.243 0.051 -0.147 -0.094 0.003
[0.025] [0.027] [0.063] [0.048] [0.007] [0.020] [0.030] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.377 -0.228 -0.194 -0.436 0.064 -0.199 -0.158 0.002
[0.024] [0.032] [0.092] [0.085] [0.009] [0.024] [0.036] [0.004]
2nd child 0.024 -0.011 -0.096 -0.167 0.009 0.010 -0.010 -0.014
[0.015] [0.017] [0.053] [0.027] [0.004] [0.012] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.065 -0.117 -0.168 -0.334 0.036 -0.063 -0.038 -0.011
[0.013] [0.019] [0.074] [0.044] [0.005] [0.014] [0.025] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 0.375 -0.877 10.149 0.072
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,135 168,135 167,765 66,574 83,243 167,765 167,765 88,893 199,514
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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1.3 Child Health Inputs
Table B.5: Child Health Inputs (2004-2010): Original
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.525 -0.031 -0.019 -0.040 -0.009 -0.008 -0.203 -0.011
[0.052] [0.008] [0.018] [0.006] [0.013] [0.005] [0.039] [0.003]
India × 3rd+ child -1.012 -0.071 -0.036 -0.092 0.014 -0.010 -0.462 -0.033
[0.060] [0.009] [0.021] [0.008] [0.014] [0.006] [0.051] [0.004]
2nd child -0.181 -0.014 -0.112 -0.088 0.005 -0.004 -0.098 -0.044
[0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004] [0.010] [0.004] [0.025] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.431 -0.031 -0.206 -0.133 -0.022 -0.013 -0.207 -0.071
[0.033] [0.005] [0.014] [0.004] [0.011] [0.005] [0.030] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.846 0.622 1.415 0.472 0.302 0.113 6.245 0.380
India mean of outcome 4.041 0.689 1.872 0.450 0.090 0.055 6.607 0.334
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,343 117,686 117,199 167,377 35,888 91,936 122,898 167,724
Source: J+P
Table B.6: Child Health Inputs (2004-2010): Unweighted
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.525 -0.031 -0.019 -0.040 -0.008 -0.008 -0.204 -0.011
[0.052] [0.008] [0.018] [0.006] [0.013] [0.005] [0.039] [0.003]
India × 3rd+ child -1.011 -0.072 -0.036 -0.092 0.015 -0.010 -0.462 -0.033
[0.060] [0.009] [0.021] [0.008] [0.014] [0.006] [0.051] [0.004]
2nd child -0.182 -0.014 -0.111 -0.088 0.004 -0.004 -0.097 -0.044
[0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004] [0.010] [0.004] [0.025] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.432 -0.031 -0.207 -0.133 -0.023 -0.014 -0.207 -0.071
[0.033] [0.005] [0.014] [0.004] [0.011] [0.005] [0.030] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.847 0.622 1.415 0.472 0.302 0.113 6.245 0.380
India mean of outcome 4.041 0.689 1.872 0.450 0.090 0.055 6.607 0.334
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,364 117,707 117,219 167,405 35,902 91,964 122,922 167,752
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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1.4 Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence
Table B.7: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2004-2010): Original
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast
Below-median
child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.078 0.008 0.078 0.039 -0.027 0.034
[0.039] [0.029] [0.030] [0.023] [0.047] [0.035]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child 0.108 0.069 0.081 0.039 0.184 0.156
[0.045] [0.033] [0.036] [0.027] [0.055] [0.041]
2nd child -0.185 -0.154 -0.207 -0.173 -0.159 -0.153
[0.017] [0.013] [0.020] [0.015] [0.017] [0.013]
3rd+ child -0.422 -0.350 -0.437 -0.363 -0.412 -0.354
[0.020] [0.015] [0.024] [0.019] [0.021] [0.016]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.388 -1.198 -1.561 -1.491 -1.732 -1.602
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.710 -1.648 -1.721 -1.622 -1.691 -1.628
Age & other controls
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
Observations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 95,125 95,125 95,125 95,125 82,084 82,084
Source: J+P
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Table B.8: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2004-2010): Unweighted
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast
Below-median
child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.078 0.008 0.077 0.038 -0.027 0.034
[0.039] [0.029] [0.030] [0.023] [0.047] [0.035]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child 0.108 0.069 0.084 0.047 0.184 0.156
[0.045] [0.033] [0.036] [0.027] [0.055] [0.041]
2nd child -0.185 -0.154 -0.205 -0.172 -0.159 -0.153
[0.017] [0.013] [0.020] [0.015] [0.017] [0.013]
3rd+ child -0.422 -0.350 -0.438 -0.364 -0.412 -0.354
[0.020] [0.015] [0.024] [0.018] [0.021] [0.016]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.388 -1.198 -1.568 -1.491 -1.732 -1.602
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.710 -1.648 -1.712 -1.618 -1.691 -1.628
Age & other controls
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
Observations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 95,125 95,125 95,125 95,125 82,084 82,084
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. In all columns the sample uses NFHS 1-3. NFHS-1 only has data for
children aged four years and younger, and NFHS-2 only has data for children aged 3 years and younger. All columns include child age
dummies, maternal age, mother’s literacy, and child age dummies, maternal age, and mother’s literacy interacted with Low son pref proxy. All
columns include survey and PSU fixed effects, and survey and PSU fixed effects interacted with Low son pref proxy. In columns 1-4, the main
effect Low son pref proxy is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Kerala and Northeast include Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Child sex ratio is defined as the number of boys aged 0-6 years over the number of girls
aged 0-6 years in the respondent’s state-by-rural cell. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to Muslims and Hindus.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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1.5 Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height
Table B.9: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010): Original
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India 0.148 -0.011
[0.026] [0.014]
India × Girl -0.111 -0.143 -0.147 -0.098 -0.116
[0.036] [0.020] [0.019] [0.032] [0.014]
India × 2nd child -0.107 -0.152 -0.228 -0.122
[0.036] [0.040] [0.069] [0.030]
India × 3rd+ child -0.352 -0.221 -0.414 -0.175
[0.033] [0.047] [0.097] [0.035]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.076 -0.045 -0.024 -0.047
[0.053] [0.057] [0.101] [0.043]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.051 -0.048 -0.030 -0.064
[0.047] [0.067] [0.092] [0.049]
Africa mean of outcome -1.575 -1.575 -1.575 -1.575 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 168,108 165,596 83,228 165,596 168,108 167,737 83,228 167,737
Source: J+P
Table B.10: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010): Unweighted
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India 0.148 -0.011
[0.026] [0.014]
India × Girl -0.112 -0.143 -0.147 -0.098 -0.116
[0.036] [0.020] [0.019] [0.032] [0.014]
India × 2nd child -0.107 -0.153 -0.228 -0.122
[0.036] [0.040] [0.069] [0.030]
India × 3rd+ child -0.352 -0.222 -0.414 -0.176
[0.033] [0.047] [0.097] [0.035]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.077 -0.045 -0.024 -0.047
[0.053] [0.057] [0.101] [0.042]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.051 -0.048 -0.030 -0.063
[0.047] [0.067] [0.092] [0.049]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 168,135 165,623 83,243 165,623 168,135 167,765 83,243 167,765
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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1.6 Impact on Average Height - Accounting exercise
Table B.11: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Original
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.162
[0.017]
Gradient proxy 0.400 0.688
[0.070] [0.132]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.331 -0.234
Africa -0.066 -0.037
Kerala & Northeast -0.229 -0.155
Rest of India -0.358 -0.257
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,108 126,039 126,039
Source: J+P
Table B.12: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Unweighted
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.162
[0.017]
Gradient proxy 0.412 0.704
[0.069] [0.131]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.331 -0.234
Africa -0.066 -0.037
Kerala & Northeast -0.229 -0.155
Rest of India -0.358 -0.257
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,135 126,066 126,066
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.13: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Original
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.265 -0.197
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.106 -0.136
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 65 % 84 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.129 -0.102
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.052 -0.070
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 32% 43%
Source: J+P
Table B.14: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Unweighted
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.265 -0.197
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.109 -0.139
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 67 % 86 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.129 -0.102
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.053 -0.072
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 33% 44%
Source: Adapted from J+Pusing data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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2 Replicated Results (2004-2010) and Replicated Results (2011-
2017): Same Methodology and Data from the More Recent
Time Period
2.1 Summary Statistics
Table B.15: Summary Statistics (2004-2010)
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.75 26.96 Child’s age (months) 30.20 28.27
[5.23] [6.86] [16.90] [17.06]
Mother’s total children born 2.74 3.88 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.82] [2.54] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.47 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.62 3.74
[0.96] [1.47] [1.80] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.51 -1.35
[0.47] [0.46] [1.81] [1.94]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.40 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.49] [0.48]
Mother is literate 0.58 0.49 Child’s WFA z-score -1.53 -0.88
[0.49] [0.50] [1.33] [1.42]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.28 10.15
[0.06] [0.07] [1.57] [1.68]
Mother took iron supplements 0.69 0.62 Child is deceased 0.05 0.07
[0.46] [0.49] [0.22] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.87 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.06 0.11
[0.94] [1.20] [0.23] [0.32]
Total prenatal visits 4.04 3.85 Child’s total vaccinations 6.61 6.24
[3.48] [3.07] [2.80] [3.12]
Delivery at health facility 0.45 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 36.16 38.69
[0.50] [0.50] [20.32] [20.63]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.09 0.30 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.29] [0.46] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.33 0.38 Open defecation 0.46 0.32
[0.28] [0.30] [0.50] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.10 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.04] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.85 1.60 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[1.09] [1.06]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.78 7.36
[0.10] [0.65]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.3 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.16: Summary Statistics (2011-2017)
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 25.12 27.23 Child’s age (months) 30.14 28.90
[4.96] [6.71] [16.92] [17.02]
Mother’s total children born 2.38 3.81 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.49] [2.48] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.42 4.73 Child’s birth order 2.26 3.70
[0.99] [1.41] [1.47] [2.42]
Mother wants more children 0.41 0.71 Child’s HFA z-score -1.26 -1.11
[0.47] [0.44] [1.82] [1.73]
Mother completed her fertility 0.61 0.28 Child is stunted 0.35 0.29
[0.49] [0.45] [0.48] [0.45]
Mother is literate 0.67 0.48 Child’s WFA z-score -1.43 -0.86
[0.47] [0.50] [1.30] [1.31]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.60 10.33
[0.06] [0.06] [1.51] [1.63]
Mother took iron supplements 0.77 0.76 Child is deceased 0.04 0.05
[0.42] [0.43] [0.20] [0.22]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.91 1.42 Child taking iron pills 0.23 0.07
[0.78] [1.09] [0.42] [0.25]
Total prenatal visits 4.19 3.77 Child’s total vaccinations 7.30 4.92
[3.86] [2.92] [2.70] [3.55]
Delivery at health facility 0.76 0.58 Birth spacing (months) 37.26 38.83
[0.43] [0.49] [21.45] [20.79]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.36 0.49 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.48] [0.50] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.46 0.40 Open defecation 0.44 0.25
[0.25] [0.29] [0.50] [0.43]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.09 Number of PSUs 28,215 12,684
[0.04] [0.00]
Number of adult females in household 1.91 1.94 Main sample of children 230,220 168,490
[1.03] [1.66]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 8.51 7.75
[0.08] [0.68]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.4 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Figure B.1: Child Height versus National GDP (2004-2010) vs (2011-2017): Unweighted
Replication (2004-2010)
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Notes: The light and dark circles represent sub-Saharan African countries and Indian states, respectively. The averages are calculated over all
children less than 60 months old. The lines represent the best linear fit for each sample.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from Penn World Table 9.0, Penn World Table 9.1, and the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States
(Robert C. Feenstra, 2016, 2019; Reserve Bank of India, 2019)
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2.2 India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Re-
lated Outcomes
Table B.17: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010)
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.083 0.092
[0.011] [0.018]
India × 2nd child -0.144 -0.161 -0.110 -0.243 0.051 -0.147 -0.094 0.003
[0.025] [0.027] [0.063] [0.048] [0.007] [0.020] [0.030] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.377 -0.228 -0.194 -0.436 0.064 -0.199 -0.158 0.002
[0.024] [0.032] [0.092] [0.085] [0.009] [0.024] [0.036] [0.004]
2nd child 0.024 -0.011 -0.096 -0.167 0.009 0.010 -0.010 -0.014
[0.015] [0.017] [0.053] [0.027] [0.004] [0.012] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.065 -0.117 -0.168 -0.334 0.036 -0.063 -0.038 -0.011
[0.013] [0.019] [0.074] [0.044] [0.005] [0.014] [0.025] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 0.375 -0.877 10.149 0.072
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,135 168,135 167,765 66,574 83,243 167,765 167,765 88,893 199,514
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from Jayachandran & Pande (2017) using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.18: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2011-2017)
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.107 -0.019
[0.006] [0.010]
India × 2nd child -0.105 -0.073 -0.059 -0.168 0.024 -0.087 -0.039 -0.002
[0.014] [0.015] [0.055] [0.028] [0.004] [0.011] [0.018] [0.002]
India × 3rd+ child -0.271 -0.112 -0.082 -0.326 0.028 -0.129 -0.013 -0.000
[0.013] [0.018] [0.076] [0.049] [0.005] [0.014] [0.020] [0.002]
2nd child 0.007 -0.049 -0.092 -0.178 0.011 -0.014 -0.026 -0.009
[0.012] [0.013] [0.053] [0.021] [0.004] [0.010] [0.016] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.104 -0.155 -0.129 -0.314 0.043 -0.082 -0.114 -0.009
[0.010] [0.014] [0.072] [0.033] [0.004] [0.011] [0.018] [0.002]
Africa mean of outcome -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 0.289 -0.858 10.332 0.049
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 398,710 398,710 397,702 176,665 189,520 397,702 397,702 300,933 410,460
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Figure B.2: Child Height in India and Africa, by Child’s Birth Order (2004-2010) vs (2011-
2017): Unweighted
Replication (2004-2010)
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Notes: The figure depicts the mean child height-for-age z-scores for sub-Saharan Africa and India, by the birth order of the child. The mean is
calculated over all children less than 60 months old.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (ICF, 2004) and IPUMS DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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2.3 Child Health Inputs
Table B.19: Child Health Inputs (2004-2010)
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.525 -0.031 -0.019 -0.040 -0.008 -0.008 -0.204 -0.011
[0.052] [0.008] [0.018] [0.006] [0.013] [0.005] [0.039] [0.003]
India × 3rd+ child -1.011 -0.072 -0.036 -0.092 0.015 -0.010 -0.462 -0.033
[0.060] [0.009] [0.021] [0.008] [0.014] [0.006] [0.051] [0.004]
2nd child -0.182 -0.014 -0.111 -0.088 0.004 -0.004 -0.097 -0.044
[0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004] [0.010] [0.004] [0.025] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.432 -0.031 -0.207 -0.133 -0.023 -0.014 -0.207 -0.071
[0.033] [0.005] [0.014] [0.004] [0.011] [0.005] [0.030] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.847 0.622 1.415 0.472 0.302 0.113 6.245 0.380
India mean of outcome 4.041 0.689 1.872 0.450 0.090 0.055 6.607 0.334
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,364 117,707 117,219 167,405 35,902 91,964 122,922 167,752
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.20: Child Health Inputs (2011-2017)
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.208 -0.016 0.085 0.008 0.006 -0.002 0.035 -0.003
[0.030] [0.004] [0.011] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.045] [0.002]
India × 3rd+ child -0.418 -0.031 0.115 -0.007 0.016 -0.011 -0.030 -0.009
[0.035] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.054] [0.002]
2nd child -0.231 -0.012 -0.178 -0.082 -0.017 -0.002 -0.173 -0.041
[0.023] [0.004] [0.010] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.043] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.466 -0.025 -0.253 -0.136 -0.032 -0.001 -0.310 -0.066
[0.026] [0.004] [0.011] [0.003] [0.005] [0.002] [0.051] [0.002]
Africa mean of outcome 3.767 0.760 1.423 0.582 0.490 0.068 4.920 0.405
India mean of outcome 4.193 0.771 1.908 0.760 0.358 0.230 7.298 0.463
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 287,302 282,486 281,157 397,406 272,650 374,185 215,976 397,636
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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2.4 Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence
Table B.21: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2004-2010)
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast
Below-median
child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.078 0.008 0.077 0.038 -0.027 0.034
[0.039] [0.029] [0.030] [0.023] [0.047] [0.035]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child 0.108 0.069 0.084 0.047 0.184 0.156
[0.045] [0.033] [0.036] [0.027] [0.055] [0.041]
2nd child -0.185 -0.154 -0.205 -0.172 -0.159 -0.153
[0.017] [0.013] [0.020] [0.015] [0.017] [0.013]
3rd+ child -0.422 -0.350 -0.438 -0.364 -0.412 -0.354
[0.020] [0.015] [0.024] [0.018] [0.021] [0.016]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.388 -1.198 -1.568 -1.491 -1.732 -1.602
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.710 -1.648 -1.712 -1.618 -1.691 -1.628
Age & other controls
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
Observations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 95,125 95,125 95,125 95,125 82,084 82,084
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. In all columns the sample uses NFHS 1-3. NFHS-1 only has data for
children aged four years and younger, and NFHS-2 only has data for children aged 3 years and younger. All columns include child age
dummies, maternal age, mother’s literacy, and child age dummies, maternal age, and mother’s literacy interacted with Low son pref proxy. All
columns include survey and PSU fixed effects, and survey and PSU fixed effects interacted with Low son pref proxy. In columns 1-4, the main
effect Low son pref proxy is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Kerala and Northeast include Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Child sex ratio is defined as the number of boys aged 0-6 years over the number of girls
aged 0-6 years in the respondent’s state-by-rural cell. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to Muslims and Hindus.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.22: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2004-2017)
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast
Below-median
child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.044 0.033 0.032 0.035 0.034 0.043
[0.021] [0.015] [0.016] [0.011] [0.024] [0.017]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child 0.076 0.057 0.083 0.050 0.127 0.104
[0.026] [0.019] [0.020] [0.014] [0.029] [0.021]
2nd child -0.146 -0.123 -0.153 -0.135 -0.142 -0.124
[0.008] [0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
3rd+ child -0.331 -0.267 -0.356 -0.283 -0.335 -0.274
[0.011] [0.008] [0.013] [0.010] [0.012] [0.009]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.153 -1.056 -1.334 -1.388 -1.426 -1.451
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.416 -1.548 -1.408 -1.532 -1.405 -1.539
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 322974 322974 320963 320963 280068 280068
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. In all columns the sample uses NFHS 1-3 in Table 8 and NFHS 1-4 in
Table 9. NFHS-1 only has data for children aged four years and younger, and NFHS-2 only has data for children aged 3 years and younger.
All columns include child age dummies, maternal age, mother’s literacy, and child age dummies, maternal age, and mother’s literacy
interacted with Low son pref proxy. All columns include survey and PSU fixed effects, and survey and PSU fixed effects interacted with Low
son pref proxy. In columns 1-4, the main effect Low son pref proxy is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Kerala and Northeast include Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Child sex ratio is defined as the number of boys
aged 0-6 years over the number of girls aged 0-6 years in the respondent’s state-by-rural cell. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to
Muslims and Hindus.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.23: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2015/6)
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast
Below-median
child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.030 0.047 0.020 0.037 0.044 0.039
[0.025] [0.018] [0.018] [0.013] [0.027] [0.019]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child 0.066 0.055 0.088 0.056 0.080 0.065
[0.031] [0.022] [0.024] [0.017] [0.034] [0.024]
2nd child -0.127 -0.110 -0.130 -0.118 -0.128 -0.109
[0.010] [0.007] [0.012] [0.009] [0.011] [0.008]
3rd+ child -0.280 -0.222 -0.309 -0.239 -0.284 -0.225
[0.013] [0.009] [0.015] [0.011] [0.014] [0.010]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.033 -0.984 -1.239 -1.346 -1.307 -1.393
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.300 -1.508 -1.279 -1.495 -1.288 -1.503
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 227849 227849 225838 225838 197984 197984
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. In all columns the sample uses NFHS 4. All columns include child age
dummies, maternal age, mother’s literacy, and child age dummies, maternal age, and mother’s literacy interacted with Low son pref proxy. All
columns include survey and PSU fixed effects, and survey and PSU fixed effects interacted with Low son pref proxy. In columns 1-4, the main
effect Low son pref proxy is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Kerala and Northeast include Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Child sex ratio is defined as the number of boys aged 0-6 years over the number of girls
aged 0-6 years in the respondent’s state-by-rural cell. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to Muslims and Hindus.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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2.5 Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height
Table B.24: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010)
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India 0.148 -0.011
[0.026] [0.014]
India × Girl -0.112 -0.143 -0.147 -0.098 -0.116
[0.036] [0.020] [0.019] [0.032] [0.014]
India × 2nd child -0.107 -0.153 -0.228 -0.122
[0.036] [0.040] [0.069] [0.030]
India × 3rd+ child -0.352 -0.222 -0.414 -0.176
[0.033] [0.047] [0.097] [0.035]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.077 -0.045 -0.024 -0.047
[0.053] [0.057] [0.101] [0.042]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.051 -0.048 -0.030 -0.063
[0.047] [0.067] [0.092] [0.049]
2nd child 0.023 -0.005 -0.202 0.006
[0.022] [0.026] [0.041] [0.019]
3rd+ child -0.057 -0.113 -0.355 -0.069
[0.019] [0.029] [0.052] [0.021]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 168,135 165,623 83,243 165,623 168,135 167,765 83,243 167,765
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.25: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2011-2017)
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India 0.028 -0.068
[0.014] [0.008]
India × Girl -0.091 -0.076 -0.072 -0.055 -0.044
[0.020] [0.011] [0.010] [0.018] [0.008]
India × 2nd child -0.100 -0.043 -0.181 -0.062
[0.021] [0.023] [0.040] [0.017]
India × 3rd+ child -0.271 -0.066 -0.349 -0.090
[0.019] [0.027] [0.056] [0.020]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.011 -0.057 0.029 -0.048
[0.030] [0.033] [0.057] [0.025]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.002 -0.094 0.054 -0.074
[0.026] [0.038] [0.053] [0.028]
2nd child 0.023 -0.049 -0.156 -0.010
[0.017] [0.019] [0.031] [0.015]
3rd+ child -0.067 -0.144 -0.286 -0.074
[0.014] [0.021] [0.039] [0.016]
Africa mean of outcome -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 -0.858 -1.110 -1.110 -1.110 -0.858
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 398,710 390,071 189,520 390,071 398,710 397,702 189,520 397,702
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
209
2.6 Impact on Average Height - Accounting exercise
Table B.26: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2004-2010)
Accounting Exercise 1 Accounting Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.162
[0.017]
Gradient proxy 0.412 0.704
[0.069] [0.131]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.331 -0.234
Africa -0.066 -0.037
Kerala & Northeast -0.229 -0.155
Rest of India -0.358 -0.257
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,135 126,066 126,066
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.27: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2011-2017)
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.186
[0.015]
Gradient proxy 0.431 0.375
[0.123] [0.187]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.251 -0.192
Africa -0.107 -0.070
Kerala & Northeast -0.182 -0.142
Rest of India -0.264 -0.203
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 398,710 168,490 168,490
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.28: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010)
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.265 -0.197
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.109 -0.139
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 67 % 86 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.129 -0.102
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.053 -0.072
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 33% 44%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.29: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2010-2017)
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.144 -0.122
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.062 -0.046
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 33 % 25 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.082 -0.061
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.035 -0.023
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 19% 12%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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3 Replicated Results (2004-2010): Adjusted Methodology and
Data from the Same Time Period
3.1 Summary Statistics
Table B.30: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Unweighted
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.75 26.96 Child’s age (months) 30.20 28.27
[5.23] [6.86] [16.90] [17.06]
Mother’s total children born 2.74 3.88 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.82] [2.54] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.47 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.62 3.74
[0.96] [1.47] [1.80] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.51 -1.35
[0.47] [0.46] [1.81] [1.94]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.40 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.49] [0.48]
Mother is literate 0.58 0.49 Child’s WFA z-score -1.53 -0.88
[0.49] [0.50] [1.33] [1.42]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.28 10.15
[0.06] [0.07] [1.57] [1.68]
Mother took iron supplements 0.69 0.62 Child is deceased 0.05 0.07
[0.46] [0.49] [0.22] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.87 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.06 0.11
[0.94] [1.20] [0.23] [0.32]
Total prenatal visits 4.04 3.85 Child’s total vaccinations 6.61 6.24
[3.48] [3.07] [2.80] [3.12]
Delivery at health facility 0.45 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 36.16 38.69
[0.50] [0.50] [20.32] [20.63]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.09 0.30 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.29] [0.46] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.33 0.38 Open defecation 0.46 0.32
[0.28] [0.30] [0.50] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.10 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.04] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.85 1.60 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[1.09] [1.06]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.78 7.36
[0.10] [0.65]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.3 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
212
Table B.31: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Weighted India
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.25 26.96 Child’s age (months) 30.18 28.27
[5.19] [6.86] [17.01] [17.06]
Mother’s total children born 2.87 3.88 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.91] [2.54] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.45 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.74 3.74
[0.89] [1.47] [1.88] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.67 -1.35
[0.47] [0.46] [1.80] [1.94]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.45 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.50] [0.48]
Mother is literate 0.49 0.49 Child’s WFA z-score -1.70 -0.88
[0.50] [0.50] [1.30] [1.42]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.10 10.15
[0.06] [0.07] [1.56] [1.68]
Mother took iron supplements 0.66 0.62 Child is deceased 0.06 0.07
[0.47] [0.49] [0.23] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.86 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.05 0.11
[0.95] [1.20] [0.21] [0.32]
Total prenatal visits 3.49 3.85 Child’s total vaccinations 6.42 6.24
[3.32] [3.07] [2.75] [3.12]
Delivery at health facility 0.39 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 35.43 38.69
[0.49] [0.50] [19.42] [20.63]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.08 0.30 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.28] [0.46] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.30 0.38 Open defecation 0.63 0.32
[0.27] [0.30] [0.48] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.10 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.03] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.89 1.60 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[1.11] [1.06]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.77 7.36
[0.10] [0.65]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.3 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.32: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Weighted
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.25 26.95 Child’s age (months) 30.18 28.26
[5.19] [6.85] [17.01] [17.05]
Mother’s total children born 2.87 3.90 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.91] [2.55] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.45 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.74 3.75
[0.89] [1.46] [1.88] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.67 -1.36
[0.47] [0.46] [1.80] [1.96]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.45 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.50] [0.49]
Mother is literate 0.49 0.48 Child’s WFA z-score -1.70 -0.89
[0.50] [0.50] [1.30] [1.44]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.10 10.11
[0.06] [0.07] [1.56] [1.70]
Mother took iron supplements 0.66 0.62 Child is deceased 0.06 0.07
[0.47] [0.49] [0.23] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.86 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.05 0.13
[0.95] [1.21] [0.21] [0.34]
Total prenatal visits 3.49 3.87 Child’s total vaccinations 6.42 6.14
[3.32] [3.28] [2.75] [3.17]
Delivery at health facility 0.39 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 35.43 38.43
[0.49] [0.50] [19.42] [20.43]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.08 0.32 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.28] [0.47] [0.29] [0.37]
Average pooled inputs 0.30 0.38 Open defecation 0.63 0.32
[0.27] [0.31] [0.48] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.09 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.03] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.89 1.59 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[1.11] [1.05]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.77 7.35
[0.10] [0.67]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.3 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Figure B.3: Child Height versus National GDP (2004-2010): Unweighted vs Weighted
Replication (2004-2010): Unweighted
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Replication (2004-2010): Weighted India
COD
COG
CMR
ETH
GHA
GIN
KEN
LBR
LSO
LSO
MDGNER
NAM
RWA
SLE
SEN
STP
SWZ
TCD
TZA
TZA
UGA
ZMB
ZWE
JM
BH
SK
AR
NA
MN
MZ
TR
MG
ASWB
HP
JH
OR
CHMP
GJ
MH
AP KA
PJ
GO
KE
TN
UC HR
DL
RJ
UP
MLI
MWI
NGA
-2
-1
.5
-1
-.5
M
ea
n 
he
ig
ht
-f
or
-a
ge
 z
-s
co
re
6 7 8 9
ln(GDP per capita) in birth year
African countries Africa fitted values
Indian states India fitted values
Notes: The light and dark circles represent sub-Saharan African countries and Indian states, respectively. The averages are calculated over all
children less than 60 months old. The lines represent the best linear fit for each sample.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from Penn World Table 9.0, Penn World Table 9.1, and the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States
(Robert C. Feenstra, 2016, 2019; Reserve Bank of India, 2019)
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Figure B.4: Child Height versus National GDP (2004-2010): Weighted
Replication (2004-2010): Weighted
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Notes: The light and dark circles represent sub-Saharan African countries and Indian states, respectively. The averages are calculated over all
children less than 60 months old. The lines represent the best linear fit for each sample.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from Penn World Table 9.0, Penn World Table 9.1, and the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States
(Robert C. Feenstra, 2016, 2019; Reserve Bank of India, 2019)
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3.2 India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Re-
lated Outcomes
Table B.33: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Unweighted
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.083 0.092
[0.011] [0.018]
India × 2nd child -0.144 -0.161 -0.110 -0.243 0.051 -0.147 -0.094 0.003
[0.025] [0.027] [0.063] [0.048] [0.007] [0.020] [0.030] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.377 -0.228 -0.194 -0.436 0.064 -0.199 -0.158 0.002
[0.024] [0.032] [0.092] [0.085] [0.009] [0.024] [0.036] [0.004]
2nd child 0.024 -0.011 -0.096 -0.167 0.009 0.010 -0.010 -0.014
[0.015] [0.017] [0.053] [0.027] [0.004] [0.012] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.065 -0.117 -0.168 -0.334 0.036 -0.063 -0.038 -0.011
[0.013] [0.019] [0.074] [0.044] [0.005] [0.014] [0.025] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 0.375 -0.877 10.149 0.072
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,135 168,135 167,765 66,574 83,243 167,765 167,765 88,893 199,514
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.34: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Weighted India
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.083 -0.086
[0.011] [0.021]
India × 2nd child -0.108 -0.138 -0.110 -0.275 0.047 -0.136 -0.094 -0.005
[0.029] [0.032] [0.068] [0.057] [0.009] [0.024] [0.035] [0.005]
India × 3rd+ child -0.360 -0.203 -0.197 -0.471 0.059 -0.190 -0.163 -0.005
[0.029] [0.039] [0.102] [0.102] [0.011] [0.029] [0.042] [0.006]
2nd child 0.024 -0.011 -0.096 -0.167 0.009 0.010 -0.010 -0.014
[0.015] [0.017] [0.053] [0.027] [0.004] [0.012] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.065 -0.117 -0.168 -0.334 0.036 -0.063 -0.038 -0.011
[0.013] [0.019] [0.074] [0.044] [0.005] [0.014] [0.025] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 0.375 -0.877 10.149 0.072
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,135 168,135 167,765 66,574 83,243 167,765 167,765 88,893 199,514
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.35: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Weighted
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.083 -0.073
[0.011] [0.023]
India × 2nd child -0.119 -0.152 -0.064 -0.274 0.047 -0.147 -0.089 -0.002
[0.032] [0.034] [0.081] [0.061] [0.010] [0.025] [0.039] [0.005]
India × 3rd+ child -0.356 -0.199 -0.088 -0.442 0.056 -0.192 -0.174 -0.001
[0.030] [0.041] [0.117] [0.107] [0.012] [0.030] [0.046] [0.006]
2nd child 0.035 0.003 -0.142 -0.168 0.009 0.020 -0.015 -0.016
[0.019] [0.021] [0.069] [0.034] [0.005] [0.015] [0.027] [0.003]
3rd+ child -0.070 -0.121 -0.277 -0.363 0.038 -0.061 -0.026 -0.015
[0.016] [0.024] [0.094] [0.054] [0.006] [0.017] [0.031] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 0.381 -0.889 10.107 0.074
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,135 168,135 167,765 66,574 83,243 167,765 167,765 88,893 199,514
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
219
Figure B.5: Child Height in India and Africa, by Child’s Birth Order (2004-2010): Unweighted
vs Weighted
Replication (2004-2010): Unweighted
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Replication (2004-2010): Weighted India
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Notes: The figure depicts the mean child height-for-age z-scores for sub-Saharan Africa and India, by the birth order of the child. The mean is
calculated over all children less than 60 months old.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (ICF, 2004)
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Figure B.6: Child Height in India and Africa, by Child’s Birth Order (2004-2010): Weighted
Replication (2004-2010): Weighted
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Notes: The figure depicts the mean child height-for-age z-scores for sub-Saharan Africa and India, by the birth order of the child. The mean is
calculated over all children less than 60 months old.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (ICF, 2004)
3.3 Child Health Inputs
Table B.36: Child Health Inputs (2004-2010): Unweighted
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.525 -0.031 -0.019 -0.040 -0.008 -0.008 -0.204 -0.011
[0.052] [0.008] [0.018] [0.006] [0.013] [0.005] [0.039] [0.003]
India × 3rd+ child -1.011 -0.072 -0.036 -0.092 0.015 -0.010 -0.462 -0.033
[0.060] [0.009] [0.021] [0.008] [0.014] [0.006] [0.051] [0.004]
2nd child -0.182 -0.014 -0.111 -0.088 0.004 -0.004 -0.097 -0.044
[0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004] [0.010] [0.004] [0.025] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.432 -0.031 -0.207 -0.133 -0.023 -0.014 -0.207 -0.071
[0.033] [0.005] [0.014] [0.004] [0.011] [0.005] [0.030] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.847 0.622 1.415 0.472 0.302 0.113 6.245 0.380
India mean of outcome 4.041 0.689 1.872 0.450 0.090 0.055 6.607 0.334
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,364 117,707 117,219 167,405 35,902 91,964 122,922 167,752
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.37: Child Health Inputs (2004-2010): Weighted India
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.536 -0.036 -0.012 -0.049 -0.003 -0.008 -0.213 -0.012
[0.060] [0.010] [0.021] [0.007] [0.014] [0.006] [0.047] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.946 -0.075 -0.032 -0.097 0.018 -0.003 -0.487 -0.030
[0.068] [0.012] [0.025] [0.009] [0.015] [0.007] [0.062] [0.005]
2nd child -0.182 -0.014 -0.111 -0.088 0.004 -0.004 -0.097 -0.044
[0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004] [0.010] [0.004] [0.025] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.432 -0.031 -0.207 -0.133 -0.023 -0.014 -0.207 -0.071
[0.033] [0.005] [0.014] [0.004] [0.011] [0.005] [0.030] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.847 0.622 1.415 0.472 0.302 0.113 6.245 0.380
India mean of outcome 3.494 0.661 1.863 0.389 0.083 0.046 6.419 0.297
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,364 117,707 117,219 167,405 35,902 91,964 122,922 167,752
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.38: Child Health Inputs (2004-2010): Weighted
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.518 -0.036 -0.029 -0.057 -0.001 -0.007 -0.208 -0.016
[0.064] [0.010] [0.023] [0.008] [0.016] [0.007] [0.051] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.940 -0.080 -0.048 -0.109 0.021 -0.001 -0.488 -0.035
[0.073] [0.012] [0.027] [0.010] [0.017] [0.008] [0.066] [0.005]
2nd child -0.200 -0.013 -0.095 -0.079 0.001 -0.004 -0.102 -0.041
[0.037] [0.006] [0.016] [0.004] [0.012] [0.005] [0.031] [0.003]
3rd+ child -0.438 -0.026 -0.191 -0.121 -0.026 -0.016 -0.205 -0.067
[0.042] [0.006] [0.017] [0.005] [0.013] [0.007] [0.037] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.871 0.616 1.407 0.466 0.323 0.134 6.142 0.377
India mean of outcome 3.494 0.661 1.863 0.389 0.083 0.046 6.419 0.297
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,364 117,707 117,219 167,405 35,902 91,964 122,922 167,752
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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3.4 Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence
Table B.39: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2004-2010): Un-
weighted
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast Below-median child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.078 0.008 0.077 0.038 -0.027 0.034
[0.039] [0.029] [0.030] [0.023] [0.047] [0.035]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child 0.108 0.069 0.084 0.047 0.184 0.156
[0.045] [0.033] [0.036] [0.027] [0.055] [0.041]
2nd child -0.185 -0.154 -0.205 -0.172 -0.159 -0.153
[0.017] [0.013] [0.020] [0.015] [0.017] [0.013]
3rd+ child -0.422 -0.350 -0.438 -0.364 -0.412 -0.354
[0.020] [0.015] [0.024] [0.018] [0.021] [0.016]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.388 -1.198 -1.568 -1.491 -1.732 -1.602
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.710 -1.648 -1.712 -1.618 -1.691 -1.628
Age & other controls
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
Observations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 95,125 95,125 95,125 95,125 82,084 82,084
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. In all columns the sample uses NFHS 1-3. NFHS-1 only has data for
children aged four years and younger, and NFHS-2 only has data for children aged 3 years and younger. All columns include child age
dummies, maternal age, mother’s literacy, and child age dummies, maternal age, and mother’s literacy interacted with Low son pref proxy. All
columns include survey and PSU fixed effects, and survey and PSU fixed effects interacted with Low son pref proxy. In columns 1-4, the main
effect Low son pref proxy is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Kerala and Northeast include Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Child sex ratio is defined as the number of boys aged 0-6 years over the number of girls
aged 0-6 years in the respondent’s state-by-rural cell. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to Muslims and Hindus.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.40: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2004-2010): Weighted
India
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast
Below-median
child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.058 -0.003 0.082 0.049 -0.052 0.033
[0.053] [0.039] [0.037] [0.029] [0.055] [0.043]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child -0.025 -0.002 0.003 -0.015 0.163 0.141
[0.061] [0.046] [0.045] [0.035] [0.065] [0.049]
2nd child -0.164 -0.135 -0.194 -0.157 -0.147 -0.136
[0.019] [0.015] [0.023] [0.018] [0.021] [0.016]
3rd+ child -0.368 -0.305 -0.375 -0.309 -0.390 -0.322
[0.023] [0.018] [0.028] [0.021] [0.025] [0.019]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.462 -1.299 -1.723 -1.700 -1.857 -1.727
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.799 -1.743 -1.810 -1.721 -1.783 -1.734
Age & other controls
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
Observations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 95,125 95,125 95,125 95,125 82,084 82,084
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. In all columns the sample uses NFHS 1-3. NFHS-1 only has data for
children aged four years and younger, and NFHS-2 only has data for children aged 3 years and younger. All columns include child age
dummies, maternal age, mother’s literacy, and child age dummies, maternal age, and mother’s literacy interacted with Low son pref proxy. All
columns include survey and PSU fixed effects, and survey and PSU fixed effects interacted with Low son pref proxy. In columns 1-4, the main
effect Low son pref proxy is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Kerala and Northeast include Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Child sex ratio is defined as the number of boys aged 0-6 years over the number of girls
aged 0-6 years in the respondent’s state-by-rural cell. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to Muslims and Hindus.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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3.5 Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height
Table B.41: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010): Unweighted
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India 0.148 -0.011
[0.026] [0.014]
India × Girl -0.112 -0.143 -0.147 -0.098 -0.116
[0.036] [0.020] [0.019] [0.032] [0.014]
India × 2nd child -0.107 -0.153 -0.228 -0.122
[0.036] [0.040] [0.069] [0.030]
India × 3rd+ child -0.352 -0.222 -0.414 -0.176
[0.033] [0.047] [0.097] [0.035]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.077 -0.045 -0.024 -0.047
[0.053] [0.057] [0.101] [0.042]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.051 -0.048 -0.030 -0.063
[0.047] [0.067] [0.092] [0.049]
2nd child 0.023 -0.005 -0.202 0.006
[0.022] [0.026] [0.041] [0.019]
3rd+ child -0.057 -0.113 -0.355 -0.069
[0.019] [0.029] [0.052] [0.021]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 168,135 165,623 83,243 165,623 168,135 167,765 83,243 167,765
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.42: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010): Weighted India
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India -0.005 -0.169
[0.031] [0.017]
India × Girl -0.160 -0.171 -0.176 -0.126 -0.139
[0.043] [0.024] [0.023] [0.039] [0.017]
India × 2nd child -0.080 -0.140 -0.264 -0.105
[0.043] [0.048] [0.081] [0.035]
India × 3rd+ child -0.356 -0.247 -0.481 -0.191
[0.040] [0.057] [0.115] [0.041]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.060 -0.006 -0.024 -0.057
[0.062] [0.068] [0.118] [0.051]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.009 0.067 0.018 -0.023
[0.056] [0.081] [0.108] [0.058]
2nd child 0.023 -0.005 -0.202 0.006
[0.022] [0.026] [0.041] [0.019]
3rd+ child -0.057 -0.113 -0.355 -0.069
[0.019] [0.029] [0.052] [0.021]
Africa mean of outcome -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877 -1.351 -1.351 -1.351 -0.877
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 168,135 165,623 83,243 165,623 168,135 167,765 83,243 167,765
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.43: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010): Weighted
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India -0.003 -0.157
[0.033] [0.018]
India × Girl -0.140 -0.167 -0.172 -0.110 -0.143
[0.046] [0.025] [0.024] [0.040] [0.018]
India × 2nd child -0.077 -0.157 -0.289 -0.116
[0.046] [0.051] [0.086] [0.037]
India × 3rd+ child -0.342 -0.246 -0.459 -0.196
[0.042] [0.061] [0.121] [0.044]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.089 -0.004 0.030 -0.059
[0.066] [0.073] [0.126] [0.054]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.028 0.075 0.040 -0.016
[0.059] [0.086] [0.115] [0.062]
2nd child 0.021 0.011 -0.178 0.016
[0.028] [0.031] [0.051] [0.022]
3rd+ child -0.070 -0.113 -0.377 -0.064
[0.023] [0.035] [0.064] [0.025]
Africa mean of outcome -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -0.889 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -0.889
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 168,135 165,623 83,243 165,623 168,135 167,765 83,243 167,765
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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3.6 Impact on Average Height - Accounting exercise
Table B.44: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Unweighted
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.162
[0.017]
Gradient proxy 0.412 0.704
[0.069] [0.131]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.331 -0.234
Africa -0.066 -0.037
Kerala & Northeast -0.229 -0.155
Rest of India -0.358 -0.257
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,135 126,066 126,066
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: J+P
Table B.45: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted India
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.332
[0.020]
Gradient proxy 0.412 0.704
[0.069] [0.131]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.324 -0.236
Africa -0.066 -0.038
Kerala & Northeast -0.214 -0.184
Rest of India -0.324 -0.234
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,135 126,066 126,066
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.46: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.342
[0.020]
Gradient proxy 0.335 0.703
[0.073] [0.139]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.324 -0.236
Africa -0.068 -0.040
Kerala & Northeast -0.214 -0.184
Rest of India -0.324 -0.234
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,135 126,066 126,066
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.47: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Unweighted
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.265 -0.197
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.109 -0.139
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 67 % 86 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.129 -0.102
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.053 -0.072
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 33% 44%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.48: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted India
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.258 -0.198
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.106 -0.139
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 32 % 42 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.110 -0.050
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.045 -0.035
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 14% 11%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.49: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.256 -0.196
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.086 -0.138
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 25 % 40 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.110 -0.050
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.037 -0.035
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 11% 10%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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4 Replicated Results (2004-2010) and Replicated Results (2011-
2017): Adjusted Methodology and Data from the More Re-
cent Time Period
4.1 Summary Statistics
Table B.50: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Weighted
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.25 26.95 Child’s age (months) 30.18 28.26
[5.19] [6.85] [17.01] [17.05]
Mother’s total children born 2.87 3.90 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.91] [2.55] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.45 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.74 3.75
[0.89] [1.46] [1.88] [2.48]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child’s HFA z-score -1.67 -1.36
[0.47] [0.46] [1.80] [1.96]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child is stunted 0.45 0.38
[0.47] [0.47] [0.50] [0.49]
Mother is literate 0.49 0.48 Child’s WFA z-score -1.70 -0.89
[0.50] [0.50] [1.30] [1.44]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.10 10.11
[0.06] [0.07] [1.56] [1.70]
Mother took iron supplements 0.66 0.62 Child is deceased 0.06 0.07
[0.47] [0.49] [0.23] [0.26]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.86 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.05 0.13
[0.95] [1.21] [0.21] [0.34]
Total prenatal visits 3.49 3.87 Child’s total vaccinations 6.42 6.14
[3.32] [3.28] [2.75] [3.17]
Delivery at health facility 0.39 0.47 Birth spacing (months) 35.43 38.43
[0.49] [0.50] [19.42] [20.43]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.08 0.32 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.28] [0.47] [0.29] [0.37]
Average pooled inputs 0.30 0.38 Open defecation 0.63 0.32
[0.27] [0.31] [0.48] [0.47]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.09 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.03] [0.08]
Number of adult females in household 1.89 1.59 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[1.11] [1.05]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.77 7.35
[0.10] [0.67]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.4 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.51: Summary Statistics (2011-2017): Weighted
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.72 27.13 Child’s age (months) 30.18 28.92
[4.76] [6.68] [16.88] [17.06]
Mother’s total children born 2.30 3.75 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[1.42] [2.46] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.28 4.62 Child’s birth order 2.18 3.64
[0.88] [1.44] [1.40] [2.41]
Mother wants more children 0.39 0.69 Child’s HFA z-score -1.26 -1.16
[0.48] [0.45] [1.82] [1.79]
Mother completed her fertility 0.63 0.31 Child is stunted 0.35 0.31
[0.48] [0.46] [0.48] [0.46]
Mother is literate 0.68 0.55 Child’s WFA z-score -1.47 -0.84
[0.47] [0.50] [1.28] [1.35]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.55 10.44
[0.06] [0.06] [1.48] [1.63]
Mother took iron supplements 0.78 0.74 Child is deceased 0.04 0.05
[0.41] [0.44] [0.19] [0.22]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.93 1.41 Child taking iron pills 0.25 0.08
[0.78] [1.11] [0.43] [0.27]
Total prenatal visits 4.63 3.99 Child’s total vaccinations 7.43 4.98
[4.20] [3.17] [2.60] [3.50]
Delivery at health facility 0.80 0.58 Birth spacing (months) 37.16 39.46
[0.40] [0.49] [21.61] [21.44]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.38 0.45 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.15
[0.48] [0.50] [0.29] [0.36]
Average pooled inputs 0.47 0.38 Open defecation 0.47 0.23
[0.24] [0.28] [0.50] [0.42]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.09 Number of PSUs 28,215 12,684
[0.03] [0.00]
Number of adult females in household 1.94 1.59 Main sample of children 230,220 168,490
[1.04] [1.12]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 8.50 7.80
[0.08] [0.68]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.4 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Figure B.7: Child Height versus National GDP (2004-2010) vs (2011-2017): Weighted
Replication (2004-2010): Weighted
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Notes: The light and dark circles represent sub-Saharan African countries and Indian states, respectively. The averages are calculated over all
children less than 60 months old. The lines represent the best linear fit for each sample.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from Penn World Table 9.0, Penn World Table 9.1, and the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States
(Robert C. Feenstra, 2016, 2019; Reserve Bank of India, 2019)
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4.2 India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Re-
lated Outcomes
Table B.52: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Weighted
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.083 -0.073
[0.011] [0.023]
India × 2nd child -0.119 -0.152 -0.064 -0.274 0.047 -0.147 -0.089 -0.002
[0.032] [0.034] [0.081] [0.061] [0.010] [0.025] [0.039] [0.005]
India × 3rd+ child -0.356 -0.199 -0.088 -0.442 0.056 -0.192 -0.174 -0.001
[0.030] [0.041] [0.117] [0.107] [0.012] [0.030] [0.046] [0.006]
2nd child 0.035 0.003 -0.142 -0.168 0.009 0.020 -0.015 -0.016
[0.019] [0.021] [0.069] [0.034] [0.005] [0.015] [0.027] [0.003]
3rd+ child -0.070 -0.121 -0.277 -0.363 0.038 -0.061 -0.026 -0.015
[0.016] [0.024] [0.094] [0.054] [0.006] [0.017] [0.031] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 0.381 -0.889 10.107 0.074
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 168,135 168,135 167,765 66,574 83,243 167,765 167,765 88,893 199,514
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.53: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2011-2017): Weighted
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.107 0.036
[0.006] [0.015]
India × 2nd child -0.113 -0.077 -0.099 -0.179 0.026 -0.093 -0.045 -0.002
[0.020] [0.022] [0.070] [0.038] [0.006] [0.016] [0.025] [0.003]
India × 3rd+ child -0.309 -0.114 -0.081 -0.413 0.027 -0.135 -0.008 0.001
[0.019] [0.026] [0.097] [0.067] [0.007] [0.019] [0.028] [0.003]
2nd child 0.003 -0.056 -0.077 -0.208 0.014 -0.014 -0.033 -0.009
[0.016] [0.018] [0.067] [0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.136 -0.167 -0.150 -0.315 0.047 -0.083 -0.127 -0.011
[0.014] [0.020] [0.091] [0.047] [0.005] [0.015] [0.025] [0.002]
Africa mean of outcome -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 0.311 -0.838 10.439 0.050
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s literacy × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 398,710 398,710 397,702 176,665 189,520 397,702 397,702 300,933 410,460
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Figure B.8: Child Height in India and Africa, by Child’s Birth Order (2004-2010) vs (2011-
2017): Weighted
Replication (2004-2010): Weighted
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-1.06
-1.09
-1.07
-1.20
-1.23
-1.55
-1
.8
-1
.6
-1
.4
-1
.2
M
ea
n 
he
ig
ht
-f
or
-a
ge
 z
-s
co
re
Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3+
Africa India
Notes: The figure depicts the mean child height-for-age z-scores for sub-Saharan Africa and India, by the birth order of the child. The mean is
calculated over all children less than 60 months old.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (ICF, 2004) and IPUMS DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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4.3 Child Health Inputs
Table B.54: Child Health Inputs (2004-2010): Weighted
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.518 -0.036 -0.029 -0.057 -0.001 -0.007 -0.208 -0.016
[0.064] [0.010] [0.023] [0.008] [0.016] [0.007] [0.051] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.940 -0.080 -0.048 -0.109 0.021 -0.001 -0.488 -0.035
[0.073] [0.012] [0.027] [0.010] [0.017] [0.008] [0.066] [0.005]
2nd child -0.200 -0.013 -0.095 -0.079 0.001 -0.004 -0.102 -0.041
[0.037] [0.006] [0.016] [0.004] [0.012] [0.005] [0.031] [0.003]
3rd+ child -0.438 -0.026 -0.191 -0.121 -0.026 -0.016 -0.205 -0.067
[0.042] [0.006] [0.017] [0.005] [0.013] [0.007] [0.037] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.871 0.616 1.407 0.466 0.323 0.134 6.142 0.377
India mean of outcome 3.494 0.661 1.863 0.389 0.083 0.046 6.419 0.297
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,364 117,707 117,219 167,405 35,902 91,964 122,922 167,752
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.55: Child Health Inputs (2011-2017): Weighted
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India × 2nd child -0.162 -0.006 0.047 0.010 0.006 -0.003 0.113 -0.000
[0.048] [0.006] [0.016] [0.004] [0.007] [0.004] [0.058] [0.003]
India × 3rd+ child -0.353 -0.022 0.088 0.003 0.016 -0.016 0.052 -0.005
[0.055] [0.007] [0.018] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.070] [0.003]
2nd child -0.279 -0.016 -0.127 -0.078 -0.014 -0.002 -0.232 -0.043
[0.034] [0.005] [0.014] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.055] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.565 -0.027 -0.207 -0.135 -0.028 -0.002 -0.380 -0.071
[0.038] [0.006] [0.016] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.065] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.993 0.742 1.410 0.582 0.448 0.078 4.982 0.382
India mean of outcome 4.631 0.783 1.933 0.795 0.376 0.251 7.431 0.475
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 287,302 282,486 281,157 397,406 272,650 374,185 215,976 397,636
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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4.4 Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence
Table B.56: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2004-2010): Weighted
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast
Below-median
child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.058 -0.003 0.082 0.049 -0.052 0.033
[0.053] [0.039] [0.037] [0.029] [0.055] [0.043]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child -0.025 -0.002 0.003 -0.015 0.163 0.141
[0.061] [0.046] [0.045] [0.035] [0.065] [0.049]
2nd child -0.164 -0.135 -0.194 -0.157 -0.147 -0.136
[0.019] [0.015] [0.023] [0.018] [0.021] [0.016]
3rd+ child -0.368 -0.305 -0.375 -0.309 -0.390 -0.322
[0.023] [0.018] [0.028] [0.021] [0.025] [0.019]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.462 -1.299 -1.723 -1.700 -1.857 -1.727
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.799 -1.743 -1.810 -1.721 -1.783 -1.734
Age & other controls
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
NFHS
1-3
Observations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 95,125 95,125 95,125 95,125 82,084 82,084
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. In all columns the sample uses NFHS 1-3. NFHS-1 only has data for
children aged four years and younger, and NFHS-2 only has data for children aged 3 years and younger. All columns include child age
dummies, maternal age, mother’s literacy, and child age dummies, maternal age, and mother’s literacy interacted with Low son pref proxy. All
columns include survey and PSU fixed effects, and survey and PSU fixed effects interacted with Low son pref proxy. In columns 1-4, the main
effect Low son pref proxy is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Kerala and Northeast include Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Child sex ratio is defined as the number of boys aged 0-6 years over the number of girls
aged 0-6 years in the respondent’s state-by-rural cell. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to Muslims and Hindus.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.57: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2004-2017): Weighted
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast
Below-median
child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.031 0.003 0.007 0.017 0.028 0.042
[0.034] [0.026] [0.021] [0.016] [0.032] [0.024]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child 0.038 0.003 0.050 0.012 0.089 0.092
[0.042] [0.031] [0.027] [0.020] [0.040] [0.029]
2nd child -0.145 -0.115 -0.146 -0.125 -0.148 -0.122
[0.011] [0.008] [0.014] [0.010] [0.012] [0.009]
3rd+ child -0.320 -0.250 -0.341 -0.262 -0.335 -0.268
[0.014] [0.010] [0.017] [0.013] [0.015] [0.011]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.153 -1.056 -1.334 -1.388 -1.426 -1.451
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.416 -1.548 -1.408 -1.532 -1.405 -1.539
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 322974 322974 320963 320963 280068 280068
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. In all columns the sample uses NFHS 1-4. NFHS-1 only has data for
children aged four years and younger, and NFHS-2 only has data for children aged 3 years and younger. All columns include child age
dummies, maternal age, mother’s literacy, and child age dummies, maternal age, and mother’s literacy interacted with Low son pref proxy. All
columns include survey and PSU fixed effects, and survey and PSU fixed effects interacted with Low son pref proxy. In columns 1-4, the main
effect Low son pref proxy is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Kerala and Northeast include Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Child sex ratio is defined as the number of boys aged 0-6 years over the number of girls
aged 0-6 years in the respondent’s state-by-rural cell. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to Muslims and Hindus.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.58: Cultural Norms and Child Height: Within-India Evidence (2015/6): Weighted
Low son preference proxy: Kerala & Northeast
Below-median
child sex ratio Muslims
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low son pref proxy × 2nd child 0.033 0.022 -0.021 0.006 0.046 0.039
[0.044] [0.033] [0.026] [0.019] [0.039] [0.028]
Low son pref proxy × 3rd+ child 0.111 0.031 0.081 0.036 0.033 0.057
[0.058] [0.042] [0.034] [0.025] [0.050] [0.035]
2nd child -0.135 -0.110 -0.124 -0.113 -0.143 -0.119
[0.013] [0.010] [0.017] [0.012] [0.014] [0.010]
3rd+ child -0.289 -0.220 -0.318 -0.237 -0.295 -0.233
[0.017] [0.013] [0.022] [0.016] [0.018] [0.014]
Low son pref group mean of outcome -1.033 -0.984 -1.239 -1.346 -1.307 -1.393
High son pref group mean of outcome -1.300 -1.508 -1.279 -1.495 -1.288 -1.503
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 227849 227849 225838 225838 197984 197984
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. In all columns the sample uses NFHS 4. All columns include child age
dummies, maternal age, mother’s literacy, and child age dummies, maternal age, and mother’s literacy interacted with Low son pref proxy. All
columns include survey and PSU fixed effects, and survey and PSU fixed effects interacted with Low son pref proxy. In columns 1-4, the main
effect Low son pref proxy is absorbed by PSU fixed effects. Kerala and Northeast include Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Child sex ratio is defined as the number of boys aged 0-6 years over the number of girls
aged 0-6 years in the respondent’s state-by-rural cell. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to Muslims and Hindus.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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4.5 Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height
Table B.59: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010): Weighted
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India -0.003 -0.157
[0.033] [0.018]
India × Girl -0.140 -0.167 -0.172 -0.110 -0.143
[0.046] [0.025] [0.024] [0.040] [0.018]
India × 2nd child -0.077 -0.157 -0.289 -0.116
[0.046] [0.051] [0.086] [0.037]
India × 3rd+ child -0.342 -0.246 -0.459 -0.196
[0.042] [0.061] [0.121] [0.044]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.089 -0.004 0.030 -0.059
[0.066] [0.073] [0.126] [0.054]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.028 0.075 0.040 -0.016
[0.059] [0.086] [0.115] [0.062]
2nd child 0.021 0.011 -0.178 0.016
[0.028] [0.031] [0.051] [0.022]
3rd+ child -0.070 -0.113 -0.377 -0.064
[0.023] [0.035] [0.064] [0.025]
Africa mean of outcome -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -0.889 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -0.889
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 168,135 165,623 83,243 165,623 168,135 167,765 83,243 167,765
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.60: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2010-2017): Weighted
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India 0.084 0.004
[0.021] [0.011]
India × Girl -0.094 -0.104 -0.097 -0.091 -0.066
[0.029] [0.015] [0.015] [0.024] [0.011]
India × 2nd child -0.088 -0.016 -0.171 -0.045
[0.029] [0.033] [0.054] [0.024]
India × 3rd+ child -0.278 -0.029 -0.408 -0.065
[0.027] [0.039] [0.077] [0.028]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.049 -0.108 -0.007 -0.088
[0.043] [0.047] [0.076] [0.034]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.066 -0.172 0.015 -0.134
[0.037] [0.054] [0.072] [0.040]
2nd child -0.010 -0.087 -0.213 -0.017
[0.024] [0.027] [0.042] [0.020]
3rd+ child -0.109 -0.174 -0.292 -0.079
[0.020] [0.030] [0.055] [0.022]
Africa mean of outcome -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -0.838 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -0.838
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 398,710 390,071 189,520 390,071 398,710 397,702 189,520 397,702
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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4.6 Impact on Average Height - Accounting exercise
Table B.61: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.342
[0.020]
Gradient proxy 0.335 0.703
[0.073] [0.139]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.324 -0.236
Africa -0.068 -0.040
Kerala & Northeast -0.214 -0.184
Rest of India -0.324 -0.234
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,135 126,066 126,066
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.62: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2011-2017): Weighted
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.119
[0.021]
Gradient proxy -0.784 -1.701
[0.149] [0.259]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.281 -0.222
Africa -0.130 -0.077
Kerala & Northeast -0.215 -0.182
Rest of India -0.281 -0.222
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 398,710 168,490 168,490
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.63: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.256 -0.196
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.086 -0.138
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 25 % 40 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.110 -0.050
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.037 -0.035
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 11% 10%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.64: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2010-2017): Weighted
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.151 -0.145
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff 0.118 0.247
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) -99 % -207 %
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.066 -0.040
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff 0.052 0.068
- Explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) -43% -57%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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5 Replicated Results (2004-2010) and Replicated Results (2011-
2017): Adjusted Methodology and Three Macro-Determinants
with Data from the More Recent Time Period
5.1 Summary Statistics
Table B.65: Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Weighted Macro-Determinants
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.25 26.95 4th poorest wealth quantile 0.21 0.18
[5.19] [6.85] [0.41] [0.38]
Mother’s total children born 2.87 3.90 Richest wealth quantile 0.27 0.16
[1.91] [2.55] [0.45] [0.36]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.45 4.62 Child’s age (months) 30.18 28.26
[0.89] [1.46] [17.01] [17.05]
Mother wants more children 0.34 0.67 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[0.47] [0.46] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother completed her fertility 0.67 0.33 Child’s birth order 2.74 3.75
[0.47] [0.47] [1.88] [2.48]
Mother is literate 0.49 0.48 Child’s HFA z-score -1.67 -1.36
[0.50] [0.50] [1.80] [1.96]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child is stunted 0.45 0.38
[0.06] [0.07] [0.50] [0.49]
Mother took iron supplements 0.66 0.62 Child’s WFA z-score -1.70 -0.89
[0.47] [0.49] [1.30] [1.44]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.86 1.41 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.10 10.11
[0.95] [1.21] [1.56] [1.70]
Total prenatal visits 3.49 3.87 Child is deceased 0.06 0.07
[3.32] [3.28] [0.23] [0.26]
Delivery at health facility 0.39 0.47 Child taking iron pills 0.05 0.13
[0.49] [0.50] [0.21] [0.34]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.08 0.32 Child’s total vaccinations 6.42 6.14
[0.28] [0.47] [2.75] [3.17]
Average pooled inputs 0.30 0.38 Birth spacing (months) 35.43 38.43
[0.27] [0.31] [19.42] [20.43]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.09 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.16
[0.03] [0.08] [0.29] [0.37]
Number of adult females in household 1.89 1.59 Open defecation 0.63 0.32
[1.11] [1.05] [0.48] [0.47]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 7.77 7.35 Meat or eggs consumed 0.12 0.43
[0.10] [0.67] [0.33] [0.50]
Poorest wealth quantile 0.23 0.23 Dairy products consumed 0.11 0.16
[0.42] [0.42] [0.31] [0.37]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.09 0.24 Number of PSUs 3,822 10,366
[0.28] [0.43]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.20 0.20 Main sample of children 42,069 126,066
[0.40] [0.40]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.4 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.66: Summary Statistics (2011-2017): Weighted Macro-Determinants
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Mother’s age at birth (years) 24.72 27.13 4th poorest wealth quantile 0.22 0.14
[4.76] [6.68] [0.41] [0.35]
Mother’s total children born 2.30 3.75 Richest wealth quantile 0.29 0.04
[1.42] [2.46] [0.45] [0.21]
Mother’s desired fertility 2.28 4.62 Child’s age (months) 30.18 28.92
[0.88] [1.44] [16.88] [17.06]
Mother wants more children 0.39 0.69 Child is a girl 0.48 0.50
[0.48] [0.45] [0.50] [0.50]
Mother completed her fertility 0.63 0.31 Child’s birth order 2.18 3.64
[0.48] [0.46] [1.40] [2.41]
Mother is literate 0.68 0.55 Child’s HFA z-score -1.26 -1.16
[0.47] [0.50] [1.82] [1.79]
Mother’s height (meters) 1.52 1.58 Child is stunted 0.35 0.31
[0.06] [0.06] [0.48] [0.46]
Mother took iron supplements 0.78 0.74 Child’s WFA z-score -1.47 -0.84
[0.41] [0.44] [1.28] [1.35]
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.93 1.41 Child’s hemoglobin level (g/dl) 10.55 10.44
[0.78] [1.11] [1.48] [1.63]
Total prenatal visits 4.63 3.99 Child is deceased 0.04 0.05
[4.20] [3.17] [0.19] [0.22]
Delivery at health facility 0.80 0.58 Child taking iron pills 0.25 0.08
[0.40] [0.49] [0.43] [0.27]
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.38 0.45 Child’s total vaccinations 7.43 4.98
[0.48] [0.50] [2.60] [3.50]
Average pooled inputs 0.47 0.38 Birth spacing (months) 37.16 39.46
[0.24] [0.28] [21.61] [21.44]
Percent non-resident among children 0.02 0.09 Diarrhea in last 2 weeks 0.09 0.15
[0.03] [0.00] [0.29] [0.36]
Number of adult females in household 1.94 1.59 Open defecation 0.47 0.23
[1.04] [1.12] [0.50] [0.42]
Log GDP per capita (in child’s birth year) 8.50 7.80 Meat or eggs consumed 0.14 0.30
[0.08] [0.68] [0.35] [0.46]
Poorest wealth quantile 0.12 0.43 Dairy products consumed 0.13 0.20
[0.32] [0.49] [0.34] [0.40]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.19 0.23 Number of PSUs 28,215 12,684
[0.39] [0.42]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.19 0.15 Main sample of children 230,220 168,490
[0.39] [0.36]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.4 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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5.2 India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Re-
lated Outcomes
Table B.67: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Weighted 3 Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.352 -0.329
[0.023] [0.036]
India × 2nd child -0.112 -0.167 -0.079 -0.269 0.053 -0.146 -0.090 -0.002
[0.032] [0.035] [0.084] [0.062] [0.010] [0.026] [0.040] [0.005]
India × 3rd+ child -0.181 -0.190 -0.121 -0.445 0.056 -0.168 -0.165 0.002
[0.032] [0.043] [0.120] [0.109] [0.012] [0.031] [0.048] [0.006]
2nd child 0.064 0.013 -0.124 -0.157 0.005 0.031 -0.004 -0.016
[0.019] [0.021] [0.071] [0.034] [0.005] [0.015] [0.028] [0.003]
3rd+ child 0.040 -0.108 -0.251 -0.349 0.032 -0.046 -0.012 -0.015
[0.016] [0.024] [0.096] [0.054] [0.006] [0.017] [0.031] [0.003]
India ×Mother’s literacy=1 0.184 0.166 0.091 0.057 0.000 -0.027 0.084 0.057 -0.004
[0.023] [0.029] [0.034] [0.050] [.] [0.010] [0.025] [0.037] [0.005]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.089 0.090 0.101 0.106 0.000 -0.030 0.116 0.065 -0.013
[0.011] [0.014] [0.018] [0.034] [.] [0.005] [0.013] [0.024] [0.002]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.093 0.054 0.044 0.026 0.000 -0.015 0.069 0.029 -0.001
[0.015] [0.018] [0.021] [0.037] [.] [0.006] [0.016] [0.026] [0.003]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.278 0.242 0.141 0.171 0.000 -0.035 0.115 0.038 -0.005
[0.015] [0.018] [0.022] [0.037] [.] [0.006] [0.016] [0.027] [0.003]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.491 0.451 0.246 0.304 0.000 -0.080 0.235 0.101 -0.006
[0.016] [0.019] [0.026] [0.042] [.] [0.007] [0.019] [0.031] [0.004]
Richest wealth quantile 0.861 0.857 0.449 0.536 0.000 -0.128 0.427 0.240 -0.016
[0.017] [0.022] [0.033] [0.054] [.] [0.009] [0.025] [0.041] [0.004]
India × Open defecation=1 -0.089 0.040 -0.062 -0.014 0.000 0.026 -0.055 -0.058 -0.008
[0.024] [0.030] [0.045] [0.063] [.] [0.013] [0.033] [0.048] [0.006]
Open defecation=1 0.015 -0.034 -0.070 -0.042 0.000 0.013 -0.055 -0.063 0.005
[0.013] [0.016] [0.023] [0.042] [.] [0.006] [0.017] [0.029] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 0.381 -0.889 10.107 0.074
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
p-Value of joint
significance test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 161,688 161,688 161,267 63,822 80,571 161,267 161,267 84,993 191,664
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from Jayachandran & Pande (2017) using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.68: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2011-2017): Weighted 3 Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.381 -0.225
[0.012] [0.022]
India × 2nd child -0.089 -0.074 -0.117 -0.166 0.024 -0.091 -0.038 -0.003
[0.020] [0.022] [0.070] [0.038] [0.006] [0.016] [0.025] [0.003]
India × 3rd+ child -0.188 -0.103 -0.108 -0.389 0.024 -0.125 0.005 0.000
[0.019] [0.026] [0.099] [0.068] [0.007] [0.020] [0.029] [0.003]
2nd child 0.027 -0.050 -0.066 -0.208 0.013 -0.008 -0.031 -0.009
[0.016] [0.018] [0.067] [0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.022] [0.002]
3rd+ child 0.016 -0.146 -0.138 -0.316 0.042 -0.064 -0.121 -0.011
[0.014] [0.020] [0.092] [0.047] [0.005] [0.015] [0.025] [0.003]
India ×Mother’s literacy=1 0.064 -0.002 0.063 0.033 0.000 -0.027 0.075 0.003 -0.002
[0.012] [0.017] [0.021] [0.037] [.] [0.006] [0.015] [0.022] [0.002]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.176 0.246 0.116 0.147 0.000 -0.031 0.091 0.109 -0.004
[0.009] [0.012] [0.016] [0.033] [.] [0.004] [0.012] [0.019] [0.002]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.162 0.126 0.090 0.117 0.000 -0.027 0.077 0.081 0.003
[0.010] [0.013] [0.014] [0.024] [.] [0.004] [0.011] [0.015] [0.002]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.329 0.284 0.180 0.179 0.000 -0.052 0.155 0.116 -0.000
[0.010] [0.013] [0.017] [0.027] [.] [0.005] [0.012] [0.017] [0.002]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.551 0.507 0.334 0.332 0.000 -0.096 0.268 0.172 -0.004
[0.010] [0.014] [0.019] [0.031] [.] [0.005] [0.014] [0.020] [0.002]
Richest wealth quantile 0.835 0.830 0.525 0.511 0.000 -0.144 0.453 0.267 -0.006
[0.011] [0.016] [0.024] [0.037] [.] [0.007] [0.018] [0.024] [0.003]
India × Open defecation=1 -0.095 -0.083 -0.008 -0.011 0.000 0.007 -0.035 -0.000 -0.003
[0.014] [0.019] [0.027] [0.049] [.] [0.007] [0.020] [0.028] [0.003]
Open defecation=1 0.018 0.040 -0.067 -0.084 0.000 0.019 -0.050 -0.074 0.006
[0.011] [0.014] [0.020] [0.043] [.] [0.006] [0.015] [0.024] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 0.311 -0.838 10.439 0.050
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
p-Value of joint
significance test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 384,190 384,190 383,034 168,981 183,299 383,034 383,034 289,410 399,467
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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5.3 Child Health Inputs
Table B.69: Child Health Inputs (2004-2010): Weighted Macro-Determinants
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs Animal sourced foods
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
Meat or
eggs
consumed
Dairy
products
consumed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
India × 2nd child -0.518 -0.036 -0.029 -0.057 -0.001 -0.007 -0.208 -0.000 0.027 -0.016
[0.064] [0.010] [0.023] [0.008] [0.016] [0.007] [0.051] [0.011] [0.009] [0.004]
India × 3rd+ child -0.940 -0.080 -0.048 -0.109 0.021 -0.001 -0.488 0.008 0.029 -0.035
[0.073] [0.012] [0.027] [0.010] [0.017] [0.008] [0.066] [0.012] [0.011] [0.005]
2nd child -0.200 -0.013 -0.095 -0.079 0.001 -0.004 -0.102 -0.001 -0.021 -0.041
[0.037] [0.006] [0.016] [0.004] [0.012] [0.005] [0.031] [0.008] [0.006] [0.003]
3rd+ child -0.438 -0.026 -0.191 -0.121 -0.026 -0.016 -0.205 -0.019 -0.032 -0.067
[0.042] [0.006] [0.017] [0.005] [0.013] [0.007] [0.037] [0.008] [0.007] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.871 0.616 1.407 0.466 0.323 0.134 6.142 0.433 0.159 0.377
India mean of outcome 3.494 0.661 1.863 0.389 0.083 0.046 6.419 0.122 0.108 0.297
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115,364 117,707 117,219 167,405 35,902 91,964 122,922 79,122 68,303 167,752
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.70: Child Health Inputs (2011-2017): Weighted Macro-Determinants
Prenatal inputs Postnatal inputs Animal sourced foods
Total
prenatal
visits
Mother
took iron
supple-
ments
Mother’s
total
tetanus
shots
Delivery
at health
facility
Postnatal
check
within 2
months
Child
taking
iron pills
Child’s
total vac-
cinations
Average
pooled
inputs
Meat or
eggs
consumed
Dairy
products
consumed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
India × 2nd child -0.162 -0.006 0.047 0.010 0.006 -0.003 0.113 0.035 0.049 -0.000
[0.048] [0.006] [0.016] [0.004] [0.007] [0.004] [0.058] [0.009] [0.009] [0.003]
India × 3rd+ child -0.353 -0.022 0.088 0.003 0.016 -0.016 0.052 0.043 0.063 -0.005
[0.055] [0.007] [0.018] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.070] [0.010] [0.010] [0.003]
2nd child -0.279 -0.016 -0.127 -0.078 -0.014 -0.002 -0.232 -0.004 -0.023 -0.043
[0.034] [0.005] [0.014] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.055] [0.008] [0.007] [0.002]
3rd+ child -0.565 -0.027 -0.207 -0.135 -0.028 -0.002 -0.380 -0.017 -0.041 -0.071
[0.038] [0.006] [0.016] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.065] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003]
Africa mean of outcome 3.993 0.742 1.410 0.582 0.448 0.078 4.982 0.304 0.202 0.382
India mean of outcome 4.631 0.783 1.933 0.795 0.376 0.251 7.431 0.140 0.135 0.475
Age & other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 287,302 282,486 281,157 397,406 272,650 374,185 215,976 146,828 146,823 397,636
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.8 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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5.4 Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height
Table B.71: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010): Weighted 3
Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India -0.250 -0.377
[0.043] [0.032]
India × Girl -0.157 -0.154 -0.173 -0.101 -0.140
[0.046] [0.025] [0.025] [0.041] [0.018]
India × 2nd child -0.105 -0.201 -0.264 -0.126
[0.046] [0.052] [0.088] [0.038]
India × 3rd+ child -0.183 -0.267 -0.422 -0.188
[0.043] [0.062] [0.122] [0.045]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.014 0.072 -0.009 -0.023
[0.067] [0.075] [0.129] [0.056]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl 0.004 0.148 -0.025 0.026
[0.060] [0.087] [0.117] [0.063]
2nd child 0.050 0.025 -0.165 0.030
[0.028] [0.032] [0.052] [0.023]
3rd+ child 0.038 -0.093 -0.356 -0.041
[0.023] [0.036] [0.064] [0.026]
India ×Mother’s literacy=1 0.166 0.097 0.078 0.207 0.125 0.113
[0.029] [0.035] [0.026] [0.028] [0.033] [0.024]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.090 0.102 0.117 0.086 0.107 0.118
[0.014] [0.019] [0.014] [0.014] [0.018] [0.013]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.055 0.041 0.066 0.056 0.043 0.069
[0.018] [0.022] [0.016] [0.018] [0.021] [0.016]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.243 0.142 0.114 0.245 0.142 0.117
[0.018] [0.023] [0.017] [0.018] [0.022] [0.016]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.452 0.242 0.233 0.454 0.252 0.239
[0.019] [0.027] [0.020] [0.019] [0.026] [0.019]
Richest wealth quantile 0.857 0.442 0.427 0.861 0.464 0.437
[0.022] [0.035] [0.026] [0.021] [0.033] [0.025]
India × Open defecation=1 0.038 -0.067 -0.058 0.028 -0.076 -0.069
[0.030] [0.046] [0.034] [0.030] [0.045] [0.033]
Open defecation=1 -0.032 -0.073 -0.054 -0.031 -0.071 -0.055
[0.015] [0.024] [0.018] [0.015] [0.023] [0.017]
Africa mean of outcome -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -0.889 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -0.889
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
p-Value of joint
significance test 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000
Observations 161,688 158,978 80,571 158,978 161,688 161,267 80,571 161,267
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.72: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2010-2017): Weighted 3
Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India -0.186 -0.297
[0.026] [0.019]
India × Girl -0.078 -0.091 -0.097 -0.093 -0.064
[0.029] [0.015] [0.015] [0.025] [0.011]
India × 2nd child -0.062 -0.006 -0.145 -0.041
[0.029] [0.033] [0.055] [0.025]
India × 3rd+ child -0.159 -0.006 -0.371 -0.054
[0.027] [0.039] [0.078] [0.029]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.053 -0.112 -0.030 -0.088
[0.042] [0.047] [0.076] [0.035]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.058 -0.188 -0.010 -0.136
[0.037] [0.055] [0.073] [0.040]
2nd child 0.016 -0.083 -0.211 -0.012
[0.023] [0.027] [0.042] [0.020]
3rd+ child 0.043 -0.156 -0.295 -0.061
[0.020] [0.030] [0.055] [0.022]
India ×Mother’s literacy=1 -0.001 0.073 0.077 0.044 0.081 0.081
[0.017] [0.022] [0.016] [0.017] [0.020] [0.015]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.246 0.111 0.088 0.242 0.127 0.101
[0.012] [0.017] [0.013] [0.012] [0.016] [0.012]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.126 0.094 0.080 0.125 0.093 0.080
[0.013] [0.015] [0.011] [0.013] [0.014] [0.011]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.284 0.180 0.154 0.288 0.187 0.159
[0.013] [0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.012]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.507 0.338 0.266 0.514 0.347 0.276
[0.014] [0.021] [0.015] [0.014] [0.019] [0.014]
Richest wealth quantile 0.830 0.526 0.450 0.844 0.554 0.472
[0.016] [0.025] [0.019] [0.016] [0.024] [0.018]
India × Open defecation=1 -0.084 0.004 -0.030 -0.089 -0.013 -0.041
[0.019] [0.028] [0.021] [0.019] [0.027] [0.020]
Open defecation=1 0.041 -0.070 -0.052 0.043 -0.069 -0.049
[0.014] [0.021] [0.016] [0.014] [0.020] [0.015]
Africa mean of outcome -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -0.838 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -0.838
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
p-Value of joint
significance test 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000
Observations 384,190 374,909 183,299 374,909 384,190 383,034 183,299 383,034
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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5.5 Impact on Average Height - Accounting exercise
Table B.73: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted 3 Macro-
Determinants
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.342
[0.020]
Gradient proxy 0.037 0.206
[0.073] [0.138]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.067 0.066
[0.017] [0.017]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.066 0.066
[0.024] [0.024]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.251 0.250
[0.025] [0.025]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.450 0.448
[0.027] [0.026]
Richest wealth quantile 0.859 0.859
[0.031] [0.031]
Open defecation=1 -0.029 -0.027
[0.020] [0.020]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.324 -0.236
Africa -0.068 -0.040
Kerala & Northeast -0.214 -0.184
Rest of India -0.324 -0.234
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,135 122,567 122,567
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.74: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2011-2017): Weighted 3 Macro-
Determinants
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.119
[0.021]
Gradient proxy -0.627 -1.146
[0.132] [0.233]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.218 0.213
[0.017] [0.018]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.105 0.104
[0.019] [0.019]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.292 0.291
[0.023] [0.023]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.603 0.602
[0.023] [0.023]
Richest wealth quantile 0.991 0.990
[0.029] [0.029]
Open defecation=1 0.055 0.055
[0.021] [0.021]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.281 -0.222
Africa -0.130 -0.077
Kerala & Northeast -0.215 -0.182
Rest of India -0.281 -0.222
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 398,710 167,173 167,173
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.75: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted 3 Macro-
Determinants
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.256 -0.196
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.009 -0.040
- Birth order explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 3 % 12%
- Macro-determinants explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 125% 95%
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.110 -0.050
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.010 -0.010
- Birth order explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 1% 3%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.76: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2010-2017): Adjusted Method-
ology and 3 Macro-Determinants with Data from the More Recent Time Period
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.151 -0.145
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff 0.095 0.166
- Birth order explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) -80% -140%
- Macro-determinants explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 287% 275%
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.066 -0.040
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff 0.041 0.046
- Birth order explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) -35% -39%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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6 Replicated Results (2004-2010) and Replicated Results (2011-
2017): Adjusted Methodology and Four Macro-Determinants
with Data from the More Recent Time Period
6.1 India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Re-
lated Outcomes
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Table B.77: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2004-2010): Weighted 4 Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.158 -0.142
[0.036] [0.057]
India × 2nd child -0.117 -0.179 -0.732 0.000 0.051 -0.184 -0.085 0.003
[0.052] [0.060] [0.605] [.] [0.015] [0.043] [0.072] [0.002]
India × 3rd+ child -0.170 -0.222 -1.374 0.000 0.065 -0.161 -0.121 0.006
[0.048] [0.070] [0.775] [.] [0.018] [0.050] [0.083] [0.003]
2nd child 0.092 0.052 1.500 0.000 -0.005 0.079 0.046 0.002
[0.033] [0.039] [0.351] [.] [0.009] [0.028] [0.055] [0.001]
3rd+ child 0.055 -0.048 2.426 0.000 0.014 -0.003 0.033 0.002
[0.028] [0.044] [0.531] [.] [0.010] [0.031] [0.062] [0.001]
India ×Mother’s literacy=1 0.157 0.154 0.081 -0.026 0.000 -0.025 0.094 0.001 0.003
[0.034] [0.043] [0.052] [0.084] [.] [0.014] [0.037] [0.061] [0.002]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.100 0.082 0.082 0.151 0.000 -0.023 0.123 0.098 -0.003
[0.019] [0.023] [0.031] [0.061] [.] [0.007] [0.021] [0.045] [0.001]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.077 0.017 0.018 -0.016 0.000 -0.012 0.061 0.027 -0.001
[0.025] [0.030] [0.036] [0.062] [.] [0.009] [0.025] [0.044] [0.001]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.229 0.184 0.140 0.175 0.000 -0.030 0.110 0.014 -0.001
[0.025] [0.029] [0.038] [0.064] [.] [0.010] [0.026] [0.046] [0.001]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.363 0.314 0.188 0.295 0.000 -0.057 0.217 0.066 -0.000
[0.025] [0.029] [0.043] [0.071] [.] [0.011] [0.030] [0.052] [0.001]
Richest wealth quantile 0.690 0.672 0.401 0.570 0.000 -0.107 0.413 0.264 0.001
[0.028] [0.034] [0.056] [0.092] [.] [0.014] [0.039] [0.070] [0.002]
India × Open defecation=1 -0.205 -0.073 -0.116 -0.019 0.000 0.038 -0.086 0.009 0.002
[0.035] [0.044] [0.068] [0.106] [.] [0.018] [0.048] [0.077] [0.003]
Open defecation=1 0.050 0.004 -0.061 0.002 0.000 0.009 -0.060 -0.076 -0.002
[0.021] [0.025] [0.038] [0.074] [.] [0.009] [0.027] [0.053] [0.002]
India ×Meat or eggs consumed=1 0.059 0.068 0.092 0.167 0.000 -0.027 0.026 0.158 0.000
[0.037] [0.048] [0.060] [0.095] [.] [0.017] [0.044] [0.066] [0.002]
Meat or eggs consumed=1 0.199 0.204 0.134 0.094 0.000 -0.029 0.120 0.031 -0.000
[0.020] [0.024] [0.030] [0.061] [.] [0.007] [0.020] [0.039] [0.001]
India × Dairy products consumed=1 0.048 -0.020 -0.058 0.165 0.000 -0.005 0.058 -0.075 0.001
[0.044] [0.056] [0.067] [0.108] [.] [0.018] [0.048] [0.072] [0.002]
Dairy products consumed=1 0.101 0.126 0.126 -0.025 0.000 -0.030 0.080 0.135 -0.002
[0.025] [0.030] [0.038] [0.078] [.] [0.009] [0.027] [0.047] [0.001]
Africa mean of outcome -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 0.381 -0.889 10.107 0.074
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
p-Value of joint
significance test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.437
Observations 64,785 64,785 63,635 24,638 1,376 63,635 63,635 28,297 47,835
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.78: India’s Differential Birth Order Gradient in Child Height and Related Outcomes
(2011-2017): Weighted 4 Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
HFA
z-
score
Stunted
WFA
z-
score
Hb
level
Deceased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
India -0.309 -0.202
[0.021] [0.040]
India × 2nd child -0.076 -0.098 0.231 0.000 0.023 -0.059 -0.104 0.001
[0.037] [0.044] [0.781] [.] [0.010] [0.032] [0.051] [0.001]
India × 3rd+ child -0.166 -0.187 -0.128 0.000 0.040 -0.123 -0.030 0.002
[0.034] [0.051] [0.900] [.] [0.012] [0.037] [0.057] [0.001]
2nd child 0.068 0.033 0.604 0.000 -0.006 0.035 0.064 -0.002
[0.029] [0.035] [0.638] [.] [0.008] [0.025] [0.044] [0.001]
3rd+ child 0.077 0.012 1.183 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.022 -0.002
[0.024] [0.039] [0.716] [.] [0.009] [0.028] [0.048] [0.001]
India ×Mother’s literacy=1 0.102 0.073 0.082 0.052 0.000 -0.024 0.087 0.041 -0.002
[0.021] [0.029] [0.038] [0.081] [.] [0.009] [0.027] [0.042] [0.001]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.122 0.167 0.104 0.119 0.000 -0.018 0.085 0.083 0.002
[0.014] [0.020] [0.028] [0.068] [.] [0.007] [0.021] [0.034] [0.001]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.096 0.086 0.051 0.132 0.000 -0.013 0.052 0.048 0.000
[0.016] [0.021] [0.026] [0.052] [.] [0.006] [0.019] [0.030] [0.001]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.225 0.217 0.113 0.183 0.000 -0.023 0.109 0.119 0.001
[0.016] [0.022] [0.031] [0.060] [.] [0.007] [0.022] [0.034] [0.001]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.410 0.400 0.270 0.326 0.000 -0.065 0.223 0.168 0.001
[0.017] [0.023] [0.036] [0.069] [.] [0.009] [0.026] [0.039] [0.001]
Richest wealth quantile 0.655 0.690 0.461 0.522 0.000 -0.100 0.416 0.269 0.001
[0.019] [0.028] [0.047] [0.085] [.] [0.011] [0.032] [0.047] [0.001]
India × Open defecation=1 -0.180 -0.151 0.010 -0.147 0.000 0.008 -0.086 -0.013 -0.002
[0.023] [0.032] [0.048] [0.099] [.] [0.011] [0.035] [0.054] [0.001]
Open defecation=1 0.084 0.122 -0.030 0.134 0.000 0.005 -0.003 -0.056 0.001
[0.017] [0.023] [0.035] [0.083] [.] [0.008] [0.027] [0.045] [0.001]
India ×Meat or eggs consumed=1 0.009 -0.059 0.011 -0.069 0.000 -0.018 0.031 0.074 -0.000
[0.025] [0.037] [0.047] [0.093] [.] [0.011] [0.033] [0.046] [0.001]
Meat or eggs consumed=1 0.183 0.187 0.134 0.123 0.000 -0.027 0.089 0.002 0.000
[0.015] [0.022] [0.027] [0.067] [.] [0.007] [0.019] [0.031] [0.001]
India × Dairy products consumed=1 -0.050 -0.058 0.037 0.128 0.000 -0.000 0.006 0.006 0.003
[0.026] [0.038] [0.046] [0.093] [.] [0.011] [0.034] [0.046] [0.001]
Dairy products consumed=1 0.209 0.174 0.095 0.105 0.000 -0.016 0.095 -0.018 -0.002
[0.017] [0.024] [0.030] [0.074] [.] [0.007] [0.022] [0.035] [0.001]
Africa mean of outcome -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 0.311 -0.838 10.439 0.050
Child’s age dummies × India No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s age at birth × India No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU FEs No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother FEs No No No No Yes No No No No
Completed fertility sample No No No Yes No No No No No
p-Value of joint
significance test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029
Observations 145,957 145,957 139,245 43,381 2,781 139,245 139,245 84,690 75,570
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.6 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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6.2 Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height
Table B.79: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2004-2010): Weighted 4
Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India -0.023 -0.168
[0.069] [0.050]
India × Girl -0.239 -0.189 -0.217 0.086 -0.161
[0.072] [0.038] [0.041] [0.285] [0.030]
India × 2nd child -0.145 -0.303 -0.161
[0.074] [0.094] [0.066]
India × 3rd+ child -0.201 -0.385 -0.176
[0.067] [0.108] [0.076]
India × 2nd child × Girl 0.066 0.224 1.835 0.007
[0.104] [0.132] [0.803] [0.095]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl 0.069 0.361 0.344 0.096
[0.092] [0.152] [0.439] [0.109]
2nd child 0.089 0.113 0.085
[0.048] [0.063] [0.043]
3rd+ child 0.054 0.017 0.028
[0.040] [0.069] [0.048]
India ×Mother’s literacy=1 0.158 0.099 0.099 0.195 0.130 0.123
[0.043] [0.057] [0.041] [0.041] [0.051] [0.036]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.079 0.074 0.112 0.074 0.076 0.120
[0.023] [0.034] [0.023] [0.023] [0.031] [0.021]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.020 0.010 0.070 0.023 0.024 0.065
[0.030] [0.039] [0.027] [0.030] [0.036] [0.025]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.185 0.145 0.116 0.188 0.147 0.114
[0.029] [0.041] [0.028] [0.029] [0.037] [0.026]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.314 0.172 0.217 0.317 0.195 0.222
[0.029] [0.047] [0.032] [0.029] [0.042] [0.030]
Richest wealth quantile 0.673 0.397 0.413 0.678 0.421 0.425
[0.034] [0.063] [0.043] [0.034] [0.056] [0.039]
India × Open defecation=1 -0.078 -0.129 -0.081 -0.087 -0.136 -0.097
[0.044] [0.074] [0.052] [0.044] [0.068] [0.048]
Open defecation=1 0.009 -0.072 -0.072 0.010 -0.055 -0.058
[0.025] [0.042] [0.029] [0.025] [0.038] [0.027]
India ×Meat or eggs consumed=1 0.065 0.139 0.087 0.070 0.048 0.087
[0.048] [0.067] [0.049] [0.048] [0.058] [0.043]
Meat or eggs consumed=1 0.205 0.112 0.101 0.205 0.153 0.085
[0.024] [0.032] [0.022] [0.024] [0.029] [0.020]
India × Dairy products consumed=1 -0.020 -0.059 0.032 -0.018 -0.078 0.093
[0.056] [0.073] [0.053] [0.056] [0.066] [0.048]
Dairy products consumed=1 0.126 0.126 0.101 0.124 0.133 0.072
[0.030] [0.041] [0.029] [0.030] [0.038] [0.027]
Africa mean of outcome -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -0.889 -1.363 -1.363 -1.363 -0.889
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
p-Value of joint
significance test 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000
Observations 64,785 60,288 1,376 60,288 64,785 63,635 1,376 63,635
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.80: Child Gender and the Birth Order Gradient in Height (2010-2017): Weighted 4
Macro-Determinants
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
HFA
z-score
WFA
z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India -0.200 -0.285
[0.048] [0.033]
India × Girl -0.000 -0.047 -0.033 -0.369 -0.075
[0.051] [0.027] [0.029] [0.171] [0.021]
India × 2nd child -0.014 -0.045 -0.053
[0.053] [0.071] [0.050]
India × 3rd+ child -0.130 -0.120 -0.092
[0.048] [0.082] [0.057]
India × 2nd child × Girl -0.115 -0.167 -0.333 -0.054
[0.074] [0.100] [0.425] [0.072]
India × 3rd+ child × Girl -0.066 -0.172 0.098 -0.068
[0.065] [0.115] [0.329] [0.082]
2nd child 0.036 0.001 0.056
[0.041] [0.057] [0.040]
3rd+ child 0.080 -0.024 -0.008
[0.034] [0.063] [0.044]
India ×Mother’s literacy=1 0.073 0.053 0.077 0.110 0.103 0.087
[0.029] [0.043] [0.030] [0.029] [0.037] [0.026]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.168 0.113 0.080 0.155 0.104 0.095
[0.020] [0.032] [0.023] [0.020] [0.028] [0.020]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.087 0.051 0.039 0.087 0.055 0.059
[0.021] [0.029] [0.021] [0.021] [0.026] [0.019]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.217 0.099 0.102 0.218 0.118 0.118
[0.022] [0.035] [0.024] [0.022] [0.031] [0.022]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.403 0.270 0.218 0.405 0.280 0.235
[0.023] [0.041] [0.029] [0.023] [0.036] [0.025]
Richest wealth quantile 0.691 0.460 0.412 0.696 0.478 0.438
[0.028] [0.052] [0.036] [0.028] [0.047] [0.032]
India × Open defecation=1 -0.153 0.007 -0.084 -0.157 0.000 -0.089
[0.032] [0.053] [0.038] [0.032] [0.048] [0.035]
Open defecation=1 0.123 -0.015 0.007 0.124 -0.027 -0.003
[0.023] [0.039] [0.029] [0.023] [0.035] [0.027]
India ×Meat or eggs consumed=1 -0.064 0.059 0.042 -0.062 0.035 0.180
[0.037] [0.055] [0.038] [0.037] [0.045] [0.032]
Meat or eggs consumed=1 0.189 0.110 0.081 0.189 0.113 -0.019
[0.022] [0.031] [0.022] [0.022] [0.026] [0.019]
India × Dairy products consumed=1 -0.059 0.046 0.012 -0.056 0.054 0.093
[0.038] [0.053] [0.038] [0.038] [0.045] [0.033]
Dairy products consumed=1 0.174 0.084 0.085 0.171 0.082 0.046
[0.024] [0.034] [0.025] [0.024] [0.030] [0.022]
Africa mean of outcome -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -0.838 -1.163 -1.163 -1.163 -0.838
Age & other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mother FEs No No Yes No No No Yes No
p-Value of joint
significance test 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000
Observations 145,957 122,102 2,781 122,102 145,957 139,245 2,781 139,245
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by mother and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.10 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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6.3 Impact on Average Height - Accounting exercise
Table B.81: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted 4 Macro-
Determinants
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.342
[0.020]
Gradient proxy 0.124 0.316
[0.120] [0.218]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.080 0.081
[0.026] [0.026]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.039 0.040
[0.039] [0.039]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.208 0.209
[0.040] [0.040]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.335 0.335
[0.040] [0.040]
Richest wealth quantile 0.664 0.665
[0.047] [0.047]
Open defecation=1 0.002 0.003
[0.031] [0.031]
Meat or eggs consumed=1 0.187 0.186
[0.027] [0.027]
Dairy products consumed=1 0.122 0.124
[0.031] [0.031]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.324 -0.236
Africa -0.068 -0.040
Kerala & Northeast -0.214 -0.184
Rest of India -0.324 -0.234
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 168,135 44,392 44,392
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in Table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.82: Accounting Exercise Part 1: Sample Comparison (2011-2017): Weighted 4 Macro-
Determinants
Accounting
Exercise 1
Accounting
Exercise 2
HFA z-score HFA z-score HFA z-score
(1) (2) (3)
India -0.119
[0.021]
Gradient proxy -0.627 -1.146
[0.132] [0.233]
Mother’s literacy=1 0.218 0.213
[0.017] [0.018]
2nd poorest wealth quantile 0.105 0.104
[0.019] [0.019]
3rd poorest wealth quantile 0.292 0.291
[0.023] [0.023]
4th poorest wealth quantile 0.603 0.602
[0.023] [0.023]
Richest wealth quantile 0.991 0.990
[0.029] [0.029]
Open defecation=1 0.055 0.055
[0.021] [0.021]
Mean of gradient proxy
India -0.281 -0.222
Africa -0.130 -0.077
Kerala & Northeast -0.215 -0.182
Rest of India -0.281 -0.222
Log GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Africa Africa
Observations 398,710 167,173 167,173
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in brackets. Please consider the notes in table 2.12 for further explanations.
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.83: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2004-2010): Weighted 4 Macro-
Determinants
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.256 -0.196
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff -0.032 -0.062
- Birth order explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 9% 18%
- Macro-determinants explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 122% 94%
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.110 -0.050
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff -0.014 -0.016
- Birth order explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 4% 5%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
Table B.84: Accounting Exercise Part 2: Sample Comparison (2011-2017): Weighted 4 Macro-
Determinants
Accounting Accounting
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
Calculation 1: Share explained by birth order gradient
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient -0.151 -0.145
- India-Africa gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coeff 0.141 0.196
- Birth order explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) -119 % -165%
- Macro-determinants explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) 267% 256%
Calculation 2: Share explained by birth order gradient rooted in eldest son preference
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient -0.066 -0.040
- Rest of India - Kerala & NE gap in birth order gradient × Gradient coff 0.062 0.054
- Birth order explained share of India-Africa level gap in height (shown in column 1) -52% -45%
Source: Adapted from J+P using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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7 Additional Descriptive Evidence
7.1 Summary Statistics: Assets of Wealth Index
Table B.85: Wealth Index Summary Statistics (2004-2010): Unweighted
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Electricity 0.72 0.20 Flush toilet 0.43 0.07
[0.45] [0.40] [0.49] [0.26]
Radio 0.33 0.64 Improved Pit latrine (ventilated, with slab, composting, etc.) 0.06 0.21
[0.47] [0.48] [0.24] [0.41]
TV 0.48 0.19 Traditional pit latrine without slab 0.05 0.36
[0.50] [0.39] [0.21] [0.48]
Phone 0.26 0.25 No facility/bush/field; also stream/water 0.46 0.32
[0.44] [0.43] [0.50] [0.47]
Refridgerator 0.17 0.08 Other type of toilet/latrine 0.00 0.00
[0.38] [0.27] [0.05] [0.05]
Bicycle 0.47 0.31 Piped into own dwelling/yard/plot/residency 0.26 0.10
[0.50] [0.46] [0.44] [0.30]
Motorcycle/scooter 0.19 0.11 Public tap/standpipe 0.15 0.16
[0.40] [0.31] [0.36] [0.37]
Car/truck 0.04 0.04 Tube well/borehole and dug well (open/protected) 0.37 0.08
[0.18] [0.20] [0.48] [0.27]
Mud/Clay/Earth/Sand/Dung floor 0.47 0.62 Protected well 0.03 0.17
[0.50] [0.49] [0.16] [0.38]
Other type of floor 0.00 0.00 Unprotected well 0.10 0.22
[0.04] [0.05] [0.30] [0.41]
Rudimentary material of floor 0.01 0.01 Surface water-river, lake, spring, etc. 0.03 0.24
[0.11] [0.12] [0.18] [0.43]
Finished material of floor 0.46 0.29 Rainwater 0.00 0.00
[0.50] [0.45] [0.05] [0.07]
Electricity for cooking 0.01 0.02 Bottled water 0.00 0.00
[0.07] [0.15] [0.05] [0.06]
LPG/bottled gas/ natural gas for cooking 0.26 0.02 Other water source 0.01 0.02
[0.44] [0.14] [0.11] [0.12]
Biogas for cooking 0.00 0.00 Scores for factor 1 0.56 -0.12
[0.06] [0.03] [1.18] [0.90]
Kerosene/Paraffin for cooking 0.03 0.03 wealthcat == Poorestwealthquantile 0.14 0.23
[0.18] [0.18] [0.35] [0.42]
Coal/lignite for cooking 0.02 0.00 wealthcat == 2ndpoorestwealthquantile 0.07 0.23
[0.13] [0.06] [0.25] [0.42]
Charcoal for cooking 0.01 0.12 wealthcat == 3rdpoorestwealthquantile 0.18 0.20
[0.08] [0.32] [0.38] [0.40]
Wood/straw/grass/dung/agricultural residue for cooking 0.68 0.73 wealthcat == 4thpoorestwealthquantile 0.23 0.19
[0.47] [0.44] [0.42] [0.39]
Other material for cooking 0.00 0.00 wealthcat == Richestwealthquantile 0.38 0.15
[0.02] [0.03] [0.49] [0.36]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets.
Source: Own calculations using data from DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.86: Wealth Index Summary Statistics (2011-2017): Unweighted
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
India
subsample
Africa
subsample
Electricity 0.85 0.30 Flush toilet 0.44 0.12
[0.36] [0.46] [0.50] [0.32]
Radio 0.09 0.58 Improved Pit latrine (ventilated, with slab, composting, etc.) 0.08 0.33
[0.28] [0.49] [0.27] [0.47]
TV 0.58 0.29 Traditional pit latrine without slab 0.03 0.29
[0.49] [0.45] [0.17] [0.45]
Phone 0.92 0.73 No facility/bush/field; also stream/water 0.45 0.26
[0.27] [0.44] [0.50] [0.44]
Refridgerator 0.24 0.11 Other type of toilet/latrine 0.00 0.00
[0.43] [0.31] [0.04] [0.04]
Bicycle 0.49 0.26 Piped into own dwelling/yard/plot/residency 0.25 0.12
[0.50] [0.44] [0.43] [0.33]
Motorcycle/scooter 0.36 0.16 Public tap/standpipe 0.13 0.14
[0.48] [0.37] [0.33] [0.35]
Car/truck 0.06 0.05 Tube well/borehole and dug well (open/protected) 0.46 0.17
[0.23] [0.21] [0.50] [0.38]
Mud/Clay/Earth/Sand/Dung floor 0.46 0.57 Protected well 0.03 0.09
[0.50] [0.50] [0.17] [0.28]
Other type of floor 0.00 0.00 Unprotected well 0.06 0.16
[0.03] [0.05] [0.24] [0.37]
Rudimentary material of floor 0.01 0.00 Surface water-river, lake, spring, etc. 0.04 0.22
[0.11] [0.06] [0.21] [0.42]
Finished material of floor 0.47 0.00 Rainwater 0.00 0.01
[0.50] [0.00] [0.05] [0.08]
Electricity for cooking 0.01 0.02 Bottled water 0.01 0.01
[0.09] [0.14] [0.11] [0.10]
LPG/bottled gas/ natural gas for cooking 0.28 0.03 Other water source 0.02 0.02
[0.45] [0.17] [0.15] [0.14]
Biogas for cooking 0.00 0.00 Scores for factor 1 0.45 -0.39
[0.07] [0.03] [1.02] [0.78]
Kerosene/Paraffin for cooking 0.01 0.03 wealthcat == Poorestwealthquantile 0.06 0.36
[0.09] [0.17] [0.24] [0.48]
Coal/lignite for cooking 0.01 0.05 wealthcat == 2ndpoorestwealthquantile 0.17 0.20
[0.11] [0.21] [0.38] [0.40]
Charcoal for cooking 0.01 0.13 wealthcat == 3rdpoorestwealthquantile 0.20 0.19
[0.08] [0.34] [0.40] [0.39]
Wood/straw/grass/dung/agricultural residue for cooking 0.68 0.73 wealthcat == 4thpoorestwealthquantile 0.23 0.16
[0.47] [0.44] [0.42] [0.37]
Other material for cooking 0.00 0.00 wealthcat == Richestwealthquantile 0.34 0.09
[0.02] [0.03] [0.47] [0.29]
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples. Standard deviations appear in
brackets.
Source: Own calculations using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004)
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7.2 Summary Statistics: Child Survival
Table B.87: Share of Ever Born Children and Survival Rate by Gender, Birth Order, Country,
and Time: Weighted
2004-2010 2011-2017
India subsample Africa subsample India subsample Africa subsample
Panel A: All ever born children age 13 to 59 months
Birth order: 1 0.30 0.21 0.39 0.22
Birth order: 2 0.27 0.19 0.32 0.19
Birth order: 3 0.43 0.60 0.29 0.59
Girl & Birth order: 1 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.11
Girl & Birth order: 2 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.09
Girl & Birth order: 3 0.20 0.30 0.14 0.29
Boy & Birth order: 1 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.11
Boy & Birth order: 2 0.14 0.09 0.16 0.10
Boy & Birth order: 3 0.23 0.30 0.15 0.29
Panel B: Survival rate of all ever born children age 13 to 59 months
Birth order: 1 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.94
Birth order: 2 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.95
Birth order: 3 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.95
Girl & Birth order: 1 0.94 0.92 0.96 0.95
Girl & Birth order: 2 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.96
Girl & Birth order: 3 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.96
Boy & Birth order: 1 0.93 0.90 0.95 0.94
Boy & Birth order: 2 0.96 0.93 0.97 0.95
Boy & Birth order: 3 0.95 0.92 0.96 0.95
Source: Own calculations using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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7.3 Child Inputs by Birth Order, Gender, Time, and Country
Table B.88: Summary Statistics of Inputs by Birth Order: Weighted Means
2004-2010 2011-2017
India subsample Africa subsample India subsample Africa subsample
Panel A: First born children
Total prenatal visits 4.93 4.47 5.54 4.41
Mother took iron supplements 0.77 0.66 0.84 0.78
Mother’s total tetanus shots 2.11 1.66 2.01 1.64
Delivery at health facility 0.58 0.60 0.89 0.73
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.11 0.35 0.40 0.50
Child taking iron pills 0.06 0.17 0.27 0.08
Child’s total vaccinations 7.18 6.49 7.72 5.45
Average pooled inputs 0.38 0.43 0.54 0.49
Meat or eggs consumed 0.21 0.61 0.14 0.33
Dairy products consumed 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.23
Child’s HFA z-score -1.72 -1.64 -1.09 -1.06
Panel B: Second born children
Total prenatal visits 4.41 4.34 5.03 4.27
Mother took iron supplements 0.74 0.65 0.82 0.77
Mother’s total tetanus shots 2.02 1.58 1.94 1.51
Delivery at health facility 0.45 0.52 0.82 0.65
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.10 0.37 0.39 0.49
Child taking iron pills 0.05 0.15 0.27 0.08
Child’s total vaccinations 6.86 6.39 7.59 5.18
Average pooled inputs 0.33 0.38 0.50 0.45
Meat or eggs consumed 0.21 0.60 0.16 0.33
Dairy products consumed 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.22
Child’s HFA z-score -1.84 -1.65 -1.20 -1.07
Panel B: Third or higher birth order children
Total prenatal visits 2.28 3.74 3.22 3.76
Mother took iron supplements 0.54 0.60 0.68 0.72
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.67 1.35 1.84 1.30
Delivery at health facility 0.21 0.40 0.65 0.51
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.07 0.33 0.34 0.42
Child taking iron pills 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.08
Child’s total vaccinations 5.61 5.95 6.88 4.79
Average pooled inputs 0.19 0.32 0.39 0.37
Meat or eggs consumed 0.14 0.54 0.12 0.29
Dairy products consumed 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.18
Child’s HFA z-score -2.22 -1.77 -1.55 -1.23
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples.
Source: Own calculations using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.89: Summary Statistics of Inputs by Birth Order for Girls: Weighted Means
2004-2010 2011-2017
India subsample Africa subsample India subsample Africa subsample
Panel A: First born children
Total prenatal visits 4.94 4.49 5.59 4.43
Mother took iron supplements 0.76 0.65 0.84 0.79
Mother’s total tetanus shots 2.11 1.64 2.01 1.64
Delivery at health facility 0.57 0.60 0.89 0.72
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.09 0.35 0.40 0.51
Child taking iron pills 0.06 0.17 0.27 0.08
Child’s total vaccinations 7.11 6.56 7.70 5.49
Average pooled inputs 0.37 0.43 0.54 0.49
Meat or eggs consumed 0.21 0.62 0.14 0.32
Dairy products consumed 0.17 0.24 0.13 0.23
Child’s HFA z-score -1.72 -1.57 -1.05 -0.96
Panel B: Second born children
Total prenatal visits 4.38 4.39 5.09 4.24
Mother took iron supplements 0.75 0.65 0.82 0.77
Mother’s total tetanus shots 2.01 1.60 1.94 1.51
Delivery at health facility 0.42 0.52 0.81 0.64
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.11 0.35 0.39 0.49
Child taking iron pills 0.05 0.16 0.26 0.08
Child’s total vaccinations 6.80 6.37 7.56 5.02
Average pooled inputs 0.31 0.38 0.50 0.45
Meat or eggs consumed 0.22 0.59 0.17 0.32
Dairy products consumed 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.22
Child’s HFA z-score -1.87 -1.57 -1.16 -0.96
Panel B: Third or higher birth order children
Total prenatal visits 2.19 3.73 3.19 3.76
Mother took iron supplements 0.54 0.60 0.68 0.72
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.63 1.34 1.84 1.30
Delivery at health facility 0.20 0.40 0.63 0.51
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.07 0.33 0.33 0.42
Child taking iron pills 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.08
Child’s total vaccinations 5.45 5.95 6.85 4.79
Average pooled inputs 0.18 0.32 0.39 0.37
Meat or eggs consumed 0.15 0.54 0.12 0.28
Dairy products consumed 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.18
Child’s HFA z-score -2.23 -1.70 -1.56 -1.16
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples.
Source: Own calculations using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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Table B.90: Summary Statistics of Inputs by Birth Order for Boys: Weighted Means
2004-2010 2011-2017
India subsample Africa subsample India subsample Africa subsample
Panel A: First born children
Total prenatal visits 4.92 4.45 5.50 4.40
Mother took iron supplements 0.79 0.66 0.84 0.78
Mother’s total tetanus shots 2.11 1.68 2.02 1.65
Delivery at health facility 0.59 0.61 0.89 0.73
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.12 0.35 0.39 0.50
Child taking iron pills 0.07 0.17 0.27 0.08
Child’s total vaccinations 7.24 6.42 7.74 5.42
Average pooled inputs 0.39 0.43 0.54 0.49
Meat or eggs consumed 0.21 0.60 0.13 0.33
Dairy products consumed 0.16 0.23 0.13 0.24
Child’s HFA z-score -1.72 -1.71 -1.14 -1.16
Panel B: Second born children
Total prenatal visits 4.44 4.29 4.97 4.30
Mother took iron supplements 0.73 0.65 0.81 0.78
Mother’s total tetanus shots 2.02 1.56 1.94 1.51
Delivery at health facility 0.48 0.52 0.82 0.65
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.10 0.38 0.39 0.50
Child taking iron pills 0.06 0.15 0.27 0.08
Child’s total vaccinations 6.92 6.41 7.61 5.33
Average pooled inputs 0.34 0.39 0.50 0.45
Meat or eggs consumed 0.21 0.60 0.16 0.33
Dairy products consumed 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.22
Child’s HFA z-score -1.81 -1.73 -1.23 -1.18
Panel B: Third or higher birth order children
Total prenatal visits 2.35 3.76 3.24 3.76
Mother took iron supplements 0.55 0.60 0.68 0.72
Mother’s total tetanus shots 1.70 1.36 1.83 1.30
Delivery at health facility 0.22 0.41 0.67 0.51
Postnatal check within 2 months 0.07 0.33 0.34 0.41
Child taking iron pills 0.03 0.13 0.22 0.08
Child’s total vaccinations 5.74 5.96 6.91 4.78
Average pooled inputs 0.19 0.32 0.40 0.37
Meat or eggs consumed 0.13 0.55 0.12 0.29
Dairy products consumed 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.18
Child’s HFA z-score -2.20 -1.84 -1.54 -1.30
Notes: The means of the specified variables are calculated separately for the India and Africa subsamples.
Source: Own calculations using data from IPUMS DHS (ICF, 2004) and DHS (Heger Boyle & Sobek, 2019)
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C | Essay 2
1 Background
1.1 India’s School-Feeding Program
The MDM provides lunch free of cost for 100 million school children from first to seventh grade
at 1.15 million government and government aided schools in India every day except school
holidays (Department of School Education and Literacy & Ministry of Human Resource and
Development, 2015; Ministry of Human Resource Development, 2015). Its purpose aligns with
the considered outcomes of this study because it aims at reducing hunger, increasing nutrition,
and improving enrolment, attendance, and academic achievements (Bihar Government, 2017).
Further, it wants to contribute to overcoming caste discrimination and gender inequity (Bihar
Government, 2017).
One meal contains 450 kcal for primary school children and 700 kcal for upper primary school
children (Bihar Government, 2017). The menu and the content of grains, pulses, vegetables,
oils and fats, salt and spices is predefined (Bihar Government, 2017; Midday Meal Scheme,
2017). 1 The meal is prepared mainly decentralized at the schools itself with special kitchens
constructed for it (Midday Meal Scheme, 2017). Apart from rice schools have to purchase all
ingredients (Midday Meal Scheme, 2017). 2 Their budget depends on the number of students
they are serving lunch (Midday Meal Scheme, 2017). 3 The costs are shared by the central and
the state government (Midday Meal Scheme, 2017).
The potential of the MDM to counter malnutrition is not unknown. The Ministry of Women and
Child Development has announced the mandatory use of DFS in government nutrition programs
like the MDM in a directive with the goal to reduce iron deficiency in school children. Never-
1The MDM for children in primary school should contain 100 grams of grains, 20 grams of pulses, 50 grams of
vegetables, 5 grams of oils and fats, and salt and spices (Bihar Government, 2017; Midday Meal Scheme, 2017).
The MDM for children in upper primary school should include 150 grams of grains, 30 grams of pulses, 75 grams
of vegetables, 7.5 grams of oils and fats, and salt and spices.
2The Food Corporation of India delivers the rice directly to the schools (Midday Meal Scheme, 2017).
3Schools receive Rs. 3.59 (USD 0.05) for one primary child and Rs. 5.38 (USD 0.07) for every upper primary
child per day (Midday Meal Scheme, 2017)
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theless, this is hardly implemented due to constraints in supply (Ministry of Human Resource
Development, 2017; Krämer et al., 2020).
1.2 Prevalence, Causes, and Consequences of Iron Deficiency in India
Using DFS in the MDM provides a unique chance to overcome iron deficiency because 15 to 80
percent of school aged children (5 to 15 years of age) in India are anemic (Alvarez-Uria et al.,
2014). Half of the cases of anemia are due to iron deficiency because low-income households
in India consume a diet with little bioavailable iron (Allen et al., 2006). In particular girls and
children from tribes have a high prevalence of this illness (Choudhary et al., 2006; Rao et al.,
2007; Malhotra & Passi, 2007).
Iron deficiency with or without anemia for children 6 to 16 years is associated with higher
risk to score below average compared to children without deficiency according to Halterman et
al. (2001) who examine the US National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey III (1988-
1994) . Li et al. (2018) also find that fourth grade students with anemia or a low hemoglobin
level in 25 primary schools in central China are more likely to perform poorly on standardized
mathematics exams compared to their healthy peers. Ji et al. (2017) add that early adolescents
(around age 12) with iron deficiency are associated with reduced neurocognitive performance
compared to children with a normal iron status in their age group.
In a review article Falkingham et al. (2010) show that iron supplementation improves attention,
concentration, intelligence quotient, memory, psychomotor skills, and scholastic achievement
for iron-deficient children aged 6 and above, adolescents, and women. Cognitive functions
might in turn affect the academic achievement of children and so human capital acquisition of
later life (Zhao et al., 2019). Supplementation with iron is also associated with an increase in
attendance for preschool children (Bobonis, 2009) and in test scores for children in fourth grade
in China Luo et al. (2012).
Deficiencies in nutrients like iron impair the development of the brain and so cognitive functions
because the frontal lobes that are assumed to be responsible for executive cognitive activities
develop throughout childhood (Bryan et al., 2004; Hudspeth & Pribram, 1990). The overview
article by Bryan et al. (2004) confirms that in case of iron "there is reasonable evidence for
the beneficial effects of longer-term iron supplementation on the cognitive performance of older
children", in particular adolescents.
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2 Study Design and Data
2.1 Causal Pathway of the Intervention
Our DFS nutrition sensitive intervention helps to close a supply chain gap and so implement the
government directive of the use of DFS in the MDM. In the following we present the underlying
causal pathway using categories of a logical framework of results based management (Figure
C.1). The objective of the study is improved development of children in early adolescents. The
project delivers outputs such as the timely available and adequate amount of DFS to the treat-
ment schools and creates awareness of the use and storage of DFS in the school personal. For
this, we directly purchase the DFS from Indian private companies with on average 0.86 mg of
iron per gram of salt. The purpose of DFS is to prevent iron deficiency but not to cure cases
that would need therapeutic attention, i.e. severe anemia cases, (Sivakumar & Nair, 2002).
Changes in hemoglobin should only be expected after a consumption of over a 2 year period
whereas changes in prevalence of anemia can be expected earlier according to Sivakumar &
Nair (2002). The low content of iron in DFS mitigates the chance of over-consumption of iron
and so potential negative treatment effects.
We deliver it to the treatment and later also control schools once or twice every month or de-
pending on the needs of the schools. We sold the DFS to the schools for a similar price as
non-DFS salt, INR 12 (0.18 USD) per kg, by subsidizing it. Due to the lack of production, we
had to switch the supplier to a less known and so less accepted company by the schools for
about 4 months in 2018.
The short term outcomes are the adequate storage of DFS and the fortification of the MDM with
DFS that in turn leads to an increase of iron in the MDM consumed by the school children. The
mid-term outcomes consist of the greater absorption of iron in school children increasing their
health, in particular their nutritional status. It provides improved conditions for the development
of the frontal lobes that are assumed to be responsible for executive cognitive activities (Bryan
et al., 2004). Healthy children are supposed to attend school more often due to lack of illness
and have improved cognitive ability. Both attribute to greater educational achievements.
For this project we focus particular on the long-term outcomes: health is measured as hemoglobin
level and iron deficiency anemia, henceforth anemia, in children. We measure cognitive ability
with different types of tests, attendance with the school records of missed days, and academic
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Figure C.1: Logical Framework of DFS Intervention
Activity Output Short-Term Outcome Medium-TermOutcome
Long-Term Outcome
Advice school
personal how to
use and store
DFS
Delivery of DFS
to the treatment
schools
Awareness of
school personal
to use DFS
Timely available
and adequate
amounts of DFS
Adequate
storage of
DFS
Fortification
of MDM
with
adequate
amount of
salt
Increased
amount of
iron in
MDM
consumed by
the school
children
Greater
absorption of
iron in school
children
Increased
health of
school
children
Increased
atten-
dance of
school
children
Increased
cogni-
tive
ability
of
school
children
Increased
academic
achievement
of school
children
Source: Own data.
achievements with a reading and math test.
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2.2 School Types Across Survey Waves
Table C.1: Frequency and Treatment Periods of Schools Included at the Three Data Collection
Waves
School Type
Frequency
Wave I
(11/2014-01/2015)
Frequency
Wave II
(08-10/2016)
Frequency
Wave III
(01-07/2019)
Type 1: PS Early 31 31 20
Type 2: MS Early 23 23 23
Type 3: PS Late 32 32 0
Type 4: MS Late 21 21 21
Type 5: MS New - - 16
Type 6: Other governmental - - >0
Type 7: Private - - >1
Notes: Early indicates a start of the DFS supply in 2015 and Late in 2017. Source: Own data.
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2.3 Measures
2.3.1 Outcomes
Figure C.2: Frequency of Age of School Children by Survey Wave
0
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Age in years
Notes: The red lines mark the next age group with different anemia thresholds.
Source: Own Data.
Distribution of age of school children 
at medical test by survey wave
Table C.2: Number of Anemia Cases by Treatment and Survey Wave
Wave I
(11/2014-01/2015)
Wave II
(08-10/2016)
Wave III
(01-07/2019)
Group Always Early Late Hardly Always Early Late Hardly Always Early Late Hardly
Severe Anemia 7 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0
Moderate Anemia 169 55 92 55 85 18 57 34 45 12 22 25
Mild Anemia 121 39 78 42 77 19 50 33 75 26 58 33
Any Anemia 297 95 173 97 163 37 107 67 122 39 80 58
Observations 594 194 391 254 560 173 361 235 566 165 350 215
Notes: Mild and any anemia are values adjusted by age and gender.
Source: Own data.
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Table C.3: Sources Used for Cognitive Tests in Wave III
Test Wave I & Wave II Wave III
Block design
Malin (1969)
(less pattern pictures)
Malin (1969)
(additional two pattern pictures)
Digit span forwards Malin (1969) unchanged
Digit span backwards Malin (1969) unchanged
Raven’s Colored Pro-
gressive Matrices Raven et al. (1998) matrices changed
Stroop
Stroop-like day-and-night test
Gerstadt et al. (1994)
Fruit/vegetable stroop
(Röthlisberger et al., 2010)
Source: Adapted from Krämer et al. (2018).
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Conduction and Calculation of Stroop Scores Instead of the Stroop like “Day-Night” test
by Gerstadt et al. (1994) used in the first two survey waves to measure the ability of inhibition
control, we use an adapted version of the fruit/vegetable Stroop by Röthlisberger et al. (2010).
This test has been conducted with the help of Prof. Dr. Claudia Mähler from the Institute for
Psychology, University of Hildesheim. In the test, four different sets of cards are presented.
In set 1 (colored squares) and set 2 (colored fruits and vegetables), the children are asked to
name the printed color of the shapes or eatables. In set 3 (black and white outlines of fruits and
vegetables) and set 4 (incorrectly colored fruits and vegetables), the children are asked to name
the colors which the fruits and vegetables would actually have. The number of the correct an-
swers, self-corrected answers, mistakes and the amount of time needed to complete each set are
recorded. To measure inhibition, we follow the approach by Archibald & Kerns (1999) using
the measured times needed for naming all objects in the sets:
timeset4 −
timeset1 × timeset3
timeset1 + timeset3
(C.1)
Higher values indicate less inhibition. Compared to the original version by Röthlisberger et al.
(2010) of the fruits/vegtables Stroop test the chosen fruits and vegetables have been adapted to
the context in India. Following fruits and vegetables are used with the correct color in brackets:
banana (yellow), tomato (red), orange (orange), and lettuce (green).
For the direct comparison of the Stroop test in the different periods, we calculate 13 quantiles
based on the inhibition scores of the children. The quantile representing the lowest inhibition
scores are assigned zero points, whereas the 13th quantile is assigned 12 points. In the same
way all other quantiles are assigned points. This conversion into points is not used for the
calculation of the cognition index.
2.3.2 Covariates
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Table C.4: Overview Covariates
Health Outcomes Cognition Outcomes Education Outcomes
Socioeconomic
Household rural or urban Yes Yes Yes
Block Yes Yes Yes
Wealth index Yes Yes Yes
Parental education level (years of schooling) Yes Yes Yes
Caste Yes Yes Yes
Household religion Yes Yes Yes
Number of household members Yes Yes Yes
Food intake
Child’s dietary diversity score Yes Yes Yes
Indicator for household food security Yes Yes Yes
Number of meals child eats every day Yes Yes Yes
Average calorie intake from the MDM at survey day per child Yes Yes Yes
Indicator for maternal health knowledge Yes Yes Yes
Dummy if the child consumes any meat, poultry or fish Yes Yes* Yes*
Dummy if the child gets iron supplements Yes Yes* Yes*
Average iron intake from the MDM at survey day per child Yes Yes* Yes*
Dummy if the child gets iron supplements Yes Yes* Yes*
Days child exposed to IFA tablets at school Only for wave III Only for wave III Only for wave III
Health care
Dummy for institutional delivery Yes Yes Yes
Dummy for health insurance coverage Yes Yes Yes
Morbidity
Diarrhea incidence of child (in last 30 days) Yes Yes Yes
Improved sanitation facilities Yes Yes Yes
Biological factors
Sex of child Yes Yes Yes
Interaction and psychosocial stimuli
If the mother helps the child with its homework No Yes Yes
Time the mother spends on giving physical care to the child No Yes Yes
Parental participation in parent-teacher meetings No Yes Yes
Father lives in household No Yes Yes
Test administration
Interviewer ID No Yes Yes (No for attendance)
Quality of schooling
Total school enrollment Yes* Yes* Yes
Number of children in second grade Yes* Yes* Yes
Distance to school Yes* Yes* Yes
Student teacher ratio (school level) Yes* Yes* Yes
If child drops out after fifth grade Only for wave III Only for wave III Only for wave III
If child attends private school only after fifth grade Only for wave III Only for wave III Only for wave III
Note: If not other specified the baseline value of the variable is used as a covariate in the analysis for the data ollection wave II and III
outcomes. * indicates a change to the strategy by Krämer et al. (2018), either inclusion or exclusion.
Source: Adapted from Krämer et al. (2018).
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3 Internal Validity Threats
3.1 Attrition
3.1.1 Illustration of Attrition over Time Using the Health Outcomes Sample
Exemplary, Figure C.3 illustrates the attrition at different points in time for the health outcomes
sample. The original randomized sample comprises of 107 schools and 1,990 children. We
have not collected data for the health outcome variables for all of these. We have missed 86
children at the wave I. The analytical wave I sample consists of 1,904 children.
Figure C.3: Flowchart of School and Child Attrition over Time for Health Outcomes
Time School Sample
Random selection
(prior 11/2014-01/2015)
107 schools (Early and Late)
1,990 children
Data collection wave I
(11/2014-01/2015)
Attrition:
0 schools
86 children
Wave I analysis
sample)
107 schools (Early and Late)
1,904 children
Data collection wave II
(08-10/2016)
Attrition:
0 schools
235 children
Wave II analysis
sample
107 schools (Early and Late)
1,669 children
Start sixth grade
(04/2018)
Attrition:
26 schools
543 children
81 schools (Early and Late)
16 new schools
1,292 children
Group Always
45 schools (Early and
Late)
0 new schools
547 children
Group Early
0 schools (Early and
Late)
10 new schools
167 children
Group Late
24 schools (Early and
Late)
0 new schools
353 children
Group Hardly
0 schools (Early and
Late)
13 new schools
225 children
Data collection wave III
(01-07/2019)
Attrition:
0 schools
38 children
Attrition:
0 schools
25 children
Attrition:
0 schools
32 children
Attrition:
1 schools
32 children
Wave III Analysis
Sample
Group Always
45 schools (Early and
Late)
0 new schools
509 children
Group Early
0 schools (Early and
Late)
10 new schools
142 children
Group Late
24 schools (Early and
Late)
0 new schools
321 children
Group Hardly
0 schools (Early and
Late)
12 new schools
193 children
Notes: Blue shaded boxes indicate attrition due to missing outcome variables. Orange shaded boxes indicate attrition due to missing or
contradictory information about attended schools or attendance of private and public school at the same time.
Source: Own data.
At wave II, the information for health outcomes of 235 children is missing. The analytical wave
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II sample reduces to 1,669 children. We have data for the children for both wave I and wave II.
After completion of the fifth grade, children at PS are forced to go to another school to attend
the next highest grade. This and the critical age of the child increase the attrition rate by large.
We can not determine the attended school of 543 children. 26 PS are no longer visited by the
children in our sample. Due to the change in school, we are left with 1,292 children and 81
sample schools for the wave III data collection. However, the school change also introduces 16
new MS that sample children attend after fifth grade.
After the school change, we are able to show the different exposure groups of our study. Group
Always consists of 45 sample schools and 547 children, group Early of 10 new schools and 167
children, group Late of 24 sample schools and 353 children, and group Hardly of 13 new schools
and 225 children. Group Early and group Hardly also contain children that have dropped out of
school or only attend private schools.
At wave III the information for health outcomes is missing for 38 children in group Always. We
are left with observations from 509 children. 25 children are lost in group Early and 32 children
each in group Late and Hardly. There are now 142 children in group Early, 321 children in
group Late, and 193 children in group Hardly.
3.1.2 Examining Correlation between Attrition and DFS Exposure
Further, we assess the attrition rate and the correlation between attrition and DFS exposure. We
report statistically significant differences at least at the 10 percent level. The attrition rate is
higher at wave III compared to the wave II for all considered outcome samples using wave I
data (column 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9 in Table C.5). For the sample considering health outcomes the
attrition varies between 16.7 percent in group Always to 29.4 percent in group Early (column
2). Groups Early and Hardly have larger attrition rates than groups Always and Late. This holds
also for cognition and education samples and for the attendance outcome sample at wave III
using wave I data. We have greatest attrition for the sample of the attendance outcome, 59.2
percent in group Early at wave III (column 9). At wave II there are no significant differences in
attrition of the different exposure groups for cognition and education and attendance outcomes
at the 10 percent significance level (column 2, 5, and 8). At wave III we find significant differ-
ences in attrition for all samples using wave I or wave II data.
In column 4, 7, and 10 we assess the additional attrition from wave II to wave III data. The
overall attrition rate is lower between wave II and wave III than between wave I and wave II
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for the health outcomes sample, 9.8 percent compared to 12.5 percent. For the cognition and
attendance sample the overall attrition rate is higher for the time period between wave II and
wave III than between wave I and wave II.
There are significant differences between the exposure groups related to attrition. For the health
outcome samples the difference between group Always and Hardly, Always and Early, and
Early and Late are statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level using wave I data.
The difference between group Early and Late loses its significance when only considering the
attrition between wave II and wave III. For the other samples at wave III there are statistically
significant difference at least at the 10 percent significance level between group Always and
Early, Always and Hardly, Early and Late, and Late and Hardly. This pattern reveals that attri-
tion seems to be different in group Early and Hardly that transition out of the school with DFS
supply due to school change compared to group Always and Late that mainly remain at schools
with DFS supply. Overall, attrition of participants is correlated with the exposure group and so
threatens internal validity.
3.1.3 Balancing Tables by Attrition Status Using wave I Data
279
Ta
bl
e
C
.6
:P
an
el
A
:B
al
an
ci
ng
Ta
bl
e
by
A
ttr
iti
on
an
d
Ti
m
e
Pe
ri
od
U
si
ng
W
av
e
ID
at
a
fo
rH
ea
lth
O
ut
co
m
es
W
av
e
II
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
sc
ho
ol
ch
an
ge
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
Ia
ttr
iti
on
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lA
.C
hi
ld
le
ve
lo
ut
co
m
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
ea
lth
ou
tc
om
es
H
em
og
lo
bi
n
(g
/d
L
)
1,
90
4
11
.5
33
11
.4
20
0.
10
7
1,
90
4
11
.5
10
11
.5
37
0.
72
0
1,
90
4
11
.5
10
11
.5
33
0.
73
6
[1
.0
96
]
[1
.1
67
]
[1
.1
15
]
[1
.0
84
]
[1
.1
22
]
[1
.0
80
]
A
ny
an
em
ia
1,
90
4
0.
44
8
0.
51
5
0.
01
4
1,
90
4
0.
45
5
0.
45
9
0.
72
8
1,
90
4
0.
45
9
0.
45
2
0.
87
2
M
ild
an
em
ia
1,
90
4
0.
18
9
0.
21
3
0.
22
9
1,
90
4
0.
18
8
0.
20
1
0.
29
9
1,
90
4
0.
19
2
0.
19
2
0.
76
9
M
od
er
at
e/
se
ve
re
an
em
ia
1,
90
4
0.
25
9
0.
30
2
0.
17
5
1,
90
4
0.
26
7
0.
25
8
0.
59
2
1,
90
4
0.
26
7
0.
26
0
0.
64
7
N
um
be
ro
fs
ym
pt
om
s
1,
99
0
1.
08
7
1.
01
2
0.
23
0
1,
99
0
1.
07
6
1.
07
3
0.
94
6
1,
99
0
1.
06
9
1.
08
4
0.
79
0
[1
.1
13
]
[1
.0
34
]
[1
.1
13
]
[1
.0
78
]
[1
.0
99
]
[1
.1
03
]
C
og
ni
tiv
e
te
st
ou
tc
om
es
B
lo
ck
de
si
gn
1,
89
5
3.
67
4
3.
94
3
0.
22
5
1,
89
5
3.
71
5
3.
70
4
0.
67
1
1,
89
5
3.
71
5
3.
70
6
0.
70
3
[2
.2
11
]
[2
.2
00
]
[2
.1
98
]
[2
.2
36
]
[2
.2
01
]
[2
.2
26
]
D
ig
it
sp
an
fo
rw
ar
d
1,
89
7
4.
04
8
4.
22
6
0.
05
0
1,
89
7
4.
05
3
4.
11
4
0.
43
2
1,
89
7
4.
06
0
4.
09
4
0.
69
4
[0
.9
97
]
[1
.0
34
]
[0
.9
78
]
[1
.0
53
]
[0
.9
85
]
[1
.0
32
]
D
ig
it
sp
an
ba
ck
w
ar
d
1,
89
7
1.
10
7
1.
24
9
0.
39
5
1,
89
7
1.
11
9
1.
14
2
0.
98
4
1,
89
7
1.
11
5
1.
14
4
0.
88
6
[1
.2
88
]
[1
.3
78
]
[1
.3
05
]
[1
.2
96
]
[1
.3
03
]
[1
.3
01
]
Pr
og
re
ss
iv
e
m
at
ri
ce
s
1,
89
5
4.
74
4
4.
83
0
0.
86
0
1,
89
5
4.
75
7
4.
75
3
0.
74
2
1,
89
5
4.
74
9
4.
76
6
0.
93
7
[1
.6
47
]
[1
.9
38
]
[1
.6
31
]
[1
.8
05
]
[1
.6
36
]
[1
.7
70
]
St
ro
op
te
st
1,
89
4
5.
29
0
5.
83
5
0.
05
6
1,
89
4
5.
29
5
5.
50
6
0.
45
4
1,
89
4
5.
27
9
5.
49
5
0.
37
6
[3
.4
20
]
[3
.4
87
]
[3
.4
25
]
[3
.4
50
]
[3
.4
32
]
[3
.4
35
]
C
og
ni
tiv
e
sc
or
e
in
de
x
1,
89
0
-0
.0
31
0.
15
0
0.
08
0
1,
89
0
-0
.0
18
0.
01
9
0.
88
3
1,
89
0
-0
.0
20
0.
01
5
0.
83
5
[0
.9
96
]
[0
.9
98
]
[0
.9
88
]
[1
.0
18
]
[0
.9
93
]
[1
.0
05
]
E
du
ca
tio
n
ou
tc
om
es
M
at
h
sc
or
e
1,
89
5
4.
70
5
5.
64
5
0.
01
8
1,
89
5
4.
75
2
5.
00
6
0.
60
9
1,
89
5
4.
75
0
4.
96
7
0.
61
0
[3
.8
29
]
[3
.9
23
]
[3
.7
65
]
[4
.0
27
]
[3
.7
49
]
[4
.0
07
]
R
ea
di
ng
sc
or
e
1,
89
6
0.
87
6
1.
17
7
0.
01
5
1,
89
6
0.
89
9
0.
95
6
0.
74
7
1,
89
6
0.
90
2
0.
94
2
0.
84
9
[1
.1
16
]
[1
.2
53
]
[1
.1
25
]
[1
.1
71
]
[1
.1
39
]
[1
.1
43
]
Sc
ho
ol
at
te
nd
an
ce
1,
87
1
0.
79
3
0.
72
0
0.
00
0
1,
87
1
0.
79
5
0.
75
8
0.
00
3
1,
87
1
0.
79
7
0.
76
1
0.
00
2
[0
.1
60
]
[0
.2
13
]
[0
.1
60
]
[0
.1
88
]
[0
.1
59
]
[0
.1
85
]
N
ot
es
:C
ol
um
ns
2,
3,
5,
6
re
po
rt
w
av
e
Im
ea
ns
by
at
tr
iti
on
st
at
us
fo
rc
hi
ld
(P
an
el
A
an
d
B
)a
nd
sc
ho
ol
s
(P
an
el
C
)i
n
th
e
st
ud
y
an
al
ys
is
.s
d
st
an
ds
fo
rs
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n.
C
ol
um
ns
5
an
d
9
re
po
rt
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
on
th
e
eq
ua
lit
y
of
m
ea
ns
fo
re
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
.F
-t
es
ts
of
jo
in
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:t
es
to
fj
oi
nt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
in
re
gr
es
si
on
of
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
at
tr
iti
on
du
m
m
ie
s
on
al
ld
is
pl
ay
ed
w
av
e
Iv
ar
ia
bl
es
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
D
at
a.
280
Ta
bl
e
C
.7
:P
an
el
B
:B
al
an
ci
ng
Ta
bl
e
by
A
ttr
iti
on
an
d
Ti
m
e
Pe
ri
od
U
si
ng
W
av
e
ID
at
a
fo
rH
ea
lth
O
ut
co
m
es
W
av
e
II
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
sc
ho
ol
ch
an
ge
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
Ia
ttr
iti
on
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lB
:C
hi
ld
an
d
ho
us
eh
ol
d
le
ve
lc
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s
an
d
so
ci
oe
co
no
m
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
M
us
lim
1,
99
0
0.
02
6
0.
02
5
0.
79
5
1,
99
0
0.
03
2
0.
01
6
0.
08
6
1,
99
0
0.
03
3
0.
01
7
0.
07
7
Sc
he
du
le
d
C
as
te
/S
ch
ed
ul
ed
Tr
ib
e
1,
99
0
0.
29
4
0.
20
2
0.
00
6
1,
99
0
0.
29
3
0.
25
2
0.
25
5
1,
99
0
0.
29
7
0.
25
3
0.
19
2
B
lo
ck
1,
99
0
1.
31
5
1.
40
5
0.
01
3
1,
99
0
1.
29
8
1.
38
7
0.
09
4
1,
99
0
1.
29
4
1.
37
8
0.
08
1
R
ur
al
1,
99
0
0.
98
1
0.
96
9
0.
13
6
1,
99
0
0.
98
1
0.
97
6
0.
45
3
1,
99
0
0.
97
9
0.
97
9
0.
99
2
Fa
m
ily
si
ze
1,
99
0
7.
72
3
7.
94
7
0.
35
9
1,
99
0
7.
80
6
7.
67
2
0.
47
4
1,
99
0
7.
77
9
7.
73
1
0.
80
0
[3
.3
95
]
[3
.8
14
]
[3
.4
02
]
[3
.5
83
]
[3
.4
00
]
[3
.5
59
]
Fa
th
er
’s
ye
ar
s
of
sc
ho
ol
in
g
1,
95
2
5.
41
6
6.
43
4
0.
00
9
1,
95
2
5.
46
4
5.
79
3
0.
33
7
1,
95
2
5.
48
7
5.
70
8
0.
50
8
[4
.8
05
]
[5
.1
76
]
[4
.7
91
]
[5
.0
37
]
[4
.7
86
]
[5
.0
07
]
M
ot
he
r’
s
ye
ar
s
of
sc
ho
ol
in
g
1,
98
4
1.
68
6
2.
95
3
0.
00
0
1,
98
4
1.
65
5
2.
32
4
0.
00
3
1,
98
4
1.
62
9
2.
25
9
0.
00
2
[3
.1
20
]
[4
.2
21
]
[3
.0
65
]
[3
.7
93
]
[3
.0
19
]
[3
.7
46
]
A
ss
et
in
de
x
1,
95
1
-0
.0
51
0.
29
0
0.
00
0
1,
95
1
-0
.0
55
0.
11
2
0.
01
4
1,
95
1
-0
.0
49
0.
07
7
0.
04
7
[0
.9
36
]
[1
.2
63
]
[0
.9
15
]
[1
.1
40
]
[0
.9
27
]
[1
.0
97
]
G
en
de
ro
ft
he
ch
ild
1,
94
6
0.
45
2
0.
52
3
0.
05
9
1,
94
6
0.
43
9
0.
50
8
0.
01
2
1,
94
6
0.
43
0
0.
51
0
0.
00
2
H
ea
lth
ca
re
In
st
itu
tio
na
ld
el
iv
er
y
1,
97
9
0.
37
8
0.
45
1
0.
00
4
1,
97
9
0.
36
0
0.
44
5
0.
00
0
1,
97
9
0.
36
7
0.
42
3
0.
01
9
H
ea
lth
in
su
ra
nc
e
1,
97
0
0.
38
5
0.
41
1
0.
35
7
1,
97
0
0.
37
3
0.
42
0
0.
07
6
1,
97
0
0.
37
7
0.
40
8
0.
20
7
[0
.4
87
]
[0
.4
93
]
[0
.4
84
]
[0
.4
94
]
[0
.4
85
]
[0
.4
92
]
D
ia
rr
he
a
1,
99
0
0.
03
0
0.
03
7
0.
99
1
1,
99
0
0.
02
8
0.
03
7
0.
46
8
1,
99
0
0.
02
6
0.
03
9
0.
20
3
Im
pr
ov
ed
sa
ni
ta
tio
n
1,
99
0
0.
07
5
0.
16
2
0.
00
1
1,
99
0
0.
07
5
0.
11
5
0.
04
3
1,
99
0
0.
07
6
0.
10
7
0.
10
6
N
ut
ri
tio
n
D
ie
td
iv
er
si
ty
sc
or
e
1,
99
0
3.
86
7
3.
94
1
0.
56
3
1,
99
0
3.
87
1
3.
89
4
0.
86
7
1,
99
0
3.
86
3
3.
90
2
0.
64
0
[1
.1
69
]
[1
.1
83
]
[1
.1
75
]
[1
.1
65
]
[1
.1
77
]
[1
.1
64
]
N
um
be
ro
fm
ea
ls
/d
ay
1,
98
9
3.
05
2
2.
95
3
0.
14
4
1,
98
9
3.
06
0
2.
99
1
0.
26
7
1,
98
9
3.
06
0
3.
00
1
0.
32
8
[1
.0
26
]
[1
.0
87
]
[1
.0
60
]
[0
.9
91
]
[1
.0
52
]
[1
.0
13
]
Fo
od
sc
ar
ci
ty
1,
98
6
0.
80
1
0.
74
0
0.
01
7
1,
98
6
0.
80
0
0.
77
4
0.
16
6
1,
98
6
0.
79
8
0.
78
1
0.
33
3
M
at
er
na
lh
ea
lth
kn
ow
le
dg
e
1,
99
0
0.
37
3
0.
45
5
0.
02
6
1,
99
0
0.
37
3
0.
41
1
0.
25
6
1,
99
0
0.
37
1
0.
40
8
0.
20
1
C
hi
ld
ea
ts
m
ea
tp
ro
du
ct
s
1,
99
0
0.
53
1
0.
54
5
0.
61
3
1,
99
0
0.
53
1
0.
53
9
0.
76
2
1,
99
0
0.
52
7
0.
54
3
0.
50
6
C
hi
ld
re
ce
iv
ed
ir
on
su
pp
le
m
en
ts
1,
96
0
0.
17
2
0.
16
7
0.
69
3
1,
96
0
0.
16
6
0.
18
1
0.
49
9
1,
96
0
0.
16
7
0.
17
8
0.
61
4
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
to
fc
ar
e
Pa
re
nt
s
he
lp
w
ith
ho
m
ew
or
k
1,
96
9
0.
15
5
0.
26
3
0.
00
1
1,
96
9
0.
16
1
0.
19
3
0.
21
2
1,
96
9
0.
16
3
0.
18
5
0.
37
8
Pa
re
nt
’s
tim
e
sp
en
tf
or
ph
ys
ic
al
ch
ild
ca
re
1,
99
0
45
.1
40
45
.2
06
0.
80
6
1,
99
0
45
.3
75
44
.7
36
0.
77
7
1,
99
0
45
.5
13
44
.6
39
0.
63
0
[2
5.
32
3]
[2
4.
02
2]
[2
5.
77
9]
[2
3.
84
2]
[2
5.
42
2]
[2
4.
67
4]
Pa
re
nt
at
te
nd
s
sc
ho
ol
m
ee
tin
gs
1,
98
4
0.
63
1
0.
56
1
0.
13
8
1,
98
4
0.
63
1
0.
59
8
0.
45
2
1,
98
4
0.
63
4
0.
59
9
0.
35
4
Fa
th
er
liv
es
at
ho
m
e
1,
98
9
0.
86
9
0.
75
4
0.
00
0
1,
98
9
0.
87
3
0.
80
9
0.
00
2
1,
98
9
0.
87
5
0.
81
7
0.
00
3
D
is
ta
nc
e
of
sc
ho
ol
(m
in
)
1,
99
0
10
.2
53
10
.7
07
0.
20
8
1,
99
0
10
.3
07
10
.3
64
0.
86
0
1,
99
0
10
.2
64
10
.4
16
0.
66
1
[6
.1
90
]
[6
.5
20
]
[6
.2
82
]
[6
.1
79
]
[6
.1
14
]
[6
.4
27
]
N
ot
es
:C
ol
um
ns
2,
3,
5,
6
re
po
rt
w
av
e
Im
ea
ns
by
at
tr
iti
on
st
at
us
fo
rc
hi
ld
(P
an
el
A
an
d
B
)a
nd
sc
ho
ol
s
(P
an
el
C
)i
n
th
e
st
ud
y
an
al
ys
is
.s
d
st
an
ds
fo
rs
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n.
C
ol
um
ns
5
an
d
9
re
po
rt
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
on
th
e
eq
ua
lit
y
of
m
ea
ns
fo
re
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
.F
-t
es
ts
of
jo
in
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:t
es
to
fj
oi
nt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
in
re
gr
es
si
on
of
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
at
tr
iti
on
du
m
m
ie
s
on
al
ld
is
pl
ay
ed
w
av
e
Iv
ar
ia
bl
es
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
D
at
a.
281
Ta
bl
e
C
.8
:P
an
el
C
:B
al
an
ci
ng
Ta
bl
e
by
A
ttr
iti
on
an
d
Ti
m
e
Pe
ri
od
U
si
ng
W
av
e
ID
at
a
fo
rH
ea
lth
O
ut
co
m
es
W
av
e
II
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
sc
ho
ol
ch
an
ge
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
Ia
ttr
iti
on
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lC
:S
ch
oo
ll
ev
el
co
va
ri
at
es
N
um
be
ro
fc
hi
ld
re
n
en
ro
lle
d
in
sc
ho
ol
49
1
19
9.
57
6
22
9.
60
9
0.
00
2
45
6
20
6.
32
9
21
7.
36
1
0.
29
2
48
1
20
3.
46
2
21
3.
92
0
0.
28
0
[1
45
.4
84
]
[1
45
.2
20
]
[1
47
.6
39
]
[1
48
.1
22
]
[1
47
.0
34
]
[1
46
.7
65
]
C
la
ss
si
ze
49
4
28
.1
01
31
.4
28
0.
00
4
46
0
28
.1
01
29
.9
30
0.
13
1
48
5
27
.9
60
29
.8
20
0.
08
0
[1
6.
39
3]
[1
8.
28
3]
[1
5.
98
6]
[1
7.
77
2]
[1
6.
05
5]
[1
7.
73
3]
St
ud
en
tt
ea
ch
er
ra
tio
49
1
35
.3
53
37
.3
24
0.
00
5
45
6
35
.5
56
36
.3
67
0.
31
3
48
1
35
.4
30
36
.1
89
0.
29
8
[1
1.
22
6]
[1
1.
34
0]
[1
0.
84
8]
[1
1.
58
3]
[1
0.
60
9]
[1
1.
49
9]
C
al
or
ie
s
of
M
id
da
y
M
ea
lp
er
ch
ild
49
4
68
.4
97
65
.7
67
0.
05
0
46
0
68
.0
90
66
.8
69
0.
42
7
48
5
67
.9
94
67
.3
57
0.
65
1
[2
1.
64
0]
[2
3.
17
0]
[2
1.
45
0]
[2
2.
27
8]
[2
1.
42
9]
[2
2.
07
6]
A
m
ou
nt
of
ir
on
in
M
id
da
y
M
ea
lp
er
ch
ild
(m
g)
49
4
0.
79
7
0.
75
1
0.
02
2
46
0
0.
78
4
0.
77
8
0.
80
7
48
5
0.
78
7
0.
77
8
0.
68
7
[0
.3
52
]
[0
.3
26
]
[0
.3
28
]
[0
.3
52
]
[0
.3
32
]
[0
.3
40
]
Jo
in
to
rt
ho
go
na
lit
iy
F
-t
es
t
F-
st
at
is
tic
s
2.
33
2
2.
85
1
3.
48
0
p-
V
al
ue
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
N
ot
es
:C
ol
um
ns
2,
3,
5,
6
re
po
rt
w
av
e
Im
ea
ns
by
at
tr
iti
on
st
at
us
fo
rc
hi
ld
(P
an
el
A
an
d
B
)a
nd
sc
ho
ol
s
(P
an
el
C
)i
n
th
e
st
ud
y
an
al
ys
is
.s
d
st
an
ds
fo
rs
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n.
C
ol
um
ns
5
an
d
9
re
po
rt
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
on
th
e
eq
ua
lit
y
of
m
ea
ns
fo
re
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
.F
-t
es
ts
of
jo
in
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:t
es
to
fj
oi
nt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
in
re
gr
es
si
on
of
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
at
tr
iti
on
du
m
m
ie
s
on
al
ld
is
pl
ay
ed
w
av
e
Iv
ar
ia
bl
es
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
D
at
a.
282
Ta
bl
e
C
.9
:P
an
el
A
:B
al
an
ci
ng
Ta
bl
e
by
A
ttr
iti
on
an
d
Ti
m
e
Pe
ri
od
U
si
ng
W
av
e
ID
at
a
fo
rC
og
ni
tio
n
an
d
E
du
ca
tio
n
O
ut
co
m
es
W
av
e
II
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
sc
ho
ol
ch
an
ge
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
Ia
ttr
iti
on
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lA
.C
hi
ld
le
ve
lo
ut
co
m
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
ea
lth
ou
tc
om
es
H
em
og
lo
bi
n
(g
/d
L
)
1,
90
4
11
.5
10
11
.5
70
0.
44
1
1,
90
4
11
.4
91
11
.5
77
0.
16
6
1,
90
4
11
.5
00
11
.5
40
0.
49
4
[1
.1
04
]
[1
.1
14
]
[1
.1
16
]
[1
.0
81
]
[1
.1
21
]
[1
.0
88
]
A
ny
an
em
ia
1,
90
4
0.
45
6
0.
46
1
0.
86
9
1,
90
4
0.
46
2
0.
44
5
0.
61
5
1,
90
4
0.
45
1
0.
46
3
0.
50
8
M
ild
an
em
ia
1,
90
4
0.
19
4
0.
18
4
0.
97
1
1,
90
4
0.
19
6
0.
18
4
0.
76
3
1,
90
4
0.
18
1
0.
20
4
0.
11
5
M
od
er
at
e/
se
ve
re
an
em
ia
1,
90
4
0.
26
2
0.
27
7
0.
88
5
1,
90
4
0.
26
6
0.
26
1
0.
75
1
1,
90
4
0.
26
9
0.
25
9
0.
51
5
N
um
be
ro
fs
ym
pt
om
s
1,
99
0
1.
07
4
1.
08
2
0.
84
7
1,
99
0
1.
05
7
1.
11
0
0.
34
5
1,
99
0
1.
06
5
1.
08
6
0.
70
9
[1
.1
08
]
[1
.0
61
]
[1
.1
06
]
[1
.0
91
]
[1
.1
07
]
[1
.0
94
]
C
og
ni
tiv
e
te
st
ou
tc
om
es
B
lo
ck
de
si
gn
1,
89
5
3.
69
3
3.
84
7
0.
83
1
1,
89
5
3.
72
5
3.
68
1
0.
49
6
1,
89
5
3.
81
5
3.
59
0
0.
04
1
[2
.2
12
]
[2
.1
97
]
[2
.1
96
]
[2
.2
45
]
[2
.1
61
]
[2
.2
62
]
D
ig
it
sp
an
fo
rw
ar
d
1,
89
7
4.
06
9
4.
10
7
0.
89
3
1,
89
7
4.
07
9
4.
06
1
0.
57
6
1,
89
7
4.
10
2
4.
04
0
0.
15
4
[0
.9
83
]
[1
.1
51
]
[0
.9
62
]
[1
.0
92
]
[0
.9
53
]
[1
.0
60
]
D
ig
it
sp
an
ba
ck
w
ar
d
1,
89
7
1.
10
0
1.
32
1
0.
12
7
1,
89
7
1.
11
5
1.
15
1
0.
88
2
1,
89
7
1.
13
9
1.
11
2
0.
55
8
[1
.2
82
]
[1
.4
31
]
[1
.3
01
]
[1
.3
04
]
[1
.2
96
]
[1
.3
10
]
Pr
og
re
ss
iv
e
m
at
ri
ce
s
1,
89
5
4.
74
7
4.
82
4
0.
99
0
1,
89
5
4.
76
9
4.
72
7
0.
49
5
1,
89
5
4.
82
1
4.
67
9
0.
07
7
[1
.6
42
]
[2
.0
20
]
[1
.6
15
]
[1
.8
48
]
[1
.6
26
]
[1
.7
61
]
St
ro
op
te
st
1,
89
4
5.
27
3
6.
06
3
0.
02
1
1,
89
4
5.
28
2
5.
55
4
0.
32
9
1,
89
4
5.
33
4
5.
40
3
0.
93
3
[3
.3
90
]
[3
.6
86
]
[3
.3
92
]
[3
.5
21
]
[3
.3
78
]
[3
.5
00
]
C
og
ni
tiv
e
sc
or
e
in
de
x
1,
89
0
-0
.0
26
0.
14
5
0.
22
6
1,
89
0
-0
.0
11
0.
00
4
0.
83
1
1,
89
0
0.
02
7
-0
.0
45
0.
11
2
[0
.9
79
]
[1
.1
27
]
[0
.9
72
]
[1
.0
55
]
[0
.9
67
]
[1
.0
32
]
E
du
ca
tio
n
ou
tc
om
es
M
at
h
sc
or
e
1,
89
5
4.
66
6
6.
11
7
0.
00
0
1,
89
5
4.
72
7
5.
08
0
0.
40
4
1,
89
5
4.
93
6
4.
71
9
0.
23
7
[3
.7
71
]
[4
.2
30
]
[3
.7
27
]
[4
.1
19
]
[3
.6
88
]
[4
.0
41
]
R
ea
di
ng
sc
or
e
1,
89
6
0.
87
8
1.
21
5
0.
00
5
1,
89
6
0.
89
2
0.
97
4
0.
53
4
1,
89
6
0.
92
4
0.
91
1
0.
57
7
[1
.1
26
]
[1
.2
07
]
[1
.1
26
]
[1
.1
70
]
[1
.1
32
]
[1
.1
51
]
Sc
ho
ol
at
te
nd
an
ce
1,
87
1
0.
79
5
0.
70
7
0.
00
0
1,
87
1
0.
79
5
0.
75
5
0.
00
1
1,
87
1
0.
80
3
0.
75
9
0.
00
0
[0
.1
58
]
[0
.2
19
]
[0
.1
59
]
[0
.1
91
]
[0
.1
57
]
[0
.1
83
]
N
ot
es
:C
ol
um
ns
2,
3,
5,
6
re
po
rt
w
av
e
Im
ea
ns
by
at
tr
iti
on
st
at
us
fo
rc
hi
ld
(P
an
el
A
an
d
B
)a
nd
sc
ho
ol
s
(P
an
el
C
)i
n
th
e
st
ud
y
an
al
ys
is
.s
d
st
an
ds
fo
rs
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n.
C
ol
um
ns
5
an
d
9
re
po
rt
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
on
th
e
eq
ua
lit
y
of
m
ea
ns
fo
re
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
.F
-t
es
ts
of
jo
in
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:t
es
to
fj
oi
nt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
in
re
gr
es
si
on
of
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
at
tr
iti
on
du
m
m
ie
s
on
al
ld
is
pl
ay
ed
w
av
e
Iv
ar
ia
bl
es
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
D
at
a.
283
Ta
bl
e
C
.1
0:
Pa
ne
lB
:B
al
an
ci
ng
Ta
bl
e
by
A
ttr
iti
on
an
d
Ti
m
e
Pe
ri
od
U
si
ng
W
av
e
ID
at
a
fo
rC
og
ni
tio
n
an
d
E
du
ca
tio
n
O
ut
co
m
es
W
av
e
II
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
sc
ho
ol
ch
an
ge
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
Ia
ttr
iti
on
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lB
:C
hi
ld
an
d
ho
us
eh
ol
d
le
ve
lc
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s
an
d
so
ci
oe
co
no
m
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
M
us
lim
1,
99
0
0.
02
7
0.
01
9
0.
38
5
1,
99
0
0.
03
4
0.
01
2
0.
04
1
1,
99
0
0.
03
3
0.
01
9
0.
13
8
Sc
he
du
le
d
C
as
te
/S
ch
ed
ul
ed
Tr
ib
e
1,
99
0
0.
28
9
0.
22
7
0.
01
4
1,
99
0
0.
29
1
0.
25
6
0.
30
1
1,
99
0
0.
28
5
0.
27
3
0.
72
8
B
lo
ck
1,
99
0
1.
32
6
1.
34
4
0.
47
6
1,
99
0
1.
30
1
1.
38
3
0.
12
6
1,
99
0
1.
29
8
1.
36
2
0.
20
8
R
ur
al
1,
99
0
0.
97
8
0.
98
4
0.
55
9
1,
99
0
0.
97
7
0.
98
2
0.
62
3
1,
99
0
0.
97
6
0.
98
2
0.
48
4
Fa
m
ily
si
ze
1,
99
0
7.
73
7
7.
87
4
0.
32
4
1,
99
0
7.
78
0
7.
71
8
0.
76
3
1,
99
0
7.
71
7
7.
80
3
0.
60
8
[3
.3
58
]
[3
.9
94
]
[3
.3
49
]
[3
.6
83
]
[3
.2
50
]
[3
.6
82
]
Fa
th
er
’s
ye
ar
s
of
sc
ho
ol
in
g
1,
95
2
5.
38
3
6.
60
8
0.
00
1
1,
95
2
5.
41
1
5.
90
1
0.
14
8
1,
95
2
5.
31
1
5.
86
1
0.
05
7
[4
.7
81
]
[5
.2
51
]
[4
.7
72
]
[5
.0
67
]
[4
.7
42
]
[5
.0
07
]
M
ot
he
r’
s
ye
ar
s
of
sc
ho
ol
in
g
1,
98
4
1.
66
2
3.
09
5
0.
00
0
1,
98
4
1.
64
3
2.
36
5
0.
00
1
1,
98
4
1.
48
1
2.
32
2
0.
00
0
[3
.1
15
]
[4
.2
09
]
[3
.0
82
]
[3
.7
78
]
[2
.9
24
]
[3
.7
06
]
A
ss
et
in
de
x
1,
95
1
-0
.0
44
0.
25
4
0.
00
0
1,
95
1
-0
.0
42
0.
09
2
0.
05
3
1,
95
1
-0
.0
51
0.
06
1
0.
06
6
[0
.9
45
]
[1
.2
36
]
[0
.9
37
]
[1
.1
14
]
[0
.9
26
]
[1
.0
75
]
G
en
de
ro
ft
he
ch
ild
1,
94
6
0.
44
9
0.
54
2
0.
00
5
1,
94
6
0.
43
5
0.
51
8
0.
00
4
1,
94
6
0.
44
0
0.
48
7
0.
06
8
H
ea
lth
ca
re
In
st
itu
tio
na
ld
el
iv
er
y
1,
97
9
0.
38
2
0.
43
1
0.
08
3
1,
97
9
0.
36
7
0.
43
5
0.
00
8
1,
97
9
0.
36
9
0.
41
2
0.
06
1
H
ea
lth
in
su
ra
nc
e
1,
97
0
0.
38
6
0.
40
5
0.
32
5
1,
97
0
0.
37
5
0.
41
8
0.
07
8
1,
97
0
0.
36
0
0.
42
0
0.
01
4
[0
.4
87
]
[0
.4
92
]
[0
.4
84
]
[0
.4
94
]
[0
.4
80
]
[0
.4
94
]
D
ia
rr
he
a
1,
99
0
0.
02
9
0.
04
1
0.
66
0
1,
99
0
0.
02
9
0.
03
5
0.
71
8
1,
99
0
0.
02
5
0.
03
7
0.
22
3
Im
pr
ov
ed
sa
ni
ta
tio
n
1,
99
0
0.
07
7
0.
15
1
0.
00
2
1,
99
0
0.
07
6
0.
11
5
0.
04
2
1,
99
0
0.
07
2
0.
10
6
0.
04
4
N
ut
ri
tio
n
D
ie
td
iv
er
si
ty
sc
or
e
1,
99
0
3.
86
0
3.
98
1
0.
11
3
1,
99
0
3.
86
2
3.
91
0
0.
58
1
1,
99
0
3.
84
6
3.
91
3
0.
36
1
[1
.1
82
]
[1
.1
11
]
[1
.1
86
]
[1
.1
44
]
[1
.1
95
]
[1
.1
45
]
N
um
be
ro
fm
ea
ls
/d
ay
1,
98
9
3.
04
3
2.
99
7
0.
48
6
1,
98
9
3.
05
5
2.
99
9
0.
41
9
1,
98
9
3.
06
1
3.
00
9
0.
44
6
[1
.0
53
]
[0
.9
43
]
[1
.0
79
]
[0
.9
48
]
[1
.0
80
]
[0
.9
87
]
Fo
od
sc
ar
ci
ty
1,
98
6
0.
80
1
0.
73
7
0.
00
9
1,
98
6
0.
80
3
0.
76
8
0.
07
8
1,
98
6
0.
80
2
0.
78
0
0.
23
7
M
at
er
na
lh
ea
lth
kn
ow
le
dg
e
1,
99
0
0.
38
3
0.
40
7
0.
60
4
1,
99
0
0.
37
9
0.
40
1
0.
59
9
1,
99
0
0.
37
8
0.
39
6
0.
59
7
C
hi
ld
ea
ts
m
ea
tp
ro
du
ct
s
1,
99
0
0.
52
9
0.
55
8
0.
22
8
1,
99
0
0.
53
2
0.
53
7
0.
82
6
1,
99
0
0.
52
3
0.
54
4
0.
38
9
C
hi
ld
re
ce
iv
ed
ir
on
su
pp
le
m
en
ts
1,
96
0
0.
16
8
0.
18
9
0.
42
4
1,
96
0
0.
16
2
0.
19
0
0.
19
7
1,
96
0
0.
14
9
0.
19
5
0.
01
7
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
to
fc
ar
e
Pa
re
nt
s
he
lp
w
ith
ho
m
ew
or
k
1,
96
9
0.
15
5
0.
26
5
0.
00
0
1,
96
9
0.
15
8
0.
19
9
0.
12
5
1,
96
9
0.
14
9
0.
19
7
0.
03
8
Pa
re
nt
’s
tim
e
sp
en
tf
or
ph
ys
ic
al
ch
ild
ca
re
1,
99
0
45
.2
50
44
.6
25
0.
88
9
1,
99
0
45
.3
58
44
.7
52
0.
79
2
1,
99
0
45
.8
36
44
.4
28
0.
34
6
[2
5.
54
6]
[2
2.
71
2]
[2
5.
56
5]
[2
4.
23
2]
[2
5.
38
6]
[2
4.
81
2]
Pa
re
nt
at
te
nd
s
sc
ho
ol
m
ee
tin
gs
1,
98
4
0.
62
9
0.
56
8
0.
18
4
1,
98
4
0.
63
1
0.
59
6
0.
43
1
1,
98
4
0.
63
2
0.
60
6
0.
52
3
Fa
th
er
liv
es
at
ho
m
e
1,
98
9
0.
86
7
0.
76
7
0.
00
0
1,
98
9
0.
87
2
0.
81
0
0.
00
2
1,
98
9
0.
88
1
0.
81
9
0.
00
1
D
is
ta
nc
e
of
sc
ho
ol
(m
in
)
1,
99
0
10
.2
72
10
.6
15
0.
30
6
1,
99
0
10
.3
29
10
.3
22
0.
99
9
1,
99
0
10
.5
03
10
.1
40
0.
32
7
[6
.2
01
]
[6
.4
74
]
[6
.3
07
]
[6
.1
29
]
[6
.5
68
]
[5
.8
82
]
N
ot
es
:C
ol
um
ns
2,
3,
5,
6
re
po
rt
w
av
e
Im
ea
ns
by
at
tr
iti
on
st
at
us
fo
rc
hi
ld
(P
an
el
A
an
d
B
)a
nd
sc
ho
ol
s
(P
an
el
C
)i
n
th
e
st
ud
y
an
al
ys
is
.s
d
st
an
ds
fo
rs
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n.
C
ol
um
ns
5
an
d
9
re
po
rt
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
on
th
e
eq
ua
lit
y
of
m
ea
ns
fo
re
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
.F
-t
es
ts
of
jo
in
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:t
es
to
fj
oi
nt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
in
re
gr
es
si
on
of
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
at
tr
iti
on
du
m
m
ie
s
on
al
ld
is
pl
ay
ed
w
av
e
Iv
ar
ia
bl
es
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
D
at
a.
284
Ta
bl
e
C
.1
1:
Pa
ne
lC
:B
al
an
ci
ng
Ta
bl
e
by
A
ttr
iti
on
an
d
Ti
m
e
Pe
ri
od
U
si
ng
W
av
e
ID
at
a
fo
rC
og
ni
tio
n
an
d
E
du
ca
tio
n
O
ut
co
m
es
W
av
e
II
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
sc
ho
ol
ch
an
ge
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
Ia
ttr
iti
on
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lC
:S
ch
oo
ll
ev
el
co
va
ri
at
es
N
um
be
ro
fc
hi
ld
re
n
en
ro
lle
d
in
sc
ho
ol
49
0
20
0.
55
8
23
4.
54
8
0.
00
0
45
2
20
9.
32
4
22
2.
02
3
0.
22
5
45
5
22
3.
78
2
21
2.
51
2
0.
31
7
[1
50
.5
17
]
[1
44
.5
14
]
[1
53
.9
75
]
[1
46
.0
49
]
[1
59
.2
68
]
[1
47
.3
85
]
C
la
ss
si
ze
49
3
28
.6
40
31
.7
45
0.
00
2
45
6
29
.1
58
30
.1
70
0.
39
8
45
9
28
.8
86
29
.2
00
0.
81
8
[1
7.
63
4]
[1
7.
22
0]
[1
7.
76
7]
[1
7.
15
6]
[1
7.
60
6]
[1
6.
87
4]
St
ud
en
tt
ea
ch
er
ra
tio
49
0
35
.2
27
38
.6
12
0.
00
0
45
2
35
.4
64
37
.0
16
0.
05
6
45
5
34
.7
01
36
.2
36
0.
06
1
[1
1.
23
9]
[1
1.
11
3]
[1
0.
86
9]
[1
1.
50
9]
[1
0.
26
0]
[1
1.
42
3]
C
al
or
ie
s
of
M
id
da
y
M
ea
lp
er
ch
ild
49
3
67
.9
43
67
.5
55
0.
77
7
45
6
67
.4
99
67
.6
65
0.
91
0
45
9
67
.7
80
67
.7
42
0.
98
5
[2
1.
70
3]
[2
3.
55
8]
[2
1.
43
4]
[2
2.
47
0]
[2
1.
61
7]
[2
1.
89
0]
A
m
ou
nt
of
ir
on
in
M
id
da
y
M
ea
lp
er
ch
ild
(m
g)
49
3
0.
78
7
0.
76
8
0.
35
0
45
6
0.
77
2
0.
78
1
0.
74
7
45
9
0.
79
0
0.
77
3
0.
53
4
[0
.3
55
]
[0
.2
96
]
[0
.3
29
]
[0
.3
30
]
[0
.3
45
]
[0
.3
22
]
Jo
in
to
rt
ho
go
na
lit
iy
F
-t
es
t
F-
st
at
is
tic
s
2.
10
8
2.
88
2
5.
83
3
p-
V
al
ue
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
N
ot
es
:C
ol
um
ns
2,
3,
5,
6
re
po
rt
w
av
e
Im
ea
ns
by
at
tr
iti
on
st
at
us
fo
rc
hi
ld
(P
an
el
A
an
d
B
)a
nd
sc
ho
ol
s
(P
an
el
C
)i
n
th
e
st
ud
y
an
al
ys
is
.s
d
st
an
ds
fo
rs
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n.
C
ol
um
ns
5
an
d
9
re
po
rt
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
on
th
e
eq
ua
lit
y
of
m
ea
ns
fo
re
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
.F
-t
es
ts
of
jo
in
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:t
es
to
fj
oi
nt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
in
re
gr
es
si
on
of
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
at
tr
iti
on
du
m
m
ie
s
on
al
ld
is
pl
ay
ed
w
av
e
Iv
ar
ia
bl
es
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
D
at
a.
285
Ta
bl
e
C
.1
2:
Pa
ne
lA
:B
al
an
ci
ng
Ta
bl
e
by
A
ttr
iti
on
an
d
Ti
m
e
Pe
ri
od
U
si
ng
W
av
e
ID
at
a
fo
rA
tte
nd
an
ce
O
ut
co
m
e
W
av
e
II
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
sc
ho
ol
ch
an
ge
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
Ia
ttr
iti
on
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lA
.C
hi
ld
le
ve
lo
ut
co
m
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
H
ea
lth
ou
tc
om
es
H
em
og
lo
bi
n
(g
/d
L
)
1,
90
4
11
.5
14
11
.5
76
0.
46
3
1,
90
4
11
.4
97
11
.5
69
0.
24
3
1,
90
4
11
.4
84
11
.5
53
0.
21
9
[1
.1
13
]
[1
.0
13
]
[1
.1
25
]
[1
.0
58
]
[1
.1
25
]
[1
.0
85
]
A
ny
an
em
ia
1,
90
4
0.
45
5
0.
47
0
0.
63
3
1,
90
4
0.
46
0
0.
44
8
0.
75
3
1,
90
4
0.
46
3
0.
45
0
0.
65
0
M
ild
an
em
ia
1,
90
4
0.
19
0
0.
21
9
0.
31
4
1,
90
4
0.
19
2
0.
19
3
0.
65
5
1,
90
4
0.
19
5
0.
19
0
0.
97
2
M
od
er
at
e/
se
ve
re
an
em
ia
1,
90
4
0.
26
5
0.
25
2
0.
73
9
1,
90
4
0.
26
8
0.
25
4
0.
43
6
1,
90
4
0.
26
8
0.
26
0
0.
63
0
N
um
be
ro
fs
ym
pt
om
s
1,
99
0
1.
08
2
0.
99
4
0.
37
3
1,
99
0
1.
07
0
1.
08
5
0.
83
1
1,
99
0
1.
05
2
1.
09
6
0.
51
5
[1
.1
04
]
[1
.0
60
]
[1
.1
06
]
[1
.0
90
]
[1
.0
75
]
[1
.1
24
]
C
og
ni
tiv
e
te
st
ou
tc
om
es
B
lo
ck
de
si
gn
1,
89
5
3.
69
3
3.
93
1
0.
27
1
1,
89
5
3.
70
3
3.
73
0
0.
84
9
1,
89
5
3.
76
2
3.
66
1
0.
31
0
[2
.2
03
]
[2
.2
95
]
[2
.1
85
]
[2
.2
72
]
[2
.1
57
]
[2
.2
62
]
D
ig
it
sp
an
fo
rw
ar
d
1,
89
7
4.
07
9
4.
00
0
0.
50
9
1,
89
7
4.
07
2
4.
07
6
0.
83
8
1,
89
7
4.
07
7
4.
07
0
0.
76
2
[1
.0
01
]
[1
.0
44
]
[0
.9
85
]
[1
.0
48
]
[0
.9
79
]
[1
.0
28
]
D
ig
it
sp
an
ba
ck
w
ar
d
1,
89
7
1.
12
6
1.
13
2
0.
94
6
1,
89
7
1.
13
3
1.
11
1
0.
58
6
1,
89
7
1.
17
4
1.
07
9
0.
14
3
[1
.3
04
]
[1
.2
86
]
[1
.3
19
]
[1
.2
62
]
[1
.3
27
]
[1
.2
76
]
Pr
og
re
ss
iv
e
m
at
ri
ce
s
1,
89
5
4.
75
3
4.
79
0
0.
96
2
1,
89
5
4.
76
2
4.
74
2
0.
65
4
1,
89
5
4.
80
1
4.
71
1
0.
29
0
[1
.6
79
]
[1
.8
34
]
[1
.6
42
]
[1
.8
01
]
[1
.5
97
]
[1
.7
78
]
St
ro
op
te
st
1,
89
4
5.
39
3
5.
03
5
0.
24
7
1,
89
4
5.
36
4
5.
36
8
0.
70
3
1,
89
4
5.
46
6
5.
26
7
0.
18
3
[3
.4
27
]
[3
.5
20
]
[3
.4
16
]
[3
.4
78
]
[3
.4
18
]
[3
.4
49
]
C
og
ni
tiv
e
sc
or
e
in
de
x
1,
89
0
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
17
0.
90
0
1,
89
0
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
09
0.
63
5
1,
89
0
0.
03
0
-0
.0
41
0.
14
9
[0
.9
87
]
[1
.1
28
]
[0
.9
81
]
[1
.0
39
]
[0
.9
90
]
[1
.0
05
]
E
du
ca
tio
n
ou
tc
om
es
M
at
h
sc
or
e
1,
89
5
4.
80
8
5.
18
2
0.
39
2
1,
89
5
4.
77
4
4.
98
4
0.
75
2
1,
89
5
5.
02
7
4.
65
0
0.
08
5
[3
.8
43
]
[3
.9
98
]
[3
.7
49
]
[4
.0
93
]
[3
.7
79
]
[3
.9
21
]
R
ea
di
ng
sc
or
e
1,
89
6
0.
91
2
0.
99
3
0.
56
6
1,
89
6
0.
90
3
0.
95
2
0.
85
9
1,
89
6
0.
96
6
0.
87
0
0.
11
5
[1
.1
35
]
[1
.2
03
]
[1
.1
24
]
[1
.1
80
]
[1
.1
46
]
[1
.1
33
]
Sc
ho
ol
at
te
nd
an
ce
1,
87
1
0.
78
6
0.
65
8
0.
00
6
1,
87
1
0.
78
8
0.
76
5
0.
07
6
1,
87
1
0.
80
0
0.
76
4
0.
00
1
[0
.1
67
]
[0
.2
61
]
[0
.1
68
]
[0
.1
79
]
[0
.1
65
]
[0
.1
75
]
N
ot
es
:C
ol
um
ns
2,
3,
5,
6
re
po
rt
w
av
e
Im
ea
ns
by
at
tr
iti
on
st
at
us
fo
rc
hi
ld
(P
an
el
A
an
d
B
)a
nd
sc
ho
ol
s
(P
an
el
C
)i
n
th
e
st
ud
y
an
al
ys
is
.s
d
st
an
ds
fo
rs
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n.
C
ol
um
ns
5
an
d
9
re
po
rt
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
on
th
e
eq
ua
lit
y
of
m
ea
ns
fo
re
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
.F
-t
es
ts
of
jo
in
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:t
es
to
fj
oi
nt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
in
re
gr
es
si
on
of
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
at
tr
iti
on
du
m
m
ie
s
on
al
ld
is
pl
ay
ed
w
av
e
Iv
ar
ia
bl
es
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
D
at
a.
286
Ta
bl
e
C
.1
3:
Pa
ne
lB
:B
al
an
ci
ng
Ta
bl
e
by
A
ttr
iti
on
an
d
Ti
m
e
Pe
ri
od
U
si
ng
W
av
e
ID
at
a
fo
rA
tte
nd
an
ce
O
ut
co
m
e
W
av
e
II
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
sc
ho
ol
ch
an
ge
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
Ia
ttr
iti
on
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lB
:C
hi
ld
an
d
ho
us
eh
ol
d
le
ve
lc
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s
an
d
so
ci
oe
co
no
m
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
M
us
lim
1,
99
0
0.
02
6
0.
02
9
0.
71
0
1,
99
0
0.
03
1
0.
01
4
0.
06
1
1,
99
0
0.
04
2
0.
01
2
0.
02
3
Sc
he
du
le
d
C
as
te
/S
ch
ed
ul
ed
Tr
ib
e
1,
99
0
0.
28
1
0.
25
7
0.
64
9
1,
99
0
0.
28
5
0.
26
6
0.
64
7
1,
99
0
0.
30
0
0.
25
9
0.
27
1
B
lo
ck
1,
99
0
1.
32
9
1.
32
7
0.
90
1
1,
99
0
1.
30
5
1.
38
3
0.
18
8
1,
99
0
1.
27
6
1.
37
9
0.
07
0
R
ur
al
1,
99
0
0.
97
7
0.
99
4
0.
05
0
1,
99
0
0.
97
6
0.
98
6
0.
35
9
1,
99
0
0.
97
8
0.
98
0
0.
93
7
Fa
m
ily
si
ze
1,
99
0
7.
72
8
8.
08
8
0.
27
6
1,
99
0
7.
81
6
7.
63
5
0.
33
8
1,
99
0
7.
65
7
7.
85
4
0.
24
0
[3
.4
27
]
[3
.8
53
]
[3
.4
15
]
[3
.5
75
]
[3
.2
71
]
[3
.6
38
]
Fa
th
er
’s
ye
ar
s
of
sc
ho
ol
in
g
1,
95
2
5.
54
8
5.
89
2
0.
61
9
1,
95
2
5.
53
8
5.
66
7
0.
83
1
1,
95
2
5.
35
2
5.
79
1
0.
16
9
[4
.8
82
]
[4
.8
50
]
[4
.8
47
]
[4
.9
50
]
[4
.7
77
]
[4
.9
65
]
M
ot
he
r’
s
ye
ar
s
of
sc
ho
ol
in
g
1,
98
4
1.
82
3
2.
60
2
0.
07
9
1,
98
4
1.
75
6
2.
18
3
0.
09
8
1,
98
4
1.
57
0
2.
18
9
0.
00
2
[3
.2
64
]
[4
.1
28
]
[3
.2
10
]
[3
.6
33
]
[3
.0
03
]
[3
.6
27
]
A
ss
et
in
de
x
1,
95
1
-0
.0
09
0.
13
2
0.
42
2
1,
95
1
-0
.0
05
0.
02
3
0.
83
2
1,
95
1
-0
.0
54
0.
05
7
0.
08
3
[0
.9
80
]
[1
.2
10
]
[0
.9
74
]
[1
.0
64
]
[0
.9
10
]
[1
.0
79
]
G
en
de
ro
ft
he
ch
ild
1,
94
6
0.
45
7
0.
51
9
0.
26
9
1,
94
6
0.
44
5
0.
50
3
0.
05
0
1,
94
6
0.
42
6
0.
49
7
0.
00
9
H
ea
lth
ca
re
In
st
itu
tio
na
ld
el
iv
er
y
1,
97
9
0.
39
0
0.
38
6
0.
92
8
1,
97
9
0.
36
9
0.
43
6
0.
01
2
1,
97
9
0.
34
0
0.
43
7
0.
00
0
H
ea
lth
in
su
ra
nc
e
1,
97
0
0.
38
8
0.
40
1
0.
96
3
1,
97
0
0.
38
1
0.
40
8
0.
29
6
1,
97
0
0.
37
0
0.
40
7
0.
18
5
[0
.4
87
]
[0
.4
92
]
[0
.4
86
]
[0
.4
92
]
[0
.4
83
]
[0
.4
92
]
D
ia
rr
he
a
1,
99
0
0.
02
9
0.
05
3
0.
23
8
1,
99
0
0.
02
7
0.
04
0
0.
29
6
1,
99
0
0.
02
4
0.
03
8
0.
13
2
Im
pr
ov
ed
sa
ni
ta
tio
n
1,
99
0
0.
08
3
0.
15
2
0.
05
4
1,
99
0
0.
08
1
0.
10
6
0.
29
2
1,
99
0
0.
07
0
0.
10
7
0.
03
5
N
ut
ri
tio
n
D
ie
td
iv
er
si
ty
sc
or
e
1,
99
0
3.
86
6
4.
01
2
0.
18
5
1,
99
0
3.
87
0
3.
89
7
0.
84
0
1,
99
0
3.
85
5
3.
90
1
0.
57
2
[1
.1
73
]
[1
.1
53
]
[1
.1
80
]
[1
.1
52
]
[1
.1
66
]
[1
.1
77
]
N
um
be
ro
fm
ea
ls
/d
ay
1,
98
9
3.
03
7
3.
02
3
0.
78
6
1,
98
9
3.
04
8
3.
01
0
0.
65
7
1,
98
9
3.
05
6
3.
01
7
0.
57
3
[1
.0
36
]
[1
.0
40
]
[1
.0
68
]
[0
.9
63
]
[1
.0
46
]
[1
.0
27
]
Fo
od
sc
ar
ci
ty
1,
98
6
0.
79
4
0.
75
4
0.
50
6
1,
98
6
0.
79
5
0.
78
2
0.
52
4
1,
98
6
0.
80
4
0.
77
9
0.
24
7
M
at
er
na
lh
ea
lth
kn
ow
le
dg
e
1,
99
0
0.
38
5
0.
39
8
0.
90
2
1,
99
0
0.
38
1
0.
39
7
0.
78
5
1,
99
0
0.
36
5
0.
40
6
0.
13
4
C
hi
ld
ea
ts
m
ea
tp
ro
du
ct
s
1,
99
0
0.
53
0
0.
57
3
0.
32
8
1,
99
0
0.
52
9
0.
54
3
0.
61
9
1,
99
0
0.
53
0
0.
53
7
0.
76
6
C
hi
ld
re
ce
iv
ed
ir
on
su
pp
le
m
en
ts
1,
96
0
0.
17
0
0.
18
3
0.
97
6
1,
96
0
0.
16
7
0.
18
1
0.
55
6
1,
96
0
0.
15
1
0.
19
0
0.
08
1
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
to
fc
ar
e
Pa
re
nt
s
he
lp
w
ith
ho
m
ew
or
k
1,
96
9
0.
16
5
0.
24
9
0.
05
9
1,
96
9
0.
16
3
0.
19
3
0.
26
7
1,
96
9
0.
14
4
0.
19
8
0.
01
1
Pa
re
nt
’s
tim
e
sp
en
tf
or
ph
ys
ic
al
ch
ild
ca
re
1,
99
0
45
.2
94
43
.6
32
0.
35
4
1,
99
0
45
.3
43
44
.7
29
0.
81
0
1,
99
0
45
.0
67
45
.2
29
0.
85
8
[2
5.
58
4]
[1
9.
39
3]
[2
5.
76
7]
[2
3.
62
9]
[2
5.
19
7]
[2
5.
04
5]
Pa
re
nt
at
te
nd
s
sc
ho
ol
m
ee
tin
gs
1,
98
4
0.
61
9
0.
62
6
0.
73
1
1,
98
4
0.
62
4
0.
60
9
0.
93
9
1,
98
4
0.
64
3
0.
59
7
0.
17
9
Fa
th
er
liv
es
at
ho
m
e
1,
98
9
0.
84
9
0.
86
5
0.
26
3
1,
98
9
0.
86
5
0.
82
0
0.
04
3
1,
98
9
0.
86
5
0.
83
8
0.
15
4
D
is
ta
nc
e
of
sc
ho
ol
(m
in
)
1,
99
0
10
.2
89
10
.7
31
0.
25
5
1,
99
0
10
.4
05
10
.1
55
0.
52
5
1,
99
0
10
.3
82
10
.2
75
0.
79
5
[6
.2
91
]
[5
.7
36
]
[6
.4
25
]
[5
.8
32
]
[6
.3
71
]
[6
.1
27
]
N
ot
es
:C
ol
um
ns
2,
3,
5,
6
re
po
rt
w
av
e
Im
ea
ns
by
at
tr
iti
on
st
at
us
fo
rc
hi
ld
(P
an
el
A
an
d
B
)a
nd
sc
ho
ol
s
(P
an
el
C
)i
n
th
e
st
ud
y
an
al
ys
is
.s
d
st
an
ds
fo
rs
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n.
C
ol
um
ns
5
an
d
9
re
po
rt
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
on
th
e
eq
ua
lit
y
of
m
ea
ns
fo
re
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
.F
-t
es
ts
of
jo
in
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:t
es
to
fj
oi
nt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
in
re
gr
es
si
on
of
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
at
tr
iti
on
du
m
m
ie
s
on
al
ld
is
pl
ay
ed
w
av
e
Iv
ar
ia
bl
es
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
D
at
a.
287
Ta
bl
e
C
.1
4:
Pa
ne
lC
:B
al
an
ci
ng
Ta
bl
e
by
A
ttr
iti
on
an
d
Ti
m
e
Pe
ri
od
U
si
ng
W
av
e
ID
at
a
fo
rA
tte
nd
an
ce
O
ut
co
m
e
W
av
e
II
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
sc
ho
ol
ch
an
ge
at
tr
iti
on
W
av
e
II
Ia
ttr
iti
on
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
N
on
-A
ttr
ite
d
m
ea
n
(s
d)
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lC
:S
ch
oo
ll
ev
el
co
va
ri
at
es
N
um
be
ro
fc
hi
ld
re
n
en
ro
lle
d
in
sc
ho
ol
42
1
20
6.
01
3
25
8.
27
5
0.
00
0
42
1
21
2.
38
1
22
7.
89
7
0.
17
4
42
0
23
7.
17
9
21
2.
15
3
0.
08
4
[1
50
.6
09
]
[1
49
.4
60
]
[1
54
.5
09
]
[1
53
.2
19
]
[1
60
.7
68
]
[1
51
.0
60
]
C
la
ss
si
ze
42
4
28
.5
53
35
.0
39
0.
00
0
42
5
28
.9
38
30
.7
40
0.
16
9
42
4
29
.3
02
29
.2
47
0.
96
6
[1
7.
40
8]
[1
7.
17
3]
[1
7.
83
5]
[1
7.
71
8]
[1
7.
10
8]
[1
7.
53
1]
St
ud
en
tt
ea
ch
er
ra
tio
42
1
35
.5
70
38
.4
67
0.
01
1
42
1
35
.7
38
36
.6
72
0.
31
2
42
0
35
.6
36
35
.8
47
0.
84
8
[1
1.
28
6]
[1
1.
21
7]
[1
0.
97
9]
[1
1.
86
5]
[1
0.
54
1]
[1
1.
45
0]
C
al
or
ie
s
of
M
id
da
y
M
ea
lp
er
ch
ild
42
4
68
.2
49
66
.0
26
0.
30
0
42
5
68
.0
06
66
.7
71
0.
48
8
42
4
69
.0
94
67
.5
22
0.
47
4
[2
1.
96
5]
[2
2.
28
7]
[2
1.
84
5]
[2
1.
99
7]
[2
2.
11
0]
[2
1.
50
5]
A
m
ou
nt
of
ir
on
in
M
id
da
y
M
ea
lp
er
ch
ild
(m
g)
42
4
0.
78
5
0.
77
1
0.
61
7
42
5
0.
77
6
0.
77
9
0.
91
2
42
4
0.
78
2
0.
78
1
0.
99
7
[0
.3
48
]
[0
.2
83
]
[0
.3
27
]
[0
.3
40
]
[0
.3
31
]
[0
.3
34
]
Jo
in
to
rt
ho
go
na
lit
iy
F
-t
es
t
F-
st
at
is
tic
s
1.
09
0
1.
53
5
6.
39
4
p-
V
al
ue
[0
.3
38
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
00
]
N
ot
es
:C
ol
um
ns
2,
3,
5,
6
re
po
rt
w
av
e
Im
ea
ns
by
at
tr
iti
on
st
at
us
fo
rc
hi
ld
(P
an
el
A
an
d
B
)a
nd
sc
ho
ol
s
(P
an
el
C
)i
n
th
e
st
ud
y
an
al
ys
is
.s
d
st
an
ds
fo
rs
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n.
C
ol
um
ns
5
an
d
9
re
po
rt
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
on
th
e
eq
ua
lit
y
of
m
ea
ns
fo
re
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
.F
-t
es
ts
of
jo
in
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:t
es
to
fj
oi
nt
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
in
re
gr
es
si
on
of
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
at
tr
iti
on
du
m
m
ie
s
on
al
ld
is
pl
ay
ed
w
av
e
Iv
ar
ia
bl
es
.
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
D
at
a.
288
3.1.4 Balancing Tables by Attrition Status Using Data of Previous Time Period Data
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3.1.5 Balancing Tables of Attrited by Exposure Group
wave II after school change using wave I data
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Table C.24: Balancing Table of Attrited Members of Exposure Group Using Wave I Data for
Health Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 612 11.334 11.337 11.584 11.528 0.993 0.224 0.413 0.484 0.608 0.788
[1.107] [1.653] [0.816] [0.915]
Any anemia 612 0.553 0.519 0.500 0.517 0.778 0.637 0.753 0.892 0.993 0.893
Mild anemia 612 0.213 0.222 0.342 0.276 0.927 0.226 0.551 0.308 0.646 0.580
Moderate/severe anemia 612 0.340 0.296 0.158 0.241 0.717 0.076 0.375 0.230 0.658 0.420
Number of symptoms 698 1.016 0.853 1.021 1.075 0.437 0.980 0.795 0.454 0.333 0.825
[1.000] [0.925] [1.132] [1.118]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 632 3.870 2.929 3.762 3.568 0.060 0.815 0.515 0.146 0.262 0.720
[2.120] [2.356] [2.128] [2.243]
Digit span forward 632 4.000 4.357 4.286 3.973 0.133 0.222 0.903 0.777 0.119 0.197
[1.099] [0.989] [0.891] [1.118]
Digit span backward 632 1.222 1.143 1.452 0.865 0.814 0.476 0.222 0.392 0.403 0.068
[1.423] [1.297] [1.418] [1.251]
Progressive matrices 631 4.593 4.429 5.143 4.622 0.700 0.164 0.950 0.111 0.702 0.277
[1.879] [2.332] [1.475] [2.046]
Stroop test 631 5.343 5.554 5.488 5.608 0.752 0.846 0.699 0.936 0.943 0.885
[3.298] [2.954] [3.627] [3.852]
Cognitive score index 630 -0.011 -0.065 0.210 -0.116 0.798 0.372 0.628 0.304 0.831 0.230
[0.962] [0.903] [1.084] [1.150]
Education outcomes
Math score 631 4.556 4.714 5.619 5.216 0.865 0.195 0.403 0.384 0.621 0.655
[3.606] [4.108] [3.800] [3.823]
Reading score 632 0.870 0.750 1.095 0.811 0.643 0.318 0.788 0.235 0.832 0.266
[1.029] [1.041] [1.144] [1.076]
School attendance 639 0.740 0.678 0.723 0.724 0.288 0.738 0.749 0.461 0.433 0.978
[0.223] [0.248] [0.220] [0.205]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 698 0.031 0.000 0.064 0.025 0.135 0.527 0.848 0.180 0.325 0.469
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 698 0.266 0.206 0.149 0.200 0.562 0.182 0.479 0.551 0.953 0.543
Block 698 1.422 1.500 1.234 1.300 0.609 0.281 0.400 0.107 0.132 0.671
Rural 698 0.969 0.912 0.979 0.950 0.301 0.744 0.654 0.224 0.535 0.488
Family size 698 8.359 8.618 8.298 7.200 0.756 0.946 0.097 0.745 0.076 0.207
[4.025] [3.869] [4.308] [2.719]
Father’s years of schooling 677 6.750 7.367 4.745 5.579 0.625 0.086 0.323 0.041 0.167 0.478
[4.778] [5.592] [5.024] [5.218]
Mother’s years of schooling 697 2.500 3.441 2.277 2.825 0.396 0.779 0.702 0.293 0.589 0.514
[3.809] [5.064] [4.137] [4.181]
Asset index 684 0.142 0.486 0.287 0.407 0.252 0.561 0.329 0.547 0.820 0.693
[1.038] [1.430] [1.355] [1.428]
Gender of the child 659 0.429 0.531 0.478 0.649 0.364 0.579 0.030 0.656 0.355 0.113
Health care
Institutional delivery 696 0.406 0.588 0.489 0.450 0.102 0.363 0.649 0.391 0.247 0.697
Health insurance 686 0.438 0.375 0.468 0.450 0.601 0.774 0.915 0.428 0.555 0.875
[0.500] [0.492] [0.504] [0.504]
Diarrhea 698 0.047 0.059 0.021 0.025 0.804 0.440 0.536 0.427 0.487 0.912
Improved sanitation 698 0.094 0.235 0.128 0.150 0.126 0.602 0.409 0.278 0.398 0.771
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 698 3.813 4.118 4.000 3.975 0.212 0.378 0.526 0.646 0.627 0.926
[1.125] [1.094] [1.285] [1.291]
Number of meals/day 698 3.125 3.176 2.660 2.750 0.831 0.068 0.156 0.077 0.155 0.768
[1.076] [1.114] [1.290] [1.235]
Food scarcity 696 0.746 0.735 0.761 0.775 0.918 0.869 0.764 0.783 0.689 0.867
Maternal health knowledge 698 0.438 0.500 0.404 0.425 0.568 0.696 0.900 0.408 0.553 0.845
Child eats meat products 698 0.563 0.676 0.532 0.525 0.286 0.693 0.732 0.130 0.217 0.944
Child received iron supplements 690 0.127 0.088 0.196 0.237 0.566 0.389 0.165 0.198 0.073 0.654
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 685 0.250 0.147 0.174 0.225 0.272 0.387 0.794 0.749 0.399 0.555
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 698 46.250 47.206 46.702 40.200 0.854 0.939 0.172 0.937 0.158 0.257
[24.527] [23.651] [22.824] [18.969]
Parent attends school meetings 696 0.563 0.441 0.638 0.600 0.295 0.517 0.737 0.103 0.167 0.740
Father lives at home 697 0.844 0.765 0.851 0.825 0.393 0.926 0.802 0.408 0.550 0.769
Distance of school (min) 698 11.359 10.676 12.128 10.850 0.662 0.619 0.732 0.332 0.903 0.367
[8.232] [5.907] [6.678] [5.600]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 272 298.548 183.759 323.429 206.500 0.001 0.568 0.024 0.001 0.517 0.011
[152.913] [105.657] [153.558] [163.307]
Class size 274 33.258 26.345 35.333 35.844 0.014 0.737 0.591 0.147 0.048 0.944
[11.225] [9.868] [26.766] [24.562]
Student teacher ratio 272 37.264 33.095 39.670 39.971 0.093 0.423 0.370 0.027 0.021 0.929
[10.083] [8.800] [10.884] [13.489]
Calories of MDM per child 274 62.284 59.721 70.219 67.852 0.634 0.208 0.308 0.109 0.154 0.716
[20.131] [21.248] [23.282] [22.786]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 274 0.696 0.635 0.789 0.840 0.309 0.269 0.107 0.071 0.023 0.630
[0.233] [0.224] [0.330] [0.439]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report wave I means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed wave I variables.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.25: Balancing Table of Attrited Members of Exposure Group Using Wave I Data for
Health Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 739 11.398 11.423 11.480 11.628 0.905 0.644 0.148 0.801 0.332 0.397
[1.114] [1.393] [1.015] [0.849]
Any anemia 739 0.494 0.481 0.500 0.410 0.869 0.944 0.296 0.837 0.435 0.333
Mild anemia 739 0.176 0.192 0.271 0.197 0.834 0.200 0.779 0.310 0.954 0.317
Moderate/severe anemia 739 0.318 0.288 0.229 0.213 0.723 0.201 0.184 0.420 0.362 0.824
Number of symptoms 825 1.069 1.085 1.025 1.056 0.941 0.829 0.950 0.772 0.891 0.876
[1.119] [1.208] [1.121] [1.099]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 758 3.870 3.019 4.041 3.449 0.049 0.667 0.273 0.028 0.331 0.157
[2.001] [2.390] [2.176] [2.193]
Digit span forward 758 3.870 4.189 4.370 3.928 0.042 0.002 0.690 0.304 0.121 0.010
[0.986] [0.921] [0.921] [1.034]
Digit span backward 758 1.185 0.962 1.466 1.000 0.318 0.243 0.408 0.047 0.872 0.066
[1.350] [1.240] [1.415] [1.328]
Progressive matrices 756 4.565 4.423 5.110 4.928 0.645 0.068 0.224 0.059 0.163 0.601
[1.673] [2.080] [1.638] [1.752]
Stroop test 757 5.571 4.745 5.918 5.384 0.136 0.531 0.729 0.056 0.282 0.371
[3.281] [3.159] [3.387] [3.724]
Cognitive score index 755 -0.041 -0.211 0.310 -0.086 0.300 0.046 0.782 0.010 0.498 0.044
[0.888] [0.908] [1.047] [1.059]
Education outcomes
Math score 757 4.348 4.415 5.904 4.971 0.921 0.022 0.350 0.044 0.446 0.196
[3.611] [3.703] [3.913] [4.018]
Reading score 758 0.739 0.755 1.164 0.884 0.933 0.015 0.417 0.057 0.555 0.174
[0.888] [0.959] [1.131] [1.132]
School attendance 759 0.758 0.727 0.726 0.760 0.473 0.422 0.935 0.979 0.392 0.332
[0.199] [0.220] [0.217] [0.182]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 825 0.039 0.000 0.051 0.014 0.070 0.762 0.324 0.105 0.324 0.281
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 825 0.275 0.271 0.127 0.250 0.970 0.057 0.764 0.075 0.803 0.091
Block 825 1.382 1.492 1.203 1.347 0.411 0.239 0.784 0.041 0.205 0.286
Rural 825 0.980 0.949 0.987 0.972 0.339 0.713 0.737 0.236 0.516 0.520
Family size 825 8.402 8.068 8.544 7.236 0.608 0.848 0.038 0.519 0.133 0.048
[3.842] [3.428] [4.293] [2.635]
Father’s years of schooling 804 5.990 6.036 4.873 6.100 0.962 0.233 0.910 0.199 0.946 0.177
[4.806] [5.564] [4.842] [5.074]
Mother’s years of schooling 823 2.029 3.172 1.810 2.806 0.126 0.685 0.256 0.068 0.664 0.143
[3.379] [4.776] [3.641] [4.171]
Asset index 809 0.012 0.104 0.121 0.328 0.659 0.529 0.118 0.940 0.351 0.321
[0.977] [1.221] [1.145] [1.225]
Gender of the child 784 0.386 0.561 0.494 0.676 0.051 0.155 0.000 0.441 0.204 0.019
Health care
Institutional delivery 823 0.382 0.424 0.392 0.417 0.654 0.904 0.662 0.744 0.938 0.769
Health insurance 812 0.363 0.351 0.397 0.486 0.893 0.655 0.154 0.631 0.194 0.349
[0.483] [0.481] [0.493] [0.503]
Diarrhea 825 0.069 0.034 0.025 0.028 0.312 0.145 0.189 0.770 0.843 0.923
Improved sanitation 825 0.078 0.136 0.101 0.139 0.332 0.621 0.260 0.580 0.961 0.510
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 825 3.873 3.915 4.025 4.000 0.835 0.390 0.524 0.595 0.708 0.900
[1.158] [1.134] [1.165] [1.278]
Number of meals/day 825 3.069 3.203 2.924 2.750 0.445 0.490 0.129 0.216 0.045 0.488
[1.110] [1.013] [1.238] [1.242]
Food scarcity 822 0.792 0.776 0.782 0.764 0.846 0.883 0.717 0.928 0.879 0.767
Maternal health knowledge 825 0.382 0.458 0.418 0.444 0.340 0.591 0.431 0.613 0.883 0.735
Child eats meat products 825 0.578 0.559 0.557 0.569 0.827 0.723 0.915 0.976 0.917 0.866
Child received iron supplements 816 0.150 0.085 0.205 0.186 0.251 0.486 0.577 0.120 0.101 0.814
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 812 0.186 0.186 0.128 0.222 0.998 0.331 0.617 0.366 0.637 0.154
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 825 41.373 50.695 46.266 43.097 0.034 0.323 0.698 0.420 0.134 0.569
[23.454] [26.556] [22.339] [29.591]
Parent attends school meetings 823 0.588 0.475 0.608 0.639 0.196 0.833 0.521 0.171 0.054 0.724
Father lives at home 824 0.863 0.831 0.823 0.833 0.604 0.536 0.597 0.919 0.967 0.881
Distance of school (min) 825 10.353 10.949 12.608 10.486 0.585 0.171 0.904 0.327 0.695 0.213
[7.211] [5.917] [8.484] [6.537]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 318 253.634 198.581 305.560 206.620 0.077 0.201 0.153 0.005 0.779 0.012
[156.768] [122.355] [160.043] [152.779]
Class size 320 29.951 27.698 34.920 34.780 0.380 0.361 0.207 0.181 0.060 0.982
[12.093] [11.277] [25.402] [23.329]
Student teacher ratio 318 35.789 33.773 39.382 39.550 0.352 0.186 0.120 0.036 0.014 0.953
[10.140] [9.590] [10.912] [12.687]
Calories of MDM per child 320 65.545 61.363 71.122 67.839 0.375 0.311 0.617 0.072 0.146 0.531
[21.910] [21.041] [21.365] [21.422]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 320 0.738 0.658 0.802 0.813 0.131 0.383 0.273 0.043 0.019 0.893
[0.253] [0.225] [0.303] [0.387]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report wave I means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed wave I variables.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.26: Balancing Table of Attrited Members of Exposure Group Using Wave II Data for
Health Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 504 12.068 12.016 11.744 11.991 0.878 0.234 0.779 0.395 0.937 0.324
[1.003] [1.270] [0.971] [1.052]
Any anemia 504 0.184 0.240 0.313 0.281 0.627 0.260 0.368 0.543 0.717 0.780
Mild anemia 504 0.079 0.040 0.094 0.188 0.505 0.811 0.177 0.378 0.066 0.253
Moderate/severe anemia 504 0.105 0.200 0.219 0.094 0.346 0.229 0.885 0.861 0.266 0.159
Number of symptoms 482 2.184 2.174 2.067 1.750 0.974 0.669 0.163 0.742 0.234 0.327
[1.205] [1.302] [1.337] [1.344]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 459 4.361 4.083 4.867 4.786 0.642 0.320 0.431 0.164 0.233 0.869
[2.257] [2.244] [1.814] [2.043]
Digit span forward 459 4.139 4.583 4.667 4.250 0.048 0.016 0.686 0.734 0.272 0.164
[0.931] [0.881] [0.922] [1.295]
Digit span backward 459 1.389 1.542 1.633 1.357 0.666 0.434 0.931 0.800 0.653 0.462
[1.315] [1.444] [1.426] [1.569]
Progressive matrices 459 4.750 4.625 5.267 5.857 0.705 0.106 0.002 0.075 0.002 0.102
[1.339] [1.245] [1.363] [1.208]
Stroop test 459 5.444 5.750 7.017 5.339 0.741 0.114 0.918 0.156 0.659 0.093
[3.913] [2.836] [2.996] [3.674]
Cognitive score index 459 -0.400 -0.267 0.099 -0.151 0.594 0.040 0.367 0.137 0.678 0.357
[1.057] [0.904] [0.889] [1.102]
Education outcomes
Math score 457 7.139 7.875 9.900 8.214 0.563 0.016 0.418 0.103 0.812 0.190
[4.800] [4.767] [3.933] [4.670]
Reading score 459 1.111 1.542 1.900 1.393 0.241 0.040 0.430 0.401 0.716 0.229
[1.166] [1.474] [1.373] [1.343]
School attendance 495 0.727 0.557 0.683 0.717 0.035 0.524 0.869 0.099 0.020 0.539
[0.199] [0.290] [0.207] [0.176]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 482 0.053 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.294 0.746 0.292 0.309 . 0.306
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 476 0.263 0.348 0.133 0.258 0.553 0.330 0.970 0.159 0.554 0.382
Block 504 1.316 1.480 1.156 1.406 0.326 0.310 0.568 0.031 0.617 0.071
Rural 504 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 . . . . . .
Family size 482 8.184 7.783 8.200 7.000 0.586 0.983 0.055 0.593 0.232 0.072
[3.030] [2.923] [3.221] [2.048]
Father’s years of schooling 478 6.237 5.087 4.633 7.375 0.414 0.191 0.416 0.732 0.130 0.042
[4.239] [4.889] [5.176] [4.804]
Mother’s years of schooling 479 1.395 2.696 1.500 2.613 0.176 0.868 0.180 0.221 0.943 0.227
[2.814] [3.925] [2.991] [3.896]
Asset index 473 -0.269 -0.302 -0.066 0.280 0.870 0.323 0.031 0.219 0.017 0.155
[0.812] [0.580] [0.699] [1.066]
Gender of the child 473 0.297 0.583 0.548 0.690 0.040 0.045 0.002 0.806 0.457 0.276
Health care
Institutional delivery 504 0.342 0.200 0.250 0.375 0.274 0.500 0.793 0.692 0.130 0.307
Health insurance 470 0.171 0.391 0.107 0.313 0.105 0.508 0.201 0.048 0.595 0.082
[0.382] [0.499] [0.315] [0.471]
Diarrhea 482 0.237 0.174 0.300 0.188 0.526 0.542 0.595 0.277 0.897 0.307
Improved sanitation 480 0.053 0.043 0.133 0.226 0.871 0.313 0.071 0.287 0.068 0.415
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 482 4.053 3.826 3.733 3.906 0.476 0.326 0.668 0.786 0.823 0.634
[1.161] [1.154] [1.172] [1.304]
Number of meals/day 482 3.605 3.261 3.633 3.656 0.079 0.886 0.773 0.064 0.029 0.899
[0.679] [0.619] [0.718] [0.653]
Food scarcity 482 0.526 0.565 0.367 0.281 0.790 0.196 0.040 0.170 0.044 0.449
Maternal health knowledge 482 0.289 0.304 0.200 0.313 0.903 0.348 0.835 0.409 0.953 0.328
Child eats meat products 482 0.526 0.522 0.400 0.594 0.974 0.274 0.589 0.346 0.600 0.088
Child received iron supplements 474 0.143 0.043 0.103 0.031 0.306 0.729 0.225 0.489 0.821 0.371
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 481 0.289 0.348 0.500 0.406 0.635 0.075 0.322 0.265 0.669 0.473
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 472 51.944 41.739 42.750 44.097 0.119 0.424 0.338 0.926 0.746 0.910
[30.502] [17.491] [45.646] [35.118]
Parent attends school meetings 475 0.324 0.364 0.310 0.406 0.790 0.925 0.539 0.732 0.762 0.499
Father lives at home 482 0.947 0.870 0.900 0.813 0.329 0.449 0.097 0.721 0.565 0.311
Distance of school (min) 480 13.658 12.391 16.333 12.806 0.613 0.458 0.731 0.267 0.860 0.315
[10.520] [8.100] [11.592] [9.005]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 227 246.565 196.522 306.467 159.321 0.426 0.406 0.150 0.034 0.248 0.003
[272.077] [123.255] [167.239] [99.392]
Class size 227 27.913 30.304 38.933 32.500 0.561 0.109 0.294 0.196 0.592 0.342
[14.694] [12.928] [23.252] [16.167]
Student teacher ratio 227 36.057 32.485 42.450 37.818 0.411 0.185 0.710 0.006 0.126 0.247
[18.231] [9.645] [10.924] [14.675]
Calories of MDM per child 227 82.692 75.627 85.364 72.178 0.753 0.913 0.635 0.460 0.678 0.303
[102.666] [29.895] [44.620] [28.783]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 227 0.773 0.670 0.692 0.527 0.584 0.685 0.165 0.864 0.126 0.142
[0.810] [0.382] [0.393] [0.246]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report wave I means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed wave I variables.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.27: Balancing Table of Attrited Members of Exposure Group Using Wave I Data for
Cognition and Education Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 620 11.578 11.693 11.539 11.691 0.686 0.861 0.601 0.616 0.995 0.533
[1.081] [1.319] [1.116] [1.015]
Any anemia 620 0.481 0.444 0.500 0.406 0.736 0.858 0.475 0.662 0.766 0.446
Mild anemia 620 0.185 0.222 0.222 0.125 0.699 0.663 0.471 1.000 0.321 0.265
Moderate/severe anemia 620 0.296 0.222 0.278 0.281 0.470 0.815 0.878 0.580 0.612 0.971
Number of symptoms 681 1.183 1.067 1.175 1.105 0.626 0.972 0.736 0.671 0.875 0.778
[1.127] [1.015] [1.174] [1.060]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 586 2.943 3.700 3.000 4.212 0.265 0.925 0.050 0.273 0.438 0.045
[2.182] [2.055] [1.941] [2.408]
Digit span forward 588 3.595 4.250 3.741 4.061 0.016 0.641 0.119 0.113 0.524 0.352
[1.212] [0.851] [1.196] [1.321]
Digit span backward 588 0.946 1.700 1.222 1.333 0.070 0.423 0.258 0.297 0.417 0.778
[1.268] [1.559] [1.450] [1.472]
Progressive matrices 586 4.000 4.842 4.667 4.970 0.132 0.180 0.073 0.761 0.834 0.585
[2.108] [2.292] [1.797] [2.298]
Stroop test 585 4.214 6.275 6.426 6.364 0.040 0.029 0.019 0.890 0.930 0.951
[3.035] [3.458] [4.153] [4.059]
Cognitive score index 581 -0.542 0.304 -0.101 0.231 0.006 0.214 0.022 0.205 0.801 0.341
[1.219] [0.758] [1.192] [1.298]
Education outcomes
Math score 586 4.000 5.900 6.423 5.818 0.082 0.058 0.095 0.669 0.937 0.620
[3.923] [3.684] [4.429] [4.231]
Reading score 587 0.703 1.053 1.037 1.152 0.207 0.142 0.107 0.955 0.755 0.677
[0.812] [0.970] [1.018] [1.253]
School attendance 617 0.694 0.730 0.659 0.753 0.622 0.561 0.296 0.287 0.713 0.049
[0.256] [0.260] [0.235] [0.175]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 681 0.017 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.315 0.393 0.314 0.161 . 0.160
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 681 0.283 0.233 0.150 0.184 0.645 0.203 0.322 0.414 0.614 0.710
Block 681 1.367 1.400 1.250 1.368 0.820 0.487 0.990 0.374 0.818 0.459
Rural 681 1.000 0.933 0.975 1.000 0.159 0.324 . 0.437 0.159 0.324
Family size 681 8.167 10.433 8.225 7.237 0.025 0.951 0.160 0.069 0.002 0.290
[4.251] [4.732] [4.406] [2.794]
Father’s years of schooling 665 5.933 7.533 6.425 6.784 0.177 0.675 0.460 0.403 0.564 0.782
[5.048] [5.191] [5.472] [5.287]
Mother’s years of schooling 680 2.050 3.800 2.975 3.395 0.109 0.264 0.078 0.496 0.727 0.651
[3.116] [5.142] [4.481] [4.378]
Asset index 670 0.014 0.695 0.069 0.387 0.031 0.795 0.159 0.050 0.378 0.237
[1.081] [1.391] [1.101] [1.273]
Gender of the child 637 0.508 0.714 0.474 0.548 0.036 0.709 0.711 0.032 0.177 0.533
Health care
Institutional delivery 676 0.431 0.433 0.475 0.378 0.985 0.714 0.628 0.756 0.658 0.417
Health insurance 668 0.407 0.393 0.450 0.474 0.909 0.678 0.555 0.654 0.549 0.841
[0.495] [0.497] [0.504] [0.506]
Diarrhea 681 0.033 0.033 0.050 0.000 1.000 0.681 0.151 0.726 0.323 0.137
Improved sanitation 681 0.117 0.233 0.100 0.158 0.206 0.799 0.561 0.173 0.454 0.455
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 681 3.833 4.267 4.025 4.132 0.124 0.402 0.256 0.345 0.635 0.650
[1.152] [1.112] [1.000] [1.119]
Number of meals/day 681 3.100 2.800 2.825 3.000 0.218 0.261 0.609 0.936 0.466 0.525
[0.969] [1.186] [1.152] [0.986]
Food scarcity 680 0.783 0.700 0.744 0.632 0.441 0.662 0.148 0.685 0.565 0.282
Maternal health knowledge 681 0.417 0.433 0.300 0.447 0.883 0.200 0.778 0.227 0.911 0.165
Child eats meat products 681 0.517 0.667 0.500 0.632 0.168 0.856 0.299 0.120 0.774 0.226
Child received iron supplements 673 0.169 0.167 0.175 0.286 0.973 0.952 0.206 0.936 0.254 0.319
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 668 0.200 0.267 0.231 0.263 0.546 0.731 0.529 0.730 0.975 0.728
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 681 45.667 37.833 48.625 47.316 0.074 0.651 0.732 0.091 0.037 0.843
[28.796] [14.895] [23.479] [23.016]
Parent attends school meetings 679 0.533 0.400 0.675 0.605 0.292 0.244 0.536 0.037 0.102 0.558
Father lives at home 680 0.883 0.900 0.775 0.763 0.842 0.226 0.152 0.239 0.176 0.910
Distance of school (min) 681 11.017 11.400 12.250 10.421 0.821 0.404 0.693 0.574 0.526 0.160
[7.503] [6.605] [6.898] [5.717]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 267 296.867 215.231 346.158 208.212 0.024 0.255 0.023 0.001 0.832 0.002
[153.711] [107.100] [141.320] [146.357]
Class size 269 33.867 31.962 36.579 31.303 0.541 0.689 0.533 0.498 0.873 0.470
[11.890] [11.276] [27.911] [19.875]
Student teacher ratio 267 37.799 37.703 38.522 41.125 0.970 0.816 0.251 0.791 0.233 0.443
[9.877] [8.959] [11.026] [12.815]
Calories of MDM per child 269 67.187 56.903 70.115 68.615 0.095 0.680 0.801 0.064 0.038 0.821
[23.944] [21.385] [24.234] [20.501]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 269 0.726 0.641 0.770 0.812 0.172 0.616 0.209 0.133 0.009 0.641
[0.257] [0.199] [0.327] [0.283]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report wave I means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed wave I variables.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.28: Balancing Table of Attrited Members of Exposure Group Using Wave I Data for
Health Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 901 11.412 11.508 11.410 11.725 0.528 0.987 0.016 0.576 0.156 0.045
[1.050] [1.097] [1.338] [0.974]
Any anemia 901 0.524 0.489 0.518 0.420 0.595 0.937 0.094 0.707 0.315 0.189
Mild anemia 901 0.204 0.250 0.253 0.223 0.445 0.375 0.699 0.964 0.671 0.609
Moderate/severe anemia 901 0.320 0.239 0.265 0.196 0.184 0.350 0.017 0.693 0.485 0.237
Number of symptoms 968 1.045 1.121 1.034 1.090 0.689 0.949 0.789 0.617 0.851 0.708
[1.105] [1.143] [1.108] [1.068]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 873 3.132 3.407 3.627 3.607 0.452 0.116 0.179 0.542 0.613 0.954
[2.112] [2.474] [2.253] [2.285]
Digit span forward 875 3.817 4.148 3.880 4.043 0.022 0.680 0.144 0.113 0.532 0.359
[1.066] [0.989] [0.999] [1.109]
Digit span backward 875 0.969 1.148 1.213 1.120 0.427 0.225 0.488 0.777 0.907 0.673
[1.370] [1.433] [1.328] [1.301]
Progressive matrices 873 4.160 4.588 4.733 4.940 0.077 0.028 0.001 0.625 0.208 0.482
[1.607] [1.833] [1.655] [1.821]
Stroop test 872 4.702 5.012 6.127 5.526 0.605 0.015 0.109 0.065 0.342 0.238
[3.500] [3.497] [3.513] [3.571]
Cognitive score index 868 -0.354 -0.076 0.010 0.012 0.080 0.020 0.031 0.594 0.614 0.989
[1.040] [0.984] [1.061] [1.059]
Education outcomes
Math score 873 3.229 4.667 5.257 4.940 0.026 0.006 0.012 0.447 0.707 0.692
[3.693] [3.821] [4.135] [3.905]
Reading score 874 0.588 0.813 1.027 1.000 0.188 0.011 0.016 0.270 0.334 0.889
[0.935] [1.092] [1.078] [1.189]
School attendance 885 0.744 0.750 0.725 0.764 0.862 0.652 0.559 0.523 0.634 0.321
[0.202] [0.192] [0.215] [0.169]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 968 0.026 0.000 0.080 0.016 0.038 0.225 0.573 0.061 0.160 0.150
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 968 0.338 0.308 0.182 0.254 0.716 0.062 0.317 0.107 0.494 0.358
Block 968 1.273 1.407 1.170 1.434 0.228 0.366 0.164 0.042 0.813 0.030
Rural 968 1.000 0.956 0.977 0.984 0.104 0.146 0.161 0.495 0.347 0.744
Family size 968 8.104 8.297 8.682 7.680 0.744 0.393 0.394 0.575 0.231 0.101
[3.938] [3.650] [4.782] [3.160]
Father’s years of schooling 947 5.039 6.898 6.103 6.683 0.012 0.148 0.030 0.289 0.780 0.454
[4.867] [5.128] [5.095] [4.871]
Mother’s years of schooling 965 1.542 3.189 2.818 2.844 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.576 0.594 0.963
[2.872] [4.479] [3.906] [3.996]
Asset index 953 -0.159 0.328 0.072 0.202 0.011 0.068 0.024 0.182 0.557 0.421
[0.863] [1.264] [0.974] [1.177]
Gender of the child 924 0.399 0.584 0.384 0.513 0.009 0.817 0.080 0.004 0.297 0.044
Health care
Institutional delivery 963 0.355 0.418 0.398 0.388 0.358 0.553 0.611 0.793 0.676 0.899
Health insurance 954 0.412 0.416 0.471 0.426 0.962 0.403 0.841 0.513 0.903 0.536
[0.494] [0.496] [0.502] [0.497]
Diarrhea 968 0.045 0.011 0.057 0.033 0.106 0.700 0.599 0.078 0.263 0.394
Improved sanitation 968 0.071 0.132 0.114 0.131 0.157 0.322 0.177 0.708 0.989 0.727
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 968 3.864 3.890 3.920 4.156 0.880 0.737 0.085 0.874 0.164 0.203
[1.061] [1.178] [1.157] [1.164]
Number of meals/day 968 3.162 3.121 2.795 2.877 0.731 0.006 0.037 0.038 0.126 0.624
[0.967] [0.964] [1.195] [1.140]
Food scarcity 966 0.837 0.758 0.816 0.689 0.202 0.684 0.013 0.350 0.311 0.034
Maternal health knowledge 968 0.351 0.451 0.330 0.434 0.111 0.736 0.214 0.071 0.819 0.141
Child eats meat products 968 0.584 0.516 0.500 0.615 0.303 0.162 0.653 0.813 0.198 0.110
Child received iron supplements 958 0.222 0.165 0.172 0.229 0.323 0.438 0.911 0.909 0.299 0.403
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 951 0.131 0.225 0.244 0.262 0.082 0.038 0.016 0.757 0.551 0.774
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 968 43.994 43.846 43.295 45.680 0.971 0.868 0.678 0.902 0.673 0.593
[27.785] [26.014] [20.593] [25.483]
Parent attends school meetings 965 0.610 0.500 0.693 0.607 0.157 0.257 0.957 0.024 0.195 0.264
Father lives at home 967 0.857 0.890 0.795 0.803 0.485 0.253 0.282 0.098 0.105 0.895
Distance of school (min) 968 9.974 10.330 11.420 9.795 0.692 0.101 0.828 0.237 0.539 0.057
[5.935] [6.039] [6.430] [5.288]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 347 249.545 193.983 324.148 197.780 0.045 0.077 0.085 0.001 0.878 0.002
[150.475] [117.046] [181.564] [147.681]
Class size 349 30.886 28.069 33.556 30.847 0.241 0.605 0.990 0.279 0.364 0.621
[12.029] [11.829] [25.044] [20.144]
Student teacher ratio 347 36.322 35.047 40.301 37.978 0.506 0.143 0.459 0.042 0.158 0.407
[9.818] [9.212] [11.684] [12.807]
Calories of MDM per child 349 66.206 62.802 69.431 69.591 0.442 0.548 0.429 0.188 0.080 0.974
[22.464] [21.574] [21.499] [19.919]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 349 0.712 0.691 0.782 0.815 0.676 0.326 0.067 0.179 0.016 0.643
[0.251] [0.226] [0.312] [0.317]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report wave I means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed wave I variables.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.29: Balancing Table of Attrited Members of Exposure Group Using Wave II Data for
Health Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 605 11.946 11.951 11.476 11.930 0.974 0.009 0.898 0.025 0.900 0.014
[1.062] [0.977] [0.996] [0.824]
Any anemia 605 0.330 0.200 0.452 0.303 0.071 0.164 0.680 0.015 0.217 0.127
Mild anemia 605 0.160 0.091 0.143 0.158 0.213 0.784 0.974 0.421 0.227 0.807
Moderate/severe anemia 605 0.170 0.109 0.310 0.145 0.329 0.060 0.669 0.009 0.561 0.025
Number of symptoms 630 2.140 2.281 2.063 2.084 0.549 0.775 0.780 0.458 0.392 0.934
[1.273] [1.485] [1.156] [1.354]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 651 3.819 4.656 4.000 4.357 0.028 0.599 0.059 0.117 0.414 0.286
[2.355] [2.198] [2.269] [2.081]
Digit span forward 651 4.309 4.541 4.438 4.512 0.195 0.441 0.219 0.552 0.865 0.641
[1.037] [0.923] [0.823] [0.938]
Digit span backward 651 1.351 1.738 1.542 1.619 0.143 0.436 0.242 0.475 0.648 0.748
[1.350] [1.537] [1.414] [1.413]
Progressive matrices 651 4.809 4.869 4.854 5.036 0.820 0.860 0.366 0.958 0.542 0.496
[1.505] [1.489] [1.271] [1.452]
Stroop test 651 5.473 6.910 5.646 6.417 0.063 0.821 0.174 0.113 0.492 0.285
[3.869] [4.119] [4.290] [3.912]
Cognitive score index 651 -0.421 -0.015 -0.294 -0.109 0.051 0.491 0.082 0.198 0.655 0.329
[1.103] [1.140] [1.066] [1.035]
Education outcomes
Math score 651 6.234 8.164 8.417 8.786 0.070 0.020 0.007 0.801 0.539 0.671
[5.169] [5.050] [4.589] [4.552]
Reading score 651 1.138 1.656 1.729 1.595 0.053 0.033 0.106 0.804 0.843 0.667
[1.404] [1.504] [1.469] [1.553]
School attendance 644 0.724 0.649 0.736 0.721 0.159 0.777 0.934 0.080 0.133 0.660
[0.205] [0.273] [0.152] [0.177]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 630 0.032 0.000 0.104 0.024 0.077 0.206 0.742 0.055 0.161 0.157
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 622 0.370 0.281 0.239 0.253 0.400 0.201 0.227 0.667 0.761 0.872
Block 651 1.213 1.410 1.104 1.464 0.101 0.250 0.045 0.010 0.699 0.004
Rural 651 1.000 0.967 0.979 0.976 0.166 0.321 0.161 0.705 0.757 0.912
Family size 630 7.699 7.491 7.479 7.795 0.717 0.702 0.870 0.980 0.538 0.525
[3.448] [2.653] [2.666] [3.215]
Father’s years of schooling 625 4.891 6.684 5.708 7.337 0.059 0.335 0.008 0.291 0.504 0.069
[4.505] [5.471] [4.981] [4.910]
Mother’s years of schooling 627 1.183 2.544 2.298 2.482 0.048 0.088 0.037 0.758 0.936 0.804
[2.766] [4.192] [3.413] [3.995]
Asset index 618 -0.301 0.262 0.048 0.253 0.017 0.115 0.010 0.421 0.973 0.408
[0.819] [1.184] [0.893] [1.130]
Gender of the child 651 0.319 0.492 0.313 0.500 0.040 0.938 0.017 0.048 0.918 0.024
Health care
Institutional delivery 650 0.309 0.410 0.333 0.393 0.218 0.788 0.279 0.440 0.842 0.533
Health insurance 619 0.182 0.281 0.170 0.244 0.174 0.874 0.344 0.176 0.619 0.328
[0.388] [0.453] [0.380] [0.432]
Diarrhea 630 0.290 0.298 0.250 0.193 0.921 0.670 0.168 0.614 0.143 0.512
Improved sanitation 628 0.054 0.193 0.170 0.157 0.023 0.082 0.058 0.786 0.624 0.864
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 629 3.839 3.982 4.191 3.940 0.580 0.100 0.665 0.437 0.881 0.301
[1.191] [1.261] [1.116] [1.301]
Number of meals/day 630 3.806 3.509 3.813 3.530 0.011 0.960 0.015 0.018 0.852 0.023
[0.664] [0.630] [0.673] [0.631]
Food scarcity 630 0.430 0.439 0.583 0.422 0.927 0.128 0.921 0.153 0.843 0.087
Maternal health knowledge 630 0.161 0.368 0.396 0.313 0.008 0.002 0.047 0.739 0.515 0.311
Child eats meat products 630 0.527 0.491 0.625 0.554 0.697 0.293 0.770 0.148 0.495 0.451
Child received iron supplements 621 0.144 0.018 0.128 0.060 0.014 0.786 0.128 0.013 0.194 0.162
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 629 0.269 0.351 0.458 0.410 0.371 0.054 0.092 0.332 0.550 0.637
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 615 52.191 42.222 42.872 40.926 0.061 0.159 0.030 0.925 0.816 0.775
[29.290] [25.415] [38.515] [35.550]
Parent attends school meetings 625 0.446 0.368 0.375 0.337 0.416 0.523 0.213 0.954 0.734 0.726
Father lives at home 630 0.860 0.860 0.854 0.831 0.993 0.917 0.599 0.938 0.675 0.702
Distance of school (min) 630 12.871 13.544 10.354 13.301 0.752 0.125 0.824 0.132 0.918 0.124
[9.249] [13.092] [6.518] [12.490]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 275 267.289 168.238 334.182 170.186 0.020 0.252 0.030 0.001 0.945 0.001
[234.032] [109.844] [205.308] [146.926]
Class size 275 30.895 27.405 34.727 31.512 0.262 0.504 0.871 0.187 0.238 0.588
[15.002] [12.335] [24.310] [18.938]
Student teacher ratio 275 37.178 32.802 42.950 37.921 0.194 0.146 0.850 0.001 0.090 0.169
[18.291] [9.931] [11.993] [16.788]
Calories of MDM per child 275 93.928 96.199 81.366 69.654 0.925 0.525 0.188 0.416 0.115 0.204
[109.730] [104.679] [38.314] [27.273]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 275 0.831 0.813 0.786 0.560 0.926 0.783 0.065 0.860 0.065 0.012
[0.873] [0.851] [0.385] [0.205]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report wave I means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed wave I variables.
Source: Own Data.
305
Table C.30: Balancing Table of Attrited Members of Exposure Group Using Baseline Data for
Attendance Outcome
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 574 11.566 11.460 11.342 12.118 0.751 0.278 0.017 0.738 0.079 0.004
[0.976] [1.198] [0.967] [0.780]
Any anemia 574 0.489 0.667 0.583 0.176 0.212 0.471 0.010 0.616 0.003 0.008
Mild anemia 574 0.234 0.400 0.250 0.118 0.191 0.884 0.220 0.318 0.047 0.287
Moderate/severe anemia 574 0.255 0.267 0.333 0.059 0.931 0.487 0.032 0.650 0.115 0.018
Number of symptoms 624 0.896 0.706 1.519 0.895 0.503 0.028 0.997 0.018 0.557 0.051
[1.036] [0.920] [1.252] [0.994]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 567 3.432 4.214 3.667 4.000 0.309 0.757 0.454 0.503 0.791 0.680
[2.472] [2.225] [2.517] [2.208]
Digit span forward 567 3.659 4.357 3.905 4.235 0.023 0.345 0.073 0.104 0.705 0.264
[1.010] [1.008] [0.768] [0.970]
Digit span backward 567 0.727 1.000 1.238 1.588 0.415 0.258 0.037 0.617 0.176 0.502
[1.107] [1.240] [1.261] [1.278]
Progressive matrices 565 4.250 4.538 4.762 5.471 0.727 0.513 0.054 0.797 0.199 0.285
[2.179] [2.106] [1.729] [1.231]
Stroop test 566 4.114 5.250 4.619 5.559 0.331 0.681 0.198 0.615 0.784 0.436
[3.476] [3.567] [3.844] [3.107]
Cognitive score index 564 -0.449 0.111 -0.101 0.318 0.203 0.454 0.059 0.649 0.597 0.328
[1.156] [1.175] [1.090] [0.979]
Education outcomes
Math score 566 4.159 5.500 5.238 5.824 0.335 0.305 0.208 0.843 0.833 0.637
[4.215] [3.956] [3.767] [3.909]
Reading score 567 0.682 0.786 0.952 1.118 0.817 0.313 0.160 0.716 0.492 0.600
[0.959] [1.311] [1.117] [0.993]
School attendance 505 0.746 0.628 0.614 0.713 0.444 0.267 0.738 0.920 0.508 0.186
[0.254] [0.314] [0.226] [0.135]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 624 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.053 . 0.122 0.301 0.124 0.304 0.502
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 624 0.396 0.235 0.037 0.263 0.262 0.002 0.379 0.083 0.859 0.072
Block 624 1.313 1.471 1.333 1.211 0.518 0.935 0.653 0.539 0.174 0.547
Rural 624 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 . . . . . .
Family size 624 8.333 9.176 8.259 7.158 0.581 0.948 0.247 0.537 0.152 0.242
[4.402] [5.053] [3.300] [2.167]
Father’s years of schooling 607 5.362 5.000 5.538 6.579 0.836 0.883 0.452 0.750 0.432 0.503
[4.594] [5.534] [4.150] [5.178]
Mother’s years of schooling 623 1.563 3.824 1.667 2.737 0.177 0.901 0.306 0.202 0.555 0.359
[2.873] [5.615] [2.774] [4.227]
Asset index 613 -0.300 0.379 -0.053 0.096 0.123 0.287 0.072 0.348 0.528 0.564
[0.691] [1.555] [1.013] [0.962]
Gender of the child 588 0.417 0.733 0.423 0.500 0.050 0.962 0.623 0.057 0.224 0.652
Health care
Institutional delivery 622 0.417 0.529 0.296 0.579 0.439 0.319 0.246 0.171 0.785 0.088
Health insurance 612 0.391 0.471 0.296 0.421 0.648 0.419 0.857 0.294 0.806 0.424
[0.493] [0.514] [0.465] [0.507]
Diarrhea 624 0.063 0.059 0.074 0.000 0.957 0.846 0.059 0.846 0.331 0.148
Improved sanitation 624 0.083 0.235 0.148 0.000 0.276 0.455 0.103 0.555 0.076 0.043
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 624 3.750 4.471 3.889 4.421 0.031 0.397 0.031 0.086 0.905 0.092
[1.101] [1.231] [1.050] [1.121]
Number of meals/day 624 3.229 3.118 2.963 2.368 0.691 0.226 0.022 0.604 0.079 0.120
[0.994] [0.928] [1.255] [1.535]
Food scarcity 624 0.833 0.647 0.852 0.684 0.274 0.882 0.328 0.214 0.840 0.251
Maternal health knowledge 624 0.354 0.412 0.370 0.421 0.712 0.869 0.631 0.799 0.961 0.728
Child eats meat products 624 0.542 0.765 0.556 0.737 0.069 0.891 0.126 0.092 0.844 0.159
Child received iron supplements 618 0.149 0.059 0.111 0.278 0.228 0.630 0.273 0.558 0.086 0.196
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 610 0.170 0.294 0.154 0.368 0.428 0.881 0.138 0.371 0.666 0.109
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 624 45.521 37.235 47.407 50.263 0.144 0.786 0.270 0.233 0.047 0.707
[19.712] [17.782] [24.937] [18.445]
Parent attends school meetings 622 0.563 0.647 0.741 0.526 0.564 0.212 0.793 0.535 0.416 0.139
Father lives at home 623 0.917 0.882 0.889 0.895 0.676 0.703 0.769 0.950 0.906 0.952
Distance of school (min) 624 11.063 8.824 11.778 10.421 0.101 0.638 0.638 0.053 0.229 0.368
[6.200] [3.909] [6.375] [4.087]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 215 360.500 233.429 374.917 208.813 0.012 0.840 0.004 0.038 0.528 0.016
[145.421] [99.556] [204.130] [111.519]
Class size 217 37.929 33.429 37.667 34.500 0.329 0.978 0.467 0.640 0.796 0.727
[13.315] [10.479] [29.525] [11.978]
Student teacher ratio 215 41.298 35.160 39.003 41.761 0.108 0.630 0.921 0.374 0.126 0.593
[11.141] [8.183] [12.626] [14.263]
Calories of MDM per child 217 54.839 58.350 67.763 65.578 0.608 0.134 0.098 0.314 0.332 0.806
[14.822] [20.480] [25.479] [19.495]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 217 0.632 0.661 0.734 0.818 0.638 0.374 0.030 0.534 0.075 0.515
[0.151] [0.176] [0.367] [0.282]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report wave I means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed wave I variables.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.31: Balancing Table of Attrited Members of Exposure Group Using Wave I Data for
Health Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 964 11.431 11.507 11.586 11.691 0.595 0.359 0.051 0.649 0.187 0.525
[1.120] [1.073] [1.263] [0.973]
Any anemia 964 0.480 0.491 0.463 0.406 0.850 0.817 0.204 0.715 0.173 0.462
Mild anemia 964 0.168 0.223 0.225 0.195 0.270 0.326 0.545 0.978 0.606 0.629
Moderate/severe anemia 964 0.312 0.268 0.237 0.211 0.413 0.200 0.042 0.649 0.338 0.672
Number of symptoms 1,029 0.966 1.118 1.333 1.089 0.357 0.082 0.427 0.293 0.847 0.216
[1.134] [1.187] [1.255] [1.089]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 957 3.452 3.586 3.701 3.700 0.700 0.550 0.454 0.790 0.747 0.998
[2.127] [2.410] [2.519] [2.198]
Digit span forward 957 3.917 4.198 3.857 4.146 0.032 0.767 0.084 0.087 0.685 0.149
[1.011] [0.903] [1.085] [0.973]
Digit span backward 957 0.935 1.072 1.013 1.138 0.463 0.721 0.270 0.804 0.747 0.594
[1.194] [1.380] [1.262] [1.310]
Progressive matrices 955 4.399 4.873 4.299 5.023 0.049 0.760 0.013 0.079 0.535 0.030
[1.751] [1.828] [1.702] [1.767]
Stroop test 956 4.443 5.104 4.961 5.754 0.187 0.329 0.006 0.793 0.179 0.124
[3.237] [3.395] [3.332] [3.635]
Cognitive score index 954 -0.270 -0.001 -0.204 0.093 0.078 0.752 0.018 0.321 0.519 0.148
[0.997] [0.956] [1.020] [0.966]
Education outcomes
Math score 956 3.589 4.820 4.195 4.862 0.033 0.389 0.030 0.393 0.946 0.367
[3.647] [3.723] [3.580] [3.702]
Reading score 957 0.607 0.892 0.740 0.885 0.099 0.440 0.042 0.473 0.968 0.429
[0.967] [1.155] [1.056] [1.046]
School attendance 910 0.757 0.740 0.735 0.782 0.590 0.599 0.425 0.896 0.084 0.199
[0.192] [0.190] [0.164] [0.156]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 1,029 0.006 0.000 0.048 0.015 0.316 0.148 0.439 0.094 0.158 0.278
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 1,029 0.303 0.261 0.095 0.274 0.605 0.007 0.733 0.009 0.857 0.008
Block 1,029 1.365 1.420 1.310 1.341 0.667 0.744 0.846 0.472 0.441 0.837
Rural 1,029 0.978 0.966 1.000 0.970 0.685 0.217 0.759 0.107 0.875 0.048
Family size 1,029 8.388 8.286 8.286 7.837 0.857 0.866 0.273 1.000 0.374 0.410
[3.927] [3.869] [3.910] [3.348]
Father’s years of schooling 1,004 5.260 6.626 5.088 6.567 0.047 0.838 0.057 0.089 0.937 0.101
[4.713] [5.199] [4.694] [4.980]
Mother’s years of schooling 1,025 1.503 3.060 1.321 2.859 0.005 0.639 0.006 0.004 0.760 0.005
[2.859] [4.312] [2.698] [4.105]
Asset index 1,013 -0.193 0.320 -0.137 0.331 0.005 0.635 0.000 0.016 0.954 0.003
[0.798] [1.330] [0.892] [1.176]
Gender of the child 989 0.416 0.607 0.410 0.523 0.003 0.932 0.080 0.010 0.199 0.127
Health care
Institutional delivery 1,024 0.401 0.513 0.440 0.414 0.101 0.588 0.841 0.370 0.163 0.721
Health insurance 1,014 0.371 0.419 0.381 0.437 0.526 0.905 0.354 0.658 0.814 0.495
[0.485] [0.495] [0.489] [0.498]
Diarrhea 1,029 0.039 0.017 0.071 0.037 0.248 0.299 0.918 0.064 0.313 0.270
Improved sanitation 1,029 0.073 0.143 0.083 0.141 0.121 0.809 0.114 0.239 0.967 0.237
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 1,029 3.848 3.882 3.690 4.222 0.833 0.350 0.017 0.275 0.037 0.002
[1.122] [1.158] [1.317] [1.214]
Number of meals/day 1,029 3.034 3.118 3.024 2.919 0.554 0.959 0.432 0.629 0.181 0.594
[1.119] [1.027] [1.280] [1.146]
Food scarcity 1,028 0.780 0.765 0.905 0.704 0.807 0.013 0.174 0.018 0.338 0.000
Maternal health knowledge 1,029 0.360 0.471 0.381 0.444 0.097 0.781 0.218 0.256 0.711 0.432
Child eats meat products 1,029 0.545 0.504 0.476 0.630 0.499 0.300 0.169 0.698 0.067 0.038
Child received iron supplements 1,021 0.215 0.185 0.095 0.227 0.591 0.014 0.818 0.086 0.469 0.011
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 1,013 0.158 0.220 0.146 0.304 0.229 0.811 0.005 0.223 0.178 0.010
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 1,029 44.303 45.874 49.524 45.763 0.588 0.416 0.625 0.579 0.974 0.570
[23.044] [24.797] [31.524] [26.387]
Parent attends school meetings 1,025 0.582 0.551 0.595 0.615 0.662 0.890 0.630 0.658 0.385 0.842
Father lives at home 1,028 0.882 0.874 0.893 0.844 0.856 0.790 0.410 0.691 0.569 0.320
Distance of school (min) 1,029 10.635 11.059 10.310 10.059 0.650 0.687 0.463 0.459 0.314 0.774
[5.967] [7.344] [6.008] [6.209]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 361 232.022 196.438 328.042 207.559 0.181 0.032 0.417 0.002 0.663 0.006
[147.989] [119.941] [187.504] [169.987]
Class size 364 28.761 27.859 35.250 31.072 0.699 0.239 0.483 0.169 0.301 0.474
[12.315] [11.654] [25.378] [22.691]
Student teacher ratio 361 34.942 34.787 40.341 36.830 0.933 0.065 0.375 0.047 0.303 0.238
[9.586] [9.440] [12.337] [13.053]
Calories of MDM per child 364 62.679 63.208 71.587 71.057 0.894 0.093 0.035 0.099 0.035 0.916
[20.149] [20.949] [21.162] [21.480]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 364 0.707 0.702 0.805 0.852 0.926 0.186 0.015 0.141 0.006 0.539
[0.255] [0.231] [0.309] [0.375]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report wave I means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed wave I variables.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.32: Balancing Table of Attrited Members of Exposure Group Using Wave II Data for
Health Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 708 11.946 12.011 12.100 11.777 0.591 0.337 0.157 0.593 0.069 0.053
[0.970] [0.870] [1.007] [0.841]
Any anemia 708 0.309 0.200 0.275 0.406 0.066 0.581 0.115 0.289 0.003 0.071
Mild anemia 708 0.171 0.106 0.157 0.219 0.158 0.808 0.366 0.385 0.040 0.338
Moderate/severe anemia 708 0.138 0.094 0.118 0.188 0.327 0.735 0.296 0.701 0.053 0.269
Number of symptoms 778 2.070 2.383 2.071 2.045 0.074 0.996 0.885 0.168 0.078 0.908
[1.317] [1.304] [1.189] [1.330]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 708 4.025 4.670 4.037 4.407 0.062 0.980 0.214 0.197 0.386 0.426
[2.424] [2.066] [2.257] [2.165]
Digit span forward 708 4.336 4.682 4.481 4.615 0.046 0.462 0.067 0.324 0.675 0.472
[0.976] [0.977] [1.094] [0.916]
Digit span backward 708 1.541 1.909 1.352 1.659 0.161 0.476 0.621 0.054 0.342 0.249
[1.397] [1.580] [1.456] [1.492]
Progressive matrices 708 4.967 5.148 4.944 5.264 0.394 0.928 0.127 0.431 0.564 0.191
[1.477] [1.386] [1.352] [1.246]
Stroop test 708 5.857 7.233 5.444 7.088 0.013 0.552 0.029 0.018 0.814 0.031
[3.658] [3.725] [4.032] [3.919]
Cognitive score index 708 -0.283 0.139 -0.322 0.033 0.020 0.865 0.051 0.062 0.555 0.127
[1.078] [1.095] [1.056] [1.013]
Education outcomes
Math score 706 7.377 9.114 7.574 9.044 0.031 0.826 0.040 0.111 0.936 0.130
[5.018] [4.726] [4.677] [4.529]
Reading score 708 1.246 1.727 1.370 1.780 0.039 0.661 0.023 0.253 0.841 0.191
[1.410] [1.514] [1.508] [1.497]
School attendance 858 0.690 0.657 0.656 0.692 0.450 0.428 0.962 0.985 0.329 0.296
[0.220] [0.234] [0.191] [0.210]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 778 0.008 0.000 0.018 0.018 0.321 0.614 0.491 0.329 0.158 0.988
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 768 0.236 0.215 0.073 0.239 0.823 0.063 0.981 0.031 0.764 0.017
Block 858 1.385 1.412 1.298 1.362 0.827 0.621 0.856 0.490 0.651 0.698
Rural 858 0.969 0.961 1.000 0.966 0.805 0.213 0.901 0.107 0.873 0.048
Family size 778 8.047 8.553 8.018 7.382 0.370 0.960 0.155 0.405 0.034 0.255
[3.434] [3.812] [3.042] [2.971]
Father’s years of schooling 773 5.703 6.617 4.732 7.211 0.227 0.292 0.031 0.065 0.463 0.012
[4.743] [5.446] [4.692] [4.854]
Mother’s years of schooling 772 1.583 2.883 0.982 2.750 0.018 0.168 0.042 0.001 0.844 0.004
[3.356] [4.250] [2.604] [4.263]
Asset index 765 -0.222 0.198 -0.270 0.430 0.021 0.748 0.000 0.012 0.245 0.000
[0.903] [1.125] [0.717] [1.120]
Gender of the child 739 0.405 0.543 0.400 0.505 0.054 0.951 0.167 0.071 0.606 0.189
Health care
Institutional delivery 853 0.395 0.510 0.509 0.386 0.123 0.141 0.892 0.990 0.102 0.117
Health insurance 765 0.220 0.298 0.148 0.255 0.265 0.441 0.587 0.126 0.543 0.255
[0.416] [0.460] [0.359] [0.438]
Diarrhea 778 0.211 0.319 0.304 0.209 0.101 0.194 0.976 0.824 0.074 0.160
Improved sanitation 774 0.055 0.149 0.071 0.187 0.046 0.688 0.008 0.149 0.518 0.038
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 777 3.648 3.872 3.818 4.009 0.293 0.437 0.074 0.808 0.508 0.368
[1.214] [1.211] [1.263] [1.338]
Number of meals/day 778 3.594 3.553 3.625 3.500 0.651 0.762 0.354 0.498 0.609 0.281
[0.581] [0.598] [0.676] [0.701]
Food scarcity 778 0.531 0.457 0.464 0.345 0.353 0.451 0.019 0.933 0.107 0.137
Maternal health knowledge 778 0.219 0.383 0.268 0.373 0.010 0.486 0.025 0.123 0.886 0.183
Child eats meat products 778 0.414 0.457 0.464 0.545 0.598 0.555 0.093 0.933 0.237 0.294
Child received iron supplements 764 0.065 0.054 0.109 0.111 0.816 0.435 0.297 0.306 0.158 0.970
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 777 0.328 0.436 0.214 0.473 0.183 0.159 0.055 0.013 0.659 0.002
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 761 48.150 44.341 42.182 40.788 0.430 0.386 0.101 0.758 0.448 0.836
[32.311] [33.418] [35.782] [30.637]
Parent attends school meetings 771 0.373 0.351 0.321 0.373 0.778 0.464 0.997 0.680 0.771 0.440
Father lives at home 778 0.883 0.840 0.857 0.873 0.419 0.682 0.815 0.814 0.553 0.809
Distance of school (min) 777 13.109 13.340 9.839 13.642 0.891 0.013 0.740 0.031 0.871 0.014
[9.191] [12.106] [6.158] [11.871]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 330 223.049 174.000 304.150 193.017 0.197 0.149 0.470 0.005 0.477 0.024
[223.735] [112.744] [194.235] [171.690]
Class size 330 28.854 27.817 34.600 31.356 0.727 0.283 0.501 0.178 0.281 0.555
[15.567] [13.127] [21.269] [21.481]
Student teacher ratio 330 34.955 31.223 39.588 35.298 0.211 0.218 0.919 0.003 0.076 0.181
[17.427] [9.181] [11.369] [14.909]
Calories of MDM per child 330 83.242 89.192 72.940 73.463 0.725 0.469 0.451 0.231 0.200 0.948
[78.782] [89.207] [31.121] [30.857]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 330 0.752 0.760 0.704 0.619 0.954 0.718 0.238 0.656 0.179 0.370
[0.656] [0.725] [0.373] [0.348]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report wave I means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed wave I variables.
Source: Own Data.
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3.2 Additional Balancing Tables by Exposure Groups
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Table C.33: Baseline Mean Characteristics by Exposure Groups - Sample for Health Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 1,165 11.401 11.458 11.586 11.709 0.654 0.037 0.001 0.330 0.059 0.198
[1.107] [1.091] [1.177] [1.058]
Any anemia 1,165 0.501 0.493 0.430 0.373 0.887 0.033 0.002 0.271 0.052 0.161
Mild anemia 1,165 0.208 0.204 0.184 0.155 0.907 0.289 0.135 0.559 0.268 0.427
Moderate/severe anemia 1,165 0.293 0.289 0.246 0.218 0.943 0.157 0.024 0.451 0.210 0.400
Number of symptoms 1,165 1.110 0.979 1.093 0.984 0.291 0.884 0.272 0.381 0.966 0.369
[1.124] [1.075] [1.100] [1.048]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 1,137 3.725 3.928 3.691 3.576 0.496 0.890 0.630 0.431 0.323 0.711
[2.184] [2.153] [2.193] [2.295]
Digit span forward 1,139 4.071 4.080 3.990 4.131 0.932 0.398 0.589 0.476 0.712 0.279
[1.016] [0.905] [0.937] [1.035]
Digit span backward 1,139 1.151 1.254 0.975 1.152 0.599 0.143 0.997 0.158 0.647 0.272
[1.299] [1.425] [1.251] [1.295]
Progressive matrices 1,139 4.667 4.906 4.704 4.921 0.305 0.817 0.246 0.410 0.956 0.349
[1.671] [1.669] [1.516] [1.701]
Stroop test 1,137 5.112 5.591 5.428 5.241 0.234 0.376 0.723 0.710 0.428 0.640
[3.329] [3.526] [3.488] [3.532]
Cognitive score index 1,135 -0.034 0.099 -0.071 0.013 0.365 0.740 0.730 0.280 0.622 0.569
[1.009] [0.950] [0.976] [1.012]
Education outcomes
Math score 1,138 4.506 5.101 4.920 4.848 0.372 0.427 0.527 0.797 0.724 0.902
[3.841] [3.657] [3.679] [3.675]
Reading score 1,138 0.815 1.058 0.949 0.937 0.099 0.273 0.441 0.498 0.525 0.945
[1.118] [1.205] [1.166] [1.089]
School attendance 1,112 0.781 0.817 0.801 0.819 0.124 0.363 0.116 0.395 0.921 0.361
[0.172] [0.138] [0.157] [0.139]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 1,165 0.041 0.000 0.050 0.005 0.022 0.816 0.054 0.126 0.313 0.175
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 1,165 0.344 0.303 0.218 0.301 0.642 0.071 0.551 0.328 0.979 0.243
Block 1,165 1.334 1.387 1.146 1.368 0.684 0.100 0.802 0.059 0.894 0.092
Rural 1,165 0.986 0.972 0.978 0.964 0.559 0.649 0.287 0.814 0.783 0.545
Family size 1,165 7.739 7.732 7.788 7.902 0.987 0.869 0.558 0.899 0.688 0.728
[3.422] [3.385] [3.385] [3.401]
Father’s years of schooling 1,148 5.002 6.371 5.588 5.948 0.032 0.225 0.096 0.249 0.567 0.560
[4.696] [4.828] [4.842] [4.790]
Mother’s years of schooling 1,161 1.295 2.142 1.809 1.834 0.030 0.043 0.078 0.395 0.471 0.934
[2.673] [3.496] [3.051] [3.361]
Asset index 1,142 -0.146 0.223 -0.082 0.066 0.004 0.512 0.088 0.023 0.302 0.257
[0.869] [1.174] [0.834] [0.976]
Gender of the child 1,162 0.448 0.486 0.383 0.421 0.448 0.076 0.576 0.043 0.274 0.431
Health care
Institutional delivery 1,156 0.348 0.454 0.330 0.414 0.038 0.654 0.182 0.018 0.496 0.096
Health insurance 1,158 0.364 0.415 0.353 0.420 0.465 0.830 0.387 0.408 0.961 0.339
[0.482] [0.495] [0.479] [0.495]
Diarrhea 1,165 0.026 0.007 0.037 0.021 0.053 0.281 0.692 0.010 0.281 0.229
Improved sanitation 1,165 0.083 0.085 0.078 0.052 0.949 0.875 0.266 0.838 0.287 0.368
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 1,165 3.827 3.838 3.841 4.010 0.938 0.909 0.244 0.983 0.325 0.295
[1.158] [1.140] [1.236] [1.150]
Number of meals/day 1,164 2.996 3.169 3.081 3.114 0.143 0.404 0.262 0.464 0.652 0.760
[1.070] [1.003] [1.065] [1.014]
Food scarcity 1,164 0.799 0.782 0.832 0.751 0.672 0.354 0.246 0.262 0.539 0.071
Maternal health knowledge 1,165 0.373 0.430 0.349 0.358 0.205 0.546 0.770 0.091 0.227 0.879
Child eats meat products 1,165 0.519 0.507 0.526 0.565 0.845 0.859 0.474 0.761 0.467 0.577
Child received iron supplements 1,144 0.147 0.214 0.150 0.213 0.101 0.949 0.089 0.170 0.975 0.162
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 1,157 0.124 0.216 0.170 0.219 0.046 0.137 0.014 0.310 0.954 0.194
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 1,165 46.953 44.901 41.576 48.715 0.587 0.045 0.653 0.364 0.413 0.063
[25.404] [25.588] [21.016] [30.849]
Parent attends school meetings 1,161 0.622 0.645 0.639 0.648 0.754 0.797 0.689 0.945 0.978 0.914
Father lives at home 1,165 0.864 0.873 0.903 0.855 0.789 0.088 0.760 0.375 0.647 0.134
Distance of school (min) 1,165 10.670 9.528 10.530 9.290 0.246 0.823 0.050 0.334 0.825 0.109
[6.203] [6.853] [5.958] [5.412]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 199 218.877 165.732 317.607 169.638 0.024 0.014 0.070 0.000 0.864 0.000
[145.401] [96.096] [181.501] [143.566]
Class size 201 27.789 25.804 32.759 27.814 0.359 0.303 0.993 0.145 0.469 0.335
[12.305] [10.537] [24.410] [18.266]
Student teacher ratio 199 34.447 33.864 40.540 35.440 0.726 0.017 0.635 0.007 0.426 0.065
[9.587] [8.012] [11.536] [12.628]
Calories of MDM per child 201 67.783 64.121 69.222 71.269 0.368 0.769 0.394 0.286 0.070 0.668
[22.467] [20.617] [20.931] [21.341]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 201 0.737 0.734 0.776 0.892 0.951 0.551 0.024 0.511 0.019 0.154
[0.260] [0.232] [0.300] [0.451]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report baseline means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed baseline variables.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.34: Baseline Mean Characteristics by Exposure Groups - Sample for Cognition and
Education Outcomes
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 1,003 11.396 11.399 11.610 11.662 0.987 0.021 0.009 0.214 0.133 0.633
[1.126] [1.241] [1.091] [1.042]
Any anemia 1,003 0.492 0.491 0.422 0.352 0.980 0.059 0.001 0.293 0.041 0.105
Mild anemia 1,003 0.204 0.160 0.185 0.120 0.280 0.411 0.016 0.529 0.387 0.053
Moderate/severe anemia 1,003 0.289 0.330 0.237 0.232 0.519 0.124 0.136 0.160 0.153 0.907
Number of symptoms 1,022 1.123 0.918 1.093 0.930 0.111 0.803 0.157 0.181 0.935 0.238
[1.129] [1.085] [1.103] [1.052]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 1,022 3.921 3.873 3.788 3.490 0.898 0.574 0.211 0.823 0.398 0.381
[2.138] [2.064] [2.179] [2.254]
Digit span forward 1,022 4.103 4.082 4.106 4.105 0.856 0.973 0.985 0.840 0.868 0.994
[0.989] [0.847] [0.927] [0.977]
Digit span backward 1,022 1.210 1.191 1.032 1.105 0.928 0.161 0.541 0.461 0.725 0.675
[1.284] [1.344] [1.288] [1.309]
Progressive matrices 1,022 4.792 4.909 4.792 4.909 0.679 0.998 0.637 0.687 1.000 0.649
[1.663] [1.769] [1.521] [1.623]
Stroop test 1,022 5.321 5.609 5.375 5.077 0.469 0.879 0.555 0.580 0.260 0.495
[3.263] [3.393] [3.449] [3.583]
Cognitive score index 1,022 0.053 0.080 -0.001 -0.034 0.878 0.599 0.552 0.650 0.581 0.827
[0.959] [0.916] [0.986] [0.997]
Education outcomes
Math score 1,022 4.840 5.091 5.071 4.832 0.747 0.656 0.988 0.980 0.752 0.681
[3.763] [3.567] [3.645] [3.654]
Reading score 1,022 0.864 1.091 0.981 0.860 0.124 0.317 0.979 0.471 0.229 0.475
[1.118] [1.177] [1.181] [1.018]
School attendance 986 0.787 0.825 0.802 0.835 0.142 0.529 0.039 0.311 0.655 0.097
[0.166] [0.141] [0.157] [0.132]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 1,022 0.046 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.026 0.907 0.025 0.179 . 0.179
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 1,022 0.330 0.282 0.205 0.315 0.625 0.066 0.832 0.426 0.745 0.121
Block 1,022 1.365 1.427 1.154 1.301 0.689 0.092 0.662 0.074 0.460 0.311
Rural 1,022 0.980 0.973 0.981 0.951 0.804 0.980 0.327 0.796 0.576 0.327
Family size 1,022 7.764 7.445 7.728 7.755 0.400 0.909 0.978 0.483 0.431 0.934
[3.341] [3.129] [3.152] [3.281]
Father’s years of schooling 1,005 5.212 5.766 5.254 5.406 0.446 0.938 0.728 0.509 0.646 0.806
[4.680] [4.921] [4.762] [4.786]
Mother’s years of schooling 1,019 1.376 1.826 1.523 1.462 0.232 0.566 0.805 0.435 0.422 0.865
[2.795] [3.302] [2.873] [3.135]
Asset index 998 -0.106 0.071 -0.074 0.082 0.157 0.762 0.118 0.303 0.941 0.253
[0.898] [1.109] [0.885] [0.937]
Gender of the child 1,022 0.451 0.445 0.410 0.469 0.930 0.297 0.763 0.569 0.762 0.334
Health care
Institutional delivery 1,016 0.353 0.468 0.327 0.437 0.064 0.517 0.112 0.024 0.654 0.038
Health insurance 1,016 0.347 0.382 0.331 0.448 0.660 0.741 0.179 0.548 0.516 0.150
[0.477] [0.488] [0.471] [0.499]
Diarrhea 1,022 0.028 0.018 0.029 0.014 0.494 0.971 0.220 0.508 0.800 0.258
Improved sanitation 1,022 0.085 0.073 0.074 0.028 0.695 0.697 0.018 0.978 0.146 0.107
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 1,022 3.825 3.836 3.865 3.881 0.943 0.747 0.760 0.860 0.834 0.933
[1.188] [1.105] [1.243] [1.190]
Number of meals/day 1,021 2.956 3.227 3.122 3.133 0.070 0.162 0.210 0.487 0.577 0.941
[1.107] [1.037] [1.065] [1.036]
Food scarcity 1,020 0.785 0.798 0.824 0.811 0.776 0.317 0.572 0.593 0.810 0.794
Maternal health knowledge 1,022 0.383 0.427 0.372 0.336 0.365 0.775 0.433 0.278 0.184 0.560
Child eats meat products 1,022 0.510 0.527 0.542 0.524 0.801 0.481 0.840 0.842 0.976 0.820
Child received iron supplements 1,002 0.122 0.185 0.157 0.186 0.185 0.363 0.110 0.610 0.992 0.554
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 1,018 0.136 0.193 0.139 0.183 0.323 0.926 0.268 0.319 0.874 0.240
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 1,022 46.705 48.882 42.279 48.476 0.610 0.111 0.653 0.126 0.937 0.120
[24.201] [25.782] [21.570] [34.340]
Parent attends school meetings 1,019 0.618 0.673 0.616 0.678 0.484 0.974 0.370 0.517 0.947 0.425
Father lives at home 1,022 0.867 0.836 0.913 0.888 0.413 0.036 0.447 0.044 0.216 0.389
Distance of school (min) 1,022 10.834 9.627 10.804 9.462 0.288 0.970 0.121 0.352 0.900 0.197
[6.511] [7.058] [6.618] [6.133]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 147 233.229 168.324 324.926 189.605 0.024 0.029 0.208 0.000 0.504 0.003
[153.259] [102.268] [180.699] [162.414]
Class size 149 27.792 24.912 32.714 30.949 0.249 0.330 0.417 0.123 0.118 0.762
[12.634] [9.805] [24.856] [21.366]
Student teacher ratio 147 33.739 31.515 39.820 35.128 0.218 0.018 0.561 0.001 0.117 0.110
[9.406] [6.807] [11.094] [12.057]
Calories of MDM per child 149 68.331 63.876 69.484 69.282 0.340 0.822 0.846 0.291 0.289 0.971
[21.856] [19.833] [21.267] [23.403]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 149 0.747 0.751 0.782 0.883 0.949 0.612 0.130 0.655 0.145 0.310
[0.264] [0.234] [0.303] [0.502]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report baseline means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed baseline variables.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.35: Baseline Mean Characteristics by Exposure Groups - Sample for Attendance Out-
come
Means [Standard Deviations] p-value of difference
Observations Group Always Early Late Hardly Always-Early Always-Late Always-Hardly Early-Late Early-Hardly Late-Hardly
Panel A. Child level outcome variables
Health outcomes
Hemoglobin (g/dL) 940 11.388 11.368 11.562 11.688 0.930 0.049 0.007 0.390 0.182 0.279
[1.102] [1.306] [1.120] [1.052]
Any anemia 940 0.508 0.488 0.437 0.357 0.803 0.036 0.002 0.542 0.152 0.088
Mild anemia 940 0.219 0.171 0.193 0.135 0.197 0.279 0.056 0.543 0.491 0.179
Moderate/severe anemia 940 0.290 0.317 0.244 0.222 0.734 0.190 0.070 0.368 0.255 0.542
Number of symptoms 961 1.159 0.854 1.013 0.915 0.031 0.258 0.088 0.253 0.682 0.490
[1.114] [0.983] [1.051] [1.027]
Cognitive test outcomes
Block design 938 3.866 3.800 3.771 3.385 0.894 0.668 0.247 0.952 0.494 0.335
[2.158] [2.021] [2.106] [2.327]
Digit span forward 940 4.088 3.987 4.113 4.008 0.577 0.756 0.562 0.491 0.926 0.453
[1.010] [0.907] [0.901] [1.096]
Digit span backward 940 1.245 1.313 1.081 1.085 0.822 0.173 0.417 0.442 0.508 0.984
[1.339] [1.374] [1.306] [1.300]
Progressive matrices 940 4.752 4.638 4.900 4.823 0.788 0.377 0.820 0.550 0.720 0.812
[1.628] [1.759] [1.483] [1.654]
Stroop test 938 5.482 5.706 5.660 4.804 0.644 0.605 0.133 0.924 0.124 0.063
[3.315] [3.496] [3.494] [3.468]
Cognitive score index 936 0.060 0.036 0.052 -0.120 0.927 0.936 0.330 0.951 0.613 0.357
[0.973] [0.938] [0.989] [1.072]
Education outcomes
Math score 939 4.838 5.037 5.333 4.900 0.860 0.335 0.924 0.797 0.911 0.522
[3.811] [3.623] [3.749] [3.835]
Reading score 939 0.881 1.089 1.052 0.962 0.245 0.177 0.711 0.840 0.623 0.686
[1.120] [1.134] [1.179] [1.151]
School attendance 961 0.783 0.861 0.796 0.823 0.008 0.553 0.156 0.012 0.221 0.263
[0.170] [0.100] [0.173] [0.148]
Panel B: Child and household level control variables
Demographics and socioeconomic variables
Muslim 961 0.055 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.017 0.906 0.017 0.144 . 0.142
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 961 0.344 0.341 0.228 0.300 0.984 0.111 0.632 0.395 0.777 0.427
Block 961 1.333 1.415 1.117 1.385 0.677 0.079 0.771 0.122 0.898 0.122
Rural 961 0.988 0.963 0.975 0.962 0.532 0.508 0.371 0.790 0.969 0.690
Family size 961 7.628 7.171 7.845 7.600 0.201 0.475 0.914 0.082 0.227 0.407
[3.289] [2.423] [3.500] [3.089]
Father’s years of schooling 948 5.131 5.775 5.535 5.388 0.489 0.438 0.705 0.795 0.707 0.825
[4.735] [4.776] [4.885] [4.671]
Mother’s years of schooling 959 1.383 1.561 1.939 1.308 0.558 0.057 0.825 0.241 0.498 0.082
[2.797] [3.123] [3.278] [2.833]
Asset index 938 -0.089 -0.004 -0.015 -0.063 0.457 0.485 0.846 0.927 0.690 0.732
[0.923] [0.911] [0.910] [0.872]
Gender of the child 957 0.447 0.366 0.403 0.453 0.322 0.271 0.926 0.651 0.390 0.474
Health care
Institutional delivery 955 0.334 0.346 0.316 0.415 0.831 0.681 0.147 0.607 0.306 0.094
Health insurance 956 0.360 0.366 0.357 0.438 0.959 0.942 0.397 0.932 0.587 0.395
[0.481] [0.485] [0.480] [0.498]
Diarrhea 961 0.030 0.012 0.025 0.008 0.223 0.668 0.029 0.398 0.762 0.121
Improved sanitation 961 0.085 0.037 0.082 0.008 0.064 0.913 0.001 0.072 0.098 0.001
Nutrition
Diet diversity score 961 3.829 3.829 3.927 3.785 0.999 0.424 0.827 0.593 0.857 0.477
[1.172] [1.109] [1.194] [1.114]
Number of meals/day 960 2.998 3.268 3.057 3.115 0.091 0.597 0.406 0.203 0.416 0.693
[1.060] [0.969] [1.051] [1.024]
Food scarcity 958 0.806 0.802 0.800 0.808 0.955 0.888 0.968 0.964 0.937 0.884
Maternal health knowledge 961 0.381 0.390 0.358 0.315 0.852 0.528 0.359 0.524 0.356 0.563
Child eats meat products 961 0.522 0.549 0.547 0.500 0.751 0.562 0.807 0.988 0.679 0.604
Child received iron supplements 939 0.120 0.163 0.179 0.183 0.349 0.196 0.147 0.777 0.717 0.942
Environment of care
Parents help with homework 956 0.125 0.188 0.166 0.132 0.287 0.226 0.858 0.698 0.362 0.349
Parent’s time spent for physical child care 961 46.727 47.659 40.636 48.669 0.875 0.035 0.730 0.217 0.893 0.135
[25.968] [27.645] [17.268] [34.403]
Parent attends school meetings 959 0.630 0.659 0.643 0.677 0.786 0.847 0.525 0.888 0.871 0.670
Father lives at home 961 0.857 0.841 0.886 0.854 0.718 0.255 0.929 0.332 0.808 0.391
Distance of school (min) 961 10.610 8.329 11.108 9.154 0.046 0.538 0.119 0.030 0.536 0.071
[6.545] [4.982] [6.716] [5.218]
Panel C: School level covariates
Number of children enrolled in school 95 256.675 126.667 324.926 123.250 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.831 0.000
[156.874] [43.423] [180.699] [38.968]
Class size 96 30.225 21.500 32.714 26.875 0.003 0.629 0.388 0.034 0.168 0.313
[13.302] [6.667] [24.856] [13.033]
Student teacher ratio 95 34.946 29.574 39.820 34.850 0.029 0.069 0.977 0.001 0.139 0.176
[9.873] [6.376] [11.094] [11.698]
Calories of MDM per child 96 70.322 64.373 69.484 68.882 0.388 0.877 0.840 0.476 0.603 0.935
[22.670] [20.607] [21.267] [24.742]
Amount of iron in MDM per child (mg) 96 0.748 0.713 0.782 0.915 0.621 0.626 0.241 0.399 0.187 0.373
[0.259] [0.203] [0.303] [0.547]
Joint orthogonalitiy F-test
F-statistics 2.402 1.352 1.962 1.352 2.526 3.705 2.998 10.376 4.137 11.377
p-Value [0.000] [0.097] [0.002] [0.097] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Columns 2-5 report baseline means by intervention arm for child (Panel A and B) and schools (Panel C) in the study analysis. Columns
6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression
of respective treatment dummies on all displayed baseline variables.
Source: Own Data.
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3.4 Lee Bounds for Outcomes
3.4.1 Health Outcomes
Table C.39: Hemoglobin (g/dL)
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always 0.204 -0.035 0.528 0.224 0.052 0.449
[0.088] [0.108] [0.107] [0.082] [0.106] [0.104]
Observations 702 702
Group Early 0.147 0.120 0.248 0.125 0.153 0.183
[0.109] [0.173] [0.174] [0.108] [0.174] [0.169]
Observations 335 335
Group Late 0.226 0.076 0.463 0.221 0.098 0.411
[0.088] [0.116] [0.111] [0.085] [0.112] [0.108]
Observations 514 514
Baseline mean 11.945 11.945
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
Table C.40: Any anemia
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.054 -0.170 -0.026 -0.058 -0.143 -0.036
[0.034] [0.054] [0.040] [0.033] [0.049] [0.041]
Observations 702 702
Group Early -0.033 -0.070 -0.039 -0.035 -0.042 -0.042
[0.045] [0.051] [0.065] [0.045] [0.050] [0.060]
Observations 335 335
Group Late -0.041 -0.128 -0.026 -0.042 -0.115 -0.033
[0.037] [0.056] [0.043] [0.038] [0.052] [0.043]
Observations 514 514
Baseline mean 0.287 0.287
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.41: Mild anemia
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.021 -0.147 -0.003 -0.021 -0.111 -0.008
[0.028] [0.052] [0.032] [0.029] [0.042] [0.032]
Observations 702 702
Group Early 0.004 -0.018 0.013 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006
[0.038] [0.042] [0.065] [0.039] [0.041] [0.060]
Observations 335 335
Group Late 0.012 -0.077 0.025 0.013 -0.061 0.022
[0.032] [0.054] [0.036] [0.033] [0.047] [0.036]
Observations 514 514
Baseline mean 0.138 0.138
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
Table C.42: Moderate/severe anemia
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.033 -0.119 -0.023 -0.033 -0.089 -0.028
[0.023] [0.023] [0.028] [0.023] [0.027] [0.028]
Observations 702 702
Group Early -0.037 -0.052 -0.022 -0.036 -0.041 -0.044
[0.031] [0.033] [0.063] [0.032] [0.034] [0.052]
Observations 335 335
Group Late -0.053 -0.119 -0.051 -0.054 -0.090 -0.054
[0.024] [0.023] [0.028] [0.024] [0.028] [0.028]
Observations 514 514
Baseline mean 0.148 0.148
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
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3.4.2 Cognition Outcomes
Table C.43: Block design
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.087 -0.092 0.163 -0.102 -0.267 0.068
[0.057] [0.076] [0.065] [0.054] [0.083] [0.082]
Observations 600 600
Group Early 0.058 0.033 0.051 -0.001 0.016 -0.061
[0.072] [0.089] [0.132] [0.068] [0.098] [0.108]
Observations 253 253
Group Late -0.124 -0.586 0.092 -0.138 -0.421 0.060
[0.058] [0.080] [0.065] [0.057] [0.080] [0.071]
Observations 455 455
Baseline mean 4.729 4.729
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
Table C.44: Digit span forward
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.050 -0.366 0.315 0.022 -0.215 0.281
[0.079] [0.093] [0.102] [0.070] [0.118] [0.108]
Observations 600 600
Group Early 0.084 -0.001 0.070 -0.005 0.034 0.003
[0.102] [0.158] [0.177] [0.094] [0.188] [0.287]
Observations 253 253
Group Late 0.052 -0.376 0.464 -0.001 -0.293 0.324
[0.088] [0.099] [0.118] [0.076] [0.114] [0.120]
Observations 455 455
Baseline mean 4.605 4.605
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.45: Digit span backward
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.046 -1.063 0.273 -0.086 -0.945 0.135
[0.067] [0.108] [0.059] [0.065] [0.110] [0.071]
Observations 600 600
Group Early 0.056 0.032 0.065 -0.038 0.012 -0.179
[0.078] [0.156] [0.216] [0.075] [0.136] [0.168]
Observations 253 253
Group Late -0.054 -1.102 0.281 -0.122 -0.983 0.150
[0.072] [0.122] [0.061] [0.070] [0.132] [0.079]
Observations 455 455
Baseline mean 1.835 1.835
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
Table C.46: Progressive matrices
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.095 -0.698 0.346 -0.072 -0.584 0.255
[0.098] [0.131] [0.120] [0.100] [0.134] [0.130]
Observations 600 600
Group Early 0.121 0.047 0.131 0.102 0.166 0.051
[0.137] [0.341] [0.264] [0.140] [0.312] [0.248]
Observations 253 253
Group Late -0.099 -0.661 0.238 -0.123 -0.645 0.191
[0.097] [0.109] [0.121] [0.099] [0.127] [0.129]
Observations 455 455
Baseline mean 5.126 5.126
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.47: Stroop test
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.154 -0.554 0.324 -0.181 -0.525 0.182
[0.098] [0.133] [0.135] [0.100] [0.138] [0.137]
Observations 600 600
Group Early -0.056 -0.104 0.101 -0.076 -0.049 0.114
[0.133] [0.205] [0.222] [0.137] [0.199] [0.208]
Observations 253 253
Group Late -0.086 -0.715 0.457 -0.127 -0.554 0.303
[0.102] [0.133] [0.136] [0.105] [0.138] [0.141]
Observations 455 455
Baseline mean 6.966 6.966
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
Table C.48: Cognitive score index
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.159 -0.567 0.318 -0.194 -0.452 0.148
[0.089] [0.105] [0.105] [0.071] [0.101] [0.105]
Observations 600 600
Group Early 0.107 0.047 0.105 -0.117 -0.142 -0.169
[0.109] [0.220] [0.239] [0.087] [0.193] [0.183]
Observations 253 253
Group Late -0.145 -0.609 0.282 -0.246 -0.515 0.090
[0.088] [0.100] [0.109] [0.070] [0.102] [0.106]
Observations 455 455
Baseline mean 0.081 0.081
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the terciles of
the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors
in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
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3.4.3 Education Outcomes
Table C.49: Math score
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.056 -0.050 0.622 -0.149 -0.154 0.194
[0.113] [0.128] [0.121] [0.084] [0.135] [0.147]
Observations 600 600
Group Early 0.212 0.143 0.186 -0.213 -0.070 -0.202
[0.140] [0.152] [0.287] [0.102] [0.184] [0.229]
Observations 253 253
Group Late -0.043 -0.084 0.593 -0.163 -0.380 0.274
[0.114] [0.136] [0.124] [0.083] [0.140] [0.139]
Observations 455 455
Baseline mean 9.137 9.137
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs dummies
indicating values below and above the median of the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata
command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
Table C.50: Reading score
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always -0.094 -0.103 0.730
[0.123] [0.144] [0.194]
Observations 600
Group Early 0.185 0.129 0.166
[0.155] [0.179] [0.280]
Observations 253
Group Late -0.090 -0.132 0.673
[0.124] [0.153] [0.152]
Observations 455
Baseline mean 1.764 1.764
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs dummies
indicating values below and above the median of the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata
command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.51: School attendance
I II
OLS Lower Upper ANCOVA Lower Upper
Group Always 0.042 -0.053 0.178 0.075 -0.034 0.185
[0.023] [0.028] [0.025] [0.021] [0.028] [0.024]
Observations 563 563
Group Early -0.010 -0.079 0.040 -0.021 -0.064 -0.005
[0.028] [0.039] [0.040] [0.026] [0.050] [0.040]
Observations 212 212
Group Late 0.078 -0.051 0.225 0.118 -0.015 0.234
[0.023] [0.030] [0.023] [0.022] [0.029] [0.022]
Observations 446 446
Baseline mean 0.751 0.751
Notes: The coefficient of each group has been estimated separately, relative to Hardly using OLS or ANCOVA. In model I, there are no
control variables and the bounds are classic Lee (2009) bounds. Model II includes the baseline outcome as control and employs the quartiles
of the baseline outcome to tighten the Lee bounds.The estimation of Lee bounds uses the Stata command by Tauchmann (2014).Standard
errors in parenthesis.
Source: Own Data.
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3.5 Multiple Hypothesis Corrected Sharpened q-Values
3.5.1 Health Outcomes
Table C.52: Multiple Hypothesis Corrected Sharpened q-Values for Inverse Probability
Weighted Effects on Hemoglobin and Anemia
Health Outcomes
Outcomes Hemoglobin Any Anemia Mild Anemia
Moderate
Anemia
III III III III
Group Always 0.260* -0.032 -0.005 -0.018
[0.110] [0.046] [0.035] [0.027]
(0.019) (0.493) (0.895) (0.493)
Group Early 0.260* -0.065 0.010 -0.086*
[0.126] [0.049] [0.038] [0.034]
(0.040) (0.192) (0.787) (0.013)
Group Late 0.202 -0.019 0.030 -0.042
[0.130] [0.052] [0.040] [0.028]
(0.124) (0.717) (0.455) (0.141)
Baseline outcome 0.441*** 0.236*** 0.082* 0.157***
[0.035] [0.035] [0.039] [0.037]
Mean of Outcome of Group Hardly 12.134 0.280 0.161 0.119
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011
Notes: Any anemia is defined as a hemoglobin value < 11.5 g/dL, mild anemia is defined as a hemoglobin value ≥ 11 & < 11.5 g/dL,
moderate/severe anemia is defined as a hemoglobin value < 11 g/dL. Standard errors are clustered by PS-MS cluster and appear in brackets.
Multiple hypothesis corrected sharpened q-values are in square brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Source: Own Data.
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3.5.2 Cognition Outcomes
Table C.53: Multiple Hypothesis Corrected Sharpened q-Values for Inverse Probability
Weighted Effects on Cognition Outcomes
Cognition Outcomes
Outcomes Block design
Digit Span
Forward
Digit Span
Backward
Progressive
Matrices
Stroop Tests
Cognitive
Index
III III III III III III
Group Always -0.092 -0.012 -0.069 -0.195 -0.041 -0.192*
[0.069] [0.099] [0.074] [0.116] [0.135] [0.095]
(0.397) (0.820) (0.533) (0.373) (0.820) (0.373)
Group Early 0.012 -0.163 -0.062 0.047 0.011 -0.175
[0.094] [0.108] [0.088] [0.178] [0.146] [0.110]
(1.000) (0.670) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.670)
Group Late -0.046 -0.051 -0.056 -0.151 -0.111 -0.137
[0.073] [0.104] [0.092] [0.128] [0.145] [0.098]
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Baseline outcome 0.257*** 0.410*** 0.218*** 0.300*** 0.151*** 0.549***
[0.020] [0.032] [0.026] [0.044] [0.041] [0.030]
Mean of Outcome of Group Hardly 6.699 4.636 2.958 5.965 6.503 0.111
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 854 854 854 854 854 854
Notes: Any anemia is defined as a hemoglobin value < 11.5 g/dL, mild anemia is defined as a hemoglobin value ≥ 11 & < 11.5 g/dL,
moderate/severe anemia is defined as a hemoglobin value < 11 g/dL. Standard errors are clustered by PS-MS cluster and appear in brackets.
Multiple hypothesis corrected sharpened q-values are in round brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Source: Own Data.
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3.5.3 Education Outcomes
Table C.54: Multiple Hypothesis Corrected Sharpened q-Values for Inverse Probability
Weighted Effects on Education Outcomes
Education Outcomes
Outcomes Math Reading
School
Attendance
III III III
Group Always -0.087 -0.038 0.042
[0.102] [0.124] [0.036]
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Group Early -0.098 -0.128 -0.051
[0.152] [0.137] [0.050]
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Group Late -0.187 -0.158 0.086*
[0.116] [0.139] [0.043]
(0.165) (0.192) (0.165)
Baseline outcome 0.670*** 0.631*** 0.382***
[0.038] [0.029] [0.073]
Mean of Outcome of Group Hardly 12.594 2.853 0.590
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 854 854 763
Notes: Any anemia is defined as a hemoglobin value < 11.5 g/dL, mild anemia is defined as a hemoglobin value ≥ 11 & < 11.5 g/dL,
moderate/severe anemia is defined as a hemoglobin value < 11 g/dL. Standard errors are clustered by PS-MS cluster and appear in brackets.
Multiple hypothesis corrected sharpened q-values are in round brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Source: Own Data.
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3.6 Ceiling Effects
Figure C.4: Frequency of Math Score of School Children by Survey Wave
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Notes: The red lines mark the increasing median over the three waves (4 at wave I, 9 at
 wave II, and 15 at wave III).
Source: Own Data.
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Figure C.5: Frequency of Reading Score of School Children by Survey Wave
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4 Heterogeneous Effects
4.1 Attendance
4.1.1 Health Outcomes
Figure C.6: Marginal Affects for Hemoglobin by Level of Attendance
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Figure C.7: Marginal Affects for Any Anemia by Level of Attendance
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Figure C.8: Marginal Affects for Mild Anemia by Level of Attendance
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Figure C.9: Marginal Affects for Moderate and Severe Anemia by Level of Attendance
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4.1.2 Cognition Outcomes
Figure C.10: Marginal Affects for Block Design by Level of Attendance
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Figure C.11: Marginal Affects for Digit Span Forward by Level of Attendance
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Figure C.12: Marginal Affects for Digit Span Backward by Level of Attendance
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Figure C.13: Marginal Affects for Raven’s Progressive Matrices by Level of Attendance
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Figure C.14: Marginal Affects for Stroop Test by Level of Attendance
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Figure C.15: Marginal Affects for Cognition Index by Level of Attendance
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4.1.3 Education Outcomes
Figure C.16: Marginal Affects for Math Score by Level of Attendance
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Figure C.17: Marginal Affects for Reading Score by Level of Attendance
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Table C.59: Heterogeneous Effects by Attendance Terciles on Education and Attendance
Education Outcomes
Outcomes Math Reading
Bottom
Ter-
cile
Middle
Ter-
cile
Top
Ter-
cile
Bottom
Ter-
cile
Middle
Ter-
cile
Top
Ter-
cile
Group Always -0.896 0.326 0.502 0.147 0.233 -0.240
[1.058] [0.876] [0.703] [0.239] [0.252] [0.375]
Group Early 0.386 0.555 0.459 0.002 0.051 -0.070
[1.233] [0.930] [0.688] [0.274] [0.264] [0.335]
Group Late -1.174 -0.236 -0.164 -0.142 -0.034 -0.227
[0.940] [0.876] [0.830] [0.202] [0.268] [0.425]
Baseline outcome 2.736*** 2.345*** 2.522*** 0.839*** 0.711*** 0.568***
[0.241] [0.248] [0.241] [0.068] [0.046] [0.060]
Mean of Outcome of Group Hardly 11.500 12.679 13.347 2.211 2.964 3.224
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: Group Always = Early 0.257 0.771 0.930 0.595 0.416 0.482
P-value: Group Always =Late 0.683 0.293 0.169 0.109 0.148 0.949
P-value: Group Early = Late 0.189 0.358 0.314 0.603 0.735 0.586
Observations 236 293 246 236 293 246
Notes: All outcomes, except attendance, are normalized with reference to the baseline mean. For the estimates we use a balanced sample for
education outcomes except for attendance, which is based on its own balanced sample. Standard errors are clustered by PS-MS cluster and
appear in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Own Data.
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Table C.60: Heterogeneous Effects by High Attendance Groups on Education and Attendance
Education Outcomes
Outcomes Math Reading
60 % 70 % 80 % 60 % 70 % 80 %
Group Always -0.071 -0.223 0.501 -0.007 -0.304 -0.270
[0.493] [0.547] [0.665] [0.175] [0.221] [0.366]
Group Early -0.374 -0.568 0.265 -0.204 -0.270 -0.036
[0.661] [0.809] [0.677] [0.189] [0.232] [0.338]
Group Late -0.607 -0.856 -0.309 -0.155 -0.341 -0.319
[0.549] [0.680] [0.806] [0.199] [0.261] [0.405]
Baseline outcome 2.387*** 2.408*** 2.506*** 0.666*** 0.628*** 0.567***
[0.169] [0.207] [0.238] [0.038] [0.044] [0.063]
Mean of Outcome of Group Hardly 13.000 13.119 13.563 3.035 3.202 3.292
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: Group Always = Early 0.621 0.631 0.658 0.234 0.863 0.360
P-value: Group Always =Late 0.123 0.180 0.096 0.273 0.829 0.809
P-value: Group Early = Late 0.718 0.714 0.377 0.787 0.746 0.334
Observations 638 458 238 638 458 238
Notes: All outcomes, except attendance, are normalized with reference to the baseline mean. For the estimates we use a balanced sample for
education outcomes except for attendance, which is based on its own balanced sample. Standard errors are clustered by PS-MS cluster and
appear in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Own Data.
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D | Essay 3
1 Comparison Believed and Measured Probabilities of Com-
petitors
Table D.1: Mean Comparison of Believed and Measured Values by Number of Solved Task for
Competing Child Without Known Gender
Number of
Solved Tasks
Observations Believed
mean [sd]
Measured
mean [sd]
t-test
p-value
Wilcoxon
p-value
Sign test
p-value
0 92 0.079 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.087] [0.047]
1 92 0.137 0.155 0.158 0.114 0.208
[0.102] [0.078]
2 92 0.163 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.147] [0.095]
3 92 0.138 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.001
[0.092] [0.124]
4 92 0.153 0.164 0.439 0.533 0.602
[0.094] [0.107]
5 92 0.145 0.143 0.908 0.347 0.246
[0.127] [0.068]
6 92 0.185 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.182] [0.078]
Notes: All tests are two-tailed. The abbreviation sd stands for standard deviation.
Source: Own Data.
342
Table D.2: Mean Comparison of Believed and Measured Values by Number of Solved Task for
Competing Girl
Number of
Solved Tasks
Observations Believed
mean [sd]
Measured
mean [sd]
t-test
p-value
Wilcoxon
p-value
Sign test
p-value
0 83 0.094 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.105] [0.050]
1 83 0.137 0.119 0.157 0.122 0.910
[0.079] [0.097]
2 83 0.141 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.086] [0.115]
3 83 0.169 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.092] [0.104]
4 83 0.161 0.217 0.003 0.004 0.075
[0.093] [0.144]
5 83 0.153 0.144 0.512 0.693 0.822
[0.105] [0.095]
6 83 0.145 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.114] [0.066]
Notes: All tests are two-tailed. The abbreviation sd stands for standard deviation.
Source: Own Data.
Table D.3: Mean Comparison of Believed and Measured Values by Number of Solved Task for
Competing Boy
Number of
Solved Tasks
Observations Believed
mean [sd]
Measured
mean [sd]
t-test
p-value
Wilcoxon
p-value
Sign test
p-value
0 91 0.089 0.036 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.116] [0.082]
1 91 0.120 0.171 0.018 0.066 0.434
[0.088] [0.186]
2 91 0.143 0.144 0.912 0.619 0.668
[0.087] [0.083]
3 91 0.158 0.203 0.034 0.061 0.050
[0.127] [0.158]
4 91 0.159 0.171 0.533 0.657 1.000
[0.112] [0.150]
5 91 0.147 0.199 0.014 0.040 1.000
[0.120] [0.165]
6 91 0.184 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.163] [0.106]
Notes: All tests are two-tailed. The abbreviation sd stands for standard deviation.
Source: Own Data.
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2 Robustness Checks: Regressions
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